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Film moves audiences like no other medium; both documentaries 
and feature films are especially remarkable for their ability to 
influence viewers. In Why We Fought: America’s Wars in Film and 
History, editors Peter C. Rollins and John E. O’Connor explore 
the complexities of war films, describing the ways in which such 
productions interpret history and illuminate American values, 
politics, and culture. 
This comprehensive volume covers representations of war in film 
from the American Revolution to today’s Global War on Terror. 
The contributors examine iconic battle films such as The Big 
Parade (1925), All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), From Here 
to Eternity (1953), and Platoon (1986), considering them as 
historical artifacts. The authors explain how film shapes our cultural 
understanding of military conflicts, analyzing the depiction of war on 
television programs, through news media outlets, and in fictional and 
factual texts.
With several essays examining the events of September 11, 2001, 
and their aftermath, the book has a timely relevance concerning 
the country’s current military conflicts. Jeffrey Chown examines 
controversial documentary films about the Iraq War, while Stacy 
Takacs considers Jessica Lynch and American gender issues in 
a post-9/11 world, and James Kendrick explores the political 
messages and aesthetic implications of United 93.
From filmmakers who reshaped our understanding of the history 
of the Alamo, to Ken Burns’s popular series on the Civil War, to 
the uses of film and media in understanding the Vietnam conflict, 
Why We Fought offers a balanced outlook—one of the book’s 
editors was a combat officer in the United States Marine Corps, 
the other an antiwar activist—on the conflicts that have become 
touchstones of American history.
As Air Force veteran and film scholar Robert Fyne notes in the 
foreword, American war films mirror the nation’s past and offer 
tangible evidence of the ways millions of Americans have become 
devoted, as was General MacArthur, to “duty, honor, and country.” 
Why We Fought chronicles how, for more than half a century, war 
films have shaped our nation’s consciousness.
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FOREWORD
Robert Fyne
American audiences have always enjoyed flag-waving war movies. They cheered 
when U.S. forces ran up San Juan Hill in the silent short Tearing Down the Span-
ish Flag (1898), hooted when Union troops attacked Confederate forces in The 
Birth of a Nation (1915), and whistled when Charlie Chaplin single-handedly 
captured the kaiser in Shoulder Arms (1918).
When the industry moved to balmy Southern California, the Hollywood 
moving picture became the country’s most popular form of entertainment. 
Why wouldn’t it? Using elaborate sound equipment, sophisticated sets, well-
known writers, and established actors, these photodramas radiated with appeal. 
But the war film caught the nation’s particular attention. With their strong 
patriotic messages, frontal attacks, and hand-to-hand fighting, these titles 
highlighted important victories and recalled glorious moments from recent 
history. Soon they also became instruments of learning. Moviegoers came to 
better understand the reasons for past confrontations and comprehend how 
battles were fought and won.
Always in favor, this genre—despite its ups and downs, changing ide-
ologies, and blatant revisionism—appealed to young men yearning for the 
adventures they had never realized or, conversely, to U.S. veterans recalling 
moments of triumph. Why not? Isn’t the motion picture industry called the 
dream factory?
Often criticized and frequently praised, Hollywood’s war dramas offered 
moving evidence that the republic would prevail. When the farmers of the 
Mohawk Valley were attacked, Henry Fonda stepped forward. Remember 
Audie Murphy’s foray into the Confederate lines? And don’t forget Gary 
Cooper, who captured scores of Germans in the Great War. Give Spencer 
Tracy some credit too. What about his Tokyo bombing raid? Say a prayer for 
William Holden, whose Korean War death validated America’s anticommunist 
determination. Stand up and cheer for Mel Gibson, who brought his men 
home from Vietnam.
With all its glories and tragedies, its triumphs and mistakes, the Hollywood 
war film remains a prominent fixture in the nation’s moviegoing experience. 
In his Born on the Fourth of July memoir, Ron Kovic admits that, as an impres-
sionable teenager, watching John Wayne blasting Japanese pillboxes in Sands of 
Iwo Jima inspired him to join the Marine Corps and volunteer for action. One 
can only speculate how many other young men were similarly influenced by 
combat motion pictures. For a broader public, these feature films also instill 
pride, inspiration, loyalty, and respect; they foster an enduring sense of patrio-
tism and provide humble reminders of the high cost of freedom. Not only do 
these screenplays mirror a nation’s past, but they also offer tangible evidence of 
the ways millions of Americans have become devoted, as was General Douglas 
MacArthur, to “duty, honor, and country.”
xii / Robert Fyne
Deborah Carmichael of Film & History was regularly involved in bringing this 
project to completion and deserves the highest praise for her professionalism. 
Her diligence on behalf of the 2005 conference “War in Film & History,” from 
which these chapters emerged, assured a strong start for this project. (See 
conference information at www.uwosh.edu/filmandhistory/.)
Debbie Olson was a diligent reader of manuscripts, taking up the task 
when the editors found themselves too close to the materials.
Leslie Fife contributed document design skills to shape the final manuscript 
into a usable text. Everyone in the popular culture movement owes a debt of 
gratitude to this conscientious and diligent colleague, especially in her role as 
program chair for the national meetings of the Popular Culture Association 
and the American Culture Association.
Susan Rollins provided fruit snacks and offered Internet advice.
The editors are grateful to Paul Fleming for his knowledge of the military 
and its representation in documentary and feature film media.
As with our six previous books, most of the illustrations contained herein 
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INTRODUCTION
John E. O’Connor and Peter C. Rollins
Military conflicts have influenced American society and reshaped the lives of 
Americans in complex and subtle ways. Although public documents, legislative 
debates, and battlefield statistics may be the best sources for understanding 
some of the more traditional historical issues such as war aims, strategies, and 
logistical successes and failures, evidence from popular culture may show more 
clearly how wars can liberate and also corrupt nations morally, just as they can 
bankrupt them financially. On a more profound level, it can help us see how 
nations can be born and—like soldiers at the front—die in wars. Moreover, 
what Carl von Clausewitz describes as “the continuation of diplomacy by other 
means” (6) also involves the continuation of all sorts of other human concerns 
and interrelationships under pressures induced by war. Why We Fought: America’s 
Wars in Film and History explores how motion pictures have influenced, re-
flected, and interpreted the American experience of war.
War, like other critical life situations, really does bring out the best and 
the worst in people. And the exigencies of war provide defining moments in 
people’s lives. These universal principles were identified in the literature of 
the ancients and still surface in today’s headlines. On an individual level, war 
places people in frightening situations they must face on their own, yet it also 
lays the foundation for friendships and support networks stronger than any 
other. Subtle yet powerful evidence of such relationships is found in the letters 
written home by members of the armed forces and in the images created by 
battlefield artists—as well as in popular films (Chenoweth).
Unfortunately, war encourages soldiers (and civilians) to dehumanize and 
demonize their enemies to make them easier to eliminate, but ironically, when 
warriors on opposing sides of a conflict are faced with similarly perilous situa-
tions, it initiates the preconditions for comradeship that few noncombatants 
can comprehend. Surely brothers in arms, even allied soldiers of different na-
2 / John E. O’Connor and Peter C. Rollins
tional backgrounds, are wont to forget the prejudices they might have harbored 
before putting on the uniform and find, to their surprise, a fellowship where 
they least expected it. For example, the famous “Christmas exchange” on the 
battlefields of France (25 December 1914) is remembered for such a mutuality 
between armies engaged in deadly conflict—before and after the event. And 
if, on the battlefield, denying the existence of any God seems too absolute, 
there are surely very few atheists in foxholes. We have seen in letters, poetry, 
and video that the daily confrontation with mortality—in the trenches of World 
War I, on the landing beaches in the Pacific during World War II, out on patrol 
in Vietnam, or after an improvised explosive device incident in Iraq—can strip 
away superficial concerns, revealing human beings’ stark need for God.
Some have argued that literature has been particularly successful in elu-
cidating such perennial themes, but motion pictures have sometimes been 
even more poignant. Consider Erich Maria Remarque’s novel All Quiet on 
the Western Front (1929) or Ambrose Bierce’s short story “An Occurrence at 
Owl Creek Bridge” (1874). In both cases, it can be argued that the cinematic 
adaptations are even more forceful than the works of literature from which 
they were adapted. The first is a 1930 feature film spelling out the horrors 
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During America’s wars, public art—which includes motion pictures—strives to foster 
national cohesion.
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of trench warfare in World War I from the perspective of youthful members 
of the German infantry (see chapter 8). The second is a very famous, short 
French film, La rivière du hibou (1962), about the experience of a Civil War–era 
Alabama farmer hanged on a bridge by Union soldiers and the desperate—yet 
futile—fantasies of survival that may have gone through his mind at the split 
second of his execution. There is an interesting contrast here to yet another 
war film that enhances its dramatic effect by drawing out time, The Longest Day 
(1962), which focuses on the first twenty-four hours of the 1944 Allied landing 
at Normandy, chronicling the critical period for both the invading Allies and 
the German defenders (see chapter 14).
Films about war often highlight cosmic ironies: for example, the feature 
film The Victors (1963) portrays a group of American GIs in World War II France 
who do not appear particularly victorious; indeed, they are the pathetic victims 
of an unfeeling command hierarchy—in this case, the U.S. Army, which decided 
The motion picture 
version of All Quiet on 
the Western Front reached 
the world with its antiwar 
message.Li
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that, as late as January 1945, executions for cowardice were still appropriate. 
In addition to political documentaries, feature films and television programs 
have questioned the wisdom of war. Some use black humor to satirize the very 
idea of war in the nuclear age, such as Dr. Strangelove; or, How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), a classic that, as the years go by, seems to 
become more outrageously entertaining. Films such as Mr. Roberts (1955) and 
M*A*S*H (1970) create humorous situations even in the midst of suffering. 
Some Hollywood warriors have been devoted to keeping themselves completely 
out of danger, such as Lieutenant Commander Charles Madison ( James Gar-
ner) in The Americanization of Emily (1964), who does everything possible to keep 
himself safe in England rather than become a D-day statistic. And then there 
is Captain Yossarian (Alan Arkin) in the Mike Nichols adaptation of Joseph 
Heller’s memorable Catch-22 (1970), a World War II story that never would 
have cleared the Office of War Information during the conflict. A comic twist 
occurs in Hail the Conquering Hero (1944), in which Eddie Bracken, playing an 
American common man with the unlikely but unquestionably patriotic name 
Woodrow Lafayette Pershing Truesmith, is mistakenly given a combat hero’s 
welcome on his return home, although, through no fault of his own, he was 
declared physically unfit and never saw service at all.
Why We Fought takes on more than a score of period feature films and some 
major documentaries along the lines of film scholarship developed over the 
last thirty years. Since the nineteenth century’s professionalization of historical 
scholarship, most people’s image of historical research has involved a seques-
tered university professor huddled over a dusty box of papers or squinting into 
a microfilm reader. In the public mind, at least, the more distant the events 
and the more explicit and more traditional the documentation, the more 
acceptable the interpretation. Yet, looking back from our own highly visual 
era, we notice that the oldest evidence of human experience is not in written 
manuscripts at all but in the iconic forms of cave paintings and physical artifacts 
left behind by ancient civilizations.
As scholars in the last three decades have broadened the types of questions 
that interest them—to include what is now called “popular memory”—they have 
turned to different kinds of evidence, such as motion pictures and television. 
Like the archaeologists studying images on cave walls, the work of popular 
culture scholars involves a different language and demands a different sensibil-
ity. They ask, Who were the filmmakers, and what influenced them to adopt 
the approaches they took? Who were the audiences for whom these films were 
originally produced, and what contemporary frames of reference influenced 
how those audiences made sense of the films they saw?
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After first studying a film’s content, considering the accuracy of the infor-
mation presented and the factors that may have influenced its production and 
reception, the second phase of historical analysis demands studying the film 
in the context of one or more of the four following frameworks for historical 
analysis, established not by the film itself but by the type of historical inquiry 
being undertaken (O’Connor):
Framework 1. A moving-image document as a representation of history. Does 
it tell a historical story? This might be any documentary or feature film 
that interprets a historical period or event.
Framework 2. A moving-image document as evidence for social or cultural his-
tory. Does a film made for a mass audience evoke the social or cultural 
values of the audience to which the producers were trying to appeal?
Framework 3. A moving-image document as evidence for historical fact. Does 
the film provide actual footage of a historical event as it took place in 
front of the camera?
Frank Capra: American 
spokesman.
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Framework 4. A moving-image document as evidence for the history of film and 
television. Although historians’ talents have been particularly valuable in 
urging the study of the paper trail (such as the studio archives or papers 
of the principals in the production process), there are also specific ques-
tions to be asked about the films themselves, dealing, for example, with 
the development of technology and the evolution of film style.
In relation to each of these four analytical frameworks, the information 
learned about content, production, and reception might have different mean-
ings. A wartime propaganda documentary such as one of the films in Frank 
Capra’s Why We Fight series, for example, would hardly be reliable as unbiased 
reporting from the front, but it could certainly be productive for the study of 
social and cultural values: the camera angles and characterizations chosen, 
even the manipulation of images (editing), offer insight into the way the film-
maker hoped to influence viewers. Knowing the role that government played in 
censoring newsreels, one would be loath to use such films as factual records of 
actual battlefield events, but when the records of the censoring agency, or even 
the edited scripts of the newsreel commentaries, are available, intriguing work 
can be done on the history of public information—and misinformation.
Most war films are representations of history—they tell a historical story 
about war or about individuals or groups of people, affirming, in the process, 
values, morals, and identities. Sometimes such films deal with recent history, 
such as the battle drama Wake Island (released 1 September 1942), a fact-based 
fictionalized account of U.S. marines valiantly defending a Pacific outpost 
immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. ( Japanese planes at-
tacked Wake Island on 8 December 1941, and the garrison surrendered on 23 
December after killing some seven hundred Japanese adversaries and sinking 
four destroyers.) In life, as well as in the film, Wake Island was a microcosm 
of American determination and teamwork. On other occasions, despite the 
differences in weapons and tactics, producers have reached back into history 
to remark on the commonalities of war throughout the ages. Peter Watkins’s 
Battle of Culloden (1965) contrasts the soldiers of the strictly disciplined and 
well-equipped British army with the poorly armed and discouraged Scots in 
April 1746 during the final Jacobite rising. The film is shocking in the verisi-
militude of its hand-to-hand combat, and it is also thought provoking when one 
considers the different style of combat American soldiers were experiencing 
in 1965 in the jungles and rice paddies of Southeast Asia.
As should be expected, Hollywood films representing past American wars 
have often been influenced by events going on at the time of their produc-
tion. Producers at 20th Century-Fox argued all the way to the top of the studio 
Introduction / 7
hierarchy in the late 1930s that making a film about the American Revolution 
while the Germans were threatening Europe would not compromise Americans’ 
resolve to support Great Britain—as long as the film cast American Loyalists 
and their Indian allies as the enemies, rather than British regulars. The project 
went forward, and John Ford’s Drums Along the Mohawk became a prime release 
of 1939 (see chapter 1).
Similarly, when Warner Bros. sought access to federal lands and cavalry 
horses for They Died With Their Boots On in early 1941, the studio pointed out to 
the War Department that “all possible consideration was given to the construc-
tion of a story which would have the best effect upon public morale in these 
present days of national crisis.” It went on to suggest that “through the life of 
the hero [General Custer, played by Errol Flynn, eulogized for the sake of a 
new war effort], we have endeavored to show the real meaning of . . . what an 
officer is, what his standards and obligations are; what a regiment is and why 
it is something more than six hundred trained men.” The film was scheduled 
for release, the studio observed, “at the moment when thousands of youths are 
being trained for commissions, and when hundreds of new and tradition-less 
units are being formed. If we can inspire these to some appreciation of a great 
The main title was rendered in needlepoint for antique effect.
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8 / John E. O’Connor and Peter C. Rollins
officer and a great regiment in their own service, we shall have accomplished 
our mission” (MacKensie). To be sure, it is unusual to find such forthright 
statements of the motives of the moguls of the motion picture business. After 
all, the mission of the Hollywood studios has more often been oriented toward 
the bottom line than the recruiting line. But there should be no question that, 
thoughtfully approached, film—and its cousin, television—can become a valu-
able tool for understanding the gestalt of historical eras.
THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES:  
REVOLUTION, CONQUEST, AND UNION
The American Revolution
This book opens with the American Revolution (1776–1783). Hollywood has 
made films about America’s wars before Lexington and Concord—struggles in 
which the colonists fought beside the British against the French or the Span-
ish or the Indians allied with one or another of them—but the first conflict 
for which we can posit a national war effort was the War for Independence. 
John E. O’Connor discusses briefly a few of the earliest productions about the 
Revolution dating back to 1911, including the first feature film to deal with 
the subject, D. W. Griffith’s America (1924). After providing this cinematic back- 
ground, O’Connor concentrates on two major films about the Revolutionary 
War produced decades apart. Although Drums Along the Mohawk (1939) and 
The Patriot (2000) both deal with rural farming communities during the eigh-
teenth century rather than the revolutionary centers of Boston, New York, and 
Philadelphia, they both also reflect contemporary concerns—in the first case, 
an impending war with Germany, and in the second case, the recent memory 
of America’s traumatic debacle in Vietnam. Each historical interpretation 
opens a portal into its own time.
The producers of Drums Along the Mohawk at 20th Century-Fox, who hoped 
to profit from the success of Walter Edmunds’s best-selling novel (1936), were 
sensitive about the English market; there were concerns that the film might be 
read as an attack on the Atlantic Alliance. Proponents argued that Edmunds’s 
story would finesse this problem, because the aggression against the colonists 
in the Mohawk Valley was launched by Loyalists and Indians rather than Brit-
ish regulars or Hessians.
Studio heads were also concerned about earning back their investment, 
because the production was so expensive—driven by the costs of extensive set 
construction and shooting on location, not to mention the economics of filming 
in the new, complicated Technicolor process. When requesting assistance from 
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Washington to gain access to locations, they argued that the film would support 
the national interest by helping to prepare the public for the approaching war 
in Europe. The rationale of the producers comes through clearly in the detailed 
interoffice memos in the studio’s extensive archives. Drums Along the Mohawk 
can also be understood in the context of evolving historical scholarship during 
the 1930s, which, in the histories of Samuel Eliot Morrison and Perry Miller, was 
rebounding to a more patriotic view after more than a decade of debunking by 
Charles Beard and such sardonic pundits as H. L. Mencken.
Director Roland Emmerich’s The Patriot was produced under very dif-
ferent conditions. By the end of the twentieth century, the major studios no 
longer dominated the film industry; more and more films, like The Patriot, 
were the outcome of ad hoc collaborations among independent screenwriters, 
producers, and directors. The Patriot reflected both the state of scholarship 
on Revolutionary America and the world situation at the time of the film’s 
production—as had Drums Along the Mohawk some sixty years before. As in the 
earlier film, the protagonist is a backcountry farmer inclined toward colonial 
Benjamin Martin (Mel Gibson) is finally aroused to the colonial cause after his fam-
ily is attacked in The Patriot.
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separation but driven to support the war less by ideology than by personal 
motives—specifically, the callous murder of one of his seven children and the 
destruction of his home by the British. At a time when memories of America’s 
role in Vietnam were still vivid in the public mind, The Patriot reawakened 
smoldering emotions. O’Connor explores both the historiographical and the 
cinematic interpretations.
The Mexican-American War
America’s next war, the War of 1812, has attracted little attention from Hol-
lywood. Films addressing it have focused on a few naval engagements plus 
Andrew Jackson’s heroic leadership against the British during the Battle of New 
Orleans (1815). (See, for example, the two versions of The Buccaneer, made in 
1938 and 1958.) It seems that the nation saw nothing heroic in a war fought 
principally through an embargo, a passive strategy at best and one deeply re-
sented in states dependent on nautical trade. At the Hartford Convention in 
1814, for example, New Englanders suffering from the naval embargo agitated 
for secession from a Union dominated by Virginians.
The next two chapters march forward to consider the defense of the Alamo 
in 1836 and the Mexican-American War of 1846–1848. Although the dramatic 
siege of the Alamo by Santa Anna’s Mexican army was, in fact, part of an ear-
lier war for Texan independence, it marked the onset of a continuing conflict 
between the United States and its southern neighbor. In the end, Texas was 
admitted to the United States in 1845, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 
1848 brought under U.S. control what are now west Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, 
and California. Frank Thompson’s “Reprinting the Legend: The Alamo on 
Film” concentrates on the pivotal 1836 battle for the stronghold (now located 
in downtown San Antonio). For many, the brief—and unsuccessful—defense 
is a symbol of American grit and determination in the tradition of Wake Island. 
Thompson’s role as historical consultant for the most recent treatment of the 
event, The Alamo (2004), adds an intriguing dimension to his discussion. Having 
spent time on the movie set, he has insightful observations, for example, on 
Billy Bob Thornton’s characterization of Davy Crockett. Thompson credits the 
film with seeking to “embrace the emotional truth of the moment [of Crockett’s 
death] while respecting the historical truth,” although he admits that we do 
not know exactly how Crockett died. Thompson himself plays a state legislator 
in one contentious scene of John Lee Hancock’s epic.
The “manifest destiny” extolled by such newspapers as the Democratic 
Review and by southern expansionists exploited the momentum of the Texas 
revolution, of which the Alamo was just one early episode. In 1998 KERA-TV 
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of Dallas, Texas, broadcast a serious, in-depth television history of the Mexican- 
American War—calling the series The U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848) and thereby 
implying the United States’ aggression in the conflict. James Yates engaged in 
original research and found the writers, producers, and directors at KERA very 
cooperative. The war is little remembered in the United States; in contrast, 
la intervención norteamericana is a lively and sensitive issue in Mexico among 
both ordinary citizens and scholars. Funded by the National Endowment for 
the Humanities (NEH), the series was designed for broadcast by the Public 
Broadcasting Service (PBS) and was obliged to consider multiple perspectives. 
In four hours of television, the KERA production team blended narration, 
historical drawings, reenactments, and interviews to bring a distant conflict 
to life with both significant drama and thoughtful interpretation. Yates finds 
the resulting production to be a success for public television and for the cause 
of historical understanding, although he identifies some of the pitfalls of pro-
ducing a visual history for television. His helpful comparison of the PBS series 
and feature films about the Mexican-American War complements the analysis 
provided by Thompson in the previous chapter.
The Civil War
The signal example of writing history on film in the last twenty years is the 
television series The Civil War (1990), an epic produced and directed by Ken 
Burns. Gary R. Edgerton takes on the daunting task of evaluating the sixteen-
hour television series. Rather than adopting a single, dominant interpretation 
of the war, Burns tried “to embrace . . . a variety of viewpoints.” As Edgerton 
explains, Burns accomplished this cinematic goal by weaving together four 
types of scenes: narrative descriptions, emotional chapters, “telegrams” (con-
temporary reactions to or observations about the evolving narrative in the 
words of a variety of individuals, such as Southern diarist Mary Chesnut and 
Northern lawyer George Templeton Strong), and editing clusters (montages 
of corroborating and conflicting observations that create “a collage of multiple 
viewpoints”). In this way, Edgerton believes, Burns bridges the divide between 
popular and professional history—clearly, a significant achievement. The Civil 
War was funded by the NEH and, more than any other such venture, made 
friends for public support of the arts on Capitol Hill and along Main Street 
America.
The second contribution on the American Civil War comes from Robert 
M. Myers, who argues that Cold Mountain (2003) attempts to “justify secession 
and account for the military defeat of the South.” This Lost Cause approach 
began as early as the 1870s, promoting three ideas: “that the South fought 
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for states’ rights, not slavery”; that Robert E. Lee was “a military genius and 
a perfect embodiment of the Southern gentleman”; and that, “despite the 
heroism of the individual Confederate soldier, the North’s overwhelming re-
sources and numbers eventually forced the South to succumb.” Myers places 
both the novel (1997) and the film version of Cold Mountain in the context of 
this popular paradigm, which he argues also holds true for the two best-known 
cinematic treatments of the war: The Birth of a Nation (1915) and Gone with the 
Wind (1939). He argues that although the source of the story, Charles Frazier’s 
novel Cold Mountain, was steeped in the Lost Cause tradition, the subsequent 
adaptation of the screenplay by Englishman Anthony Minghella may have been 
additionally influenced by contemporary antiwar concerns.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: TOTAL WAR
World War I
After the Civil War, U.S. military actions involved subduing American Indian 
populations on the western frontier, followed by the Spanish-American War 
in Cuba and the Philippines. Unlike these “splendid little wars,” America’s 
experience in World War I was fortuitously timed to mesh with Hollywood’s 
growing capacity to reach millions of viewers. While Michael T. Isenberg con-
cedes that war films were not particularly popular in the years immediately 
following World War I, he discounts the traditional wisdom that Americans in 
the 1920s rejected war and were overly embittered by the experience of World 
War I. The coming together of a talented trio set The Big Parade (1925) apart 
as the most memorable war film of the 1920s. King Vidor, Irving Thalberg, and 
Laurence Stallings were responsible for the film, which ran in New York’s Astor 
Theater for ninety-six weeks, bringing in a total of $1.5 million. Although the 
soldiers in The Big Parade  “yearn for the blessings of peace,” Isenberg explains, 
they also demonstrate that “the doughboy is a committed civilian who, when 
aroused, becomes a dominant warrior.” Two years later, William A. Wellman’s 
Wings (1927) added momentum to this view by rendering World War I as a 
noble adventure in the skies over France.
The second contribution on the World War I era addresses images and 
documents often passed over by film scholars. James Latham explains that 
hundreds of advertisements were created to promote films to local exhibitors, 
who were “encouraged to see themselves not simply as merchants but as actively 
serving both their local communities and the country.” Latham focuses on 
film advertisements that touted new technologies that could make a differ-
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ence in combat—the machine gun, the submarine, the tank, the airplane. He 
discusses a series of such advertisements and how they helped shape wartime 
public opinion both directly and indirectly. He concludes that the promotion 
of war-related films “conveyed cultural meanings of patriotism and national 
identity, as well as reasons why the country was at war and why the public should 
participate.” Reinforcing the messages of the films, “advertisements functioned 
to rally support for the war effort” and showed “how film could portray the 
leaders, heroes, villains, and victims of the war in ways that furthered national 
interests.” Latham’s chapter should remind scholars that film studies need to 
consider more than just the viewing experience.
Interim and Isolationism
World War I generated its share of heroes, but it also shocked America and the 
rest of the world with the costs—human and financial—of modern conflicts. 
The 1920s saw enlightened but ultimately unsuccessful efforts by interna-
tional agencies to outlaw war. Three chapters deal with this interim period 
(1918–1941). David Imhoof devotes attention to the meaning of World War I 
films as they were viewed by the local audience of Göttingen, Germany. He 
concludes that, “like other cultural activities in Germany, local moviegoing 
in the interwar period aided the process of Nazification as much as national 
and international political events did.” Göttingen had a smaller working class 
than most of its neighboring industrial cities, which may help explain its ten-
dency toward conservatism on cultural as well as political issues. In the end, 
through a careful reading of the local newspapers, Imhoof is able to trace the 
local reception of two films: Westfront 1918 (1930), the first German sound 
film about the war, and Hollywood’s All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) in its 
German dubbed version. Although most reviewers approved of the realism 
and general antiwar orientation of Westfront 1918, All Quiet on the Western Front 
was met with “raucous protests” in the streets of Berlin and “direct appeals 
from politicians in Saxony, Brunswick, Thuringia, Württemberg, and Bavaria 
[that] eventually convinced the Appellate Censorship Board to reconsider 
the approval of the film.” In the end, each of these films created a “popular 
platform for talking about politics.”
John Whiteclay Chambers II studies the relationship between Hollywood and 
the isolationist debate in the United States between 1930 and 1941. He divides 
the movement into three distinct parts: a peace movement—internationalist, 
not isolationist—that advocated nonviolent methods; an isolationist movement, 
opposed to U.S. intervention overseas but willing to support military defense 
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of the Western Hemisphere; and an anti-interventionist movement comprising 
participants from both the political Left and Right who were opposed to U.S. 
entry into World War II. In various ways, all three “tried to shape members’ 
attitudes and actions toward motion pictures, the film industry, and U.S. for-
eign policy.” Chambers joins others in finding Lewis Milestone’s All Quiet on 
the Western Front to be a touchstone for antiwar ideology, noting its rerelease 
in 1934 and the release of an augmented version in 1939, by which time the 
nation’s aversion to war had led to the production of other “disillusionist” 
films such as Cavalcade (1933) and Paramount’s The President Vanishes (1935), 
in which the chief executive goes into hiding rather than make decisions that 
might lead to war. At first, peace organizations spoke out against films that 
promoted war but then decided to sponsor special nontheatrical screenings 
of films that supported international peace. Most noteworthy was Francis 
Skillman Onderdonk’s Peace Films Caravan, which, during the early 1930s, 
sponsored antiwar screenings in local churches and clubs in several states. 
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and German rearmament and 
aggression after 1938 had an obvious impact. By 1939, Chambers notes, “new 
antiwar films became increasingly rare.” Soon thereafter, Hollywood began 
distributing features such as The Fighting 69th (1940) and Sergeant York (1941), 
which were clearly “preparedness” productions designed to nudge a quiescent 
American public toward intervention.
Cynthia J. Miller studies Hitler, Beast of Berlin (1939) as a film that, rather 
than whispering words of fear in the ears of American moviegoers, “screamed 
. . . mocked, shocked, and menaced in defiance of the Third Reich.” It was 
“one of the first to openly cast the Nazi regime in a villainous light.” But, ready 
for distribution after a production schedule of less than a week, Hitler, Beast of 
Berlin ran into opposition from the Production Code Administration because it 
was deemed inflammatory and prowar. In response, the Producers Distribution 
Corporation and filmmaker Ben Judell agreed to a number of edits and even 
dropped Hitler’s name from the title in several distribution markets. The central 
characters are members of a small underground group in Germany resisting the 
growing Nazi “beast.” The film opens with scenes of storm troopers parading 
through small towns to the “reluctant salutes” of townspeople. The plot also 
introduces concentration camps, venues of physical and psychological torture. 
It is little wonder that the film was advertised as “a wail of anguish from a nation 
in chains.” As Miller points out, the film is of special interest today because it 
maximizes the melodramatic techniques of the B movies and noir films of the 
day—both in the production and in its zany advertising stunts. No trick was 
missed for attracting public attention and selling a message.
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World War II
Although President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed World War I to be “the war 
to end all wars,” the technological developments in the decades following the 
conflict raised the costs of World War II by astronomic proportions—especially 
for civilian populations, the ultimate targets of total war. In the first of four 
chapters on World War II, Ian S. Scott studies Frank Capra and Robert Riskin 
and their documentary films supporting America’s war effort. Although the 
two men had worked together previously in a string of successful commercial 
projects, including Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936), Lost Horizon (1937), and You 
Can’t Take It with You (1938), in their greatest contributions to the war effort—
documentaries made for the U.S. government—they functioned independently. 
Scott describes Capra’s Why We Fight series of films as narrative history imbued 
with “a strong Christian ethos.” Scott sees Riskin’s documentary work for the 
Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information, the Projections of America 
series, as more of “a quiet affirmation of life in America, of accomplishment, 
and, indeed, of social attainment and cultural appreciation.” The quiet films 
of the Riskin team deserve more study and acknowledgment, since a number 
of them fulfill one of the primary goals established by John Grierson, father of 
the documentary: “to make peace as exciting as war.”
Obviously, the Hollywood studios continued to provide a product that 
would please audiences, and there were numerous opportunities as they ad-
vanced the war effort. Yet the postwar era posed problems of its own: How would 
a mobilized nation—deprived of consumer goods during the war years—return 
to a market economy? And what about the psychological stress of veterans as 
they made the transition from the military, where life was structured, scheduled, 
and controlled by direct and clear orders? Could young men who had battled 
America’s enemies settle down to civilian “chaos”?
Filmmakers did not ignore the plight of those who would later be described 
as “the greatest generation.” One of the classic works of the postwar era, director 
William Wyler’s The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), follows three veterans back to 
their hometown in the American heartland—tracing their attempts to get in 
step with a peacetime economy. Frank J. Wetta and Martin A. Novelli consider 
Wyler’s film along with other selected film portrayals. Contrary to writers such 
as Paul Fussell and Michael C. C. Adams, who dismiss such productions as 
misrepresenting the impact of war on veterans, Wetta and Novelli argue that 
a mature “realism” in the post–World War II film justifiably includes stories of 
adjustment and creative reintegration. In The Best Years, each of three former 
servicemen must overcome challenges, but each emerges as an adjusted and 
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constructive member of society: one rejects his drinking habit, an unfortunate 
“hangover” from military life; another experiences divorce but discovers a re-
juvenating relationship; and a physically handicapped sailor finds acceptance 
from his family and learns to adapt to his new limitations. No single solution in 
the film is perfect for all, but these three stories argue that despair and anger 
are not the only options for those tested in the fires of combat. In this regard, 
the subject of Pride of the Marines (1945), Joe Schmid ( John Garfield), loses 
his sight but finds ways to succeed back home. As actor Garfield said of his 
character, “I found him the kind of kid we like to think of as the wholesome 
American type—brave, determined, resourceful, fun loving, but not without 
some of the faults that are American, too” (Nott 156). Schmid is a human be-
ing, not an irreparably wounded soul. Likewise, Tom Rath (Gregory Peck) in 
The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1956) comes home with problems but finds 
happiness with his loving wife ( Jennifer Jones) and growing son.
Although film is a popular medium, it has not been employed sufficiently 
to tell the story of ordinary people during times of crisis. In her chapter on 
both the novel and film versions of From Here to Eternity, J. E. Smyth believes that 
author James Jones produced his book and Fred Zinnemann the award-winning 
feature film to bring the unofficial—yet significant—history of America’s “Good 
War” to the public. Indeed, it is Smyth’s contention that Jones devoted much 
of his career to validating the perspective of “the hairy, swiftly aging, fighting 
lower class soldier” in World War II. An uncompromisingly proletarian writer 
in the tradition of Theodore Dreiser, Jones felt contempt for the officer corps 
and, by extension, for America’s Establishment—including historians, whom he 
decried as members of the upper classes writing for the upper classes. Although 
permission was granted for filming at the Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, the 
film’s undermining of authority did not sit well with the Department of Defense. 
Basing her chapter on a study of the literary original, studio documents such 
as correspondence and scripts, and the film itself, Smyth concludes that James 
Jones’s vision of the U.S. Army prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor was more 
than a personal statement; it was an ambitious attempt to revise the image of 
the American military. When From Here to Eternity reached theaters in the fall 
of 1953, it was a harbinger of an entirely new Hollywood paradigm for the war 
film, one that would reach its apogee during the post-Vietnam era.
Robert Brent Toplin, who is responsible for the fourth contribution on 
World War II, brings his own considerable experience as both filmmaker and 
historian. Both The Longest Day (1962) and Saving Private Ryan (1998) address 
the Allied invasion of France in 1944, an accomplishment that represented one 
of America’s finest efforts for the Allied cause, even though some ten thousand 
U.S. troops were killed in this invasion to liberate Europe. As Toplin demon-
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strates, in addition to the obvious historical questions, each film can be read 
as a comment on issues that were relevant at the time of its production. In the 
1960s, for example, the German military commanders of 1944 were presented 
in a relatively benign way because the nations of the West were relying on the 
Federal Republic of Germany as a Cold War ally in holding the line against the 
Soviet Union. As a result, in The Longest Day, leaders of the German military 
elite “seem confused, fumbling . . . sometimes comic. . . . [and] not enthusiastic 
about Nazi policies.” By 1998, after years of disillusionment with Vietnam and 
scores of films that questioned the necessity of war, Steven Spielberg’s Saving 
Private Ryan reminds audiences that “some battles are worth fighting” and that 
the men who fight them “deserve to be honored.”
COLD WAR AND INSURGENC Y
The Cold War
The firestorm over Dresden and the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki raised the stakes of military conflict so high that most world powers 
seemed to abandon plans for conventional warfare; then the threat of anni-
hilation was escalated after the first H-bomb tests in the mid-1950s. The result 
Berlin: a divided city in a divided world.
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was a Cold War of challenges and containment. In Asia, victory of the insurgent 
communists in China created yet another world power and set the stage first for 
a war in Korea (1950–1953) and later for extended “low-intensity” conflicts over 
several decades in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—what Nikita Khrushchev, in 
his famous “secret speech” of 1956, dubbed “wars of national liberation.”
Immediately after World War II, the city of Berlin became a compact mi-
crocosm of Cold War confrontation—a polity dramatizing the tensions of a 
divided Germany and a larger divided Europe and, ultimately, a polarized world. 
Thomas W. Maulucci Jr. surveys films that portray “the morally ambiguous hu-
man landscape and the still fluid and uncertain political situation of postwar 
Germany.” These “rubble films,” as Maulucci calls them, “stress the need for a 
clean break with the past.” Representing a “door in the Iron Curtain” (because 
it was embedded in East Germany), Berlin became a meeting place for East 
and West. Maulucci compares Berlin films from the West, particularly Billy 
Wilder’s American production One, Two, Three (1961), with an East German 
documentary that “premiered exactly one year to the day after construction 
began on the Berlin Wall.” Until it came down in 1989, the infamous barrier 
was a metaphor for world divisions as well as a physical obstacle that thwarted 
freedom seekers. As the author concludes, “Cold War Berlin continues to 
fascinate filmmakers and moviegoers who themselves remain divided about 
life in Germany since reunification [in 1990].”
Susan A. George explains how, from the mid-1940s through most of the 
1950s, “shaken by the trial of the ‘Hollywood Ten’ and the communist blacklists 
Marine platoon commanders in Vietnam were often very young.
D
av
id
 W
in
te
r
Introduction / 19
that put more than three hundred directors, technicians, writers, and actors 
out of work,” a mood of fear and anxiety took root in Hollywood. But Robert 
Wise’s The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951) was different. Through inventive 
manipulation of generic conventions, this now-classic science fiction film 
“opens a space for emergent ideologies” and “offers a different worldview.” As 
George demonstrates, films of this period tend to show women locked in as 
homemakers in traditional families rather than as accomplished professionals; 
they are basically “high-heeled, well-dressed damsels . . . who represent tradi-
tional American notions of hearth, home, and family.” In contrast, in The Day 
the Earth Stood Still, it is a woman (Helen Benson, played by Patricia Neal) who 
“disrupts dominant ideologies” by rejecting her suitor’s proposal of marriage 
and protecting Klaatu (Michael Rennie), the alien invader who announces his 
goal of promoting world peace.
The Vietnam Conflict 
Turning to the war in Vietnam, Peter C. Rollins addresses what he sees as a 
significant tendency toward bias in most histories, novels, films, and televi-
sion productions about the war. After surveying several memoirs, collections 
of GI letters, and oral histories about the war, he observes that “war viewed 
from a foxhole shows vivid pyrotechnics, but the view is often as narrow as it 
is intense.” Vietnam as portrayed on television has been equally problematic. 
Rollins underscores difficulties with the thirteen-episode WGBH series Vietnam: 
A Television History (1983) and compares it with two rebuttal documentary 
productions: Television’s Vietnam: The Real Story (1985) and Television’s Vietnam: 
The Impact of Media (1986). Finally, he surveys a series of Hollywood films about 
the Vietnam conflict, explaining how they reflect the opinions Americans 
had about Vietnam and how important it is to ensure that students have “the 
tools to identify opinion and point of view as they consider the meaning of 
our longest war.”
The “gritty realism” of Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986) is what interests 
Lawrence W. Lichty and Raymond L. Carroll, although they also examine 
three earlier films about Vietnam: The Green Berets (1968), The Boys in Com-
pany C (1978), and Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979). Platoon 
accompanies Chris Taylor (Charlie Sheen) as he arrives for a tour of duty in 
Vietnam, just as Stone had done as a soldier twenty years earlier. Lieutenant 
Wolfe (Mark Moses) leads his unit into an area where all the confusion—and 
much of the distress—of service in Vietnam becomes evident. This first part 
of the film presents what Lichty and Carroll call “the ‘small war’ fought by 
the ordinary grunt.” But as the story goes on, it presents some troubling ques-
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tions. For example, “when the bad soldier kills the good soldier, and young 
Taylor must avenge the act, how are we to think about heroes or murderers?” 
Platoon raises other provocative questions, too, about the “madness of war” and 
Taylor’s corruption by it. Subsequent to the release of Platoon, Stone’s actual 
company commander, Robert Hemphill, wrote a brief history of his infantry 
unit entitled Platoon: Bravo Company, in which he details an alternative history 
of the filmmaker’s experience, one more in keeping with the honored tradi-
tions of the U.S. Army and its citizen-soldiers.
The final contribution on Vietnam takes a longer view. William S. Bushnell 
studies the vision of two screenwriters, working almost fifty years apart, and their 
different takes on Graham Greene’s 1955 novel The Quiet American. Bushnell 
describes the literary base as “part political thriller, part romance, and part 
detective story set in exotic French Indochina in 1952.” Joseph Mankiewicz 
was responsible for the first screenplay, filmed in 1958, which enraged Greene 
because of its “reworking of his novel.” The second version, which reached 
screens in 2002, was by Australian writer-director Phillip Noyce and “devotes 
more interest to the character relationships and the introspective quality 
of Greene’s text.” Taken together, the two films yield insight into America’s 
experience in Indochina and the ways films can inform history; as is so often 
the case, each reflects the preoccupations and prejudices of its own time. The 
1958 version upholds a staunch Cold War vision of America’s rightful defense 
of South Vietnam; in contrast, informed by the “Vietnam syndrome,” the 2002 
rendering is more in the spirit of the British novelist’s skeptical interpretation. 
Bushnell concludes that Noyce achieved a cautionary tale with the prescience 
of the original.
THE TWENT Y-FIRST CENTURY: TERRORISM AND  
ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS
Lawrence Suid has devoted a research career and two respected volumes to 
studying the Pentagon’s involvement in helping Hollywood producers make 
better war-related films—films that, by virtue of  “getting the history right,” also 
protect and defend the reputation of the armed forces. Using the methods 
pioneered by Suid,  John Shelton Lawrence and John G. McGarrahan focus on 
Black Hawk Down (2001), a classic example of a film that the Pentagon wanted 
made. In December 1992, during Operation Restore Hope, President Bill Clin-
ton sent twenty thousand U.S. marines to bring law and order to Somalia and 
its capital, Mogadishu, in the wake of a short but violent civil war. In June 1993, 
after a system for distributing humanitarian aid had been set up and a United 
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Nations multinational peacekeeping force had been established, U.S. troops 
were reduced to twelve hundred, but some of the remaining American forces 
were responsible for a July 1993 raid that set the stage for violent conflict and 
humiliating losses. Eventually, by March 1994, there was a complete (and some 
believe ignominious) withdrawal of American troops from a nation in chaos. In 
the end, despite the involvement of Pentagon consultants hoping for a positive 
“spin,” Black Hawk Down presents a story of confusion, ill preparedness, and com-
mand failure. Some observers have suggested that the film fits very comfortably 
into the Vietnam War film formula rather than a new, heroic mold.
More recently, there have been attempts to reconfigure the war film. In 
his chapter, Jeffrey Chown surveys a wide selection of films that have emerged 
from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The baseline for comparison is the famous 
Vietnam-era documentary Hearts and Minds (1974) by Peter Davis. Chown sees 
Davis’s Academy Award–winning film as a template of dramatic devices and 
editorial techniques that Michael Moore used in his own widely seen documen-
tary Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004). In a survey of documentary productions, Chown 
believes that Baghdad E.R. (2006) is the film on Iraq with “the most graphic 
Rebel forces in Somalia had firepower.
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shock value,” as it depicts wounded American soldiers being brought in off 
the line. Yet he concludes that this film—presented in the style of television’s 
E.R.—is less critical of the war than might be expected. Proposing a “Vietnam 
template,” Chown also compares The Anderson Platoon (1967) and Occupation: 
Dreamland (2005), the latter of which traces the experiences of a squad in Iraq, 
and he comments on the influence of lightweight video cameras in the hands 
of combatants. As the war has evolved, so have the cinematic treatments. Al-
though the new war genre cannot be defined with exactitude, this early survey 
of recent documentaries lays the groundwork for a critical exploration. In a 
style fulfilling many of Chown’s predictions, Brian De Palma’s Redacted (2007) 
blends documentary footage with acted sequences to track the destructive 
impact of prolonged combat.
Some of the earliest documentaries and feature films concerning the 
Iraq war focus on the narrative of Pfc. Jessica Lynch, who was captured by 
fedayeen after her convoy made a disastrously wrong turn and was ambushed 
near Nasariyah. Since the Puritan-era revelations of Mary Rowlandson in 
1682, Americans have been fascinated with stories of captivity and have found 
lessons in them about national character and identity. Stacy Takacs devotes 
a chapter to examining some of the treatments of Lynch’s ordeal, delineat-
ing how gender issues become enmeshed with political rhetoric. Motion 
picture formulas apply as well: Jessica Lynch was a “damsel in distress” who 
embodied the values of America’s homeland. (It is interesting to note how 
many war films posit their protagonists from the Appalachians, assuming that 
such a locale confers special heartland values and an innocent, politically 
unsophisticated character. To name only a few, consider Benjamin Martin in 
The Patriot, Davy Crockett in The Alamo, Inman in Cold Mountain, the Henry 
Clark family in Riskin’s World War II documentaryValley of the Tennessee, the 
protagonist of Sergeant York, the Gary Cooper character in Friendly Persuasion, 
and, of course, Robert E. Lee Prewitt in From Here to Eternity.) The filmmakers 
who rushed their Jessica Lynch documentaries and features to the screen in 
2003 must have been surprised to tune in to C-SPAN in late April 2007 and 
find the subject of their films testifying before a congressional committee 
and rejecting her heroic status: “I am still confused as to why they chose to lie 
and try to make me a legend when the real heroics of my fellow soldiers that day 
were legendary.” (Notably, Lynch did not offer to return the fees she received 
for her story from filmmakers and the networks.) Looking at the record of 
Hollywood’s wars and American mythmaking, it comes as no surprise that the 
details of her story were woven into a national fable; the resulting films are a 
combination of generic and historical necessity.
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The recent mobilization of political and screen resources commenced, of 
course, after the terrorist attacks on symbolic sites in New York and Washington 
on 11 September 2001. Those watching NBC’s Today Show at 8:45 A.M. were 
told that the first collision into the South Tower of the World Trade Center was 
probably an accident. Then, while “experts” speculated for Katie Couric and 
recalled the 1945 collision of a B-25 bomber into the Empire State Building, 
the nation watched as, at 9:03, a second plane smashed directly into the North 
Tower of that icon of American capitalism. Within forty minutes, a Boeing 757, 
acting as a flying bomb, hit a recently reinforced section of the Pentagon just 
across the river from the National Mall, killing the 64 people aboard the aircraft 
and some 125 workers in an edifice that has been a symbol of the American 
military since World War II. Some twenty-seven minutes later, a heroic group 
of Americans confronted their hijackers over Pennsylvania, thwarting a third 
aerial attack on a Beltway target—either the Capitol or the White House.
The world gasped as it watched in real time and was then overwhelmed by 
seemingly endless rewinds and reruns of the horrific events of what became 
known as 9/11. James Kendrick considers the news and documentary render-
ings of these events and two feature films: Oliver Stone’s World Trade Center 
(2006), which focuses on the heroism of Americans on that tragic day in the 
Hitting the Pentagon, a symbol of U.S. military might.
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nation’s history; and Paul Greengrass’s United 93 (2006), a tense narrative of 
the flight that went down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Kendrick discusses 
how news programs and documentaries presented the events of that fateful 
day and then compares them with the feature film renderings. Many people 
thought that the films came too soon after the event, but given the recycling 
of the actual images on television at every opportunity, Kendrick questions 
why there would be any sensitivity remaining. Both feature films examined 
“are built around themes of heroism and resilience.” In the case of United 93, 
the “hero” is a group of ordinary Americans who stand up to the challenge of 
terrorism. In World Trade Center,  one central figure—in the Hollywood war film 
tradition—takes the lead in asserting “the refusal of the United States to back 
down in the face of aggression.” As marine staff sergeant Dave Karnes, actor 
Michael Shannon “becomes a ready metaphor for the undaunted American 
spirit in the face of catastrophe.” (After 9/11, the real Dave Karnes gave up 
his career as an investment counselor and went back on active duty as a U.S. 
marine, eventually serving two tours of duty in Iraq.)
The collection concludes with both a filmography and a bibliography assembled 
by John Shelton Lawrence. Previous books have shown that listing the films 
considered in a chronological sequence helps readers grasp the evolution of 
the genre and see the relationships among the various productions. Lawrence 
lists those films focused on by the contributors to this volume, as well as other 
films that have received significant public recognition. Considering the rich 
tradition of commentary, the authors could not be comprehensive in citing 
every important book in their chapters; therefore, the bibliography extends the 
chapter references and offers a guide—organized by war era—for future inves-
tigation. These resources provide excellent launch points for researchers.
THE FILM AND HISTORY APPROACH
Why We Fought takes a “film and history” approach, based on a commitment 
to studying both the historical and the communications issues of the artistic 
medium of motion pictures. Other methods exist, and each has value. The 
following thematic rubrics, discussed in detail below, stress the interests and 
commitments of film and history scholars who treat wartime motion pictures 
or motion pictures about war as historical documents and apply the same 
methods of analysis that would be directed toward texts in any archive—verbal 
or visual (see more at www.uwosh.edu/filmandhistory/):
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1. War films must be studied in their historical contexts.
2. War films are propaganda vehicles.
3. Censorship and sponsorship influence war films.
4. War films constitute a genre of their own.
5. War films should be studied with caution.
Historical Contexts
Every war film is made within a cultural milieu that either dictates its approach 
or more subtly influences its construction in ways that are often not perceived 
by the filmmakers themselves. Anyone “reading” a cinematic text about war 
must take into account the zeitgeist of the period in which it was made. For 
example, most scholarship about the 1920s agrees with F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
famous lament that it was a decade the younger generation found empty of 
heroic opportunities, with “all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faith in mankind 
shaken” (Fitzgerald 185). Yet Michael T. Isenberg discovered that there was a 
heroic way of remembering World War I and that King Vidor’s The Big Parade 
(1925) documents an important alternative historical memory—yes, there was 
suffering, but heroism and national maturation were fostered by the “Great 
War.” Many years later, during the controversy over Vietnam, Vidor felt obliged 
to apologize to Hollywood peers for the film’s (unintended) positive vision.
In the case of Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986), it is important that the film was 
not made until after the Watergate scandal of 1972–1974. Indeed, during an 
interview with Playboy magazine, the iconoclastic director admitted that it was 
Watergate-related revelations that inspired the script—not Stone’s experience 
as a U.S. Army rifleman in Vietnam during 1967–1968. This detail about the 
creative environment should inspire scholars to rethink their evaluation of the 
film and to consider how it uses Vietnam as a vehicle to explore Stone’s views 
on the culture crisis of the 1970s. In this context, Charles Reich’s The Greening 
of America may be more relevant to decoding the messages of the film than any 
military or diplomatic history. Such a reading would certainly exonerate the 
film of the volleys of criticism launched by Vietnam veterans who were angered 
by its many misrepresentations (see chapter 17).
Any study of America’s war films in context must consider where the 
pendulum is located as it swings between isolationism and interventionism, 
for the American national mood keeps shifting—seemingly by decade. With 
respect to these moods, motion pictures often impact viewers by reinforcing 
their established mind-sets—so much so that, in some cases, the antiwar film 
of one generation becomes the recruiting poster of the next. This unexpected 
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reversal is confirmed by the fascination engendered by a DVD of Apocalypse 
Now among the marines in Jarhead (2005) who are participating in the first 
Gulf War.
Propaganda 
Sometime prior to World War I, governments decided that motion pictures 
could serve as psychological weapons. During the period of strict neutrality, 
prior to the American declaration of war in 1916, motion picture producers 
were asked to avoid partisanship. Indeed, antiwar efforts by such leading 
filmmakers as D. W. Griffith were released to a public that was not willing to 
become involved in a war that, by 1916, had already consumed hundreds of 
thousands of lives in combat. (The Battle of the Somme in 1916 alone inflicted 
some 300,000 battle deaths.) Productions such as Thomas Ince’s Civilization 
(1916) played to isolationist audiences receptive to messages from the Prince of 
Peace. Once America was committed to war, however, such films were quashed, 
and in a prominent case, film producer Robert Goldstein was imprisoned for 
sedition (see chapter 1).
After hostilities began, even Griffith produced his quota of films deni-
grating the German “Hun” and depicting damsels in distress, most notably in 
Why We Fight   spoke in simple terms that everyone could understand.
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Hearts of the World (1918), starring Lillian Gish. Never lax in his zeal, Griffith 
made “war-front” documentaries with British troops going “over the top” 
in such manageable geographical settings as Scotland. No one noticed this 
falsification at the time, and the footage is still used repeatedly in television 
documentaries and on covers of “historical” publications. Apparently, the im-
ages proved to be too convincing to be rejected, long after their fraudulent 
nature had been exposed.
For World War II, the peace movement derived considerable support from 
the dramatic success of director Lewis Milestone’s All Quiet on the Western Front, 
a film so powerful in its antiwar statement that its star, Lew Ayres, converted 
to pacifism and refused military service even after Pearl Harbor. (He did not 
refuse to serve in the medical corps and was highly decorated for his combat 
bravery as a frontline medic in the Pacific.) Chapter 8 reveals that there were 
other uses for the film—uses by audiences. In Göttingen, Germany, All Quiet 
became a Rorschach test around which citizens, unions, and elites defined 
their attitudes toward the military disaster behind them.
And just as there are different kinds of propaganda, there are counter-
vailing efforts designed to swim against the stream and contradict the official 
portrayal of the military—films such as From Here to Eternity (1953). In his epic 
1951 novel, James Jones vowed to reveal the “untold story” of the working-class 
members of the American military, a story that—according to Jones—had 
been left out of the history books because history is written by the elite for 
the elite. Both the novel and the film portray an antiheroic military rife with 
indecency, brutality, and corruption—a portrait that never would have been 
permitted during the war it portrayed. Part of the permissiveness stemmed 
from the distance from the war, and part from Hollywood’s discovery that its 
cooperation with the government during World War II had led not to contin-
ued support but to congressional probes, blacklisting, and a crushing Supreme 
Court decision that abolished the studio system. It seems clear, in retrospect, 
that the frustration of a limited war in Korea further undermined America’s 
trust in the military. Newsreels (accurately) showed Americans outgunned and 
overpowered in the early days of the struggle, to the point that the U.S. Army 
was backed into a defensive perimeter around Pusan, Korea, during the late 
summer of 1950. Here was a context ripe for negative portrayals.
The Vietnam War saw very few government-sponsored films in support of 
the struggle, in part because President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk believed that a World War II–style public information cam-
paign would make it difficult to wage a limited war. The government-produced 
Why Vietnam? (1965) included speeches by President Johnson and diplomats 
28 / John E. O’Connor and Peter C. Rollins
laying out a rationale for the struggle, but the preponderant response by the-
atergoers was negative. Later, PBS would release its own ambitious chronicle 
of the struggle, Vietnam: A Television History, a thirteen-part series critiqued by 
answer films from Accuracy in Media (see chapter 17).
The war in Iraq inspired documentaries such as the very popular Fahrenheit 
9/11, in which Michael Moore emulates the style and themes of Peter Davis’s 
anti-Vietnam classic. Moore’s analysis, in turn, was answered by such films 
as Roger Aronoff’s Confronting Iraq: Conflict and Hope (2005), a feature that 
showcases historians, cultural critics, and diplomats who argue that the war is 
a viable strategy but requires political will to succeed.
It is safe to say that all war films have political implications, even when 
they appear to avoid didacticism. There is not a single film considered in this 
collection that does not carry lessons about American society, domestic issues, 
or foreign policy. When all else fails, such films can be used to examine the 
nature of America’s national character. For example, The Best Years of Our Lives 
and The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit make no explicit attempt to buttress any 
Some rebuttals of Fahrenheit 
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view of World War II, yet both consider the nature of America’s fighting men 
and their resilience as they confront the new challenges of the marketplace in 
the postwar era. Not political in any way, but also preoccupied with the issue 
of character, is Jarhead (2005). The narrative follows a small group of marines 
from boot camp through Operation Desert Storm and then back home; the 
film has a “destruction of innocents” message, which should not be surprising 
since the screenplay was written by former marine William Broyles, a Viet-
nam veteran. What makes the film so interesting is its avoidance of political 
commentary; what it does deliver is a bleak message of what it means to be a 
marine (according to Broyles). The final scene gives a mixed judgment, but 
the overall story is one of indoctrination and discipline, which are irrelevant 
to a world that needs peacemakers.
Finally, the documentaries examined in chapter 21 seem more interested 
in grandstanding or memorializing than in delivering a political message. The 
proliferation of technologies has created an entirely novel production context, 
leaving behind the days when messages were dispensed to a passive audience 
by governments, defense departments, and oligopolistic television networks. In 
the new context, even photos taken for personal use can prime political debate. 
In a noteworthy example, the “humorous” photographs of Lyndy England and 
Charles Graner touched off the Abu Ghraib scandal. Members of the 372nd 
U.S. troops fire a missile at a fortified position.
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Military Police Company never realized that their e-mails would become politi-
cal bombshells. England and Graner may have found it “cool” to torment the 
prisoners under their supervision, but the world thought otherwise—and so 
did the army, which sentenced both to prison terms (England for three years 
and Graner for ten years). Yet political statement was the last thing the two 
pranksters had in mind as they “built” human pyramids, humiliated naked 
prisoners, and mocked the dead and dying in their charge. 
Censorship and Sponsorship 
The federal government found ways to control film content during both world 
wars because, as iterated in Why We Fought, motion pictures were important 
weapons. Though it is easy to scoff at this effort to control public exhibitions, 
it is also important to consider the observation of David Welch: “In all political 
systems policy must be explained, the public must be convinced of the efficacy 
of governmental decisions (or at least remain quiescent), and rational discus-
sion is not always the most useful means of achieving this, particularly in an 
age of mass society” (xviii). 
During the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped the power of 
radio to reach millions of Americans with his message of a “New Deal.” When 
war came to America, Roosevelt—an avid movie buff—and General George C. 
Marshall, his chief of staff, saw the importance of motion pictures in stimulat-
ing the national will. An obvious corollary was that control of overall movie 
content was essential so that the messages would have the desired cumulative 
effect. Likewise, through much of World War II, radar antennas were erased 
from still photographs released to the public because it was assumed that the 
enemy was better off not knowing about this advance in tracking—a special 
advantage for naval operations under the cover of night. 
Sometime in 1943 it was decided that the public had lost enthusiasm for 
the struggle and needed to be made aware of the sacrifices being made at the 
front. From that time on, bodies of American soldiers were shown floating in 
the surf at Tarawa and other Pacific beachheads. Life magazine explained its 
publication of such images as follows: “The love of peace has no meaning or 
stamina unless it is based on a knowledge of war’s terror. . . . Dead men have 
indeed died in vain if live men refuse to look at them” (Roeder 34). The goals 
were to persuade civilians to donate to the war-bond drives and to subdue the 
strong demand for consumer goods that was building against restrictions on 
purchases.
Scripts for Hollywood films were vetted closely during both world wars, 
and guidelines were provided to the studios. The studios normally cooperated 
Introduction / 31
with the government in these requests, although there was some tension before 
the United States entered World War II and was still claiming “neutrality,” a 
condition that came to an end at 0800 (Hawaiian time) on Sunday, 7 December 
1941. A number of studies discuss the studios’ wartime commercial concerns, 
including the availability of raw materials for film stock, but it can be assumed 
that the studios were behind the war effort. In fact, most of the Hollywood mo-
guls were ahead of the public when it came to supporting intervention. Their 
European backgrounds and business contacts kept them up-to-date about the 
“progress” of totalitarianism in Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union.
More significant was the notion of sponsorship and partnership between 
the studios and the government. War films, in search of verisimilitude, needed 
costumes, locales, equipment, and the guidance of military professionals. Al-
though it was (and still is) fairly easy to acquire the advice of retired military 
personnel interested in serving as consultants, it was very expensive to procure 
the machines and personnel of war. Here, cooperation with the Department 
of War (1942–1947) and later the Department of Defense would continue to 
be essential to the bottom line.
Some examples are worth mentioning. In making The Big Parade several 
years after World War I, director King Vidor had the full support of the U.S. 
Army (see chapter 6). An assistant director was sent to Killeen, Texas, to film 
large bodies of troops and trucks advancing toward the front as part of the “big 
parade.” The scenes must have taken a full day to complete, but the assistant 
director came back with footage that Vidor rejected as unusable for aesthetic 
reasons. Vidor then traveled to Fort Hood, where the scenes were reshot, once 
more with army assistance; this second effort provided the epic mass and 
rhythm sought by the Hollywood artist. For its part, the army believed that it 
was improving its image with the postwar public.
Some fifty-four years later, Francis Ford Coppola discovered that the De-
partment of Defense was unwilling to provide the helicopters and troops he 
needed for Apocalypse Now. The media liaison office concluded that the adap-
tation of Joseph Conrad’s novella to a Vietnam setting—and its ending with a 
statement about “the horror”—would reflect negatively on the armed forces 
of the United States and on national policy. Coppola’s epic encountered all 
kinds of equipment, weather, and budgetary problems in addition to a lack 
of cooperation by the government, but it finally recouped its investment. The 
film is now considered one of the great American war productions—at least 
by film critics.
During World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, the armed forces 
cooperated with many filmmakers out of self-interest. Frank Capra’s Tunisian 
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Victory (1944), a film about the North African campaign, was filmed in New 
Mexico with an armored unit still undergoing combat training. Because the 
early battles in Africa had gone badly for the Americans, it was very much to the 
army’s benefit to have a heroic rendering. Therefore, track vehicles, fuel, and 
troops were supplied in abundance. (It is inexplicable that Capra would later 
deny his use of reenactments for any of his wartime productions.) In a more 
complex twist during the Cold War, director Edward Dymytrk brought to the 
military a project proposal designed to bring Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny 
to the screen. Dymytrk, who had been imprisoned as one of the “Hollywood 
Ten,” was using this film as a vehicle to work his way back into the movie business 
after being what was called a “friendly witness” for the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities. The tiresome introduction to the film is an unabashed 
commercial advertisement for the U.S. Navy, stressing the impressiveness of its 
ships as well as the humor and humanity of the sailors who man them: music, 
lighting, and color reveal an impressive nautical environment where it is fun 
to serve. The navy was clearly happy to cooperate with the project, and the 
director was working very hard to prove his loyalty, making it difficult for the 
Department of Defense to turn down such a sanguine propagandist.
A classic survey of the interactions between Hollywood and the Pentagon 
can be found in Lawrence Suid’s Guts & Glory: The Making of the American Mili-
tary Image in Film. As Suid notes, he is concerned with “the irony of filmmakers’ 
claims that they make only anti-war movies while continuing to portray combat 
as exciting and as the place where boys become men, where men become 
heroes, and even role models to the next generation”(xii). Suid notes in his 
preface that motion picture hagiography contributed to the unseemly ease 
with which Americans permitted an escalation of the war in Vietnam. No one 
interested in understanding the impact of governmental support and sponsor-
ship can ignore this work of truly original scholarship.
The War Film Genre 
The study of popular culture and motion pictures is accepted by scholars in 
the twenty-first century, but many have forgotten how it all got started. Back 
in 1970, a pioneering work by John Cawelti entitled The Six-Gun Mystique was 
published by Ray Browne of the Popular Press—published so hurriedly that 
Browne neglected to stake a copyright claim for the volume. Cawelti’s funda-
mental argument is that the popular arts employ and embellish formulas that 
are worked and reworked over time and that the study of the popular arts must 
focus on these core motifs and their evolution, because the popular arts reflect 
the concerns of the times in which they are produced. According to Cawelti, 
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“formula . . . is cultural; it represents the way in which a particular culture has 
embodied both mythical archetypes and its own preoccupations in narrative 
form” (30). Obviously, his book focuses on the Western film, but he later ex-
amined the detective and mystery genres, and his many readers were inspired 
to apply the notion to other literary and motion picture genres as well.
One such scholar is Jeanine Basinger, whose book The World War II Combat 
Film is to the war film genre what Suid’s Guts & Glory is to the issue of sponsor-
ship. With a very empirical style, Basinger defines and then explores the char-
acteristics of the combat film, tracing its evolution over time from 7 December 
1941 until January 1945. An update provides a chronology of war films up to 
2003. The overview identifies the genre’s “introductory stage” (7 December 1941 
to 31 December 1943), consisting of such films as Wake Island and Flying Tigers, 
films that vilify the enemy while linking the conflict back to earlier embattled 
moments in America’s history. Next, an “emergence of a basic definition” of 
genre fundamentals occurred (1943), when productions such as Bataan and 
Air Force introduced the formula of the “international platoon” that included 
American regional, class, and ethnic types working together as part of a cohesive 
fighting team. Finally, during a “repeat of the definition” (1 January 1944 to 31 
December 1945), films stressed the sacrifice of servicemen in such dark stories 
as Objective Burma and They Were Expendable. Later evolutionary variations are 
also examined, including Battleground and The Story of GI Joe. About Battleground, 
Basinger suggests that “it was a pure combat movie that celebrated, finally with 
the full audience, the fact that we won the war and could dare to be proud of it. 
It healed, united, and entertained” (147). About The Story of GI Joe, she concludes 
that the film “announces itself as celebratory of the American common man, 
a democratic look at the forces who fought for democracy” (129). In Why We 
Fought, these two popular films are studied for their commentary on the much 
debated topic of “Hollywood realism” (see chapter 12). 
Basinger is a true popular culture scholar, in that her study unapologeti-
cally explores the combat genre as art form. With empathy for the efforts of 
Hollywood, she observes, “World War II films were not intentionally unrealistic. 
In the most cynical terms, that was not good business. Instead, working within 
the limitations of censorship, wartime materiel restrictions, ‘good taste,’ and 
propaganda, they accepted their task as one in which they were to entertain the 
audience but also gain acceptance by coming close to the experiences they were 
living through outside the theater” (256). Basinger’s book should be mandatory 
reading as part of any investigation of Hollywood’s war films. Her respect for 
the popular arts allows her to examine the details of the formula in a way that 
yields insights that would likely be missed by the traditional scholar.
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Caution
War as a theme has attracted a number of independent filmmakers who, though 
perhaps free of some of the commercial motives driving the major studios, may 
still be in the grips of an ideology. Many of these people, lacking training in 
history themselves, tend to grasp a single source—usually an easily illustrated 
visual one—and make it their only source or become overly committed to the 
ideas of their historical and military consultants. Thus, the fact that a motion 
picture or television study of war has been made outside the studio system does 
not guarantee a truly balanced perspective; in fact, the reverse may be true.
Visual literacy is certainly a goal to strive for in our media environment. 
This is especially so when it comes to Hollywood’s wars, where government 
support and studio budgets have often produced overwhelming experiences. 
Films such as The Longest Day (see chapter 14) are of such epic proportions that 
Epic images of struggle on that “longest day” of 6 June 1944. Here, 
British troops go ashore, bringing their three-speed Raleighs with 
them.
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their very scope can be humbling. Throughout the D-day film, the technique of 
parallel action—used for the first time by D. W. Griffith in The Birth of a Nation 
(1915)—starts with developments on the Allied side of the war and then cuts 
to the German forces and their preparations; the implied omniscience of such 
editing can deprive theater audiences of critical capacity. In Patton (1970), ac-
tor George C. Scott is built into a demigod through low angle shots, telephoto 
lens manipulation, editing, music, and mise-en-scène from the grandiloquent 
opening (in which Patton addresses his imagined troops) to one of the most 
powerful montages in the history of the war film. During the Battle of the 
Bulge sequence of the film, “Patton’s Prayer” combines poetry, music, and lack 
of sound to evoke a warrior’s ecstatic vision of conflict and victory. Director Carl 
Foreman’s The Victors (1963) contains an execution sequence visualized against 
a sound track in which Frank Sinatra sings, “Have yourself a merry little Christ-
mas,” an audio track that directly conflicts with the grim story in a definitive 
example of “film irony.” As Cynthia Miller points out in chapter 10, newsreel 
footage was inserted into Hitler, Beast of Berlin to blur the line between what the 
audience knew was real and what was fiction (viewers often lacked the visual 
literacy to discern the distinction). Those who have been taught how motion 
pictures communicate will both appreciate such artistic touches and be aware 
of their intentions. The editors of this volume believe in this approach—for 
all visual experiences—and have expressed concern over the years that those 
who are not ready to decode such messages will become the unwitting victims 
of them. In the case of war films, the ramifications could be disastrous.
Viewers forget how much thought and planning go into a film production. 
In many cases, production files are available for inspection, and these paper 
trails reveal the contending goals and varied production techniques explored 
by filmmakers. Often, the Motion Picture Code Administration forced script 
rethinking and changes; even more often, there were exchanges among writ-
ers, producers, and directors about the core issues in the films. From Drums 
Along the Mohawk to Saving Private Ryan, Why We Fought has attempted to show 
how much can be learned about the final released film by examining such 
documentation.
The Internet provides a new portal, a gateway with unprecedented oppor-
tunities for researchers. Increasingly, documents about films are available at 
dedicated Web sites. Press kits, correspondence, trailers, interviews, and scripts 
are coming online, as are details about the lives of creative personalities in the 
film business. List-servs such as those on H-NET invite scholars to post queries 
and to engage in public discussions of research problems and opportunities. 
When the editors of Why We Fought began their own study of film back in the 
1970s, it took a major effort to find important reviews, essays, and opinions. 
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Today, such readily available resources as the Internet Movie Data Base (IMDB) 
provide “external reviews,” details of plot, and even exact locations where films 
were produced; through Project MUSE and other academic assistance avail-
able via university libraries, major journals around the globe can be searched. 
Finally, documentary and feature films themselves are coming online to be 
viewed or downloaded. And when all else fails, there is Netflix.
What will be needed in the future, of course, is a means to filter the pro-
liferating information from war films and to interpret the origins, messages, 
and impacts of such information. This collection consolidates much of what 
is now known and points to future “after-action reports” about Hollywood’s 
wars. As we study these films, it is important that we remember the men and 
women of our armed forces who, when called to serve, risked their lives—and 
sometimes surrendered them. Hollywood’s wars project images of real events 
for which they sometimes provide insight and sometimes obscure; either way, 
the wars and the films deserve the attention of responsible citizens.
The task is not easy: King Vidor, director of The Big Parade, concluded 
production of his epic with a sense of satisfaction that he had made an antiwar 
film. How could he have been so wrong? After the release of his first Vietnam 
film in 1986, Oliver Stone was surprised that Platoon was not accepted by all 
as “Vietnam as it really was.” Time magazine ran a cover story to that effect, 
but members of Stone’s unit and countless other combat veterans were out-
An allied soldier in Iraq prepares for evening.
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raged about what they saw as a gross misrepresentation of their service and 
sacrifice. Why would a veteran so demean his comrades? Similarly, director 
Eric Zwick’s very popular Glory (1989) cannot be understood without exam-
ining the foregrounding of racial issues in the 1980s; the film valorizes the 
significant contribution of freedmen to the Union army during the Civil War, 
an additional 10 percent of manpower that, according to the film, made the 
difference between victory and defeat for the North. This story of the fight-
ing 54th from Massachusetts was no secret, but it took an era of affirmative 
action to consider it important enough to become a major motion picture. 
That Clint Eastwood’s 2006 feature about Iwo Jima, Flags of Our Fathers (2006), 
would be followed almost immediately by his motion picture from the Japanese 
perspective, Letters from Iwo Jima (2006), is a reflection of the current rapport 
between the two former adversaries. The objective of Why We Fought: America’s 
Wars in Film and History is to map out such connections and to identify avenues 
of approach for future researchers.
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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ON 
THE SCREEN
Drums Along the Mohawk  and The Patriot
1 / John E. O’Connor
Hollywood productions about the American past have been relatively common 
over the century-long history of motion pictures—especially if one counts all the 
representations of the western frontier and all the films about American wars. 
In this context it is somewhat surprising that there have been so few thought-
ful productions about the period of the American Revolution (1763–1789). 
The truly memorable films dealing with the nation’s founding can easily be 
counted on two hands, with a few fingers left over.
After all, the only feature-length film that focuses on the councils of the 
Revolution, 1776 (1972), is a musical. A few of the earliest silent productions, 
most too short to qualify as feature films, did deal with aspects of the Revolu-
tion. Consider The Pride of Lexington (1911), Washington at Valley Forge (1914), 
and The Spirit of ’76 (1917). The last of these was a two-hour film that landed its 
producer, Robert Goldstein, in prison, charged with producing a film “designed 
to arouse antagonism, hatred, [and] enmity between the American people and 
the people of Great Britain at a time when the defendant well knew that the 
government of Great Britain . . . was an ally of the United States in prosecution 
of war against . . . Germany” (Slide 207–11). Perhaps, twenty years later, the 
producers of Drums Along the Mohawk (1939) were aware of Goldstein’s troubles 
when they decided to portray America’s eighteenth-century enemy differently. 
Sixty years later still, producers of The Patriot (2000) were more sensitive to the 
issues raised by foreign invaders in an agricultural countryside after decades 
of debate and protest about America’s role in Vietnam.
The earliest well-known feature film to focus on the Revolution was D. W. 
Griffith’s America (1924), a sweeping representation of the main events of the 
Revolution from the Boston Tea Party to Yorktown, with special care taken 
in the re-creation of such locations as Independence Hall in Philadelphia. 
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The scope of Griffith’s epic was surely influenced by his previous productions 
about major American military conflicts, such as The Birth of a Nation (1915) 
and Hearts of the World (1918). Like these two films, made when World War I 
was in the headlines, several of Hollywood’s small collection of Revolutionary 
War–era films seem to have been influenced by the world situation at the time 
of their production. Although the European conflict was over by the time of 
America’s release, and, presumably, a generation of American doughboys had 
proved the amity that now existed between the two nations, the film was ini-
tially banned in Britain, despite Griffith’s traveling there to make a personal 
appeal. Perhaps because of the difficulties Griffith faced in distributing his 
film in Britain, added to what people knew of Goldstein’s troubles, there was 
a tendency in future productions to have American Tories rather than English-
men play a central role and to allow Native Americans to take the blame for 
most atrocities (Glancy 523–45).
Another of the handful of notable films about the Revolution, Drums Along 
the Mohawk, was released in 1939 as war clouds gathered again over Europe 
and Americans began to worry about their possible role in a second world war. 
John Ford’s film was based on Walter Edmunds’s popular 1936 novel about 
farming settlers in upstate New York defending themselves against Indian raids 
and later marching off to do their part in the larger conflict.1 As had been the 
case before World War I, it was clear that were America to be drawn into the 
European conflict, Britain would be its ally. This certainly occurred to at least 
some of the decision makers at 20th Century-Fox when they decided to make an 
American Revolution film in which it would barely be noticed that the British 
were the enemy. Domestic audiences were crucial, but a production such as 
Drums could also expect European bookings. In normal times, had the British 
enemy been featured, it might have been considered innocuous, but in 1939, 
as one interoffice memo took pains to explain, “the international situation is 
so delicately balanced, that the powers to be in England weigh feathers and 
might find the picture injudicious.”2
In the same way that 1939 audiences might have been influenced in their 
reception of Drums, viewers of The Patriot in 2000 may have responded to Ben-
jamin Martin’s (Mel Gibson) original hesitancy to fight, followed by his seem-
ingly uncontrollable outbursts of violence on the battlefield, with thoughts of 
America’s recent extended experience in Vietnam, as well as to the potential for 
war looming in the Middle East. In addition, there were worldwide terror threats 
that were soon to become very present even in downtown New York City.
Drums Along the Mohawk and The Patriot are interesting because they both 
deal with the Revolution as it impacted not the famous leaders of the move-
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ment in Philadelphia and Boston but ordinary people, young families living 
in western New York and in the Carolina backcountry and being driven to sup-
port a war that they did not start, or necessarily want, but one that nonetheless 
reached out to engage them.
Historical spectacles about America were hardly a new genre in 1939, but 
they did enjoy a spurt of popularity that year.3 Why did Hollywood producers 
choose this time to deal with the American past? Why did audiences respond 
so well, choosing Drums Along the Mohawk, for example, as one of their favorite 
movies of the 1939–1940 season? The answers to these questions lay buried 
deep in the changing national consciousness as the Great Depression drew to 
a close and involvement in another world war loomed on the horizon.
Even at the end of the decade, the vast majority of the American people 
were still caught up in the malaise of the 1930s. Many suffered from a psycho-
logical depression brought on by the harsh economic realities of everyday life. 
Drums Along the Mohawk 
portrays a young rural family 
under attack.M
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The Americans who had grown up in the freewheeling 1920s and felt that they 
had every reason to look forward to success in life were forced to reshape their 
images of America and of themselves. For some it was a trauma they would 
carry for the rest of their lives.
As Europe turned toward fascism to confront its economic crisis, American 
disillusionment and despair increased. Dreams of democracy and individual 
success may have seemed unrealistic to many people living in a crisis-ridden 
world. In this climate of tension and insecurity, panaceas became more appeal-
ing: Huey Long proposed to “Share Our Wealth,” Father Charles Coughlin 
promised to expose those who conspired to betray America’s economic inter-
ests, and Francis Townsend explained that pensions for the elderly would prime 
the economic pump by boosting consumer spending. When FDR sought to 
defuse such movements by co-opting some of their suggestions in his proposals 
for a social security program and a progressive income tax, a storm of indigna-
tion arose from those who still held dear the conservative gospel of rugged 
individualism that supporters of Herbert Hoover had believed so fervently a 
Mel Gibson stars as farmer Benjamin Martin in The Patriot. 
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decade before. Even supporters of the New Deal were unsure where the new, 
seemingly uncharted course would take the nation. People felt the need to 
reassure themselves that traditional American ideals were still alive and that the 
United States would not follow Europe headlong into radical antidemocratic 
experiments. This thirst for reassurance reached a new intensity in 1939 and 
1940 as friends and allies overseas were caught up in another total war that 
threatened, like the last one, to drag in the United States.
One manifestation of this concern of the 1930s was the passion for redis-
covering the roots of America’s national heritage. During the 1920s, an era 
marked by extraordinary confidence in America, the trend in historical writing 
had been toward debunking the legends of the founding fathers and adopting 
a more cynical attitude toward the ideals for which they had supposedly stood: 
James Truslow Adams condemned seventeenth-century Puritans for being 
repressed autocrats, and Charles Beard accused the authors of the U.S. Con-
stitution of being concerned with pecuniary gain rather than the public good. 
In his three-volume biography of George Washington, Rupert Hughes pulled 
the legendary general off his pedestal and tried to set the record straight with 
regard to all those supposed patriots in the struggle for independence: “The fact 
[was] that the generation of Americans that coincided with the Revolution, was 
far from being the supremely virtuous race its descendants have been pleased 
to pretend. . . . A few soldiers, a few statesmen, a few devoted men did all the 
work, suffered all the hardships, and saved the country in spite of itself, while 
the majority ran away or kept aloof, grew fat and looked on” (691, 694). The 
time was ripe for rebuilding the reputations of America’s founders.
The task began in 1930 with Samuel Eliot Morison’s respectful new look at 
seventeenth-century New Englanders and was continued by Clifford Shipton, 
Perry Miller, and others. An interesting index of popular history can be found 
in the guides prepared in the 1930s by the Works Progress Administration, 
including historical surveys of every state and major city in the nation. By cata-
loging the historic sites that related to the experiences of ordinary Americans, 
as well as the homes of the great and the famous, the guides helped to restore 
a recognition that ordinary people as well as their leaders made history. By 
the late 1930s, a significant body of literature sought to reaffirm the virtues 
of American heroes and to resurrect their positive images. Even radicals and 
communists who before had devoted their efforts to pointing out the flaws in 
American society now turned to highlighting the traditional American values 
that united people of diverse backgrounds in opposition to fascism—thus 
American leftists who went off to Spain in 1936 and 1937 to struggle against 
Franco and Hitler called themselves the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
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DRUMS ALONG THE MOHAWK
Published in 1936, Walter Edmunds’s Drums Along the Mohawk is a pastoral 
novel. A man builds a home for himself in the wilderness, then marries a 
pretty young girl and takes her to live with him there. They farm the land in an 
idyllic setting and survive with the rest of their agrarian community of simple 
folk. Their greatest challenge comes in the form of repeated savage attacks 
by Indian “destructives” who remain loyal to the British and threaten frontier 
settlements during the war for independence.
The novel owed its popularity to more than its romantic interest, its 
bucolic setting, and its excitement and suspense. Edmunds so revered the 
historical facts that he indicated in a foreword which of the characters were 
fictional and which real and almost apologetically pointed out where a few 
stories of actual persons had been altered for dramatic emphasis. Moreover, he 
acknowledged his debt to specific historians, encouraged interested readers to 
study further, and recommended primary as well as secondary sources for the 
period. Edmunds also noted that the characters in the book were moved by 
some of the same types of concerns that preoccupied Americans in the 1930s. 
The challenges of everyday life on the colonial frontier were complicated by 
the military struggle for independence, in which neither Continental troops 
nor state militia could be relied on to defend tiny settlements on the fringe 
of civilization, and in which the hopes and dreams of ordinary people were 
shattered as families were terrorized and homesteads destroyed. Now the De-
pression had shattered hopes and dreams too, and, as in revolutionary days, 
it seemed as though the solutions that were proposed from above sometimes 
made things worse. As Edmunds explains in his foreword, “These people of 
the [Mohawk] valley were confronted by a reckless Congress and ebullient 
finance, with their inevitable repercussions of poverty and practical starvation. 
The steps followed with automatic regularity. The applications for relief, the 
failure of relief, and then the final realization that a man must stand up to live” 
(xi). Here was the relevant and comforting (if only implied) message of the 
book: through reliance on their inner strength and traditional American ideals, 
twentieth-century Americans could live to prosper and to dream again about 
the future just as the colonists had. The public responded so well to the book 
that it seemed only a matter of time before it would be put to the screen.
Indeed, Darryl F. Zanuck had purchased the movie rights to the book in 
1936, even before it went into circulation. The book’s sales moved slowly at 
first, but in the first month of 1937, there were five printings of ten thousand 
copies each, and Drums became a best seller. Still, Zanuck described himself 
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as “not terrifically enthused” about the project, and when several other com-
panies made offers, he considered disposing of the property (memorandum). 
Only the continuing popularity of the book (it went into thirty-one printings 
by 1939) encouraged him to stick with the uplifting story. He personally su-
pervised revision after revision of the screenplay in a process that eventually 
involved William Faulkner (who tried to simplify the story in a short narrative 
treatment dated 15 March 1938), Sonya Levein (who wrote two dialogue treat-
ments and a first-draft continuity script with shots, angles, and cuts spelled out 
in detail), and Lamar Trotti (who polished Levein’s work, made more changes 
to satisfy Zanuck, and completed the shooting script in May 1939). At every 
stage, Zanuck maintained close contact with the writers, dictating detailed 
conference notes on several editions of the screenplay in which he specified 
places to tighten the story and techniques to heighten the drama.
To Levein’s first-draft continuity script of 2 December 1938, Zanuck 
responded,
In the first place, let us get it understood that we do not want to make a picture 
portraying the revolution in the Mohawk Valley. We want to tell a story about 
a pioneer boy who took a city girl to the Mohawk Valley to live and we must 
tell the story of what happened to them—their ups and downs, their trials and 
tribulations—the same as it was told about the Chinese couple in The Good Earth 
[1937]. In The Good Earth the producers wisely discarded chapter after chapter of 
the book and concentrated on the personal story and on one spectacular trick 
with the locusts. We must follow this example. We have in the script practically 
all of the necessary ingredients to accomplish this but now they are dissipated 
and lost in a rambling jumble of historical and revolutionary data.
After giving another writer three months to work on the project, the producer 
was again dissatisfied, especially with the still complicated plot development. 
Zanuck’s reactions on 11 March 1939, as written up by one of his assistants, 
ran to eleven pages, but a few sentences carry the gist of his feelings:
We must not let ourselves be bound by the contents of the book—but simply 
retain the spirit of the book. We must concentrate our drama, tighten what plot 
we have and make it more forceful—so that we build and build to a sustaining 
sock climax where we let everything go with a bang. So as long as we capture the 
general line, the characters, the period—we can and should forget the book. Mr. 
Zanuck could not be emphatic enough in bringing home the fact that we are in 
the business to Give A Show—that our first job is to Make Entertainment.
Zanuck was happier with the “final” script of 24 April, but he and John Ford, 
who had been chosen to direct the picture, still found seven pages of corrections 
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to suggest. All through the writing process, Zanuck looked to Julian Johnson, 
chief story editor for the studio, for insight and reassurance. As Johnson ob-
served to him some weeks later in a memorandum dated 31 July: “I think the 
thing that gave us the fine script we shot was, as much as anything else, your 
own constant revision and elimination, revision and elimination, every time a 
new treatment showed its head. The shooting final was a triumph of perspira-
tion as well as inspiration.”
Historian Edward Countryman has argued that, as a result of such pres-
sure, the script transformed an essentially historical novel into a “mythic” story 
driven by the characters in “one isolated community.” In the process the writers 
“transformed the social history of the Revolution. . . . By de-revolutionizing the 
Revolution, even as it reconstructs it, the film has helped to rob Americans of 
an appreciation of their past. Its social meaning cannot be grasped without 
reference to this other, pseudo-revolutionary, de-politicizing part of its content” 
(89). Screenwriters also altered some significant aspects of the plot and the 
characterizations presented in the novel. For example, the scene that contrib-
utes the dramatic high point of the film never actually happened, either in 
Gil and Lana Martin (Henry Fonda and Claudette Colbert) share an idyllic moment 
in the Mohawk Valley.
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history or in the novel. The settlers were forced into the fort and, from there, 
did witness the burning of several of their homes, but this came earlier in the 
story. The eventual victory was more of an anticlimax, as the overall defeat 
of the British, culminating at Yorktown, Virginia, meant that they would no 
longer be promoting the Indians’ attacks on the settlers. The main characters, 
Lana and Gil Martin, also underwent transformation during the adaptation. 
Edmunds had been much more sensitive to the plight of the pioneer woman 
and portrayed her inner strength. In the film she does grow into a stronger 
character, but the script gives her none of the depth and complexity possessed 
by Edmunds’s heroine. The simplification of her role early in the film was 
dictated by Zanuck, who feared that otherwise viewers would not see how far 
she had developed by the end of the story (conference notes, 5 Apr. 1939). 
Gil’s character was polished for the film. Early in the novel he takes part in the 
burglarizing of the house of a suspected Loyalist, and later he joins a party of 
Americans that deliberately seeks vengeance against a Tory settlement by set-
ting fire to homes and raping the defenseless women there. In each of these 
two cases, Gil’s participation is only halfhearted, and he is plagued by second 
thoughts, but even with those qualifications, the film’s Gil Martin could not 
take part in such atrocities. Neither the Motion Picture Production Code nor 
the patriotic tone of the film would permit it.
In their final form, the plot, characters, and dramatic elements of Drums 
Along the Mohawk seemed tailor-made for the special talents of John Ford. 
Ford’s skills as a director were well known, but they had resulted in only a few 
memorable films: Iron Horse (1924), The Informer (1935), and Hurricane (1938). 
There was also a series of Ford films with Will Rogers culminating with Steamboat 
Round the Bend (1935)—films that focused on cherished American values. It 
was in 1939 that Ford began to turn out hit after hit with Young Mr. Lincoln, 
Stagecoach (his first Western since the introduction of sound), Drums Along the 
Mohawk, and finally The Grapes of Wrath (1940). Each of these, like his 1941 
classic How Green Was My Valley, gave him the opportunity to develop characters 
based on common people. Ford’s best films shared with those of Frank Capra a 
populist view of American society. Although Capra’s plot situations were usually 
comedies, in contrast to Ford’s popular dramas, both men had a special talent 
for portraying ordinary people who struggle to preserve significant human 
values challenged by forces far more powerful than themselves.
Drums Along the Mohawk offered Ford a rare opportunity. Here he could 
depict an idyllic, early-American agrarian community in more explicit terms 
than in any of his other films. That this idealized lifestyle was menaced by 
barbarous Indians who would not hesitate to rape and torture innocent vic-
tims served to accentuate the virtuous qualities of the God-fearing settlers. In 
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dramatizing the life of New York’s Mohawk Valley in the 1770s, the film strikes 
a careful balance between the individualism and the mutual interdependence 
that typify the frontier ideal. It is punctuated by scenes that celebrate the simple 
agrarian life: weddings, births, and harvests, and a scene in which neighbors 
come seemingly from miles around to help Gil Martin (Henry Fonda) clear 
his land. The frontier people are outgoing and friendly. Some are comical, 
such as Christian Real (Eddie Collins), who forgets to respond to his own 
name while calling roll for militia muster, and the Scots-Irish parson (Arthur 
Shields) who works an advertisement for a local dry goods store into his Sunday 
sermon. Gil’s bride, Lana (Claudette Colbert), raised in a comfortable home 
in Albany, is heartbroken at the first glimpse of his cabin on the fringe of the 
wilderness and terrified at the sight of Blue Back, an Indian who turns out to 
be peaceful and friendly. She demands that Gil take her back home. But soon 
the beauty of the surroundings, the sense of accomplishment in seeing their 
own farm take shape, and the feeling of belonging to the open and congenial 
community of settlers bring her to love their simple life. Ford paints this picture 
Tory leader Caldwell ( John Carradine), rather than British regulars, is the villain of 
Drums Along the Mohawk.
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in such appealing terms that the audience understands perfectly when she 
prays, “Please, God, let it go on like this forever.” Unfortunately, the American 
Revolution disturbs their serenity.
Thanks to Zanuck and his screenwriters, the story that reached the screen 
is a fine example of movie drama with three carefully paced climaxes, increas-
ing in intensity until the final climax of the film. Shortly after the crops are 
harvested, the colonists meet their first challenge as bloodthirsty Indians come 
whooping through the woods and, under the direction of a Tory leader named 
Caldwell ( John Carradine), destroy the Martins’ farm, sending the settlers scur-
rying to the nearby fort to keep the women and children safe. When Gil returns 
from chasing the Indians, he finds his house burned to the ground and his wife 
barely surviving the miscarriage of their first child. Gil is disheartened by their 
bad luck, and now it is Lana’s turn to sustain the pioneering couple. They go 
to work for a wealthy widow, Mrs. McKlennar (Edna May Oliver), and begin 
planning their family once more. But, as if on cue, a second crisis arises. It is 
reported that Indians and Loyalists are gathering at the head of the valley in 
preparation for a major attack, and the militia marches off to meet them. This 
time we do not see the Indians themselves, but we do see the human cost of 
their “war fever” as the men are pictured, weak and wounded, straggling back 
from Oriskany. In a daze, Gil explains that the militia force was ambushed and 
nearly wiped out, but they rallied and finally sent the Indians running. As Gil 
sleeps off the exhaustion of battle, General Nicholas Herkimer (Roger Imhof) 
lies outside in Mrs. McKlennar’s parlor, dying at the hands of a young doctor 
performing his first amputation.
For a year after the Battle of Oriskany, the Martins and their infant son live 
happily with Mrs. McKlennar, hoping someday to rebuild their cabin. Then, 
on the day after they have celebrated a bumper crop, a party of hostile Indi-
ans sets fire to the McKlennar house and lays waste to the neighboring farms. 
The terrified colonists, huddled at the fort at German Flats, find themselves 
besieged by an overwhelming force. The plot becomes more active as the situ-
ation at the fort becomes more desperate. The colonists are outnumbered by 
their attackers, and the women take weapons and join the men on the walls. 
Mrs. McKlennar is the first to be hit. She takes an arrow in the chest and dies. 
Things look bleak. Ammunition is getting dangerously low. In desperation, Joe 
Boleo (played by Francis Ford, the director’s brother) resolves to escape and 
run to Fort Dayton for aid. Unfortunately, Boleo is captured by the Indians, 
who tie him atop a wagon loaded with hay and, in full view of the fortress, set 
the wagon aflame. To spare him from being burned alive, the parson shoots 
Boleo. It is left to Gil to make another try. Assuring Lana that he can outrun 
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any “redskin,” he lowers himself through a portal in the fort wall and takes 
off, with three Indians close at his heels.
Gil’s escape is the most memorable action sequence of the film, as Ford 
drags out the chase for almost five minutes. It is worth noting that this is 
another example of the screenwriters’ “adjusting” historical facts to improve 
the film’s plot. The actual run, as described in Edmunds’s book and as noted 
above, came earlier in the conflict and was made by a man named Adam 
Helmer (played by Ward Bond in the film). It was made to the fort at German 
Flats, not away from it. Furthermore, Helmer’s warning, instead of bringing 
Continental reinforcements, frightened the colonists and their militia into 
hiding within the walls of the fort. As portrayed in the novel, this was one 
of dozens of confrontations with the “destructives,” none of which was truly 
conclusive. In the film’s version of the run, it becomes the dramatic turning 
point. The sun comes up a vivid orange in the background as Gil finally leaves 
his pursuers gasping behind. In the next shot, the main force of Indians is 
seen breaching the fort walls, and Lana, the woman who had cowered in fear 
at her first encounter with the harmless Blue Back, is bravely shooting one of 
the intruders at point-blank range. As Zanuck wanted it, alerted by Gil, the 
Continental reinforcements arrive just in time to rout the savages and save the 
day. Fortunately, the fight will not recur. In the last scene, an officer arrives 
with the news that General Washington’s troops have defeated Cornwallis at 
Yorktown in the final battle of the Revolutionary War. But thanks to the pencil 
of fiction wielded by Zanuck’s writers, in 20th Century-Fox’s version of the 
war, the farmers of the valley have enjoyed their own victory at German Flats 
before the news of Yorktown arrives.
From the outset it was obvious that, because of the sets and locations 
required, Drums would be a very expensive picture to make. The greatest 
problems were logistical. The open spaces called for in the script required 
shooting on location. Any thought of shooting in the Mohawk Valley itself 
was quickly rejected because industrialization had transformed almost every 
inch of the landscape. Moreover, Zanuck’s decision to film in Technicolor led 
him to search for special atmospheric conditions to maximize the quality of 
the photography. They finally chose a high plateau in the Wasatch Range of 
the Rocky Mountains, near Cedar City, Utah, where the lack of haze in the 
morning allowed vast distances to be photographed with perfect clarity, and 
beautiful cloud formations appeared on schedule every afternoon to accent 
the panoramic views (Drums press book).
As with its previous historical films, 20th Century-Fox was scrupulous about 
details. The studio claimed to have searched all over Hollywood for Iroquois 
Indians to play in the film. They could find only two, however, and one of them 
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was thought to be too short and fat. The other was a seventy-two-year-old man 
named Chief Big Tree who was purported to have posed for the buffalo nickel. 
He was given the role of Blue Back, a friendly but rather dull-witted native 
who has been Christianized and now fights on the side of the colonists. Great 
attention was also given to the uniforms the men would wear and the weapons 
they would use. In a paean to its enterprising agents abroad, the studio boasted 
that the flintlock muskets employed had been purchased in Africa, where their 
anachronistic ineffectiveness had been proved in Ethiopia’s failed attempt to 
ward off Mussolini’s modernized army in 1935 (Drums press book).
THE PATRIOT
Both the world situation and the nature of movie production were rather dif-
ferent in 2000 than they were in 1939. The two world wars were buried safely 
in the history books, and the cold war seemed to be over as well. To be sure, 
there were new tensions in the world, ones more colored by religious extrem-
ism, terror, and the world supply of oil. Americans still worried about being 
drawn into foreign wars, but the conflicts seemed more likely to take place in 
the Middle East, and the enemy was more likely to be driven by a commitment 
Benjamin Martin (Mel Gibson), a member of the South Carolina 
Assembly.
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to Islamic fundamentalism than to the tenets of Hitler or Marx. Daily reports 
of street bombings came from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and it seemed that dip-
lomats might be unsafe almost anywhere in the world. At the same time, the 
movie studios were becoming things of the past. No longer did giant studios 
maintain sound stages, stables of writers, costume departments, and contract 
players ready to adapt themselves to whatever new project came along. Instead, 
financial backers, producers, directors, and on-screen personalities might form 
ad hoc relationships for a few pictures at a time.
The Patriot was the outcome of one of these collaborations. While working 
together on the World War II drama Saving Private Ryan in 1996, screenwriter 
Robert Rodat and producer Mark Gordon had the idea of making a film about 
the American Revolution. They found the story of South Carolina planter 
Benjamin Martin particularly appealing because it was “the story of a man 
who has conflicting responsibilities to the then developing nation and to his 
family.” The main character has to deal with “obligations that are in direct 
conflict.” As the pieces came together for The Patriot, the team continued to 
work together on Stargate (1994), Independence Day (1996), and Godzilla (1998) 
(Fritz and Aberly 14).
The production of The Patriot was undertaken by Columbia Pictures and 
Sony Pictures Entertainment, but the day-to-day work was put in the hands of 
director Roland Emmerich and producer Dean Devlin through their indepen-
dent production company, Centropolis Entertainment. In a preproduction 
boot camp, as they called it, they prepared their cast with training in the arts 
of horsemanship and eighteenth-century warfare. In the end, the sixty-three 
principal actors were supported by ninety-five stuntmen, four hundred extras, 
and four hundred more reenactors familiar with re-creating battle scenes of 
two centuries before. Whereas 20th Century-Fox had been able to utilize its 
many in-house resources to research and acquire or produce what it needed 
in terms of props and costumes for Drums, the Centropolis group enlisted the 
Smithsonian Institution both to assist with research and to provide some of the 
items required. The goal, as explained by associate producer Diane McNeff, 
was to achieve a “subtle accuracy” in which viewers weren’t necessarily aware of 
the work that had been done because “everything looks perfectly believable.” 
The filming was done in South Carolina, where some major construction was 
called for. The entire town of Pembroke was rebuilt, as were the ruins of Cow-
pens and Benjamin Martin’s plantation, where we first meet the characters 
(Fritz and Aberly 14).
As the film begins, we hear Benjamin Martin’s voice before we see him. 
It’s an inner voice expressing concern about his problems with self-control: 
“I have long feared that my sins will come to revisit me and the cost is more 
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than I can bear.” We soon learn that the sins he regrets relate to his tenden-
cies toward violence, which expressed themselves in his conduct during the 
French and Indian War. Yet our first sight of him is a picture of domesticity. 
His wife having died recently, he is raising his seven children on his own. His 
efforts at homemaking extend to his trying, without much success, to craft a 
spindle-backed chair. Part of his problem is his short temper, which leads easily 
to frustration and to a woodworking project gone awry.
Although he lives in the countryside, Martin is a community leader who 
travels to the capital at Charleston to sit in the colonial assembly as it votes 
for independence. We see and hear the debate on the issues of taxation and 
imperial control, but the factors that really matter to Martin and at least some 
of his neighbors are more personal. Martin wants to avoid fighting and thus 
protect his family, as well as escape having to face his insecurity about his own 
penchant for violence. But when his eldest son, Gabriel (Heath Ledger), enlists 
and British regulars arrive in his neighborhood, Benjamin is driven to pick up 
his weapons and go off to fight. Harking back to his experience in the Indian 
wars, with his musket he carries another symbolic weapon of choice, a toma-
British regulars torch the Martin homestead. 
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hawk, which he wields expertly. In some ways Gibson’s character seems to be 
a reprise of his role as a crazed Scottish freedom fighter against the British in 
Braveheart (1995). In other ways, particularly in its revenge scenario, the film 
is reminiscent of Lethal Weapon (1987), in which Gibson plays an “ordinary 
man driven to manic despair and crazed violence by circumstances out of his 
control” (Glancy 532).
The ultimate challenge that drives Benjamin into the conflict is the defense 
of his family. His son Gabriel has already been in the fight for some months. 
He is identified as a dispatch rider for the American army, is captured on a 
visit to his father’s plantation by a particularly boorish British officer named 
Tavington ( Jason Isaacs), and is taken off for military trial and expected execu-
tion (a punishment that we learn is inappropriate for a lowly dispatch rider). 
In the confrontation, Tavington (a character based on Banastre Tarleton, 
leader of the Green Dragoons in South Carolina during 1780) shoots one of 
Benjamin’s younger sons dead for trying to defend Gabriel and orders that 
the house be put to the torch. Benjamin’s first action in support of the larger 
cause is the ambush of the small party that is taking Gabriel away and achieving 
his escape. Thereafter, Benjamin becomes the bane of the British regulars and 
their Tory supporters by leading a ragtag but very effective local militia made 
up of his neighbors and former fellows in arms. Before they can identify him, 
the British refer to Martin as the “Ghost” because of his capacity to attack by 
surprise and then disappear. 
In this way the plot seems to resemble most closely the career of Francis 
Marion, the South Carolina revolutionary known to the British as the “Swamp 
Fox” because of his consistent ability to attack and then retreat to hide in the 
protection of nearby swamps. Aspects of two other revolutionary leaders are 
also reflected in Martin’s character. Daniel Morgan of Hunterdon County, New 
Jersey, accompanied Benedict Arnold in his assault on Quebec and fought at 
Saratoga. Later in the war he led troops seeking to slow the advance of Lord 
Cornwallis in the South, culminating in the victory at Cowpens in January 1781. 
A third source for Martin’s achievements was the life of Thomas Sumpter, a 
Virginia-born officer who earned the nickname “Carolina Gamecock” for his 
fighting against the British there (Fritz and Aberly 28).
After the British defeat at Saratoga (1777) and other losses in the North, 
and with the formal entry of the French as an ally of the colonists, the British 
adopted a “southern strategy.” They took Savannah and resisted an Ameri-
can assault there. Subsequently they besieged Charlestown (an attack that is 
portrayed in the film). Then in 1780 and 1781 the war became centered in 
the Carolinas, with the British, led by Cornwallis, enjoying the considerable 
assistance of Loyalists there. The Patriot follows the struggle of the colonists’ 
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militia forces in resisting the British as they fight their way north through the 
Carolinas: there is the British defeat at Cowpens, the bloody confrontation 
at Guilford Courthouse, and the final cornering of the British at Yorktown, 
where they are forced to surrender. (For the fullest and most recent treatment 
of these events, see John Ferling’s Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the 
War of Independence, especially his chapter “The Pivotal Southern War.”) Along 
the way Martin satisfies his thirst for revenge, killing Tavington (his younger 
son’s shooter) in a face-to-face confrontation.
We also observe two love stories—Benjamin’s growing affinity for his wid-
owed sister-in-law ( Joely Richardson) and Gabriel’s feelings for Anne Howard 
(Lisa Brenner), who is smitten with Gabriel when she hears him stir the com-
munity to fight. Anne marries Gabriel in a seaside ceremony but then dies in 
the most vicious of the British attacks on local citizens: the British board up and 
set fire to a church full of worshippers. This is perhaps the most questionable 
event portrayed in the film. Producer Devlin claims, “We tried to keep all the 
events in the film real to the events that happened in the American Revolution. 
They may not have happened in the same way or in the same place, but the 
spirit of everything in the film can be drawn from real events all throughout 
the American Revolution” (quoted in Fritz and Aberly 18). The immolation 
of religious people in a house of worship certainly seems more twentieth than 
eighteenth century—and more Nazi than British—in spirit. But it may have 
rung true to most viewers of the 2000 film as they matched the film’s acts of 
terror with what they read in daily newspapers.4
There are touching moments, too, in the film, such as the relationship 
that develops between Martin and revolutionary officer Colonel Burwell (Chris 
Cooper), one of Martin’s previous fellows-in-arms who comes to appreciate 
even more the guerrilla fighters led by his old friend. And a few interesting 
symbols are used. Benjamin gives Gabriel a star amulet as a remembrance of 
his mother. He passes it to Anne as a symbol of their love and commitment to 
each other, only to find it later in the ashes of the church. As a symbol of the 
indestructibility of Gabriel and Anne’s love, the amulet survives the fire. In 
contrast, as the military engagements progress and Benjamin needs lead for 
musket balls, we see him on several occasions melting down the toy soldiers 
he kept in remembrance of his younger son, who was killed by the British in 
the first confrontation at their home. The toy soldiers are melted to form shot 
to kill real soldiers.
Both Drums Along the Mohawk and The Patriot were widely reviewed at the time 
of their release. Critic Louella Parsons called Drums “unexcelled entertain-
ment.” Most reviewers were impressed with the action scenes, such as the 
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Indian attacks and Gil’s dash for reinforcements. Almost all liked Fonda and 
Colbert. Several also noted approval for Arthur Shields and Edna May Oliver, 
especially for the scene in which she browbeats two Indians who have just set 
her house on fire into carrying her and her bed through the flames to safety 
(see New York Times 2 Nov. 1939; Variety 9 Nov. 1939; New York World Telegram 4 
Nov. 1939). Movie critic Herbert Cohn, who saw the film at the Roxy Theater 
in Manhattan (along with a stage show featuring “Bobby May, the juggling 
jester”), was more perceptive than some of the better-known reviewers. He 
noted that the film needed “dramatic tightening” and more “fluidity of plot” 
(Brooklyn Daily Eagle  4 Nov. 1939). Time  magazine (20 Nov. 1939) predicted that 
the film would appeal to “fans who like their warpaint thick, their war whoops 
bloodcurdling, and their arson Technicolored.” Moviegoers who responded 
to questionnaires in twenty-six newspapers across the country ranked Drums 
their thirteenth favorite film of the year (Film Daily Yearbook 1941), and the 
studio was pleased enough with the profits to rerelease the film in 1947 for 
another successful run.
Reviewers of The Patriot were also generally pleased with what they saw. 
(Some were concerned about the images of youngsters using guns, but it was 
a revolution, after all.) By 2000, even prestigious historical journals were re-
viewing films, and here there was more dissatisfaction. The reviewer for the 
Journal of American History, for example, expressed concern about an inter-
view with Mel Gibson indicating that the filmmakers had “taken license with 
history to make it more compelling” and noted the film’s “almost complete 
omission of the Loyalists. . . . Though Loyalist provincial and militia units 
constituted one-half of the British army in the South, the film portrays only 
one Loyalist soldier” (St. George 1146). In Britain, according to one analyst, 
“critics discussed the film in a dismissive manner rather than a condemnatory 
one” (Glancy 536). FreeRepublic.com, an online conservative news forum, 
reported that British prime minister Tony Blair “demanded an apology from 
Mel Gibson for ‘Anti-British’ Sentiments in The Patriot ” (Shamaya). And there 
was a flurry of gripes from viewers who noted mistakes, especially in the film’s 
editing and continuity.5
The study of the evolution of these two productions, and the comparison of 
the two films that eventually reached the screen, suggests a few generalizations 
about Hollywood’s treatments of the American Revolution—indeed, its treat-
ment of many historical topics. We can posit three general rules.
First, for a film to be successful with a mass audience, it must contain 
scenes and characters with which the broadest possible group of people can 
identify—therefore Drums includes the roles played by Eddie Collins and Ar-
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thur Shields and accents weddings and births, experiences that every viewer is 
likely to have encountered at some time in life. The opening scene in Drums, 
the wedding at Lana’s comfortable Albany home, does not appear in the novel. 
It was added by the scriptwriters in an obvious attempt to provide a colorful 
contrast to the Spartan life of the frontier and to allow the audience to relate 
immediately to Gil and Lana. This type of scene, of course, was John Ford’s 
stock in trade and may have had special meaning for him, but its most basic 
function in a film such as this is in helping the audience relate immediately 
to characters from the past. The same end is accomplished in The Patriot with 
the poignant playing up of the widower father and his children. The relation-
ship between Benjamin and his son Gabriel is central to The Patriot’s drama. 
As Devlin explains, “It’s an enormously emotional compelling story about a 
father and a son, which I think everyone can relate to, the idea of a father try-
ing to keep his family together” (quoted in Fritz and Aberly 18). The scene of 
Gabriel and Anne’s wedding at the beach is touching too. The film appealed 
to women as well as to men who might picture themselves fighting alongside 
Benjamin and his compatriots.
Second, characters who are meant to have broad appeal cannot be too 
intellectual or too radical; their personalities should be simple and their loyal-
ties unconfused. One aspect of Gil’s personality is forgotten in Drums. In the 
novel he, like Benjamin in The Patriot, has a troubling personal history—his 
previous experience in battle also showed a penchant for violence. The early 
chapters of Edmunds’s book include reference to a bloody raid Gil and other 
colonists made against an Indian settlement, justifying their own savagery 
against the less-than-human “destructives.” In the film, in contrast, there is 
no reference to specific earlier Indian conflicts, and Gil is shocked at the 
violence he encounters in his fight with the Indians. He remarks emotion-
ally to his wife about the surprised look on one Indian’s face as he fell on an 
upturned knife, and he expresses distress that some other colonists seem to 
be enjoying themselves in the fight. Driven though he is to acts of violence, 
he shows some sensitivity to the suffering and barbarity encountered on both 
sides. In The Patriot, several of Benjamin’s violent outbursts appear, and view-
ers may be put off by his placement of a tomahawk squarely in the forehead 
of one of his foes. At another point he is drenched in the blood of one of his 
opponents, but perhaps the filmmakers resisted the temptation to show even 
more bloodletting.
Third, events and characters might have to be adjusted or their actions 
reordered to heighten the excitement and sharpen the climaxes. Therefore 
Gil rather than Adam Helmer makes the dramatic run, and a cavalry-to-the-
rescue dramatic ending is grafted onto Drums to achieve the desired emotional 
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crescendo. The clearest example of such creative adaptation in The Patriot is 
the shock value achieved by the burning of the church full of worshippers.
However indirectly these two important films on the American Revolution 
may have responded to the contemporary events of 1939 and 2000, impending 
wars in Europe and the Middle East helped set the tone for their interpreta-
tions of history. In addition, in their “adjustments” of plot and characteriza-
tion (such as the cleansing of Henry Fonda’s character in the film version of 
Drums and the sharpening of the violence in The Patriot’s church burning), 
both films reflect a twentieth-century worldview. The colonists in Drums are 
blameless victims of the Indians and Tories inflamed by the British, and the 
inhumanity of the church-burning enemy in The Patriot justifies any response. 
Taking a long view, both these films about the American Revolution answer 
the very challenging question of why we fought.
We can wish for more thoughtful and more accurate representations of 
our nation’s founding struggle, ones more driven by scholarship than by per-
ceived box office appeal. But as long as motion pictures remain a popular art 
form, historians who study them must remain cognizant of the pressures that 
inevitably come to bear in a film’s production and must be sensitive to the con-
cerns and perceptions of the audiences for whom the films were made. In the 
end, the analysis of popular historical dramas such as Drums Along the Mohawk 
and The Patriot can help us to understand the centuries-long confrontation 
between settlers and Native Americans, as well as the more specific struggle 
for American independence. Moreover, such study can inform us about how 
the nation’s involvement in twentieth-century wars has helped shape modern 
portrayals of American history.
NOTES
Much of the material here on Drums Along the Mohawk was originally published in 
my article “A Reaffirmation of American Ideals: Drums Along the Mohawk (1939),” in 
O’Connor and Jackson (97–119).
1. Another Hollywood product of 1939 was The Howards of Virginia, which cast 
Cary Grant and Martha Scott as frontier settlers. They are at the center of revolution-
ary developments: Matthew Howard (Grant) is elected from his frontier district to sit 
in the House of Burgesses, where he votes for independence. As another interesting 
detail, Howard’s brother-in-law, played by Sir Cedric Hardwick, was an unreconstructed 
Loyalist.
2. The memo was between two military consultants relied on by the studio to 
gain access to specialized information and to maintain good relations with the armed 
forces. Captain Lloyd Morris to Colonel Jason Joy, 27 June 1939, story editor’s corre-
spondence file, 20th Century-Fox Archives, Hollywood, Calif. Presumably, the author 
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was not thinking of the Indians’ costumes when he suggested that the British might 
“weigh feathers.”
3. Consider adaptations of other historical novels such as Margaret Mitchell’s Gone 
with the Wind (1939) and Kenneth Roberts’s Northwest Passage (1939).
4. Glancy argues that the event is a reference to the burning of a church in World 
War II. Although the scene was based on an actual wartime atrocity, he observes, it “was 
in the French village of Oradour-sur-Galne, and in 1944, that the German SS locked 
the villagers in their church and set it on fire.” Others saw the burning of the church 
as a reference to the massacre of civilians at My Lai in Vietnam. Still others saw it as 
a reference to the siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, in 1993 
(Glancy 536, 538).
5. For example, one viewer noted that, although the film covers a seven-year 
span from 1776 to 1783, with one exception the children in the film do not age at 
all. Movie Mistakes <http://www.moviemistakes.com/film958>. See also http://www 
.moviemistakes. com/film958/corrections and http://www.saunalahti.fi/~frog1/goofs/
patriot.htm.
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REPRINTING THE LEGEND
The Alamo on Film
2 / Frank Thompson
Back when schoolchildren actually knew something about history, the stir-
ring and heroic saga of the siege and fall of the Alamo was as well known as 
Washington’s crossing of the Delaware or Teddy Roosevelt’s charge up San Juan 
Hill. To tell the story was to sing a hymn to gleaming, unassailable patriotism 
and, as Alamo commander William Barret Travis wrote in his most famous 
letter, “everything dear to the American character.” Surely, the battle of the 
Alamo is a mythic event.
THE MYTHIC STORY
The story that those schoolchildren knew was roughly this: In February 1836 a 
small but determined band of Americans holed up in the Alamo, a crumbling 
old mission turned fort just outside San Antonio, Texas. Texas was at the time 
still a part of Mexico, and the cruel and despotic Mexican dictator General 
Antonio López de Santa Anna adjudged these Americans to be interlopers and 
revolutionaries. He and his army of thousands laid siege to the Alamo. What 
the defenders inside the walls of the Alamo lacked in numbers they made up 
for in ferocity, bravery, and sterling goodness. Young William Barret Travis, 
a firebrand lawyer and revolutionary, was in command. His cocommander, 
Jim Bowie, was too ill to take an active role in the defense of the fort, but 
his legendary knife and exciting exploits were such that his presence was as 
important as his actions.
But even Bowie’s fame paled beside that of a recent arrival, Davy Crockett 
of  Tennessee. Crockett’s fellow fighters in the Alamo were inspired by his color-
ful history as a bear hunter and Indian fighter—not to mention congressman 
from 1826 to 1830 and from 1832 to 1834. He was possibly the greatest living 
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frontiersman, and he had cast his lot with the outnumbered Texans in San 
Antonio.
Santa Anna’s cannon pounded the walls of the Alamo for thirteen days. 
Despite Travis’s repeated pleas for assistance, only one group of thirty-two 
reinforcements showed up. Finally, knowing all was lost, Travis gave a stirring 
speech to his men, telling them that they would surely die if they continued 
to defend the Alamo. He drew a line in the dirt with his saber and invited ev-
ery man who volunteered to stay and fight to the death to cross over the line. 
Without hesitation, they all crossed over.
In the predawn hours of 6 March 1836, the Mexican army attacked. By 
sunrise the battle was over and every defender of the Alamo lay dead. But each 
Texan had taken scores of Mexicans with him into death. As Travis had promised 
in his letter of 24 February, Santa Anna’s victory was “worse than a defeat.”
A few weeks later, a vengeful Texas army under Sam Houston surprised 
Santa Anna at San Jacinto and defeated him in a battle that lasted a mere 
fifteen minutes. Santa Anna was captured and, in exchange for his life, gave 
the land we now call Texas to his victorious adversary. Now the territory was an 
independent republic, thanks to the martyrdom of the heroes of the Alamo.
The Alamo set from Errol Flynn’s San Antonio.
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THE BACKSTORY
Of course, as with all “true” stories, the actual event was far more chaotic and 
complicated than that pristine myth of patriotic sacrifice. Scholars and histo-
rians have spent decades uncovering new details, and every time they do, it 
seems that the legend of the Alamo is chipped away just a little more.
James Bowie was certainly an adventurer—but he was also a slave trader, 
land swindler, and sometime partner of the Louisiana pirate Jean Lafitte. And it 
appears that the famed Bowie knife was created by James’s brother Rezin Bowie. 
William Barret Travis abandoned his pregnant wife to take up with a mistress 
and arrived in Texas under suspicion of murdering a man back in Alabama. 
And David Crockett, while admittedly a fine hunter, did not have much of a 
career as a fighter of Indians or anybody else. His most striking achievement 
in life had been serving three terms in Congress.
Nor was the Texas revolution quite the pure-hearted enterprise of which 
the storybooks sing. Settlers had been drawn to the Mexican territory of Texas 
by offers of no taxes and free land. But when Mexican dictator Santa Anna 
closed the borders, the settlers saw the action as downright un-American and 
started protesting and then fighting the new rulings.
In short, the battle of the Alamo was not a case of good guys being over-
whelmed by bad guys but a conflict in which each side had uncompromising 
arguments that could be settled only by violence.
MY TWO VERSIONS OF THE ALAMO
For the movies, however, complexity has never been a comfortable attitude. 
Nearly every Alamo film over the past century has gone straight for the legend, 
erasing any ambiguity of motive. After all, if John Wayne is fighting for an ideal, 
who can doubt that he is firmly on the side of good and right?
John Wayne did not introduce me to the subject of the Alamo. In 1960, 
at the age of eight, I had lived through the backwash of the Crockett craze of 
1955, even though I had been just a little too young to experience the real 
thing. Long before Wayne’s The Alamo came along, I had spent countless hours 
defending the redoubtable fort in the backyard and re-creating the massacre 
with my precious 54mm plastic figures by the Louis Marx Toy Company. Thus 
I walked into the Wayne film somewhat familiar with the subject—but I walked 
out as a convert.
In the summer of 1963 my family took a road trip from South Carolina to 
San Antonio to let me see the Alamo in person. While we were there, I bad-
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gered one of the Daughters of the Republic of Texas—the caretakers of the 
shrine since 1905—with questions. I couldn’t quite reconcile the modern-day 
Alamo, which is essentially one building, with the massive mission compound 
that had served as the fort back in 1836. The caretaker suggested to my father 
that he take me down to Brackettville, a tiny town about 120 miles southwest of 
San Antonio, to see the set constructed for the Wayne film. My father thought 
that was a splendid idea, and we drove down the next day.
The Wayne set—or the Waynamo, as aficionados call it—was out in the 
middle of nowhere, in ruins from the blasts it took during production of the 
film four years earlier. It was magical—like a Marx play set come to life. From 
that day on, my imagination had room for two Alamos—the historical Alamo 
and the Alamo of popular culture. I kept them separate but equal. Others, as 
I was to learn over the years, did not bother to separate them at all.
In the late 1980s I began work on a book about the Alamo on film, which I 
titled, imaginatively, Alamo Movies. In it I charted the different ways Hollywood 
has approached the famous story. But I did not deal with how history has been 
The John Wayne version of the Alamo.
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mangled in these films. That struck me as pointless. No one had ever even 
tried to make an accurate depiction—although nearly every Alamo filmmaker 
made extravagant claims to authenticity. The artistic license started from the 
very beginning.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MOVIE HISTORIES
In January 1910 the New York–based Star Film Company came to San Anto-
nio, Texas, in search of sunny winter quarters to make moving pictures. The 
company, under the direction of Gaston Méliès, older brother of cinema pio-
neer Georges Méliès, came to San Antonio to populate its one-reel Westerns, 
comedies, and melodramas with “real cowboys” and “real Mexicans.” The 
visitors stayed in the famous health resort Hot Wells Hotel and rented a house 
and barn on the banks of the San Antonio River. They called it the Star Film 
Ranch; it was the first moving picture studio in Texas. Given the location, it was 
probably inevitable that, in addition to the genre films they were producing, 
the Alamo would strike Méliès’ troupe as a perfect subject—especially since 
no one had ever tried it before.
The Film Index reported that the company planned “a correct representa-
tion of the Alamo insurrection, famous in history, taken on the very ground 
where it took place. Many of the old houses which played an important part 
in the ‘defense of the Alamo’ are the scenes of the picture” (26 Feb. 1910, 3). 
The Alamo picture was among the first announced projects of the Star Film 
Company, but it took a year for the filmmakers to get around to it. When they 
did, director William Haddock stressed how hard they were working to fill the 
film with solid history. He told a San Antonio Light reporter in January 1911, 
“Already the scenario is being prepared and has necessitated delving into the 
old archives to obtain the correct historical setting and the infinite number of 
details to be known. Of course it would be impossible to give the siege in its 
entirety, but the incidents of most historic interest will be faithfully portrayed. 
The Alamo as it now stands does not resemble its appearance at the time of 
the famous battle, so we are building an exact reproduction of the structure as 
it then looked” (12–13). In 1911 the siege of the Alamo was still within living 
memory, closer in history than we are, for example, to Black Monday, which 
marked the stock market crash that precipitated the Great Depression. Many 
elderly citizens of San Antonio had witnessed the event. Indeed, at least one 
survivor of the battle—Enrique Esparza, who, as an eight-year-old boy, had 
watched his father die in the Alamo—still lived in the city, not far from where 
the film was produced.
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All the information from these witnesses and the records found in the “old 
archives” must have ensured that The Immortal Alamo would be as accurate and 
authentic a reproduction as was possible to make. But of course, it wasn’t.
The “exact reproduction” turned out to be a painted canvas backdrop. 
Cadets from nearby Peacock Military Academy were pressed into service be-
cause their uniforms were vaguely similar to those worn by the Mexicans in 
1836. And the plot was pure fictional melodrama about a pretty Anglo wife 
who survives the battle only to be nearly forcibly “married” to a lustful and 
deceitful Mexican (portrayed by Francis Ford, older brother of director-to-be 
John Ford). Luckily for her, her husband, Lieutenant Dickinson (a historical 
character who actually perished in the Alamo) has been sent out for reinforce-
ments. He and Sam Houston’s army arrive just in the nick of time, like the 
perennial cavalry, defeating the Mexican army and, more important, saving 
Mrs. Dickinson’s honor.
The Immortal Alamo set the pattern for Alamo movies over the next nine 
decades. Claims of exhaustive research and rigorous attention to historical 
detail were regularly followed by cinematic depictions that were rarely anything 
other than pure fiction.
The press book for producer Anthony J. Xydias’s With Davy Crockett at the Fall 
A scene from the first Alamo film, The Immortal Alamo (1911).
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of the Alamo (1926) claims that the film bears “the stamp of authentic detail” and 
that the Alamo and San Antonio sets “are shown exactly as they were in those 
days,” a lie made even odder by the fact that the city of San Antonio appears 
nowhere in the film, authentically or otherwise. And, needless to say, only tiny 
snippets of history were allowed to seep into the action-packed movie.
John Wayne loudly touted that the sets for his The Alamo (1960) were based 
precisely on the “original blueprints” in Spain and that screenwriter James 
Edward Grant had read scores of books on the Alamo. Of course, there are no 
“original blueprints.” If they existed, perhaps art director Al Ybarra’s sets would 
not have been so fanciful and inauthentic. And there is no evidence in Grant’s 
dreadful, entirely fictional screenplay that he had read even a single book on 
the Alamo. Wayne did hire two of Texas’s leading historians, Lon Tinkle and 
J. Frank Dobie, to act as historical consultants on the film, but both men left 
the set in disgust at the historical liberties being taken and asked Wayne to 
remove their names from the credits.
And the IMAX production Alamo . . . The Price of Freedom (1988), which 
even Alamo historians believed would be the most scrupulous film of all, was 
compromised by the reuse of Wayne’s inaccurate set (which still stands near 
Brackettville, Texas), a cast of primarily amateur actors, and a simplistic screen-
play written by one of the film’s major financial backers. The creative forces 
behind the project crowed loudly about their careful adherence to fact, but 
even these history buffs were not immune to the lures of myth. The screen-
writer, the late George McAlister, told me during production of Alamo . . . The 
Price of Freedom that whenever his research yielded more than one version of 
any given event, “we came down on the side of heroism every time.”
So do nearly all Alamo films. Although the filmmakers want the public to 
believe they are witnessing precise reconstructions of events as they actually 
happened, the story of the Alamo has always been particularly problematic on 
this score. First, and perhaps most important, the myth of the Alamo is more 
persistent in the public’s imagination than are the facts of the matter. Before 
the smoke of battle had cleared, the event was already inspiring poetry. Soon 
would follow songs, novels, plays, toys, games, souvenirs, comic books, and, of 
course, movies. And, in all these media, the battle of the Alamo is portrayed 
as an uncorrupted moment of heroism, the tale of an outnumbered band of 
patriots who stood bravely against an overwhelming, barbarous army led by 
a despot. That makes a shining legend, but it has little to do with the reality 
of the Alamo. Still, as the newspaper editor in John Ford’s The Man Who Shot 
Liberty Valance (1962) says in one of the most quoted lines in movie history, 
“When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.”
In 1955, when Fess Parker went down swinging his rifle at the onrush-
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ing Mexicans in the “Davy Crockett at the Alamo” episode of Walt Disney’s 
Disneyland TV series, the image was fixed in the minds of millions of impres-
sionable youngsters. The Crockett craze of that year was the big bang of the 
baby boom—more than three thousand items of Crockett merchandise were 
sold; Crockett-related clothing accounted for a whopping 10 percent of all 
children’s clothes sold; and the theme song “The Ballad of Davy Crockett,” 
recorded by a score of artists, sold millions of copies. There is almost nothing 
of real historical value in the program. The sets and costumes are all wrong, 
nearly all the characters are fictional, and there is no political context for 
the fight—just some vague lines about freedom. But none of that mattered 
to the kids who became Crockett fiends overnight. They followed the Liberty 
Valance principle: if this isn’t what the battle of the Alamo was like, it’s what 
it should have been like.
The release of John Wayne’s epic five years later only compounded the 
problem. This huge Batjac/United Artists production was found wanting by 
many, but its homespun script, its outsized characters, and its colorful scenes 
of action were hugely attractive to those same kids who had lately been con-
verted by the Crockett craze to the secular religion of Alamoism. The Wayne 
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film contains not a word, character, costume, or event that corresponds to 
historical reality in any way. But in its heartfelt simplicity, it remains enormously 
entertaining and even moving. Its vast sets and location shooting even give it 
a powerful aura of reality. Unfortunately, many have confused this aura with 
genuine authenticity, of which the film contains not a whit.
I followed Alamo Movies with two more books on the subject: The Alamo: A 
Cultural History (2001) and The Alamo (2002). That seemed like enough for any-
body, and I figured I had had my last word on the subject. But I was wrong.
MY CONTRIBUTION TO THE MOVIE MYTHS
In April 2002 producer Todd Hallowell asked me to attend a “summit meet-
ing” with Ron Howard and several Alamo historians at the Omni Hotel in 
Austin. There had been rumblings for some time that a new Alamo film was 
in preproduction, and now I learned that the rumors were true.
Screenwriter Les Bohem had pitched the idea to Howard several years 
earlier and in 1998 had produced the first draft of a screenplay. But the project 
remained on the back burner until the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center on 11 September 2001. Soon afterward, Disney head Michael Eisner 
put the dormant project on the fast track, apparently eager to get a good, 
patriotic, all-American story onto the screen. (It seems clear that Eisner’s view 
of the Alamo came from other movies, not from history.) But Howard did not 
see the subject as a flag waver. Instead he wanted to tell the story of the Alamo 
with all the grimness and violence of Saving Private Ryan or The Wild Bunch. 
And overriding everything was his desire to take history seriously. Several 
other screenwriters contributed drafts, including one fascinating if rambling 
effort by independent filmmaker John Sayles, who was known for his original 
meditation on Texas history in Lone Star.
The summit meeting undoubtedly unnerved Howard far more than it 
enlightened him. He, his production designer Michael Corenblith, and his 
producer Todd Hallowell spent a very long day with the eight historians, dis-
cussing and debating every nuance of the Alamo narrative. Sometimes when 
Howard asked us a question, he would receive eight mutually exclusive answers. 
On some points, the authorities disagreed vehemently.
Howard left the project soon after and was replaced by John Lee Hancock. 
Happily, Hancock (a Texan) was even more determined to make the film as 
authentic as possible. He wrote a meticulously researched final draft of the 
script and kept two noted Alamo historians, Stephen Hardin and Alan Huff-
ines, on the set with him nearly every day. Even so, he admitted that “each of 
us who attempts to tell the story of the Alamo, whether in words or images, is 
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doomed to some degree of failure. Seemingly, every source one finds defends 
itself against a counter source; every bit of data carries an asterisk that puts its 
relevance or veracity in question.” One day, in conversation with Corenblith, 
Hancock was reminded “that in any true story there exists both a factual and 
emotional truth. And that, to be faithful to the tale, you need a balance of 
both” (quoted in Thompson, Alamo: Illustrated).
During production, I learned that my Alamo book output was to rise from 
three books to a whopping five. I was assigned to write not only the “making 
of ” volume, The Alamo: The Illustrated Story of the Epic Film, but also the novel-
ization of the screenplay, The Alamo. I was given carte blanche to visit the set 
and was even asked to appear in a cameo role in the film as a Texas politician. 
All this, as you can well imagine, made me want to write a detailed postcard 
to the eight-year-old me. 
The production of the Hancock version of The Alamo was one of the great 
events in my life. And part of the reason was that John Lee Hancock stayed 
An unused book cover for what would become The Alamo: The Illustrated Story of the 
Epic Film.
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true to his pledge of making The Alamo the most authentic and accurate film 
ever made on the subject. For the first time, all the events were based on what 
we know—or, at least, what we think we know—about the historical reality of 
the time and place. Also for the first time, the costumes evoked the top hat 
and tailcoat fashion of 1836 rather than the generic “frontier” style of other 
films on the subject; director Hancock took to calling the clothing style “dirty 
Dickens.” Corenblith’s sets, among the largest ever built at more than fifty acres, 
are very nearly perfect. The Alamo church—the only building standing today, 
the structure that we now call the Alamo—was reproduced in stunning detail 
based on its 1836 appearance. Indeed, each stone in the facade is the precise 
size and shape of the stones in the real thing. And the characters, Bowie ( Ja-
son Patric), Travis (Patrick Wilson), Crockett (Billy Bob Thornton), and Santa 
Anna (Emilio Echevarría), are thoughtful and multidimensional creations, 
built solidly on what we know about the real men. The film correctly depicts 
the climactic battle as a surprise attack under cover of night, meticulously 
re-created according to Santa Anna’s original battle plans and the eyewitness 
accounts of survivors.
But even with all this, The Alamo presents a curious dichotomy: it is by 
far the most accurate and authentic Alamo movie ever made, yet, by its very 
nature, it can be neither accurate nor authentic; such a feat is simply beyond 
the capabilities of a single film—on any subject. Hence the hero worshippers 
may be offended by the distinctly human, and often fallible, portrayals of the 
Alamo heroes; the lovers of the myth can be dismayed that the motives of the 
Mexican army are presented with respect and understanding; and the hard-
core Alamo buffs, each of whom clings to his specific set of beliefs as though 
they were handed to him by the angel Moroni, can endlessly nitpick each detail 
that differs from his own conception—and almost any detail of this particular 
moment in history can be nitpicked to death.
WHO WAS DAVY CROCKETT?
As an example of how impossible Hancock’s task was, consider the character 
who was the most famous figure at the Alamo—David Crockett.
Who was he? What was he really like? It depends on who described him. 
To his political enemies, Crockett was an illiterate buffoon, a figure to ridicule. 
To his followers, he was a shining symbol of the frontier, clean, virtuous, and 
canny. To readers of the ubiquitous Crockett almanacs, he was a devilish and 
witty trickster, violent, racist, crude, and exuberant—“a ring-tailed roarer, 
half horse, half alligator and a little tetched with snapping turtle” (Clarke 
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164). To baby boomers in 1955 and ever after, he was the perfect hero—kind, 
principled, and brave.
But no movie has the luxury of exploring every aspect of a personality— 
especially one for which we have so relatively little to go on. John Lee Hancock 
had to do what any screenwriter must—create a character who is basically fic-
tion but would seem real, based as closely as possible on the historical record. 
Billy Bob Thornton’s portrayal of Crockett is the richest and most complex 
in any Alamo movie (sorry, Fess). It is a brilliant, nuanced performance that 
explores the duality of Crockett’s life—“David” versus “Davy.” There is plenty 
of evidence to support the idea that he did engage in such a struggle, that he 
felt limited, if not trapped, by the public’s unrealistic perception of him.
One of the earliest scenes in the film depicts a true incident that speaks 
volumes about how the world viewed Crockett and how he viewed himself. In 
the scene, Congressman Crockett attends the performance of a play, The Lion 
of the West by James K. Paulding. The lead character, Nimrod Wildfire, was 
widely known to be a crude lampoon of Crockett, a buffoonish bull in a china 
shop who constantly enrages or embarrasses the high-society types on whom 
he imposes himself. The real Crockett was not pleased by the portrayal. When 
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he showed up in the theater in Washington that night in 1833 (1835 in the 
film), the actor who played Nimrod, James Hackett, had every reason to be 
nervous; as far as he knew, Crockett really was a violent bumpkin like Nimrod. 
Before the play began, Hackett bowed to Crockett. As the audience applauded 
enthusiastically, Crockett stood and bowed back, a beautiful moment in which 
the real man acknowledged his own legend—however imperfect.
Thornton’s Crockett understands the power of this legend. When he shows 
up in Texas, where he hopes to begin a prosperous new phase in his political 
career, he is dressed in buckskins and a coonskin hat—exactly as his constitu-
ents, or audience, expect to see him. Later, in the Alamo, when Bowie teases 
him about the hat, Crockett sheepishly admits, “I only started wearing that thing 
because of that play they did about me. People expect things.” Throughout 
the film, this tug-of-war between the man and the myth continues. Trapped 
behind the walls of the Alamo, Crockett confides to Bowie, “If it was just me, 
simple old David from Tennessee, I might jump over that wall one night and 
take my chances. But that Davy Crockett feller—they’re all watchin’ him.”
The struggle is resolved only at the point of his death. Of course, the man-
ner of Crockett’s death is among the most hotly and bitterly contested Alamo 
topics, even though there is virtually no real evidence to support any of the 
theories. But many historians take the word of one of Santa Anna’s officers, 
Colonel José Enrique de la Peña, that Crockett was among the few Alamo 
defenders who survived the battle and were later executed. The film’s purely 
speculative solution to this conundrum is slightly controversial but, dramati-
cally, highly satisfying. As Crockett, on his knees before Santa Anna, faces death, 
he notices that one Mexican soldier is wearing his vest and another is sporting 
his coonskin cap. With a rueful laugh, Crockett realizes that he now has to 
choose for good—David or Davy. And he chooses Davy, the hero. He grins at 
his attackers and takes as his last words a line from the stage production of 
The Lion of the West—“I’m a screamer!”
Did this actually happen? Certainly not. Except for de la Peña’s version, 
we have nothing reliable on which to base our guesses about Crockett’s death. 
But this fictional moment seeks to illuminate a truth about Crockett, one that 
embraces the emotional truth of the moment while respecting the historical 
truth.
It is, in short, something that virtually no movie about the Alamo has ever 
attempted, preferring to look at Crockett and the others as men, not marble 
statues. The 2004 telling of The Alamo is not a documentary-style foray into 
unvarnished truth; it simply takes history seriously and tries its best to honor 
the reality of what those men and women in distant 1836 went through. I have 
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watched, studied, and researched every Alamo film ever made, and I believe 
that this is probably the most we can ever ask of a movie with a historical sub-
ject. It is impossible to fully resurrect a time, a place, a people. But if those 
elements can be evoked with honesty, integrity, and sensitivity, the attempt can 
help ease us into a fuller appreciation and understanding of the subject. The 
result may be more emotional than historical, but when it comes right down 
to it, emotion is what the movies do best.
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ASSESSING TELEVISION’S VERSION 
OF HISTORY
The Mexican-American War and the  
KERA Documentary Series
3 / James Yates
To better understand the Mexican-American War, we must place the conflict 
within the historical framework of the early and mid-nineteenth century, and 
especially in the context of how Americans viewed themselves and the world. 
The 1840s were years of rapid and dramatic territorial growth. This expan-
sion, coupled with the ebullient popular attitudes, resulted in actions many 
Americans insisted were part of a “manifest destiny.” The phrase was coined 
by John L. O’Sullivan in an editorial for the Democratic Review regarding the 
annexation of Texas in July 1845, and it quickly became the watchword for the 
mission of the republic and its citizens. Elected on a proexpansion platform 
in 1844, President Polk quickly moved to annex Texas and defiantly disre-
garded British claims to Oregon. Polk “incorrectly believed that the Mexican 
government was acting with Great Britain to thwart US territorial ambitions” 
(Haynes, “Manifest” par. 7), thereby fueling a distrust of Great Britain that 
lingered throughout the decade.
The gatherings and celebrations of American victories south of the border 
moved Walt Whitman to declare that there was no more “admirable impulse 
in the human soul than patriotism,” which convinced him that the Mexican 
war was a great democratic mission; these military victories, he believed, would 
“elevate the true  self respect of the American people” to a point equal to “such 
a great nation as ours really is” (82–85). This assertion of superiority and pa-
triotism of the American ideal was but one element of manifest destiny; it also 
justified the extension of American democracy to the rest of the continent and 
placed a mantle of legitimacy over the entire expansionist effort. Of course, 
America’s superiority assertion also contained the denigration of the enemy.
Though expansion and manifest destiny were inevitably linked, the ex-
pansionist agenda, never a clearly defined movement, did not enjoy what 
is now called bipartisan support. The fear and anxiety that Americans felt 
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toward Great Britain—whose real and imagined designs involved blocking 
American territorial expansion at every turn and (what was feared by Southern 
landowners) actively engaging in a plot to abolish slavery throughout North 
America—changed the face of manifest destiny. Anglophobia converted sup-
port for gradual expansion to a more militant brand of American imperialism 
(Haynes, “Manifest” par. 1–2, 6–7).
In the years preceding the Mexican-American War, Great Britain was the 
dominant power opposed to the U.S. annexation of Texas. Her Majesty’s gov-
ernment maintained extensive commercial and financial links with Mexico— 
Mexico owed a substantial debt to British stockholders, and the majority of 
foreign merchants living in Mexico were British. British policy essentially 
had two objectives: to secure Mexico’s northern frontier against further en-
croachment by the United States and to reduce Britain’s dependency on the 
American South by utilizing Texas’s position as a great producer of cotton 
(Roeckell 182). Thus, according to historian Sam Haynes, there were much 
larger issues involved in the United States’ expansion into Mexico (telephone 
interview).
Manifest destiny was a dream of progress.
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Another aspect of the struggle between the United States and Great Britain 
was control of the western territories of Oregon and California. According to 
Haynes, “There was a fear that if the United States didn’t acquire this terri-
tory now, Britain would acquire California; however, that does not diminish 
the Mexican role” (telephone interview). In fact, during the summer of 1845, 
Thomas O. Larkin, a U.S. merchant in California, warned the Polk administra-
tion that Britain, as well as France, had designs on the region. Mexican officials 
recognized California’s vulnerability to American encroachment by land and 
sea and approached British minister Charles Bankhead for protection against 
potential U.S. expansion. But the British government was not prepared to 
contest America’s move in California (Graebner 86–87). Once the annexation 
of Texas was accomplished, Great Britain abandoned further efforts to resist, 
rejecting opportunities to acquire California in 1845 and 1846.
Though the Mexican-American War has almost vanished from the Ameri-
can collective memory, it still remains very much alive south of the Rio Grande, 
where the war is called la invasión norteamericana, la intervención norteamericana, 
and la guerra del 47. Ironically, though the United States was victorious, the 
war is one that America strives to forget because it does not fit well with the 
preferred idea of American history; likewise, the war is one Mexico would like 
to forget, as it was lost in part because of internecine conflicts.
TELEVISED HISTORY
The television documentary has served a variety of functions since its inception 
in the early 1950s: it has been a focal point for national attention on complex 
issues, a record of human experience, and an instrument of social and artistic 
expression. Consequently, the genre is often a barometer of social and political 
dynamics. A nonfiction report devoted to a single thesis or subject overseen 
by a single producer, the TV documentary blends words, visuals, sound tracks, 
and individual aesthetic style to focus on singular moments or issues in his-
tory. But all too often, filmmakers are not content to merely depict the past; 
instead they turn out products designed to change attitudes and perspectives. 
When the work of these documentarians becomes popular, the films can serve 
to bridge the chasm between historians and the lay public (as evidenced by 
the success of Ken Burns’s The Civil War [1990] and many programs on the 
History Channel), but they can also deepen the rift. The genre is judged not 
only by the standards of television but also by the standards of the academy. 
In achieving “resonance” (as Ken Burns terms a documentary’s current social 
and moral relevance) with the modern mind as it places its subject in contem-
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porary social and moral thought, the genre can fall victim to the dangers of 
historical manipulation and “presentism” (Melton par. 30).
Praised for its multiple-perspective approach and meticulous research, the 
KERA-Dallas/Fort Worth series The U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848) (1998) em-
bodies the tensions and compromises inherent in the production of any such 
historical documentary: the limitations imposed when presenting a historical 
event—and its subtleties—in a dramatic fashion; the presence of bias, even 
when attempts are made to avoid it; and the difficulties involved in creating 
an interesting and balanced product while remaining “true” to history, espe-
cially when focusing on a highly controversial period of conflict between two 
intricately connected nations. With its combination of contemporary visual 
materials, modern-day re-creations, and expert commentaries, The U.S.-Mexican 
War series is a case study for examining the creation of a compilation televi-
sion documentary. Several key theoretical questions—and their very practical 
solutions—emerge: How can a narrator dramatically relate an event long 
ignored by some, yet significant and highly emotional for others? How can 
various contentious viewpoints be dealt with, both in preproduction and in the 
final product? Can such a project ultimately be fair and accurate, yet engag-
ing enough for a general audience? The series applies current ideals, morals, 
and standards to historical figures and events, portraying the past through 
the prism of present-day standards. Even the series’ title asserts a judgment, 
characterizing the United States as the aggressor.
Dallas-based columnist Ed Bark called The U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848) 
a “triumph of the will” for KERA executive producer Sylvia Komatsu, who 
“wouldn’t let the project die, despite innumerable rebuffs from potential major 
underwriters.” The project began in 1991, when Komatsu saw an exhibition 
of daguerreotype images from the battlefields. After years of appealing, plan-
ning, and fund-raising, she won the aid of experts and historians steeped in 
the subject. She revealed to Bark that corporations were polite but “very frank” 
in declining to underwrite the project. “They told us, ‘Fascinating subject, but 
it’s simply too controversial for us to be associated with’” (C1). After finally 
receiving $672,000 in planning and production grants, including $527,000 
from the National Endowment for the Humanities and generous support from 
Corpus Christie attorney J. A. “Tony” Canales, the series eventually attracted 
other funding from various foundations and councils. Komatsu, coproducer 
and screenwriter Rob Tranchin, director Ginny Martin, and the rest of the 
production team faced numerous challenges during production. Tranchin 
remembered that “it was a fight to get the show on the air. There was a certain 
lack of perspective, especially in the Northeast, and we were surprised by the 
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feeling on the part of some that the war was of more regional interest than 
national significance” (telephone interview).
Essentially, the series presents a war fought in the name of manifest destiny. 
In 1846, the United States was looking well beyond the Rockies to expand all 
the way to the Pacific, but a vast wedge of Mexican territory inconveniently 
obtruded. The conflict with Mexico gradually escalated over the span of a 
decade: first came the Texas revolt of 1836, with the massacre at the Alamo 
followed quickly by a stunning victory for Sam Houston’s forces in the Battle 
of San Jacinto; later came the more sustained conflict, involving the U.S. Army 
and Navy from 1846 to 1848 and the historic U.S. Marines’ actions at the “Halls 
of Montezuma” (i.e., Chapultepec Castle, Mexico City).
The KERA series locates the conflict’s origins in slavery, taxation, and an 
American settler rebellion against Mexico’s central government. In the inter-
vening nine years, President Polk annexed Texas all the way to the Rio Grande, 
deep inside territory claimed by Mexico. The unstable Mexico City regime was 
Marines battle on the plain below Chapultepec Castle, September 1847.
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experiencing enough problems overseeing its own southern states, so many 
felt that it was impossible for Mexico to have much influence on its northern 
territory. Though Mexican officials knew their country was too weak to fight a 
war, their pride would not allow them to settle the issues diplomatically. When 
Polk declared war, it would be “the first time tens of thousands of [American] 
soldiers would be sent to fight on foreign soil,” narrator Bruce Dubos intones 
(forgetting the incursions into Canada in 1776 and 1812). The series also as-
serts that, as the first war “fought in the media,” the conflict fueled popular 
passions through heroic songs, plays, paintings, and lithographs, bringing the 
first reassurance since the War of 1812 that Americans could act heroically 
as a nation. By the 1840s, jingoistic cries arose from newspaper editors who 
wanted the country to exert its rightful interests and who whipped up war fever 
to bring about that end.
A darker consequence—internal division—threatened the movement 
toward war. The conflict was denounced as a cruel act of aggression by New 
Englanders as diverse as Henry David Thoreau, Frederick Douglass, and Daniel 
Webster, all of whom feared southern expansion. Conversely, it was celebrated 
as a necessary step in expansion and development by Polk and John C. Calhoun. 
As this division fueled the slavery debate, Massachusetts senator Webster op-
posed the antislavery position taken by his own Whig Party; he emphasized the 
party’s need to remain flexible and abstained from voting on the declaration 
of war. Later, in response to the Wilmot Proviso, Webster stated that the United 
States should not wrest territory from the Republic of Mexico (Britt 477).
THE SERIES
On 13–14 September 1998 PBS affiliate KERA broadcast its four-hour docu-
mentary series The U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848). As an original broadcast, the 
series was shown in two-hour blocks over two nights. Produced in both English 
and Spanish, the series was KERA’s first major PBS telecast since LBJ (1991). 
Interestingly, the series was not broadcast on KERA’s Spanish-language partner 
network Canal Once (channel 11) or channel 13, the Mexico City educational 
station, until November of that year. The primary reason was that to air the 
Mexican version—which was a complete reproduction with Mexican actors and 
a complete reworking of the sound track—at that time was considered “too 
painful for their viewers” (Komatsu interview), since 13–14 September marked 
the 151st anniversary of the fall of Mexico City. Both sides paid heavily in blood. 
Of the 104,556 American men who served, 13,768 died—“the highest death 
rate of any war in our history,” writes historian John S. D. Eisenhower (son of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower) in So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico 
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(quoted in Killian 2). Mexican casualties were considerably higher. But mention 
the U.S.-Mexican war, and most Americans react with a blank look. Mexicans, 
in contrast, remember more passionately. “It’s a scar for them,” Komatsu ex-
plained in an interview. Senior producer Paul Espinoza told journalist Diane 
Claitor that, when the war is mentioned in Mexico, “even a Mexican with a 
limited education will say, ‘Oh, the war where the Gringos stole our territory,’ 
while the Americans say, ‘Which war?’” (par. 6).
The KERA series used a multiple-perspective approach to avoid historical 
inaccuracy.1 The filmmakers provided commentary from both Mexican and 
American scholars. During preproduction, a panel of thirteen historians met in 
Dallas for a two-day seminar. Komatsu guided the discussions, soliciting advice 
and interpretive and factual information for the production.2 Coproducers 
Paul Espinoza and Andrea Boardman, director Ginny Martin, and producer-
scriptwriter Rob Tranchin often had to insert the working aspects of television 
production into a discussion that, at times, was “contentious” (according to at 
least one adviser) as the scholars lobbied, labored, and argued over points of 
particular concern (Haynes telephone interview). As David Weber remembered 
the process, “We read various drafts of the script and offered corrections or 
suggestions in our own areas of expertise. It seemed that those [corrections] 
were incorporated when possible.”
The production team found itself in what amounted to a “scholarly 
war—with its own skirmishes, pre-emptive strikes, and sometimes full-fledged 
battles” (Claitor par. 13). Sam Haynes found the experience “frustrating and 
contentious and a rehash of old grievances.” The older Mexican historians, 
he felt, often took “a position of victimhood,” while the American historians 
examined the war in “broader, more objective terms.” Ultimately, he thought 
that this “colored the editorial process”; “the battle lines were drawn and it was 
like we were fighting the war all over again.” In his view, the Mexican historians 
on the panel exercised more editorial control over what was shown than the 
American historians, though he insisted that the traditionalist view was not 
shared by all attendant experts. Yet the traditionalist view does “make for more 
compelling television.” In summing up the overall atmosphere of the meet-
ing, Haynes said, “It may have started out as a turf war, but it didn’t stay that 
way. Mexican historians were more passionate than the American historians” 
(telephone interview). The American advisers credited Komatso with moving 
the panel toward consensus on key points (Weber).
One of the most vocal members of the committee and the loudest critic 
of the series, Josefina Zoraida Vázquez argued that, in spite of the producers’ 
earnest attempts at balance, a clear American bias surfaced. “I recognize the 
good intentions [of the production team] and it is difficult to overcome 150 
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years of trying to justify an unjust war,” but she wished the Mexican advisers 
had been able to influence the makers of the series more. “In general,” she 
said, it is unfortunate that the filmmakers “portray the standard U.S. view of the 
war . . . because most of the sophisticated university text books on U.S. history 
acknowledge U.S. provocation of the war” (quoted in Claitor par. 18–19). As 
Claitor explains, Vázquez is referring to “the presence of U.S. troops on the 
border, which led to border skirmishes that were used to justify the American 
invasion” (par. 19). Another Mexican adviser and critic of the series, Jesús 
Velasco-Márquez, further argues that, during the conflict, Mexico defended its 
territory not as “a result of arrogance, nor of irresponsibility, but rather the only 
[possible] response to the arguments and actions of the U.S. government. . . . 
The armed conflict between Mexico and the United States from 1846 to 1848 
was the product of deliberate aggression and should therefore be referred to 
as ‘The U.S. War Against Mexico’” (par. 15). As noted above, the title of the 
series certainly implies this viewpoint. According to Weber, “Each of us had 
our own particular interest and viewpoint, and not all of those could be ac-
commodated. . . . Most of the scholars were very aware that the film could not 
be too didactic or it would lose its audience.” Therefore, the advisers did not 
provide “easy” answers to the filmmakers, whose goal was not to cast blame for 
the war but to present a “neutral” narrative. “I remember a couple of occasions,” 
Weber added ironically, “where the filmmakers seemed more concerned with 
historical accuracy than with filmic qualities, while the historians wondered 
how to make the narrative more crisp, increase the number of images, and 
make the film more visually interesting.”3
Komatsu said that the production team “let the point of view come from 
historical characters and the historians themselves.” Both Tranchin and Kom-
atsu accept the criticism of the finished product: Said Tranchin, “It is natural, 
since different opinions were encouraged and those opinions were delivered 
in good faith and were reflective of difficult discussions.” He pointed to the war 
itself as evidence of this natural reaction: “The subject for each audience is very 
different. Audiences come to the series with completely different emotional 
mind-sets” (telephone interview). Yet, Komatsu explained, “It wasn’t simply 
a matter of U.S. advisers vs. Mexican advisers. Everyone involved felt that he 
or she had a ‘particular take on the war,’ not simply a matter of national bias. 
These divergent views were even present among the production team.”
In the end, most of the historians agree that the other filmmakers “made 
a tremendous effort to include as many voices as possible. From Tejanos and 
women to Native Americans, there was a diversity of voices” (Haynes telephone 
interview). Weber concluded that “this was a fine collaboration, for each group 
was interested in advancing the fundamental goal of the other.” Obviously, 
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the participants prefer to cast a more positive light on these proceedings and 
to take a high ground over the disagreements. But it stands to reason that 
any product forged out of such contentiousness—and with such an earnest 
attempt to include as many voices as possible—might suffer from its own best 
intentions. In this atmosphere, political correctness would very likely arise to 
placate all sides, to soften and dilute any historical realities that might prove 
troublesome to any of the “voices.”
Once the project was under way, points of contention multiplied expo-
nentially. “Did Polk have a vision of how the war was going to take place when 
he sent [General Zachary] Taylor to the Rio Grande?” Tranchin asks. “In the 
main, our American scholars felt that he [Polk] didn’t know—that he was re-
acting as much as acting. Our Mexican scholars felt Polk had a plan and was 
carrying out that plan. These are tricky shoals to navigate. When the narrator 
is involved, we make sure that the narrator doesn’t plant a seed where we can’t 
be sure” (quoted in Stabile 13). Despite the efforts of the production team to 
maintain an equilibrium, the series, as producer Andrea Boardman saw it, “was 
still television,” meaning that the first priority remained presenting a story to 
an audience in an entertaining manner—which in so many telegenic studies 
of history leads to preferring drama over information and modern prejudice 
over truth about the past. From the producers’ point of view, the need for a 
consistent narrative voice and clear, streamlined “story line” arose immediately. 
Tranchin recalled that “writing the script was excruciating because there were 
so many different points of view. The production was ongoing as the script 
was being constantly revised. It was a lot of work to get the visual track and 
narration to work together. Ginny [Martin] went through many revisions” 
(telephone interview).
A major challenge also lay in the actual storytelling, especially in describing 
the origins of the war. The producers felt it necessary to include basic informa-
tion and history to set the stage. As Tranchin notes, “Most people imagine the 
war as the Alamo, which was a decade earlier.” That meant the producers had 
to “get the viewers up to speed very quickly.” The challenge to keep both the 
narrative development and the informative aspect provided yet another layer 
of tension: “We didn’t want a spotty, superficial program, especially since a lot 
of TV history is bad history” (Tranchin quoted in Claitor par. 31, 36). To make 
this process as accessible as possible, the producers aimed to reflect the pulse 
of the past. They made an effort to incorporate a larger number of artifacts, 
portraits, and images of the period. “Paintings and lithographs are images,” 
Tranchin said, “but they are also artifacts—they speak of a time and place 
in addition to the images they present. Daguerreotypes, photographs, and 
archival film footage are artifacts as well; they have a mechanical and optical 
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relationship to the world that most viewers accept as more authentic, though 
not necessarily more interesting” (e-mail). But one of the difficulties the team 
faced—surprisingly—concerned access to visual and written documents. For 
some, this inability to deal with primary materials might appear to be a major 
flaw. As Weber pointed out, “Visual materials for this period of time are scarce. 
With photography in its infancy, we had to depend on lithographs, paintings, 
historic places, and reconstructions. In the interest of historical accuracy, the 
producers did not employ photographs from later eras and present them 
anachronistically as of the era of the U.S.-Mexican War.”
The producers sought to be authentic. “We were trying to balance the 
wealth of information from the U.S. side with a relative lack of information 
on the Mexican side,” Tranchin said (telephone interview). English-language 
texts were available, but one challenging aspect, Komatsu said, was “our access 
to Spanish-language materials. Ultimately, our team of advisers would often be 
able to help us obtain translations of Mexican materials.” Tranchin pointed 
out that the production team was “also fortunate to work with institutions that 
provided invaluable assistance. This testifies to a commitment to use historically 
accurate materials—a commitment that distinguishes most PBS productions” 
(telephone interview). Though such a statement rings of public relations 
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posturing, the series does include these materials, which adds another layer 
of authenticity. The filmmakers combined these materials with scholar inter-
views, voice-over readings of period writers such as Walt Whitman, and scenes 
of battle reenactments. The producers rendered vignettes regarding events, 
individual battles, and interesting characters with historical accuracy.
One way the series attempted to reflect the pulse of the past was to include 
numerous landscape shots: “Landscapes are flexible because the viewer can 
accept them for what they are and imagine a past that took place ‘there’” 
(Tranchin e-mail). Martin’s challenge was to evaluate such perspectives and 
create a relationship between pictures and words. She was also in charge of 
the numerous historical re-creations; she “contacted several reenactor groups 
and set up a production schedule in Colorado, South Texas, and Mexico.” 
Martin compiled and developed a wish list of historical moments to portray, 
sequences to set up, and shots to be taken at “a set of locations—like the Cali-
fornia coastline, or a Santa Fe winter scene, or a South Texas plain” (Tranchin 
telephone interview). Tranchin explained, “Ginny would think . . . of shots 
that would convey a sequence—for example, introducing the battle of Palo 
Alto—and those locations would be approached with an eye towards record-
ing the most important historical details. There was an enormous amount of 
footage, and only a fraction of it ended up in the final show.” Re-creations are 
always perilous: “especially in documentaries,” they “require a leap of faith. 
They function as moving illustrations and have to be produced well and used 
carefully because they can either enhance or distract” (Tranchin e-mail). The 
filmmakers found the reenactment groups to be as valuable as the advisory 
committee of scholars. “Our re-enactor groups were excellent to work with,” 
Komatsu remembered. “They were very helpful and often served as advisers 
on historical detail.” Of course, unless sketches or paintings are used instead, 
reenactors are necessary in a documentary depicting historical battles from 
periods before the advent of the motion picture camera to enable the audi-
ence to visually connect with the actions and the period. But this reliance on 
reenactors also proves problematic, because each reenactor has a personal 
view of the period and the conflict, and once again, the plethora of voices 
can overwhelm a visual history. Nevertheless, the production team was well 
aware of its responsibility to the public, and the final product demonstrates a 
responsible balance between reenactments and historical materials.
Though this approach is fairly standard for a historical compilation film, 
according to Tranchin, “there are so many different kinds of images and so 
many variables at work in each sequence. The images were chosen for their 
ability to carry the sense of the narration and dramatic readings, and sometimes 
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because they enhanced the emotional quality of a certain passage.” Various 
images perform certain functions at key points in the narration. “Some [im-
ages] have a naturally introductory character—they set the scene. Others are 
explanatory—they underline a point. Some enhance a particular mood or 
emotion” (Tranchin e-mail). The series’ visuals thus achieve Ken Burns’s no-
tion of resonance in placing the Mexican-American War squarely within the 
present social and moral dialogue.
Along the way, the filmmakers created lively portraits of major personalities 
of the war, such as generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott and Ambassa-
dor Nicholas Trist, primarily through their own writings, contemporary news 
accounts, and letters. The two most prominent and colorful characters to 
emerge in the series are presidents Antonio López de Santa Anna and James 
K. Polk—the former as a windbag of military bravado and foolhardy resolve 
and the latter as a steely, intimidating agent of American expansion. Polk, 
a dark-horse presidential candidate who won one of the closest elections in 
American history, was unswervingly devoted to Jacksonian democracy and ag-
gressively confrontational toward Mexico. As historian David Pletcher states in 
the series, “When you face Santa Anna with Polk, you’re facing one opportunist 
with another. They both had that characteristic as part of their makeup. Polk 
was using Santa Anna deliberately to gain negotiations with Mexico, but he 
Antonio López de Santa 
Anna, president of Mexico.
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didn’t count on Santa Anna rallying his people. Polk didn’t realize this as a 
danger.” An example of the series’ portrayal of these two pivotal characters lies 
in Santa Anna’s manipulation of Polk to enable the former to reenter Mexico 
from his exile in Cuba. Santa Anna persuaded Polk to let him slip through the 
naval blockade under the pretense of arranging negotiations between Mexico 
City and Washington. After Polk agreed and Santa Anna was safely back in 
Mexico City, he staged a coup, reinstalled himself as president, and declared 
war against the United States.
KEY FLAWS OF THE SERIES
Historians have been divided in their interpretations of the war since it ended 
in 1848. Some hold the United States culpable, while others blame Mexico; a 
survey of the historical literature indicates that the majority have taken a bal-
anced view and consider neither country entirely blameless. Some, like John 
Eisenhower, see the annexation of Texas to the Union as the goal of the war 
(xix). Others believe that the fundamental conflict was a simple dispute: the 
United States demanded Mexico’s land, and Mexico refused. The series returns 
to this particular point time and again. Vázquez argues in her commentary 
that “for North America, Texas was already a thing of the past. The only thing 
that interested them was to buy territory.” Pletcher adds that “the one way to 
provoke the Mexicans into resistance was the one way Polk had chosen: to pres-
ent a strong front and bluff the Mexican government into resisting—or into 
yielding—in other words, negotiating at cannon’s point.” The United States 
expected Mexico to willingly surrender half of its large territory, while Mexico 
expected, equally unrealistically, to fend off a U.S. military force.
Despite the resolve of the filmmakers to present an unbiased and factual 
look at the U.S.-Mexican war, the series demonstrates a tendency to downplay 
or omit significant elements that contributed to the conflict. One of the most 
obvious examples regards the role Great Britain played, if not in sparking the 
conflict then at least in exacerbating it. Not only does the series simplify the 
rather complicated role Britain played (only a fleeting reference is made in 
“The Terrible Word” and “The Other Shore” segments), but it omits that the 
British accused the United States of ignoring consequences to British trade 
and investments in Mexico and deliberately provoking an unjust war for the 
extension of slavery. (Mexico had abolished slavery in 1826; Britain abolished 
slavery and the slave trade in 1833.) Even more glaring, the series ignores the 
crucial role British diplomats played in facilitating communication between 
the United States and Mexico. In fact, thanks largely to British urging, Nicholas 
Trist remained in Mexico after being recalled by President Polk. In addition, 
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British agents assisted in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo (Roeckell 182). Ultimately, the series weaves all the various causes of 
the war into one simplistic and personalized thread: the U.S.-Mexican war was 
a result of President Polk’s obsession with manifest destiny.
The series does note the war’s military and journalistic significance. As 
mentioned above, except for incursions into Canada in 1776 and 1812, the 
Mexican-American War was the first occasion on which American troops were 
sent to fight on foreign soil. It was also the first war in which the United States 
raised and trained a large army, transported troops by railroad and by sea, and 
made a major amphibious landing. Significantly, it was the first war to be cov-
ered by mass circulation newspapers using dedicated correspondents. In the 
segment “Mr. Polk’s War,” the series shows the role the press played in affecting 
the public. It reveals that the war, for example, inspired Henry David Thoreau’s 
famous treatise against war, “Civil Disobedience,” and was the first major subject 
for mass-produced color lithographs and America’s penny press.
Another area in which the series vacillates concerns President Polk’s 
decision to go to war. According to the series’ segment “Declaration of War,” 
on Saturday, 9 May 1846, Polk met with his cabinet to “discuss” a declaration 
of war against Mexico—a document that had already been drafted. Later, at 
6 P.M., Polk received Taylor’s dispatch from two weeks earlier, detailing the 
commencement of hostilities. According to Weber, the production sidesteps 
that Polk had already decided to go to war but needed a plausible excuse to 
take to Congress:
One of the points that I particularly wanted the film to make is that Polk had de-
cided to declare war on Mexico even before he received the news of the skirmish 
on the Rio Grande. We know this from Polk’s diary. At that point, many congress-
men would have balked and war would have been a hard sell. Then came news 
of the episode on the Rio Grande that allowed him to make the specious claim 
that American blood had been shed on American soil and gave him a pretext 
for war that American congressmen found palatable. Although I’d suggested on 
more than one occasion that the script should include this small point, it didn’t 
make it into the final cut.
This example illustrates the central problem with the series: the need for a nar-
rative required the elimination of historical clutter. To appeal to the audience, 
the editorial desire for dramatic “story” took precedence over informational 
nuances. These particulars represented fascinating material that might provoke 
discussion, yet the producers’ intention was to present a general overview for a 
general public that might be confused or bored by such historical sidelights.
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This tendency to oversimplify extends to the treatment of the Saint 
Patrick’s Battalion (Batallón de San Patricio). As depicted in the segment 
“The Naked Blade,” the Mexican army, retreating to the Churubusco River, 
was pursued by U.S. troops, who came under heavy crossfire from the bridge 
and nearby convent. Here, the U.S. Army also clashed with two companies of 
Catholic immigrant deserters from the American army who had crossed over 
to the Mexican side. These deserters “stiffened the backbone of the Mexican 
resistance and brought about a more serious battle than Scott had any reason 
to expect,” adds Eisenhower (quoted in Killian). The next mention the series 
makes of the deserter unit is in the segment “The Fate of Nations,” where, as 
the battle at Chapultepec Castle rages on, thirty members of the Saint Patrick’s 
Battalion watched from the gallows and, as the American flag was raised over 
the castle, were executed. According to Eisenhower, “if ever there were two 
points of view, this was one. To the Mexicans, the San Patricios were patriots. 
For the American military, there was little sympathy for deserters” (quoted 
in Killian). Yet the series offers no explanation for these soldiers’ desertion. 
Though virtually none of the men left written records, as Robert Ryal Miller 
points out, other contemporary sources indicate possible factors (150). Brutal 
military discipline, hatred of and unsuitability for military life, harassment 
of and discrimination against foreign-born soldiers by native-born officers, 
religious sentiments and ideological beliefs, romantic entanglements, and, 
ultimately, material enticements by Mexican officers are all plausible reasons 
that the members of this battalion deserted (151). Yet the series offers little 
more than scant hints of the more complex issues within the Mexican army.
In contrast, MGM’s feature film One Man’s Hero (1999), which chronicles 
the life of Major John Riley and the Saint Patrick’s Battalion, presents sig-
nificant explanations for the Irish troops’ desertion. According to the film, 
President Polk, with the backing of southern slave states, raised an army of the 
sons of Irish immigrants by promising them full citizenship for their families 
and forty acres of western land. After encountering pervasive nativism, the 
Irish troops deserted the army and fought for the Catholic Mexicans. Since 
the monumental volte-face, generations of Mexicans have regarded Riley as a 
folk hero. Director Lance Hool, who labored for three decades to bring the 
story to the screen, doubted whether American audiences would have the same 
sympathetic reaction: “After all, the Saint Patrick’s were deserters. But they 
were also fighting for a cause they believed in [freedom from intolerance], a 
quality Americans still appreciate today” (quoted in Wherry 89). The film fol-
lows on the heels of Mark Day’s 1996 documentary The San Patricios, which was 
shot on location in Ireland, Texas, and Mexico. Day’s film includes interviews 
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with American and Mexican historians, writers, and journalists and has been 
broadcast by RTÉ in Ireland, Televisa in Mexico, and more than a dozen PBS 
stations in the United States. In September 1997 the Saint Patrick’s Battalion 
was honored in a commemoration ceremony in Mexico City involving Mexican 
president Ernesto Zedillo, Ireland’s ambassador to Mexico, and other dignitar-
ies. One Man’s Hero did not benefit from this attention, however; controversy 
arose shortly after its release because of its seemingly anti-American flavor, and 
MGM stopped its U.S. distribution. To add insult to injury, the film was also 
critically assailed, often receiving a dismal rating of one star when it appeared 
on television listings.4
KEY STRENGTHS OF THE SERIES
Though effective in its military execution, the Mexican-American War was 
intensely ambiguous in the American national consciousness and remains 
controversial as a defining moment. The U.S.-Mexican War is successful in 
presenting these uncertainties for Mexico and offers some reflections on U.S. 
uncertainties as well. In the “Legacies” segment, Pletcher insightfully comments 
that America, “if not at fault, did not fully live up to its ideology of democracy. 
This was an aggressive war in which we attacked a neighbor. We do not like to 
look at the way in which we won it.”
The series effectively discusses how this war ravaged Mexico. Though 
the Mexican cession of a half million square miles of new territory was the 
most important consequence of the war, the country also fell into political 
turmoil—France invaded in 1862 to collect a massive debt, and a series of 
brutal dictatorships further ravaged the country until 1910. Mexico remains 
economically underdeveloped. According to Israel Garza, “The only benefit 
is that we have found a spirit of Mexican identity.”
The series is also strong in relating the differences in size between Mexico 
and the United States. In 1846 Mexico had a population of 7.5 million, com-
pared with the United States’ 20 million. The northern provinces in dispute 
were sparsely populated. California had only 7,000 residents, and except for 
Texas, what would become the American Southwest was desolate and isolated 
from central authority. Mexico received $15 million for lands lost to the 
United States, plus $10 million in other compensation. Before the war, Polk 
had offered $30 million to buy the territory outright. Miguel Soto adds in the 
“Legacies” segment, “The sooner we Mexicans confront how we have been in 
the presence of the United States, the better we will relate to North America. 
That we are victims of imperialism, yes, and many other ways as well. Certainly, 
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our conditions helped the U.S. do what it did and to do what it does today. It is 
necessary to demystify our relationship with the U.S.” Josefina Zoraida Vázquez 
adds, “To study that war will help those here to live together.”
The Mexican-American War has long been eclipsed in the nation’s popular 
memory by the American Civil War, which followed only a dozen years later, 
even though the war with Mexico ignited passions that would lead to the Civil 
War. For Mexico, the end of the war ushered in demoralization and turmoil, 
social restructuring, economic collapse, and the creation of “American” lands 
and Chicano culture.
A Mexican couple in the acquired territory.
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REACTION TO THE SERIES
Verne Gray of Newsday commended the series for its “efficient, crisp script” and 
its stunning cinematography, remarking that it “looks fresh and feels energetic 
for the most part,” but he criticized the extended commentary from Mexican 
and American historians. Gray opined that there was too much reenactment 
footage, “though it does, presumably, give a sense of what battle dress was like.” 
He noted the density of detail in the series: “The producers seem to have found 
every illustration still extant of the war, including every early daguerreotype.” 
Most critics held that the series’ biggest accomplishment was the attempted 
conjoining of both national memories. As historian Eisenhower notes, “the 
biggest thing that Americans have to realize is that Mexicans have not forgot-
ten this [war]” (quoted in Killian). Walter Goodman, in the New York Times, 
called the production “vigorous” and “fair-minded”; he appreciated that the 
main battles of the war were “effectively re-enacted in a rugged-looking ter-
rain, and in the spirit of [Ken Burns’s] The Civil War, soldiers’ letters home 
provide personal touches.” Goodman praised the producers for giving the 
Mexican defenders their due (1). In the Columbia (S.C.) State, Doug Nye found 
that the film “excellently blends daguerreotypes, lithographs, and paintings of 
the period with re-enactment footage shot at the actual battle sites” and com-
mended the producers, who “strove hard to present a balanced and unbiased 
presentation of both sides of the story” (3). Ed Bark, in the Dallas Morning 
News, called the series “extraordinary save for its ordinary title” and charac-
terized it as an “indelible, valuable retelling of this largely forgotten conflict” 
(C1). Tranchin noted that the series “had decent ratings, maybe not a home 
run like The Civil War  was, but we had a uniformly good response” (telephone 
interview). In 1999, the series won an Emmy Award.
The most immediate impact of the series, according to the producers, was 
educational. The series “created more awareness about the war, and [it] is still 
being used in the classroom,” Komatsu said; “it’s helped to show how history 
and demographics change.” The “balance of opinions” was key to the criti-
cal and commercial success of the series, and the panel of advisers reported 
“overwhelmingly positive responses” (Komatsu). The companion Web site to 
the series was identified by PBS as among its top visited. PBS was so pleased 
that PBS Educational Services funded a refurbishment of the site, including 
extensive video, sophisticated graphics, a brief episode summary, an interactive 
timeline map of events, and a large biographical section that covers the major 
figures involved on both sides of the conflict.5
The consensus among the production team was that Americans, espe-
cially Texans, would reject Mexican interpretations of the conflict. For many 
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Americans, who are accustomed to a stable government, there is a tendency 
to look at the disorganization and disunity in Mexico as a sign of ineptitude. 
To counter that stereotype, Tranchin said, one goal of the series was to por-
tray Mexican society at the time as it emerged from imperial domination. “It 
had only been a nation for twenty years and was still operating with medieval 
institutions and a government it had inherited from the Spanish” (telephone 
interview). This colonial structure hampered the Mexican reaction to the U.S. 
invasion and severely handicapped efforts at national defense. But despite the 
mostly positive reviews from critics, the series’ presentation of Mexico’s view 
of the conflict as a war of Yankee aggression was repugnant to some viewers. 
Komatsu, for example, remembered that when KERA aired a short promo-
tional spot before the series debuted, the station immediately received angry 
calls from Dallas viewers, who often began with phrases like, “My ancestors 
fought the Mexicans at San Jacinto” and “How dare you” (quoted in Claitor 
par. 49). Tranchin hoped that, when the series aired, Americans in all parts of 
the country would see how much more complex the issues were and still are. 
“The Mexicans didn’t come to the U.S., the U.S. came to them,” he said. After 
attending a San Antonio preview with a largely Mexican American audience, 
Tranchin said that he was struck by the “intensely emotional reaction” to the 
“Legacies” section. “Here the series makes it clear for the first time that the 
war between U.S. and Mexico was the birth event for the Mexican American 
[i.e., Chicano] people,” he explained (quoted in Claitor par. 57). The war was 
assuredly pivotal for both nations in a variety of ways, and for many it is still an 
emotional firestorm 150 years later.
No matter how sincere the production team’s effort was to achieve a balanced 
approach to presenting the war with Mexico, the divisive nature of the subject 
undermined the final product. The series suffers from trying to be all things to 
all sides: at times, it vocalizes the “victimhood” of the Mexican viewpoint while 
castigating the arrogant American motivations; at other times, it steadfastly 
presents the American viewpoint of expansionism and defense while demon-
strating the Mexican arrogance and, ultimately, incompetence in provoking a 
war with its dynamic neighbor. The series shows the difficulty of maintaining 
balance in the face of fervent multiple perspectives. In the end, the series at-
tains no single perspective but leaves it to the viewer to form a rationale for 
the nature and causes of the war—which is not necessarily a negative result. 
Ultimately, the series falls victim to its own ambitions: by concentrating on 
streamlining a clear, telegenic narrative, it loses significant historical subtle-
ties, and by striving so diligently for multiple perspectives, it often succumbs 
to political correctness. These are critically missed opportunities to add layers 
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of complexity and understanding for the viewer. The filmmakers fall back to 
the traditional question that has been asked from the first major project in the 
compilation tradition, Victory at Sea (1952–1953): what would be most interest-
ing and engaging—and visually dramatic—to an audience?
History is not always well served by the methods of production that result 
from such a focus. The U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848) is significant as the most 
comprehensive television treatment of this war. The impact of the series will 
continue to be felt, and the “almost forgotten war” will remain in the conscious-
ness of two very different—yet very connected—nations. The U.S.-Mexican war 
gave shape not only to the borders but also to the populations and political 
identities of the two countries, an impact that has extended into the twenty-first 
century. KERA’s The U.S.-Mexican War does not merely offer historical details 
but, more significantly, presents perspectives on an ambiguous and pivotal 
moment in U.S.-Mexican relations—a historical moment that may have more 
relevance as the twenty-first century progresses.
NOTES
1. From the outset, Komatsu and her production team resolved to present multiple 
perspectives to produce a balanced and compelling story. According to screenwriter- 
producer Rob Tranchin, “The bi-national nature of the project was our biggest 
challenge—it always, in a way, had two heads. We were trying to account for both the 
U.S. and Mexican perspectives without having each cancel out the other point of view” 
(quoted in Stabile 12). The extensive collaboration of experts from the United States 
and Mexico did, indeed, attract a wide range of views. KERA also provided a number 
of teaching materials, including a companion book (Christensen and Christensen), a 
curriculum kit designed for middle and secondary schools, and a thorough Web site 
(http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/educators) amplifying the issues broached 
by the documentary. A significant element of the KERA documentary is its emphasis 
on the Mexican point of view; some Mexican scholars view the conflict as not merely a 
war fought over territory but a spiritual violation by expansionist America—a violation 
of language, labor, and culture. Other Mexican sources view the war as a simple matter 
of self-defense that Mexican authorities were unable to meet—in addition to fighting 
the Americans, many Mexican factions were fighting one another. Still others come 
very close to echoing nineteenth-century Mexican nationalist José María Lafragua’s 
demand that the United States return unjustly acquired territory to the nation from 
which it was wrested.
2. The advisory panel included R. David Edmunds, American history, University of 
Texas at Dallas; Mario T. Garcia, Chicano and American race and ethnicity, University 
of Santa Barbara; Deena Gonzalez, history of Chicano/a studies, Pomona College; Rich-
ard Griswold del Castillo, history, San Diego State University; the late David Pletcher, 
history, Indiana University; Miguel Soto, history, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México; Ron Tyler, history, University of Texas at Austin; Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, his-
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tory, El Colegio de México; Sam W. Haynes, history, University of Texas at Arlington; 
Robert W. Johannsen, history, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Robert Ryal 
Miller, history, California State University, Hayward; Jesús Velasco-Márquez, interna-
tional studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo; and David Weber, history, Southern 
Methodist University.
3. The historical commentary was provided by numerous scholars, including Antonia 
Castañeda, Israel Cavazos Garza, Richard Deertrack, William DePalo Jr., R. David Ed-
munds, John S. D. Eisenhower, Luis Garfias, Miguel González Quiroga, Sam W. Haynes, 
Robert W. Johannsen, Tony Mares, Genaro Padilla, David Pletcher, Carlos Recio Dávila, 
Miguel Soto, Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, Jesús Velasco-Márquez, and David W. Weber.
4. After The U.S.-Mexican War aired in September 1998, interest in the Mexican-
American War grew as other films appeared on the small screen and in theaters, though 
not entirely without controversy. In 1998 the History Channel aired a four-part docu-
mentary titled Mexico that offers a different perspective on the war. The film’s second 
episode, “From Independence to the Alamo,” examines the initial conflict between 
Mexico and the United States. The third episode, “Battle for North America,” treats 
the U.S.-Mexican war as a result of Polk’s obsession with manifest destiny and Mexico’s 
refusal to accept the annexation of Texas by another country.
In the fall of 2006 the History Channel presented a new two-hour documentary 
called The Mexican-American War. The documentary was shot in high-definition and was 
also broadcast on History en Español, the channel’s Spanish-language sister network. 
Three of the KERA production’s advisers, Sam Haynes, Jesús Velasco-Márquez, and 
Josefina Zaraida Vázquez, also served as advisers and interviewees on this documentary 
(Filmmakers 1–3).
5. The impressive Web site, http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/, is arguably 
the best Internet site dealing with the war. If one combines the Web site, the series, and 
the companion book written by Carol and Thomas Christensen, both accomplished 
translators and publishers, one has a full and detailed discussion of the broad strokes 
of the war and a good presentation of the subtleties of the conflict. Where the series 
often comes up short, the Web site and the book fill in numerous details. Although 
the Web site never contradicts the series, it does capture more of the nuances of the 
conflicts and broaches a wider spectrum of interpretations.
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KEN BURNS’S R EBIRTH OF  
A NATION
The Civil War as Made-for-Television History
4 / Gary R . Edgerton
It has been around eighteen years since The Civil War premiered over five 
consecutive evenings (23–27 September 1990), amassing a level of attention 
unsurpassed in public television history. Ken Burns’s eleven-hour version of 
the war acted as a flash point for a new generation, attracting a spectrum of 
opinion that ranged from rapturous enthusiasm to milder interest in most 
segments of the viewing public, from outrage over Yankee propaganda in a 
few scattered areas of the South to both praise and criticism from the academy 
(Lord, “Did Anyone” 18; Civil War Illustrated  July–Aug. 1991; Confederate Veteran 
Jan.–Feb. 1991, Mar.–Apr. 1991, July–Aug. 1991; Toplin). Burns employed 
twenty-four consultants on this project, including many prominent historians, 
but understandably, not all these scholars and filmmaking specialists agreed 
with everything in the final series.1 With so many experts, and with a subject 
the size and scope of the Civil War as the historical terrain, a certain amount 
of controversy was unavoidable.2
One historian even concluded his analysis of The Civil War by calling the 
series “a flawed masterpiece” (Koeniger 233), evoking the customary judg-
ment of D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation (1915) that has been repeated in 
dozens of general film histories over the past seventy years.3 This analogy goes 
only so far, however; it makes more sense on the grounds of shared cinematic 
brilliance than on the basis of any similarities in outlook or sensibility. Indeed, 
one of Burns’s stated intentions was to amend the “pernicious myths about the 
Civil War from Birth of a Nation to Gone with the Wind,” especially in regard to 
racial stereotyping and the many other bigoted distortions in plot and imagery 
(quoted in Milius 1, 43).
Still, The Birth of a Nation and The Civil War were similarly indicative of 
mainstream contemporary public opinion. For example, Russell Merritt has 
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argued convincingly that the racist aspects of The Birth of a Nation were anything 
but the ravings of some “isolated crackpot”; rather, they were representative of 
white America at the time. According to Merritt, Griffith “attracted his audi-
ence . . . because the drama itself was one . . . Americans wanted to see” (167, 
175). As a result, The Birth of a Nation was embraced by an estimated 10 per- 
cent of the U.S. population in its original release, making it the preeminent 
box office success in silent film history (166).
The popular reaction to The Civil War was likewise record setting. Public 
television achieved its highest ratings ever when 38.9 million Americans tuned 
in to at least one episode of the five-night telecast, averaging 12 million viewers 
at any given moment (Statistical Research Inc. 2.1–2.8). The audience research 
findings also indicated that half the viewership would not have been watching 
television at all if it had not been for this program (“CBS, PBS” 28; “Learning 
Lessons” 52–53; Gold 36; Carter C17; Gerard 46; Bickelhaupt, “‘Civil War’ 
Weighs” 61, 64). This fact was reflected in the range of published responses 
to The Civil War, which included pieces by political pundits who rarely, if ever, 
attend to the opening of a major motion picture or television series. George 
Will, for example, wrote, “Our Iliad has found its Homer. . . . If better use has 
ever been made of television, I have not seen it” (A23). David S. Broder and 
Haynes Johnson weighed in with similar high praise.
Film and television critics from across the country were equally effusive. 
Newsweek reported that The Civil War  was “a documentary masterpiece” (Waters 
68); Time  called it “eloquen[t] . . . a pensive epic” (Zoglin 73); and U.S. News and 
World Report named it “the best Civil War film ever made” (Lord, “Unvarnished” 
74). David Thomson in Film Comment declared that The Civil War  “is the great 
American movie of the year—and one of the true epics ever made” (12). Tom 
Shales of the Washington Post remarked, “This is not just good television, nor 
even just great television. This is heroic television” (G5). And Monica Collins 
of the Boston Herald informed her readers that “to watch ‘The Civil War’ in its 
entirety is a rare and wonderful privilege.” She then urged, “Keep in mind that 
the investment in the program is an investment in yourself, in your knowledge 
of your country and its history” (43).
Between 1990 and 1992, accolades for Ken Burns and the series took on 
institutional proportions, as it garnered more than forty major awards from 
the entertainment industry and the academic community combined. Burns 
was named producer of the year by the Producers Guild of America; the series 
won two Emmys for outstanding informational series and outstanding writing 
achievement, best foreign television award from the British Academy of Film 
and Television Arts, a Peabody Award, a duPont-Columbia Award, a Golden 
Ken Burns’s Rebirth of a Nation / 101
Globe, a D. W. Griffith Award, two Grammys for best traditional folk album and 
best spoken word album, best special and best program from the Television 
Critics Association, and a People’s Choice Award for best television miniseries. 
Gettysburg College also awarded The Civil War its first $50,000 Lincoln Prize 
as the “finest scholarly work in English on Abraham Lincoln or the American 
Civil War soldier” in competition with forty-one books (“Ken Burns Wins” 14). 
Burns was awarded eight honorary doctorates from various American colleges 
and universities in 1991 alone.4 In retrospect, Burns said, “I don’t really know 
how to put my finger on it. A generation ago as we celebrated, or tried to 
celebrate, the centennial, we seemed focused on the battles or the generals, 
and the kind of stuff of war, but here we seemed to respond to the human 
drama, and maybe it just resonated in a particular way with how we are. I feel 
a tremendous sympathy for this country and somewhere along the line that 
sympathy must line up with where we are now and whatever the subject is” (per-
sonal interview). The Civil War became a phenomenon of popular culture. The 
series was mentioned on episodes of Twin Peaks, Thirtysomething, and Saturday 
Night Live during the 1990–1991 television season. It was spoofed on National 
Public Radio and in a New Yorker cartoon. Burns appeared on the Tonight Show 
shortly after Johnny Carson took the unusual step of recommending the series 
to his audience on the Monday following the Sunday debut of the first episode. 
Burns was selected by the editors of People  magazine as one of 1990’s twenty-five 
“most intriguing people,” along with the usual odd assortment of international 
figures, including George H. W. Bush, Julia Roberts, M. C. Hammer, Saddam 
Hussein, Bart Simpson, Sinead O’Connor, and Nelson Mandela.
The series also developed into a marketing sensation, as the companion 
book published by Knopf, The Civil War: An Illustrated History, became a runaway 
best seller. According to Publishers Weekly, “The celebrated PBS television series 
The Civil War certainly helped its eponymous companion volume sell enough 
books for the #2 slot. Knopf reported sales of 560,931 in 1990, and the book 
is still enjoying a brisk rate of sales in 1991” (Mayles 20). This hardcover title 
spent eleven straight weeks on the top-ten list during 1990 and then extended 
its streak for fifteen additional weeks in 1991 (“Longest-Running” 34). “Con-
sidering the $50 ticket price,” Publishers Weekly related, “the book is easily the 
year’s bestselling nonfiction grosser in dollars” (Mayles 20). The accompanying 
Warner sound track and the nine-episode videotape version from Time-Life 
were similarly successful. Burns noted that “the Civil War videotapes are the 
best-selling nonfiction documentary series on history ever made” (“Movie 
Maker” 1050). Billboard reported that the videotape set reached the 1 million 
plateau in aggregate sales as early as October 1993 (Fitzpatrick 9).
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Several interlocking factors evidently contributed to the extraordinary 
level of interest surrounding The Civil War, including the overall technical and 
dramatic quality of the miniseries itself, its accompanying promotional cam-
paign, the momentum of scheduling Sunday through Thursday, the synergic 
merchandising of all its ancillary products, and a TV industry strike earlier in 
the year that disrupted the fall season and caused the network competition to 
briefly delay its season premieres. Most significant, though, a new generation of 
historians had already begun addressing the war from the so-called bottom-up 
perspective, underscoring the role of African Americans, women, immigrants, 
workers, farmers, and common soldiers in the conflict. This fresh emphasis on 
social and cultural history had revitalized the Civil War as a subject, adding a 
more inclusive and human dimension to the traditional preoccupations with 
great men, transcendent ideals, and battle strategies and statistics. The time 
was propitious for creating another rebirth of the nation on film that included 
the accessibility of the bottom-up approach. In Burns’s own words, “I realized 
the power that the war still exerted over us” (personal interview).
The Civil War has, indeed, fascinated Americans for more than 140 years. In 
his Pulitzer Prize–winning Battle Cry of Freedom, James M. McPherson estimates 
that the literature “on the war years alone . . . totals more than 50,000 books 
and pamphlets” (865). Reader interest had been increasing in the five years 
preceding the debut of The Civil War; 520 of the 1,450 titles that were still in 
print in September 1990 had been published since 1986. After the premiere 
of the series, however, fascination with the war became “higher . . . than it has 
ever been” (McDowell D10).
Shelby Foote was the first modern writer to liken the Civil War to the Iliad, 
in the third volume of his trilogy The Civil War: A Narrative (Red River 1064). 
His intent was to emphasize how “we draw on it for our notion of ourselves, 
and our artists draw on it for the depiction of us in the same way that Homer 
and the later dramatists—Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides—drew on the Trojan 
war for their plays” (“Conversation” 8). Much of the success of Ken Burns’s The 
Civil War is linked to the extent that his version made this nineteenth-century 
conflict immediate and comprehensible to audiences in the 1990s. The great 
questions of race and continuing discrimination, of the changing roles of 
women and men in society, of big government versus local control, and of the 
individual struggle for meaning and conviction in modern life all remain. The 
Civil War captivates because its purposes endure; Americans are as engaged as 
ever in the war’s dramatic conflicts. As Burns summarized,
There is so much about The Civil War that reverberates today . . . a developing 
women’s movement, Wall Street speculators, the imperial presidency, new mili-
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tary technology, the civil rights question and the contribution of black soldiers. 
. . . There are also approximations and that sort of thing. You have to cut stuff 
out. I would have loved more on the congressional sort of intrigues during the 
Civil War. I would have loved to do more on women and more on emancipation 
and more on Robert E. Lee and more on the western battles, but limitations of 
photographs or just time or rhythm or pacing, or whatever it is, conspired against 
those things. And they were there, but they were taken out to serve the demands 
of the ultimate master, which is narrative. (personal interview)
THE FILMMAKER AS POPULAR HISTORIAN
Narrative is a particular mode of knowledge and means of relaying history. It 
is a historical style that is dramatic and commonly literary, although The Civil 
War does indicate that it can be adapted to electronic media as well. Burns 
Shelby Foote (seated left), the author and principal on-
screen commentator for The Civil War, with producer- 
director Ken Burns.
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strongly recognizes that “television has become more and more the way we 
are connected to the making of history” (“In Search” 1). In selecting the Ho-
meric model, he chose certain narrative parameters that are epic and heroic 
in scope. The epic form tends to celebrate a people’s national tradition in 
sweeping terms, and a recurring assertion throughout Burns’s filmic history is 
that the Civil War gave birth to a newly redefined American nation. The final 
episode, “The Better Angels of Our Nature,” for example, begins with three 
commentaries on nationhood that rhetorically set the stage from which the 
series will be brought to its rousing conclusion:
Strange is it not that battles, martyrs, blood, even assassination should so condense 
a nationality. —Walt Whitman (spoken by Garrison Keillor)
[The Civil War] is the event in American history in that it is the moment that 
made the United States as a nation. —Barbara Fields
Before the war it was said the United States are, grammatically it was spoken that 
way and thought of as a collection of independent states, and after the war it was 
always the United States is as we say today without being self-conscious at all—and 
that sums up what the war accomplished: it made us an is. —Shelby Foote
These remarks are immediately followed by the bittersweet and tragic lament 
that serves as the series’ anthem, “Ashokan Farewell,” thus reinforcing the 
overall heroic dimensions of the narrative. Heroism, honor, and nobility are 
related Homeric impulses that permeate this series, shaping our reactions to 
the great men of the war, such as Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, and 
Robert E. Lee, along with the many foot soldiers whose bravery often exceeded 
the ability of their officers to lead them, resulting in the appalling carnage 
recounted in episode after episode.
History on TV tends to stress the twin dictates of narrative and biography, 
which ideally express television’s inveterate tendency toward personalizing 
all social, cultural, and, for our purposes, historical matters within the highly 
controlled and viewer-involving confines of a well-constructed plot structure. 
The scholarly literature on television has established intimacy and immediacy 
(among other aesthetics) as inherent properties of the medium (see Newcomb, 
Television and T V ; Fiske and Hartley; R. Adler; Allen; and Bianculli). In the case 
of intimacy, for instance, the confines of a relatively small TV screen, typically 
watched within the privacy of the home environment, long ago resulted in an 
evident preference for intimate shot types (i.e., close-ups and medium shots). 
Thus most fictional and nonfictional historical portrayals are fashioned in the 
style of the personal drama or melodrama, played out by a manageable number 
of protagonists and antagonists. When the effort is successful, audiences closely 
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identify with the historical actors and stories being presented and respond in 
intimate ways in the privacy of their own homes.
The Civil War’s most celebrated set piece, the poignant and eloquent voice-
over of Major Sullivan Ballou’s parting letter to his wife before he was killed 
in the First Battle of Bull Run (again accompanied by the haunting strains of 
“Ashokan Farewell”), illustrates the skillful way in which Burns infuses the epic 
sweep of the series with a string of highly personal and well-placed dramatic 
interludes. This scene, which lasts approximately three and one-half minutes, 
concludes episode one, “1861—the Cause,” thus lending the preceding ninety-
five minutes an air of melancholy, romance, and higher purpose. Poetic license 
is used throughout the segment, as Ballou’s declaration of love is heard over 
This famous photograph of three Confederate soldiers captured at the Battle of 
Gettysburg is used several times during The Civil War. Shelby Foote discusses it for 
nearly a minute at the start of episode five, “The Universe of Battle,” suggesting that 
it reveals the “attitude . . . determination . . . and individuality” of its subjects. He 
concludes, “There is something about that picture that draws me strongly as an im-
age of the war.”
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images that have nothing factually to do with Sullivan Ballou but evoke the 
emotional texture of his parting sentiments: photographs of the interior of 
a tent where such a letter might have been written, a sequence of pictures 
portraying six other Civil War couples, and three static filmed shots of the 
Manassas battlefield as it looks today in a pinkish twilight.
This photograph is used in The Civil War, in the accompanying 
book, and on the series’ video jacket to portray a band of young 
Confederate soldiers. Taken before the Confederacy was even cre-
ated, however, this photo actually shows the Richmond militiamen 
of the First Virginia Regiment, who were guarding John Brown 
in Charles Town, West Virginia, in November 1859, following his 
capture at Harpers Ferry. Such poetic license is a regularly acknowl-
edged feature of TV histories. 
Valentine Museum, Richmond, Va.
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After narrator David McCullough briefly begins the scene with the words, 
“A week before Manassas, Major Sullivan Ballou of the Second Rhode Island 
wrote home to his wife in Smithfield,” actor Paul Roebling’s serenely heartfelt 
and understated reading fades up quietly underneath the photographs:
My very dear Sarah. . . . I feel impelled to write a few lines that may fall under 
your eyes when I shall be no more. . . . I have no misgivings about, or lack of 
confidence in the cause in which I am engaged, and my courage does not halt 
or falter. . . . Sarah my love for you is deathless. . . . The memories of the blissful 
moments I have spent with you come creeping over me . . . but O Sarah, if the 
dead can come back to this earth and flit unseen around those they loved, I shall 
always be near you . . . always, always, and if there be a soft breeze upon your 
cheek, it shall be my breath, as the cool air fans your throbbing temple, it shall 
be my spirit passing by. Sarah do not mourn me dead; think I am gone and wait 
for thee, for we shall meet again.
The effectiveness of this section, titled “Honorable Manhood,” was immediately 
apparent, as Burns recalled a year later: “Within minutes of the first night’s 
broadcast, the phone began ringing off the hook with calls from across the 
country, eager to find out about Sullivan Ballou, anxious to learn the name 
of Jay Ungar’s superb theme music (‘Ashokan Farewell’), desperate to share 
their families’ experience in the war or just kind enough to say thanks. The 
calls would not stop all week—and they continue still” (“Mystic Chords”).
Burns’s plot structures are characteristically composed of four kinds of 
scenes. To start with, he employs narrative descriptions, which primarily move 
the story along. These sections follow a simple chronology and are designed 
above all to provide the audience with the basic historical facts: what is hap-
pening and who is involved. The Civil War was planned as a five-part, five-hour 
series, according to the National Endowment for the Humanities grant ap-
plication written in late 1985 and early 1986 by Ken and Ric Burns, with each 
section “covering roughly one year of the conflict, 1861 through 1865. While 
the three central episodes will treat most of the major battles and campaigns, 
we will take advantage of the militarily less eventful years, 1861 and 1865, to 
explore the origins and consequences of the conflict. The war was, of course, 
a great epic, and episode by episode we will chart the large ebb and flow of the 
war: the mobilization of men and material, of industry and new technology, 
the deeds of generals and diplomats, the statistics of death, disease, and cost” 
(9). By the premiere telecast, The Civil War had more than doubled in length 
to eleven hours. Burns “eventually subdivided ’62, ’63, ’64, and ’65 into the 
first and second halves of the years, creating a total of nine episodes” (Burns, 
“Movie Maker” 1035).  As Daniel Boorstin explains, the “most popular” method 
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of organizing historical stories is in one-year, ten-year, and “hundred-year pack-
ages. Historians like to bundle years in ways that make sense, provide continuity 
and link past to present” (37). Burns, first and foremost, then, creates descrip-
tive scenes that provide the factual details needed to support and validate the 
larger historical outlines of the overall nine-episode structure.
Second, he designs what he calls emotional chapters, such as the afore-
mentioned Sullivan Ballou set piece, that have the “ability to float between 
episodes” (Burns, “Movie Maker” 1037). This category of scene is bound less 
by chronological demands than by its capacity to affect mood and engage an 
audience emotionally at strategic moments within the plot. The Civil War  is pep-
pered, for instance, with the entertaining and informative anecdotes of writer, 
popular historian, and master raconteur Shelby Foote. His seemingly intimate 
asides about the human-interest aspects of the conflict add a needed personal 
dimension to the drier evidential framework of the broader historical narrative. 
Burns suggested, “Just go back to the section on the Gettysburg Address and 
watch Shelby’s head twitch as he talks about Lincoln stepping down from the 
stand and, Shelby says, he came back and he turned to his friend Ward and 
he said, Ward, that speech won’t scour. And he tilted his head as if, [had] the 
camera pulled back, you’d see next to Shelby, Abraham Lincoln, and on the 
other side of Lincoln, Ward Lamon. And to me, any man who puts you there, 
that’s a great gift” (personal interview).
The third type of scene that Burns designs are those he calls “telegrams 
[or] short bursts that also have a certain potential to move but are more or 
less tied to a specific moment or a specific time” (“Movie Maker” 1037). Tele-
grams are a mixture of both narrative description, because they are bound 
to whatever event is transpiring in the story line at the time, and emotional 
chapters, since these concise segments strongly contribute to viewer involve-
ment. Prime examples of this sort of scene include the many private reactions 
to a wide array of historical developments throughout the series by Southern 
diarist Mary Chesnut (as spoken by Julie Harris) and Northern lawyer and civic 
leader George Templeton Strong (as spoken by George Plimpton). The most 
remembered telegrams, undoubtedly, are the ones built around single archival 
photographs featuring ground-level views of ordinary Union and Confederate 
soldiers before and after virtually every bloody engagement. These evocative 
images, once again, render the personal dimension of the conflict much more 
accessible to a modern audience of millions. As Burns disclosed,
We wanted you to believe you were there. . . . There is not one shot, not one 
photograph of a battle ever taken during the Civil War. There is not one mo-
ment in which a photographer exposed a frame during a battle, and yet you will 
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swear that you saw battle photography. . . . You live inside those photographs, 
experiencing a world as if it was real inside those photographs. . . . Once you’ve 
taken the poetry of words and added to it a poetry of imagery and a poetry of 
music and a poetry of sound, I think you begin to approximate the notion that 
the real war could actually get someplace, that you could bring it back alive. 
(personal interview)
Burns, fourth and finally, constructs editing clusters as his way of criti-
cally analyzing the various sides of a theme, question, or controversy that is 
central to a better overall understanding of his subject, such as “slavery and 
emancipation” in The Civil War, which he calls “the inner core of our story” 
(“Movie Maker” 1040). This type of scene involves editing together images of 
historical relevance with a montage of commentators who typically present 
both corroborating and conflicting opinions, creating a collage of multiple 
viewpoints. The “Was It Not Real?” segment of the final episode, for example, 
contains three commentaries presenting both confirming and dissenting 
points of view about the lasting meaning of the Civil War. Barbara Fields, who 
previously had suggested that Lincoln was actually a moderate on the issue 
of race in comparison to his contemporaries, begins by observing that “the 
slaves won the war and they lost the war because they won their freedom, that 
is the removal of slavery, but they did not win freedom as they understood 
freedom.” Next, James Symington provides a different slant on the issue by 
declaring that “the significance of Lincoln’s life and victory is that we will never 
again enshrine [slavery] into law.” Yet he agrees with Fields that we should 
“see what we can do to erase . . . the deeper rift between people based on race 
. . . from the hearts and minds of people.” Stephen Oates ends this section 
by shifting the focus to the survival and triumph of “popular government,” 
ending with the assertion that the Civil War is “a testament to the liberation 
of the human spirit for all time.” Oates’s conclusion has little to do with the 
specific substance of the previous statements by Fields and Symington, but 
coming where it does, his testimony cannot help but soften the references to 
racial injustice that preceded it.
More important, this specific editing cluster establishes the liberal plural-
ist consensus: different speakers might clash on certain issues (such as what 
degree of freedom was won in the Civil War and by whom), but disagreements 
take place within a broader framework of agreement on underlying principle. 
In this case, the larger principle is Oates’s evocation of popular government, 
which is understood to guarantee the democracy and human rights needed 
to eventually eradicate racial inequality and disharmony. A historical narrative 
does not merely record and dramatize what happens; it also at times interprets 
events and shapes the presentation of the subject at hand.
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Furthermore, this particular example illustrates that the historical docu-
mentary is able to sustain a certain degree of analysis (although not nearly as 
deep and comprehensive an analysis as written discourse and public discussion 
and debate can provide). The expert testimonies and first-person reports that 
Burns employs provide shifting angles of vision that sometimes agree and at 
other times contrast with each other. These multiple voices, however, form a 
cultural consensus because of both the filmmaker’s liberal pluralist orientation 
and, in Burns’s words, “the power of film to digest and synthesize” (quoted in 
Weisberger 99). In the end, then, Ken Burns, the popular historian, is much 
more a committed storyteller than a reasoned and detached analyst. As he 
explains, “It is the texture of emotion that is important to me. And this is what 
television can do that all the texts cannot do” (quoted in Powers 218).
Burns’s position as a historical documentarian, moreover, straddles two 
well-established and generally distinct professions. He is a highly accomplished 
television producer-director and, as he often characterizes himself, “an amateur 
historian” with a wide-ranging interest in American history but no particular 
scholarly training or specialization. His work habits, nevertheless, do have a 
great deal in common with many standard academic practices. Preparing a 
historical documentary includes the disciplined rigors of thoroughly research-
ing his subject, writing grant proposals, collaborating and debating with an 
assortment of scholarly advisers, composing multiple drafts of the off-screen 
narration, and gathering and selecting the background readings and the expert 
commentaries. (The final 372-page script for The Civil War was its fifteenth 
version.)5
The academic community began paying far closer critical attention to 
Burns and his made-for-television histories after the remarkable public response 
to this miniseries. One historian, for example, chided Burns for utilizing the 
Sullivan Ballou letter without “report[ing] in The Civil War . . . that the letter 
was never sent; it was discovered among Ballou’s possessions” (Sullivan 42). 
Other scholars pointed out that a number of versions of the letter exist (Dono-
hoe 54–55; Bickelhaupt, “Civil War Elegy” 1, 5). Burns responded that “poetic 
license is that razor’s edge between fraud and art that we ride all the time. 
You have to shorten, you have to take shortcuts, you have to abbreviate, you 
have to sort of make do with, you have to sometimes go with something that’s 
less critically truthful imagery-wise because it does an ultimately better job of 
telling the larger truth, but who is deciding and under what system becomes 
the operative question” (personal interview).
Here Burns raises two fundamental differences between his own approach 
to producing history on television and the academic standards shared by most 
professional historians. First, he is far more concerned with the art of story-
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telling than with a fundamentalist sense of detailed accuracy, although he is 
always careful to marshal the facts of history as his stated goal of capturing the 
emotional truth of his subject allows (Burns, “Historical Truth” 752). As he 
explains, “The historical documentary filmmaker’s vocation is not precisely 
the same as the historian’s, although it shares many of the aims and much 
of the spirit of the latter. . . . The historical documentary is often more im-
mediate and more emotional than history proper because of its continual joy 
in making the past present through visual and verbal documents” (“Mystic 
Chords”). Second, Burns is not as self-reflexive about historiography as are 
professional historians. He is aware that there are “systems” to history, but he 
has been criticized for stressing plot over historical analysis: “I am primarily 
a filmmaker. That’s my job. I’m an amateur historian at best, but more than 
anything if you wanted to find a hybridization of those two professions, then 
I find myself an emotional archaeologist. That is to say, there is something in 
the process of filmmaking that I do in the excavation of these events in the past 
that provoke a kind of emotion and a sympathy that remind us, for example, 
of why we agree against all odds as a people to cohere” (personal interview).
At first blush, Burns’s statement might appear to confirm the assessment 
offered in a 1992 American Quarterly essay, which suggests that “‘The Civil 
War’ stands as a new nationalist synthesis that in aims and vision can be most 
instructively compared to James Ford Rhodes’s histories of the Civil War 
(written at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries)” 
(Censer 245). A 1991 appraisal in American Historical Review similarly takes the 
filmmaker to task: “Burns used modern historical techniques, at the level of 
detail and anecdote, to create an accessible, human-scale account of the Civil 
War. But, when it comes to historical interpretation, to the process by which 
details coalesce to make events meaningful, The Civil War is vintage nineteenth 
century.” The severity of these judgments is encapsulated by the same author 
in a final dismissal: The Civil War “is the visual version of the approach taken 
by generations of Civil War buffs, for whom reenacting battles is a beloved 
hobby” (DuBois 1140–41).
Historical documentaries should certainly be subject to evaluation and 
criticism, especially if they are to be viewed by audiences of tens of millions 
and subsequently used as teaching tools in our nation’s schools. The Civil War, 
for example, was licensed after its premiere telecast to more than sixty col-
leges and universities for future classroom use ( Jones and Kelley D4). Burns 
reports that he has “received over 6,000 letters and cards from secondary school 
teachers alone, grateful for the series, pleased with how well it works” (“Mystic 
Chords”). Clearly, then, The Civil War  should be assessed, and the authors of 
the American Quarterly and American Historical Review articles raise relevant ques-
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tions of interpretation and detail. It is a welcome development that historians 
are increasingly attending to the validity of films and television programs.
These reviews, however, also demonstrate the academy’s long-standing ten-
dency to underestimate yet another motion picture or television series, which 
in turn shortchanges The Civil War as popular history. One of the primary goals 
of scholarship is to create new knowledge. No more thorough indictment ex-
ists, according to this frame of reference, than to reject a text for its obsolete 
conception and design, in this case, banishing it to the nineteenth century. 
The Civil War, however, deserves a more measured examination than dismissal 
as the stuff of “Civil War buffs.”
In his widely acclaimed book That Noble Dream (1988), Peter Novick skill-
fully examines the controversies that have fundamentally affected the history 
discipline over the last generation. Current debates continue in the literature 
and at conferences over the relative merits of narrative versus analytic history, 
synthetic versus fragmentary history, and consensus versus multicultural history. 
Lawrence W. Levine suggests that all these historiographical exchanges make 
“sense only when it is seen as what, at its root, it really is—a debate about the 
extent to which we should widen our historical net to include the powerless as 
well as the powerful, the followers as well as the leaders, the margins as well as 
the center, popular and folk culture as well as high culture” (8).
The Civil War is a product of this intellectual climate. In this respect, it is 
not enough to focus on specific details from The Civil War, such as the Sullivan 
Ballou letter, without also considering Burns’s ideological bearings and the 
scope of his historical net. This more comprehensive outlook reveals fragments 
of a nationalist approach to historiography, as the aforementioned reviewers 
suggest. The Civil War  evinces elements of the romantic, progressive, social his-
tory, and consensus schools as well. As Burns explained, “In narrative history 
you have this opportunity, I believe, to contain the multitude of perspectives. 
You can have the stylistic, and certainly my films have a particular and very 
well-known style. You can involve yourself with politics, but that’s not all there 
is. And that’s what I’m trying to do, is to embrace something that has a variety 
of viewpoints” (personal interview).
The Civil War  is essentially a pastiche of assumptions derived from a number 
of schools of historical interpretation. As just mentioned, the series is national-
istic in its apparent pride in nation building, but it lacks the nineteenth-century 
arrogance that envisioned America as the fulfillment of human destiny. The Civil 
War is romantic in its narrative, chronological, and quasi-biographical struc-
ture, but it lacks the unqualified, larger-than-life depictions of the unvarnished 
“great men” approach. The Civil War is progressive in its persistent intimation 
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that the war was ultimately a struggle to end slavery and ensure social justice, 
although this perspective, too, is tempered by some passages, such as Barbara 
Fields’s assertion in the final episode that the Civil War “is still to be fought, 
and regrettably, it can still be lost.” The Civil War is also informed by social his-
tory, with its attention to African Americans, women, laborers, and farmers, 
and especially with its firsthand accounts in each of the nine episodes by two 
common soldiers (Elisha Hunt Rhodes, a Yankee from Rhode Island, and Sam 
Watkins, a Confederate from Tennessee), but the series is nowhere near as 
representative of the bottom-up view as is pure social history. In Burns’s own 
words, “I try to engage, on literally dozens of levels, ordinary human beings 
from across the country—male and female, black and white, young and old, 
rich and poor, inarticulate and articulate” (quoted in “C   ivil War ” 58).
What Burns is annunciating is his liberal pluralist perspective, where dif-
ferences of ethnicity, race, class, and gender are kept in a comparatively stable 
and negotiated consensus within the body politic. Burns’s brand of made-for-
television history is marked more by agreement than is the multicultural or 
diversity model that grounds the social history perspective. The preservation 
of the Union and an emphasis on its ideals and its achievements are funda-
mental to consensus thinking; they are also some of Burns’s primary themes 
throughout The Civil War:
It is interesting that we Americans who are not united by religion, or patriarchy, 
or even common language, or even a geography that’s relatively similar, we have 
agreed because we hold a few pieces of paper and a few sacred words together, we 
have agreed to cohere, and for more than 200 years it’s worked and that special 
alchemy is something I’m interested in. It doesn’t work in a Pollyanna-ish way. 
. . . We corrupt as much as we construct, but nevertheless, I think that in the 
aggregate the American experience is a wonderful beacon . . . and I think the 
overwhelming response to The Civil War is a testament to that. (Burns, personal 
interview)
Rather than being ideologically stuck in the nineteenth century, Burns and 
the audience for The Civil War were instead fully modern in their outlook. 
The tenets of liberal pluralism were prevalent throughout American culture 
during the 1990s and continue to be today. Popular metaphors such as the 
quilt, the rainbow, and, to a lesser degree, the old-fashioned melting pot are 
still used by public figures across the political spectrum to evoke a projection 
of America that is basically fixed on agreement and unity, despite whatever 
social differences may exist. By realizing this perspective on film, Burns has, 
moreover, usurped one of the foremost goals of social history, which is to make 
history meaningful and relevant to the general public. The Civil War brilliantly 
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fulfills this objective as few books, motion pictures, television series, or even 
teachers, for that matter, have ever done.
BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN  
POPULAR AND PROFESSIONAL HISTORY
The mutual skepticism that sometimes surfaces between popular and profes-
sional historians is understandable but unfortunate. Each usually works with 
different media (although some scholars do produce historical TV programs, 
videos, and films); each tends to evaluate differently the role of storytelling 
versus the role of analysis in relaying history; and each tailors a version of the 
past that is designed for disparate—though overlapping—audiences. These 
distinctions are real enough. Still, the artist and the scholar, the amateur and 
the expert can complement each other more than is sometimes evident. Both 
make their own unique contributions to America’s collective memory—that 
is, the full sweep of historical consciousness, understanding, and expression 
that a culture has to offer.
Interdisciplinary work in memory studies now boasts adherents in Ameri-
can studies, anthropology, communication, cultural studies, English, history, 
psychology, and sociology.6 The contemporary preoccupation with memory 
dates back to Freud, although recent scholarship focuses more on the col-
lective nature of remembering than on the individual act of recalling the 
past, which is the traditional realm of psychological inquiry into this topic. 
Researchers today make distinctions between the academic historical record 
and the rest of collective memory. Professional historians, in particular, “have 
traditionally been concerned above all else with the accuracy of a memory, 
with how correctly it describes what actually occurred at some point in the 
past” (Thelen 1119). However, “less traditional historians have allowed for a 
more complex relationship, arguing that history and collective memory can 
be complementary, identical, oppositional, or antithetical at different times” 
(Zelizer, “Reading” 216). According to this way of thinking, more popular uses 
of memory have less to do with accuracy per se than with using the past as a 
kind of communal, mythic response to current events, issues, and challenges. 
The proponents of memory studies, therefore, are more concerned with how 
and why a remembered version is being constructed at a particular time, such 
as The Civil War in 1990, than with whether a specific rendition of the past is 
historically correct and reliable above all else. As Burns further clarifies his 
approach, “History . . . is an inclusion of myth as well as fact because myth tells 
you much more than fact about a people” (“Historical Truth” 749).
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Rather than thinking of popular and professional history as diametrically 
opposed traditions (i.e., one unsophisticated and false, the other more reli-
able and true), it is more helpful to consider them as two ends of the same 
continuum. In his 1984 book Culture as History, the late Warren Susman first 
championed this more sympathetic appreciation of the popular historical 
tradition. Susman noted that myth and history are intimately linked. One 
supplies the drama; the other, the understanding. The popular heritage holds 
the potential to connect people passionately to their pasts; the scholarly camp 
maps out the processes for comprehending what happened with richness and 
depth. Susman’s fundamental premise was that popular history and profes-
sional history need not always clash (7–26).
From this more inclusive perspective, popular history and professional 
history are seen less as discrete traditions and more as overlapping parts of 
the same whole, despite the many tensions that persist. For instance, popular 
histories can nowadays be recognized for their analytical insights, while profes-
sional histories can be valued for their expressive possibilities. Popular history, 
too, is built squarely on the foundations of academic scholarship; it provides 
professional historians, such as Fields and Oates in the case of The Civil War, 
with a platform from which to introduce their scholarly ideas and insights to 
a vastly wider audience. Together, popular history and professional history 
enrich the historical enterprise of a culture, and the strengths of one can serve 
to check the excesses of the other (Susman 7–26).
Any understanding of The Civil War, accordingly, needs to be based on 
the fundamental assumption that television’s representation of the past is an 
altogether new and different kind of history. Unlike written discourse, the 
language of TV is highly stylized, elliptical (rather than linear) in structure, 
and associational or metaphoric in its portrayals of historical themes, figures, 
and events. The Civil War as popular history is above all an artistic attempt to 
link audiences immediately and intensely with the life stories of the people who 
were caught up in the conflict. A content analysis of “444 substantive letters 
from the more than 1,100 letters Burns had received as of March 1991” found 
that “more than one out of every four letters (27 percent) praised Burns for 
offering them a sense of direct, emotional connection with the past” (Glassberg 
3). As with any mediated rendering of history, the main strength of The Civil 
War is experiential: it provides viewers with the dramatic illusion that they are 
somehow personally involved in the action, even as they are learning factual 
details about this vast subject through the course of the narrative. Popular his-
tory is always vicarious and participatory, rather than comparatively detached 
and analytical like most examples of written professional history.
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Made-for-television histories are thus never conceived according to the 
standards of professional history. They are not intended chiefly to debate is-
sues, challenge conventional wisdom, or create new knowledge or perspectives. 
The Civil War, more specifically, is designed for the far less contentious and 
communally oriented environment of prime-time television with its audiences 
in the tens of millions. In this way, producing, telecasting, and viewing this 
miniseries became a large-scale cultural ritual in and of itself.
This process, in turn, completed three important functions: First,The Civil 
War served as an intermediary site bridging the findings of professional his-
torians with the interests of the general public. “There are levels of inquiry,” 
according to Burns, “and we have to celebrate those that bring us to the door 
of the next level. And I think Roots brings in a huge audience. MaybeThe Civil 
War has a little bit more select audience . . . but all of it is enriching the academy 
as well as the populace” (“Historical Truth” 757). Second, the series facilitated 
an ongoing negotiation with America’s usable past by portraying those parts 
of the collective memory that were of most interest to the television producers 
as well as to the nearly 40 million viewers who decided to tune in: issues such 
as the residual effects of slavery and the continuance of racial conflict and 
discrimination in the United States, the influence of a strong federal pres-
ence in both state and local governments across the country, and the search 
for meaning and personal responsibility in national life. In this regard, Burns 
explains, “history is really not about the past; it’s about the present. We define 
ourselves now by the subjects we choose from the past and the way each suc-
ceeding generation interprets those subjects. They are more a mirror of how 
we are now than they are a literal guide to what went before” (“Movie Maker” 
1033). And, third, The Civil War loosely affirmed mainstream standards, values, 
and beliefs; in the filmmaker’s own words, “there is more unum than pluribus 
in my work” (“Historical Truth” 747).
Burns, overall, articulates a version of the country’s past that conveys his 
own perspective as a popular historian, intermingling many widely held as-
sumptions about the character of America and its liberal pluralist aspirations. 
Like other documentarians of his generation, he too addresses matters of race, 
gender, class, and regional division, but unlike many of his contemporaries, 
he presents an image of the United States eventually pulling together despite 
its many chronic differences rather than coming apart at the seams. Exploring 
the past is Burns’s way of reassembling an imagined future from a fragmented 
present. The Civil War, in particular, reaffirmed for the members of its principal 
audience—which, according to the ratings, skewed white, male, thirty-five to 
forty-nine, and upscale (Statistical Research Inc.)—the relevance of their past 
in an era of unprecedented multicultural redefinition. This aesthetic reinte-
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gration of the past into the present is one of the major purposes of popular 
history. For Ken Burns, it is a process of reevaluating the country’s historical 
legacy and reconfirming it from a wholly new generational outlook.
In the end, Burns contends, “the Civil War compelled me to do this film,” 
enabling him to establish “a dialogue with the past.” As Fields reminds us in 
the final episode of the series, “The Civil War is in the present as well as in the 
past.” In this sense, at least, all history is contemporary. We can never escape 
our own time or set of ideological predispositions, and within this context, no 
one has ever done a better job of “bringing [the Civil War] back alive” to more 
Americans through the power and reach of television than Ken Burns.
NOTES
1. The consultants listed in the credits are Shelby Foote, Barbara J. Fields, C. Vann 
Woodward, Don Fehrenbacher, Stephen Sears, William McFeely, James McPherson, 
Bernard Weisberger, Mike Musick, Richard Snow, Eric Foner, Stephen B. Oates, Robert 
Johannsen, Tom Lewis, William E. Leuchtenburg, Daniel Aaron, Charles Fuller, Char-
ley McDowell, Ira Berlin, Gene Smith, Robert Penn Warren, Jerome Liebling, Dayton 
Duncan, and Amy Stechler Burns.
2. Some of the more prominent critiques of The Civil War  focus on its errors in de-
tail, its abridgement of the origins of the war and Reconstruction, and its condensation 
of other complex issues, such as policy making and the formation of public opinion. 
For additional disagreements in interpretation, see J. Adler, Censer, DeCredico, DuBois, 
Koeniger, Marc and Thompson 307, May, Purcell, and Summers.
3. Echoing many film scholars before him, Louis Giannetti writes, “Birth is a diseased 
masterpiece, steeped in racial bigotry” (67). This critical ambivalence about The Birth 
of a Nation in general film histories dates back to Ramsaye, Hampton, and Jacobs.
4. Burns received the following honorary degrees in 1991: LHD, Bowdoin College; 
LittD, Amherst College; LHD, University of New Hampshire; DFA, Franklin Pierce 
College; LittD, Notre Dame College (Manchester, N.H.); LittD, College of St. Joseph 
(Rutland, Vt.); LHD, Springfield College (Ill.); and LHD, Pace University.
5. The final draft of the script, dated 17 July 1989, is in the Ken Burns Collection, 
Folklore Archives, Wilson Library, U of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. The materials 
on The Civil War include all drafts of the script, all the filmed interviews with various 
scholars and experts (including outtakes), other footage, notes on decision making, 
test narrations, some financial records, and correspondence.
6. See Fussell; Kammen; Le Goff; Lewis; Lipsitz; Schudson; and Zelizer, Covering 
and Remembering.
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“IT’S WHAT PEOPLE SAY WE’RE 
FIGHTING FOR”
Representing the Lost Cause in Cold Mountain
5 / Robert M. Myers
In the introduction to Cold Mountain: A Screenplay, author Charles Frazier de-
scribes a strange moment that occurred during the making of the film. As they 
were filming a Christmas celebration, director Anthony Minghella suddenly 
stopped the cameras and asked Frazier, “This scene is in the book, isn’t it?” 
Remarkably, Frazier responded, “I’m not sure. I’d have to check” (xii). This 
unusual confusion over authorial paternity leads Frazier to speculate on the 
proper relationship between a book and its film version. On the one hand, he 
recognizes that “books are books and movies are movies. They should not be 
identical, nor can they be” (xii–xiii). Nevertheless, he insists that “the original 
work—if it is worth taking on in the first place—is owed something. Not perfect 
fidelity. Not excessive respect. But it is owed a degree of commitment not to 
violate its essence, its heart. Otherwise, go make up your own story” (xv).
The initial impression that Minghella’s Cold Mountain (2003) creates is 
one of unusual fidelity to Frazier’s novel. The costumes, the sets, and the mu-
sic all capture the essence of the novel’s time period. But a close analysis of 
the novel and the film reveals many differences. Scenes that are central to the 
novel’s meaning did not make it to the screen, and other scenes, such as the 
Christmas party, are not in the literary version. As Frazier recognizes, many of 
the differences can be attributed to a film’s need for compression: “a sort of 
agreed-upon shorthand of narrative and character development” (xiii). Other 
changes are harder to explain: for example, in the film, the corrupt minister, 
Veasey (Philip Seymour Hoffman), suffers ostentatiously from constipation, 
and Teague (Ray Winstone), the ruthless leader of the Home Guard, inex-
plicably joins in the singing of “I Wish My Baby Was Born” shortly before the 
shooting of Pangle (Ethan Suplee) and Stobrod (Brendan Gleeson). But the 
most consistent and intriguing differences between the novel and the film are 
in their representation of the ideology of the Lost Cause.
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The expression the “Lost Cause” comes from the title of an 1866 history of 
the Confederacy by Edward A. Pollard.1 The meaning of the phrase has shifted 
over time, but Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara L. Bellows suggest that, in 
its general sense, it refers to “the core of that enduring memory of southern 
defeat” (4). In the 1870s, the Southern Historical Society, led by its president, 
Jubal Early, formulated a discourse to help justify secession and account for 
the military defeat of the South. Through the society’s journal, the Southern 
Historical Society Papers, members constructed a consistent interpretation of 
the war that promoted three main ideas. First, they insisted that the South 
fought for states’ rights, not slavery. Second, they represented Robert E. Lee 
as a military genius and a perfect embodiment of the Southern gentleman. 
Finally, they claimed that, despite the heroism of the individual Confederate 
soldier, the North’s overwhelming resources and numbers eventually forced 
the South to succumb. In the 1880s, this Lost Cause vision grew from the 
stubborn resistance of a few Virginia diehards into a widespread celebration 
of Southern culture and virtue. Indeed, as the two sections began to move 
toward reconciliation in the late nineteenth century, Northerners increas-
ingly adopted elements of the Southern interpretation of the war, especially 
the deification of Lee and the celebration of the Southern soldier. Much of 
the nationalization of Lost Cause ideology can be attributed to two immensely 
popular epic films: D. W. Griffith’s 1915 The Birth of a Nation, an adaptation of 
Thomas Dixon’s The Clansman (1905), and David Selznick’s 1939 version of 
Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind (1936). While not as popular as these 
earlier works, Cold Mountain in its novel and film versions perpetuates the 
mythology of the Lost Cause.2
FRAZIER AND THE LOST CAUSE
An important figure associated with the historiography of the Lost Cause is 
Thomas L. Connelly, who was a professor of history at the University of South 
Carolina when Frazier was working on his PhD. In The Marble Man: Robert 
E. Lee and His Image in American Society (1977), Connelly traces the develop-
ment of the Lee myth from the 1870s, when the Southern Historical Society 
represented him as the embodiment of the Southern chivalric ideal, to the 
Civil War centennial, by which time Lee had been transformed into a national 
hero and a representative of middle-class values (161). By the 1970s, historians 
such as Connelly had begun to complicate the Lee myth, and this revisionist 
history seems to have influenced Frazier’s novel, especially the characteriza-
tion of the protagonist, W. P. Inman. At the Battle of Fredericksburg (1862), 
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Inman’s regiment is placed behind a stone wall on Marye’s Heights, near Lee 
and Longstreet. Frazier writes that “the two generals spent the afternoon up 
on the hill coining fine phrases like a pair of wags” (12). However, unlike 
subsequent historians, Inman is not impressed:
Old Lee . . . said it’s a good thing war is so terrible or else we’d get to liking it 
too much. As with everything Marse Robert said, the men repeated that flight of 
wit over and over, passing it along from man to man, as if God amighty Himself 
had spoken. When the report reached Inman’s end of the wall he just shook his 
head. Even back then, early in the war, his opinion differed considerably from 
Lee’s, for it appeared to him that we like fighting plenty, and the more terrible 
it is the better. And he suspected that Lee liked it most of all and would, if given 
his preference, general them right through the gates of death itself. (12)
Proponents of the Lee myth attributed his military defeats to failures by his 
subordinates, especially Longstreet’s alleged lethargy at Gettysburg in 1863. 
But when Inman compares Lee and Longstreet, he thinks “he’d any day rather 
have Longstreet backing him in a fight. Dull as Longstreet looked, he had a 
Union troops under withering fire in Cold Mountain. 
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mind that constantly sought ground configured so a man could hunker down 
and do a world of killing from a position of relative safety” (10). Inman realizes 
that his thoughts about Lee are unspeakable, “as were his feelings that he did 
not enlist to take on a Marse, even one as solemn and noble-looking as Lee 
was that day on Maryes Heights” (12).
This passage raises the question of why Inman enlisted. As a deserter, he 
is in an ambiguous position between the two sides, and he frequently muses 
on his reasons for fighting. As he struggles through the foul flatlands near 
Raleigh, North Carolina, he wonders, “How did he ever think this to be his 
country and worth fighting for?” (85). When he passes through a region with 
large mansions, he bitterly realizes “he had been fighting battles for such men 
as lived in them, and it made him sick” (261). The most sustained discussion 
of the causes of the war occurs while Inman recuperates with the goat woman. 
She asks him, “What I want to know is, was it worth it, all that fighting for the 
big man’s nigger?” (275). When Inman protests, she insists that slavery is the 
real cause of the war: “Nigger-owning makes the rich man proud and ugly and 
it makes the poor man mean. It’s a curse laid on the land. We’ve lit a fire and 
now it’s burning us down. God is going to liberate niggers, and fighting to 
prevent it is against God” (275). Inman then speculates aloud on the reasons 
that he and his fellow Southerners fought: “I reckon many of us fought to 
drive off invaders. One man I knew had been north to the big cities, and he 
said it was every feature of such places that we were fighting to prevent. All I 
know is anyone thinking the Federals are willing to die to set loose slaves has 
got an overly merciful view of mankind” (275). Finally, Inman realizes that he 
was motivated partially by the call of adventure: “The powerful draw of new 
faces, new places, new lives. And new laws where-under you might kill all you 
wanted and not be jailed, but rather be decorated. Men talked of war as if they 
committed it to preserve what they had and what they believed. But Inman 
now guessed it was boredom with the repetition of the daily rounds that had 
made them take up weapons” (276). When Sara tells him that her husband 
was killed at Gettysburg, he completes the process of effacing any meaningful 
cause for the war: “Every man that died in that war on either side might just 
as soon have put a pistol against the soft of his palate and blown out the back 
of his head for all the meaning it had” (305). Accordingly, at the end, when 
Inman must decide whether to return to the fighting or surrender to the 
Yankees, the decision is purely pragmatic. He decides to “put himself in the 
hands of the Federals, the very bastards who had spent four years shooting at 
him. They would make him sign his name to their oath of allegiance, but then 
he could wait out the fighting and come home” (436).
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When the war is represented as being without larger purpose, the focus 
shifts from the legitimacy of the cause to the courage of individual soldiers. 
David Blight has pointed out that, in the late nineteenth century, the eman-
cipationist implications of the war were neglected as both Northerners and 
Southerners enabled sectional reconciliation by developing amnesia over the 
causes of the war. Instead, they celebrated the heroism of the American soldier, 
whether Union or Confederate: “By the 1880s, Americans needed a social and 
moral equivalent of war. They would achieve this, of a kind, in the realm of 
sentiment—in a resurgent cult of manliness and soldierly virtues recycled in 
thousands of veterans’ papers, speeches, and reminiscences. But such a moral 
equivalent of war came increasingly to exalt the soldier and his sacrifice, dis-
embodied from the causes and consequences of war” (95). Ambivalent about 
the cause of the war to the point of desertion, Inman is nevertheless clearly 
not a coward. He reflects with some surprise on his ability to fight: “Before 
the war he had never been much of a one for strife. But once enlisted, fight-
ing had come easy to him. He had decided it was like any other thing, a gift” 
(123). As he struggles to return home, he dispatches every enemy, regardless 
of the odds. As is the case in nearly all Civil War literature, both northern and 
southern readers can admire Inman’s martial prowess.
In Lost Cause ideology, the courage of the Southern soldiers is linked 
closely with an insistence on the superior numbers of the North. Frazier de-
scribes the Battle of Fredericksburg from Inman’s perspective as resembling 
“a dream, one where your foes are ranked against you countless and mighty” 
(11), and Inman becomes frustrated at the persistence of the seemingly limit-
less enemy: “The Federals kept on marching by the thousands at the wall all 
through the day, climbing the hill to be shot down. . . . The Federals kept on 
coming long past the point where all the pleasure of whipping them vanished. 
Inman just got to hating them for their clodpated determination to die” (11). 
When he is with the goat woman, Inman regrets his initial enthusiasm for the 
war: “The shame he felt now to think of his zeal in sixty-one to go off and fight 
the downtrodden mill workers of the Federal army, men so ignorant it took 
many lessons to convince them to load their cartridges ball foremost. These 
were the foes, so numberless that not even their own government put much 
value to them. They just ran them at you for years on end, and there seemed 
no shortage. You could kill them down until you grew heartsick and they would 
still keep ranking up to march southward” (276). But Frazier seems to under-
mine the Lost Cause emphasis on the Northern superiority of numbers. When 
Ada and Ruby visit Mrs. McKennet, she tells “a long and maudlin story she had 
read about a recent battle, its obvious fictitiousness apparently lost on her. It 
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was fought—as they all were lately—against dreadful odds” (181). Like the 
Southern women who would maintain the altar of the Lost Cause throughout 
the postwar period, Mrs. McKennet “found the fighting glorious and tragic 
and heroic. Noble beyond all her powers of expression” (180). Ada dismisses 
the romantic story as “the most preposterous thing I have ever heard” (181).
To some extent, Frazier’s ambivalent representation of the Lost Cause 
can be attributed to his protagonist: by focusing on a soldier from the moun-
tains of North Carolina rather than a Tidewater cavalier, Frazier puts his fic-
tion outside the mainstream of Lost Cause ideology. Nina Silber points out 
that in the 1880s Northerners looking to heal the wounds of the war turned 
with hope to the Southern mountaineer. Praised for his primitive virility and 
national loyalty, the mountaineer was especially valued for his racial purity: 
“Indeed, what began as an explanation of the mountaineers’ isolation from 
the sectional politics of slavery and the slaveholder became a tribute to their 
detachment from the black people. . . . Suddenly, the southern mountaineers 
had become a people defined by their distance from African Americans, a point 
of considerable significance in a period when northern culture had begun to 
cast the black population aside as foreign and to embrace Anglo-Saxonism 
as pure Americanism” (146–47). Although Frazier does not completely avoid 
the racial implications of the war, they are not as central to his novel as might 
be expected for a work published in 1997. Mountaineer and deserter, Inman 
evades the complications that would have been inherent in a sympathetic 
protagonist fighting for the preservation of slavery.
MINGHELLA’S FILM VERSION OF COLD MOUNTAIN
In an interview, Minghella explained that when he read Cold Mountain, it ap-
peared “to be a story about the American Civil War, and I don’t necessarily 
have an interest in war stories. But then I realized that war was not the issue. It’s 
more about a man’s return from war, the after effects of war, and the effects of 
war on the world away from the battlefield” (quoted in Walsh par. 21). Given 
his lack of interest in war stories and his cultural distance from the American 
Civil War, it is not surprising that Minghella ignores much of Frazier’s critique 
of the Lost Cause. Although some important elements of this ideology remain, 
they are transformed by Minghella’s own cinematic vision.
Frazier’s challenge to the idolization of Robert E. Lee is eliminated from 
Minghella’s film. The screenplay does include a shortened reference to Lee’s 
famous quote at Fredericksburg: before he is sent on his mission at Globe Tav-
ern, an officer tells Inman ( Jude Law), “It’s what our general said, son: Good 
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thing war is so terrible, else a man might end up liking it too much” (22), but 
there is no irony to undercut the quote, and these lines were dropped from the 
film. Likewise, there is less emphasis on the overwhelming numbers of the North 
and the heroism of the individual Confederate soldier. In the film, Inman tells 
the goat woman (Eileen Atkins), “I could be at killing for days, my feet against 
the feet of my enemy, and I always killed him and he never killed me,” but the 
cinematic version shows fewer of his battles during the war and on the way home 
to Cold Mountain. The Battle of the Crater in Petersburg is not as lopsided as 
the endless slaughter at Fredericksburg; Minghella deletes Inman’s battle with 
the three men at the Cape Fear River; and Inman is assisted by Sara (Natalie 
Portman) in his fight with the three Yankees.
Minghella’s Cold Mountain reflects the Lost Cause interpretation most 
pointedly on the origins of the war. In contrast to Lost Cause ideology, the film 
identifies slavery as the fundamental cause, but Minghella carefully distances 
the main characters from this issue. In the published screenplay, the hospital 
has been moved from Raleigh to a former mansion in Charleston, the location 
of Fort Sumter, where the war began. As Inman convalesces, he is surrounded 
by slaves in the fields, and the stage directions note, “He brings the wet bandage 
to his neck, considers the ocean, his fellow ragtag of wounded, the slaves, the 
great fields, the mansion. The whole meaning of this war around him” (43). 
Although this episode does not appear in the film, a similar scene makes the 
Inman ( Jude Law) deserts the battlefield and returns to his roots.
P
h
o
to
fe
st
128 / Robert M. Myers
point even more clearly. The Charleston hospital is surrounded by cotton fields 
that are being worked by slaves, and as the doctor shows a group of women 
the horrors of the hospital, he comments, “Look out the window, ladies, and 
see what these poor fools are dying for. How many would still lose a leg for 
the rich man’s slave?”
The film suggests that, before the war, the average Southerner was deluded 
about what was leading the South into war. Esco Swanger ( James Gammon), 
who is described in the screenplay as having “no truck with a war he judges to 
be based on a conflict between one type of wealth and another,” gets into a 
debate with young men enthusiastic about the prospect of going into battle:
ESCO: What do you fools think you’re fighting for?
ROURKE: The South.
ESCO: Last time I checked, south was a direction.
In the screenplay, he continues, “You cut the wood, you carry the water for 
good old King Cotton. Now you want to fight for him. Somebody has to explain 
it to me” (9–10). As they are hammering nails into the church roof, one man 
says, “I call this nail Northern Aggression.” In the screenplay, the next line is, 
“I call this nail a free nigger” (5–6), but in the film, it is changed to “Yankee 
skulls,” and another man dismisses their enthusiasm: “Fightin’ for a rich man’s 
slave, that’s what.” Minghella represents the economic interests of the wealthy 
planters as the real cause of the war, a cause that is hidden from most of the 
men who will fight.
Inman’s motives for enlisting are problematic. In the screenplay, he ex-
plains to Ada Monroe (Nicole Kidman), “I don’t care much for a man from 
Washington telling me how to live” (20), echoing the Southern antigovern-
ment individualism that W. J. Cash discusses in his classic study The Mind of the 
South. In the film, this scene is replaced by a conversation that occurs during 
Inman’s walk with Ada’s father, Reverend Monroe (Donald Sutherland). When 
Monroe comments on the beauty of the distant mountains, Inman replies, 
“It’s what people say we’re fighting for—to keep it that way.” Thus in the film, 
he enlists to protect the South he loves, whereas in the novel, he comes to a 
more complex realization that it was boredom that seduced him into military 
service. In any case, both screenplay and film take pains to demonstrate that he 
does not enlist to defend slavery; indeed many of Minghella’s changes to the 
novel distance Inman from the racism of the region. In a scene deleted from 
the final cut, Inman is “appalled” when Butcher (Trey Howell) kills a wounded 
black Union soldier after the Battle of the Crater (15–16).3 In Frazier’s novel, 
Representing the Lost Cause in Cold Mountain / 129
Inman meets Veasey as he is about to murder his white mistress; Minghella 
makes her black, which gives Inman the opportunity to express his outrage: 
“So you reckoned to kill her because she’s a slave.” Similarly, when Inman 
attempts to buy eggs from the escaping slaves, he insists, “I’ve got no quarrel 
with you.” Thus Minghella challenges the Lost Cause denial that slavery was 
the cause of the war, but his critique is compromised by Hollywood’s need to 
make sure that a protagonist is free of racism—even more than Inman’s status 
as a Confederate deserter would suggest.
Ada’s racial attitudes in the film are equally modern. Minghella gives 
Reverend Monroe slaves; indeed, in the screenplay, he points out that they 
are the only slaves within twenty miles of Cold Mountain (28). When Ada ar-
rives at Cold Mountain, a voice-over describes her happiness at escaping from 
Charleston, “a world of slaves, and corsets, and cotton.” During a party, she 
demonstrates her compassion by serving root beer to the lowly inhabitants of 
the slave quarters (20). In the screenplay, the Home Guard drives Monroe’s 
slaves away by burning their homes (35), but in the film Ada frees them herself. 
Commenting on the sorry state of Ada’s farm, Sally Swanger points out, “Poor 
soul. She let those slaves go free and she’s got nobody and nothing.” Indeed, 
the only racists in the South seem to be the members of the despicable Home 
Guard. In a scene cut from the released version, Teague echoes the message 
of The Birth of a Nation when he promises to “guard against the Negro. They 
want what the white man got. Give them the chance, they’ll carry rape and 
murder to your firesides” (28).
THE RESIDUAL LOST CAUSE
Modern interest in arguments about the causes of the war, the relative merits of 
its commanders, and the reasons that the North won is largely limited to Civil 
War historians. Yet key aspects of Lost Cause ideology have become embed-
ded in popular culture. Connelly and Bellows define the modern Lost Cause 
as “an awareness of defeat, alienation from the national experience, and a 
sense of separatism from American ideals. It is not the totality of southern folk 
culture, but remains a strong central element”(137). They argue that America 
has alternated between two images of the South. One option, especially dur-
ing the desegregation struggles of the 1950s, has been to see the South as a 
benighted contrast to mainstream America (138). The other option, evident in 
such films as Walking Tall (1973), Smokey and the Bandit (1977), and Every Which 
Way but Loose (1978), has been to see southern resistance to northern culture 
as a desirable alternative to the social turmoil of post-1960s America; in these 
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films, “the stress was upon the protagonist, who, while fighting evil, exhibited 
human weaknesses slightly outside of the confining aspects of the law. To a 
nation emerging from civil turmoil and disillusionment with its political lead-
ers, the southern image was a welcome change” (144). In other words, Inman 
might be seen as a Southern Dirty Harry who has exchanged his .44 Magnum 
for a LeMat pistol. Seeing Inman as an antiestablishment vigilante who uses 
violence for good ends creates a context for Cold Mountain’s selective embrace 
of Lost Cause mythology: like those Clint Eastwood antiheroes, Inman faces 
overwhelming numbers with courage, is ambivalent about the cause for which 
he fights, and has contempt for his superiors.
Another aspect of the Lost Cause that has persisted in American culture can 
be sensed in country music. Connelly and Bellows argue that “the core of this 
music is continual striving amid perpetual disappointment—that is the heart of 
the Lost Cause” (146). Music plays an important role in the novel, and much 
of the film’s popularity may be attributed to Gabriel Yared’s bluegrass score. 
Indeed, not one but three popular albums have been generated by the film: 
the original sound track (2003), Return to Cold Mountain (2004), and Backroads 
to Cold Mountain (2004). Songs such as “Wayfaring Stranger” and “I’m Going 
Home” evoke the heroic endurance of the Southern people.
This perseverance in the face of defeat is common to the endings of both 
novel and film. To provide narrative closure, Frazier adds an epilogue that 
balances the random, violent death of Inman with images of his child and 
Ada thriving on Black Cove Farm. Frazier sets the epilogue in 1874, midway 
between the 1872 reelection of Ulysses S. Grant (the last election in which 
the “bloody shirt” of the war was useful to the Republicans) and the 1876 
election of Rutherford B. Hayes, which precipitated the end of Reconstruc-
tion by way of the Compromise of 1877. This period was the beginning of the 
celebration of the Lost Cause that would lead to a restoration of Southern 
confidence and ultimately to sectional reconciliation. The film does not make 
the time frame clear but instead concludes with Ada’s mournful voice-over: 
“What we have lost will never be returned to us. The land will not heal. Too 
much blood. The heart will not heal. All we can do is make peace with the 
past and try to learn from it.” Clearly, the lesson from the past is to avoid 
war, but the film’s final image draws on Lost Cause affirmations of Southern 
perseverance, reinforced by images of music, family, and religion.
In his introduction to Cold Mountain: The Journey from Book to Film, director 
Anthony Minghella uses adoption as a metaphor for the process of convert-
ing a novel into a film: “Sitting with Charles Frazier on the porch where most 
of his novel was written, the mountains in front of us shrouded in mist, I was 
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conscious of a strange moment, as if I were adopting someone’s child. I was 
starting the long and painful journey to turn Charles Frazier’s Cold Mountain 
into something of my own” (12). In his introduction to the screenplay, Frazier 
uses a slightly different version of the family metaphor. While recognizing the 
inevitability of difference, he insists, “If novel and film adaptation can never 
be twins, it seems to me that they ought to share significant amounts of DNA 
beyond just a correspondence of character names and the barest elements 
of plot, always the least interesting parts of a movie or a novel for me” (xiv). 
Adopted child or sibling, the film version is a creation of both parents and 
reflects the ideologies of both author and adapter. Of course, Frazier’s novel 
is itself a retelling of Homer’s Odyssey. Frazier explained that while writing Cold 
Mountain, “I realized that there are two kinds of books about a war: there’s an 
Iliad, about fighting the war, and about the battles and generals, and there’s an 
Odyssey, about a warrior who has decided that home and peace are the things 
he wants” (interview, par. 12). The choice of the Odyssey as a pattern does 
distinguish Cold Mountain from those Civil War novels that glorify war—for 
example, Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels (1974). And even more than the 
novel, Minghella’s Cold Mountain focuses on Inman’s disenchantment with the 
war and the manipulation of the common soldier. Inman tells the goat woman, 
“I’m like the boy who goes for wood in winter and comes back in the spring 
with a whistle. Like every fool sent off to fight with a flag and a lie.” War was 
certainly a context for Minghella’s involvement with Cold Mountain: he wrote 
the screenplay in the spring of 2001 and began filming in July 2002, during 
the buildup for the Iraq War.
Nevertheless, one wonders whether either the novel or the film is truly 
an effective antiwar protest or merely another opportunity to experience vi-
cariously the thrill of battle, sheltered under reassuring platitudes about the 
evils of war. An entire chapter of Cold Mountain: The Journey from Book to Film 
is devoted to the filming of the battle sequence, and producer Bill Horberg 
describes the crew’s painstaking quest for realism: “We wanted to avoid the 
sense of reenactment that turns up in most films of the Civil or Revolutionary 
War. We wanted a quality of first-time authenticity and nonvarnished life that 
didn’t feel like it came out of the Smithsonian Museum” (quoted in Sunshine 
77). The “thousands of extras and tons of explosives” (77) certainly did produce 
an exciting and memorable experience, but it seems less certain that filmgoers 
were any more repulsed by, or informed about, the horrors of war than they 
would have been at a Civil War reenactment.
In 1960, C. Vann Woodward, in The Burden of Southern History, warned that 
America might fall victim to its belief in its own innocence and the inevitability 
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of success. Writing during the cold war, just prior to the buildup of Vietnam, 
Woodward described the paradox of America’s situation in the world: “Having 
more power than ever before, America ironically enjoys less security than in 
the days of her weakness. Convinced of her virtue, she finds that even her al-
lies accuse her of domestic vices invented by her enemies. The liberated prove 
ungrateful for their liberation, the reconstructed for their reconstruction, and 
the late colonial peoples vent their resentment upon our nation—the most 
innocent, we believe, of the imperial powers” (172–73). As southerner and 
Yale professor, Woodward called for the southern historian, infused with the 
Lost Cause understanding of limitations and defeat, to rescue America from its 
blindness. He warned of the potential consequences if the implications of the 
Civil War were not learned: “There is the danger that America may be tempted 
to exert all the terrible power she possesses to compel history to conform to 
her own illusions. The extreme, but by no means the only expression, would 
be the so-called preventive war” (173). Forty years later, both Frazier’s novel 
and Minghella’s film use the tragedy of Southern experience to represent the 
dangers of naïve idealism and the horrors of war. But recent events suggest 
that it remains unclear whether we have avoided Woodward’s Cassandra-like 
prophecy that America might not learn the lessons of the Lost Cause.
NOTES
1. There has been much recent scholarship on the Lost Cause. Gaines M. Foster, in 
Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865–1913 
(1987), sees the late-nineteenth-century popularity of the concept as a response to social 
tensions in the New South. Charles Reagan Wilson, in Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the 
Lost Cause, 1865–1920 (1980), argues that the Lost Cause was a civil religion that linked 
Christianity and regional history. David W. Blight, in Race and Reunion: The Civil War in 
American Memory (2001), discusses the role that white supremacy played in Lost Cause 
ideology. Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara L. Bellows, in God and General Longstreet: The 
Lost Cause and the Southern Mind (1982), distinguish between the literary productions of 
diehard ex-Confederate political and military leaders that occurred before World War 
I and the timeless Confederate ideal that has evolved into a national Lost Cause.
2. Gross sales for The Birth of a Nation are difficult to determine with any accuracy, 
but according to the Internet Movie Database, it grossed $3 million, which adjusts to ap-
proximately $50 million today. Gone with the Wind remains the highest-grossing film of 
all time, with gross box office receipts at $198 million in the United States alone. Cold 
Mountain has grossed $95 million (“Business Data”).
3. Although the Union attack at the crater was performed largely by African 
American troops, Minghella’s soldiers are white, because he used the Romanian army 
as actors. There is, however, a brief scene showing the Native American swimmer ( Jay 
Tavare) grappling with an African American soldier—perhaps to emphasize the irony 
of two oppressed groups fighting a white man’s war.
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THE GREAT WAR  
VIEWED FROM THE 1920S
The Big Parade
6 / Michael T. Isenberg
The decade of the 1920s has long stood in the popular perspective as a unity, 
bounded by the ignoble brackets of war and economic crisis. The customary 
view of the period, kept alive by dozens of colorful book titles, is that it was a 
time of carefree hedonism and relentless materialism when American society 
unleashed the pent-up energies of the war years.
The traditional vision sees World War I not only as Woodrow Wilson’s great 
crusade but also as the great watershed in modern American history. The war 
broadened the breakdown of the old moral code, particularly in relation to 
late Victorian concepts of femininity. It produced a universal social malaise 
that saw all gods dead, all heroes humbled, all causes exhausted. Americans 
responded to the Carthaginian peace of Versailles by withdrawing from world 
affairs and expressing a strong revulsion to war and militarism. The author 
of the League of Nations proposal died embittered and disowned by his own 
political party; Wilsonian idealism lay sacrificed on the altar of normalcy.
With the exception of the unfortunate Herbert Hoover and a few others, 
the decade was almost bereft of first-class political leaders at all levels. The 
economy, though it seemed to be booming right along, was disastrously uneven. 
By contrast, the nation’s intellectual life flourished, particularly in areas of 
cultural criticism. The war produced a strong and antagonistic reaction from 
literature and the plastic arts. The postwar climate shaped by such “lost gen-
eration” authors as Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, and e. e. cummings 
commonly is regarded as one of disillusionment.
The traditional interpretation is clear. A fatigued society, worn from pa-
triotic exertion and with its almost hysterical idealism shattered, turned away 
from Progressive reform and ran the gamut of self-indulgence. Only with the 
convulsive shock of the stock market crash and the sickening slide into eco-
nomic depression did Americans begin to pay for their excesses.
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Yet this traditional view of the war-spawned 1920s is drawn largely from 
the evidence provided by cultural elites dissatisfied with their society. The war 
itself was at least as much an accelerator as it was a cause of the postwar mood 
of dissatisfaction and rebellion. Although many Americans doubtless took part 
in the war-induced climate of cynicism, historians have tended to overlook 
the continuities of the period. The flaming passions of the Jazz Age probably 
held more smoke than fire, for family and church life continued as the hubs 
of social activity for millions. The Progressive reform impulse still flickered; 
Robert La Follette was able to mount a strong third-party movement on its 
base in 1924, and watchdogs such as George Norris kept progressivism alive 
in Congress. Some old Progressives were still around to praise the New Deal, 
although many became as intensely displeased with the second Roosevelt as 
they had been enchanted with the first.
Overlooked in the minds of many Americans is the fact that the recent 
European war experience persisted as a legitimate theater for heroism and 
the display of national idealism. To be sure, this attitude was at a high pitch 
President Woodrow Wilson promised to “make the world safe for democracy.”
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between 1917 and 1919, when government, organs of public opinion, motion 
pictures, and popular literature allowed almost no dissent from total and un-
compromising support of the war effort. But even in the years following the 
war, the general public was probably as supportive of this alternative vision as 
of the more pessimistic view that is much better known historically. With the 
nation in a conservative mood, the sacrifices of wartime met with approbation 
as well as disapproval. Veterans’ organizations hawked their brand of patri-
otism. The Veterans of Foreign Wars, founded in 1899, gained new life and new 
blood from World War I, while veterans of the American Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) developed the American Legion and the Military Order of the World 
Wars in 1919. These organizations had fond memories of the Great War and 
were assiduous in the cultivation of “Americanism” and militant patriotism in 
textbooks and among teachers.
Although it is fair to say that most of the elitist literature and art was 
intensely critical of the war and of America’s role in it, newspapers, popular 
magazines, cheap books, and motion pictures did not advance beyond the 
common sentimentality of daring heroism and noble sacrifice. This view was 
particularly true of the motion picture industry, a young and growing busi-
ness giant that advanced to the forefront of popular culture during the 1920s. 
In 1919 General John J. 
Pershing helped create the 
Military Order of the World 
Wars, a distinguished veteran 
officers association that is still 
active on military issues.U
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Americans became habitual moviegoers during these years, when the silent 
film reached its artistic and financial peak. What had once been an inexpensive 
source of amusement for lower-class urban workers blossomed into a major 
recreation for persons of every social and geographic background.
Historical evidence gleaned from commercial films is useful because of 
their appeal to a mass audience. Common themes in films often reflect the 
fears, desires, ideas, attitudes, and beliefs of the mass audience. Producers de-
pend on this relationship, for profit is maximized in the dead center of audience 
desires. Such evidence is indirect, but it must be noted that traditional forms 
of evidence are also indirect in this regard. Historians using novels, memoirs, 
and other literary works often make assumptions about the impact when they 
have no audience on which to depend. The difference between using film and 
literature as historical evidence is one of degree, not of quality. If anything, 
film evidence may be more useful because of its wider audience. The American 
literary public for a Hemingway novel numbered in the thousands; the movie 
public for a Chaplin film was in the millions.1
The motion picture industry generally did well during the war years. Mov-
iemakers dutifully cranked out hundreds of one- and two-reel features with 
war plots, most of which brought an average return of a few thousand dollars. 
Many of these films were of the trite heroic genre, although some moved far 
enough into the fantastic to be remembered today as examples of the ex-
tremism of war. The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin (1918) might be regarded as the 
quintessence of the latter type. But with the armistice, the hate pictures quickly 
became ludicrous. War pictures were falling off as profit makers by November 
1918. Caught with titles such as Red, White and Blue Blood and Break the News to 
Mother, industry flacks hastened to assure distributors that these were not war 
stories. Movie pioneer Fred J. Balshofer remembered that on the day of the 
armistice, he completed final cutting on a “six-reel all-out anti-Kaiser picture.” 
The market was dead, and he lost $80,000 (Balshofer and Miller 139).
The immediate postwar climate continued to treat the war film as a pariah. 
Very few pictures with a world war background were made between 1919 and 
1925. Almost all sank at the box office. The one major exception, Metro’s Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1921), succeeded largely on the strength of its excit-
ing new leading man—Rudolph Valentino. In general, the industry rode the 
crest of the broadening wave of materialism, sexual freedom, and sensation.
VIDOR, MAYER, THALBERG, AND STALLINGS
Riding this crest with everyone else was a young director named King Vidor. 
Vidor was born in Galveston in 1894, the descendant of a Hungarian grandfa-
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ther who had immigrated to Texas at the close of the Civil War. In 1918, already 
a veteran maker of amateur newsreels, Vidor moved to Hollywood, the new 
golden land where the motion picture industry had firmly seated itself during 
the second decade of the century.
In 1918 and 1919 Vidor did a series of feature films for the Brentwood 
Corporation, a group of doctors and dentists seeking profits in foreign fields. 
Then, after a short stint with First National, he formed Vidor Village, his own 
independent production company. As was common in those days, he inserted 
his “Creed and Pledge” in Variety in 1920. It was couched in the purplish 
prose and hyperidealism of a young man, and an inevitable recession from its 
extremes soon occurred. But throughout his life Vidor remained committed 
to film as an art and as a noble device of human expression: “I believe in the 
picture that will help humanity to free itself from the shackles of fear and suf-
fering that have so long bound it with iron chains” (quoted in Baxter 10).
In 1922 Vidor Village folded, and the young entrepreneur moved to the 
Metro Pictures lot. He then worked on “artistically respectable” productions 
for Louis B. Mayer, and in 1924 he moved with Mayer to the newly formed 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, where he was a staff director. By the age of thirty, 
Vidor had put a world of moviemaking experience behind him, a background 
not uncommon in an industry whose organizational and bureaucratic patterns 
were still congealing. Mayer regarded him as a reliable director of marketable 
films, and Vidor was entrusted with directing some of MGM’s best talent, such 
as John Gilbert in His Hour (1924) and Wife of the Centaur (1925).
Irving Thalberg, Mayer’s chief of production, was even younger than 
Vidor, having been born in 1899 in modest middle-class comfort in Brooklyn. 
His father was a lace importer, but the young Thalberg broke away from the 
world of trade and by 1919 was on the West Coast working for Carl Laemmle 
at Universal Studios. For four years he learned about motion pictures from 
the front office. In February 1923 he amicably left Laemmle to join Mayer. 
The division of labor worked out by the two men—which carried MGM to 
leadership of the industry in less than a decade—was for Thalberg to concern 
himself with the production end and Mayer to serve as administrator and 
link to the home office in New York. Thus, Thalberg was the man the restless 
Vidor approached late in 1924 with an idea for a film that would tackle an 
important question. As a child of the Progressive Era, Vidor was concerned 
with three major topics: war, wheat, and steel. Thalberg asked whether he had 
a particular subject in mind, and Vidor replied vaguely that the story would be 
about an average young American, neither patriot nor pacifist, caught up in 
war. Nothing was on paper yet, and the two men agreed to search for a good 
story centered on World War I (Vidor, Tree 111–12). Both knew of the chilly 
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box office reception of war stories, yet each felt that a fresh and innovative 
treatment would find an audience. Thalberg, who had production control, 
was the key to script approval.
Weeks later, Thalberg returned from a trip to New York accompanied by a 
writer named Laurence Stallings and a story, tentatively titled “The Big Parade,” 
typed on five pages of onionskin. Unlike Thalberg or Vidor, Stallings (who was 
the same age as Vidor) was an AEF veteran. As a captain in the U.S. Marines, 
he had lost his right leg at Belleau Wood in June 1918. When Thalberg met 
him, the young veteran and Maxwell Anderson had one of the hottest plays 
of the 1924 season, What Price Glory? running on Broadway.
The former marine had recently completed a semiautobiographical novel, 
Plumes, about the painful rehabilitation of a wounded war veteran. Overwritten 
and consciously tendentious, Plumes presented a weaker version of the postwar 
climate of disillusion that had been more artfully limned by such writers as 
Hemingway, Dos Passos, and cummings. For Stallings, the sound of the trum-
pets persisted among the carnage. Despite a shattered leg, his hero, Richard 
Plume, remained a patriot, albeit a troubled one.
Until his death in 1968, Stallings retained the love-hate relationship for 
the war that is so evident in What Price Glory? and in much of his later work. 
The memory of his doughboy comrades was constantly with him. “Why write 
of them at this hour?” he asked rhetorically in 1963. “Why open the door of 
a room sealed off in my mind for so many years?” In fact, the door was never 
sealed; the stump of his right leg was a daily reminder: “I have my Idaho wil-
low foot to remind me now” (Stallings, Doughboys 1). As it did for many aging 
veterans, romanticism battled horror for memory’s hand and won. Stallings 
claimed in his final testament concerning the earth-shaking adventures of his 
young manhood that he had written about the doughboy “conscious of being 
unable to summon him back in entirety, and heartsick of enduring the melan-
choly of trying to recover long-buried remembrances of the past” (6–7).
In 1924 Stallings’s memory of the war was fresh and unencumbered by 
time. The theatrical realism of his brawling, cursing marines in What Price 
Glory? brought him to Thalberg’s attention. Those first five pages were loosely 
based on Plumes, but what evolved bore little resemblance to the original. 
Whereas Plumes was concerned with a veteran’s postwar struggles, the onionskin 
treatment dealt mostly with the war itself. Both Thalberg and Vidor believed 
that they had found their story. Vidor and writer Harry Behn traveled back 
to New York with Stallings, stayed a week, and returned with the completed 
script of The Big Parade. The title was a product of Stallings’s romantic image 
of the transatlantic chain of doughboys fighting in defense of liberty (Vidor, 
Tree 113–14; Stallings, Doughboys 7). As the film would make clear, the vision 
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included another less exhilarating “parade”—of the ambulances returning 
from the front with America’s wounded.
PRODUCING THE BIG PARADE
Casting the film presented little problem, since MGM had a growing roster 
of contract actors from which to choose. Robert Sherwood, one of Stallings’s 
friends at the celebrated Algonquin Round Table, would later claim that Stall-
ings had been allowed to select the director and the leads. However, this was 
Stallings’s maiden voyage in the hazardous seas of film creation, and though 
Vidor and Thalberg were young, they were not inexperienced in the indus-
try. It is therefore most unlikely that Stallings had the final say in the casting 
process (Baxter 26).
The male lead, an average American boy, was cast against type. Thalberg, 
with Vidor’s concurrence, selected John Gilbert, although Vidor had supposedly 
experienced some difficulties with the actor on the set of Wife of the Centaur. 
Thalberg convinced Vidor that Gilbert, shorn of his mustache, would fit the 
role of Jim Apperson nicely. The actor had developed a sophisticated, roman-
tic acting style that began to attract public notice after Thalberg offered him 
a five-year contract with MGM (Crowther 103–4). The female lead, a French 
peasant girl, went to an unknown with the improbable name Renée Adorée. 
The roles of Apperson’s two doughboy buddies were filled by raw-boned 
Karl Dane, who had just stepped up from a job as studio carpenter, and Tom 
O’Brien, a stocky “Irish” actor (Vidor, Tree 115).
The story line, a collaboration of Stallings, Vidor, Behn, and perhaps 
Thalberg, was modified slightly by Vidor a number of times during shooting, 
a common practice in the silent film era. What emerged was a tale hackneyed 
by today’s standards but fresh and engaging to the motion picture audience 
of 1925.
As the film opens, the three principal characters are seen in their civil-
ian occupations: Slim (Dane) at work as a steelworker on a skyscraper; Mike 
“Bull” O’Hara (O’Brien), as a bartender; and James Apperson (Gilbert) as a 
rich wastrel—a departure from Vidor’s notion of an average young American. 
Apperson is persuaded to enlist by an exciting parade of recruits, leaping from 
his luxury car to join the marching men and their brass band.
A time-transition montage sequence follows the conversion of the raw 
recruits into doughboys, tracing the developing friendship of the central trio. 
The unit is sent to France, where the men are billeted in a small village and 
they begin to mingle with the local population. Apperson meets a pretty girl, 
Melisande (Adorée), in the first series of light romantic scenes. Rash youth 
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that he is, Apperson attempts to kiss her but is met with a slap in the face. The 
budding romance is postponed by the movement of Apperson’s unit to the 
front, a melee of scurrying soldiers, careening trucks, and hurried good-byes. 
The sequence includes one of the most famous separation scenes in cinema, 
in which Melisande has to be pried from her lover by a sergeant. Distraught, 
she clings to Apperson’s leg, then to a chain dangling from the rear of his 
truck transport, and finally collapses in the dust of the road. Apperson throws 
her his dog tags, watch, and an extra boot as a remembrance. The fade-out 
is on the peasant girl clutching the precious boot (a symbol of Apperson’s 
forthcoming injury) and gazing toward the front.
The battle sequences follow, most prominently a tense march through 
woods—resembling Belleau Wood, where Stallings was wounded—heavy with 
impending death. When Slim ventures into no-man’s-land and is killed, an 
enraged Apperson engages in hand-to-hand combat. He holds a bayonet to a 
German soldier’s throat but cannot follow through. Instead, he lights a cigarette 
for the German, who then dies of other wounds. Apperson takes the cigarette 
Melisande (Renée Adorée) bids au revoir to James Apperson ( John Gilbert) as he 
marches off to the battlefront.
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and calmly smokes it himself. (There is a matching shell crater scene with a 
German corpse in All Quiet on the Western Front [1930].)
A parade of trucks returning from the front disgorges Apperson, minus a 
leg. The village has been evacuated, and Melisande is nowhere to be found. Ap-
person is repatriated to America, where his family is shocked by his appearance 
and his deferred brother is courting Apperson’s left-behind fiancée. Nothing 
remains but a postwar return to France; he and Melisande are reunited in an 
open field as the film ends.
Location shooting was rare under the studio system, and the adventures 
of Apperson and his buddies were mostly re-created on back lots. Many of the 
sets had an authentic air, a tribute to the talents of an artist named Warren 
Newcombe. Many of the bombed upper stories of French farmhouses and the 
roof of a cathedral used as a field hospital were expertly painted by Newcombe 
to match the action taking place in the lower half of the frame.
The technical skill behind the picture is not readily apparent today because 
the film is usually seen without the original orchestration. The most admired 
aesthetic aspect was the welding of visual imagery to music. As a young man, 
Vidor had shot footage of army maneuvers in Texas; some of these composi-
tions helped him order the crowd shots of The Big Parade. In preparation for 
filming, the director screened almost a hundred reels of Signal Corps war 
footage. In the process, he was struck by the rhythmic cadence of the soldiers’ 
images in combat—“the whole pattern spelled death.” For the sequence of the 
doughboys advancing through the woods, filmed in Los Angeles’s Griffith Park, 
Vidor used a metronome for pacing and had a bass drum keep the beat for 
the actors as they strode toward enemy positions in Belleau Wood. In theaters, 
the orchestra stopped playing during this sequence, and only a muffled bass 
drum kept cadence with the warily advancing soldiers on the screen, a highly 
evocative suspense mechanism (Vidor, Tree 156–57).
Vidor and his assistants also created distinctive orchestral rhythms for the 
love scenes and the hurly-burly of the movement to the front. Most of the war 
footage was shot for the film, adhering rigidly to Vidor’s visual conceptions 
gleaned from the Signal Corps material. The director sent an assistant down 
to Fort Sam Houston to get shots of trucks, planes, and men all moving in a 
straight line (the “big parade” to the front). Although army personnel were 
cooperative, they convinced the assistant that the actual conditions on the west-
ern front had not allowed such geometry. Vidor was aware of this fact, but the 
convolutions in the resulting footage did not match his vision, so everything was 
reshot. Thus, realism and aesthetic considerations were interwoven, although 
some of the scenes of trucks moving at night look like model work. The director 
sometimes kept his camera running through three hundred to four hundred 
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feet of film without a cut. This experiment was quite an innovation. Longer 
scenes would later evolve with the use of synchronized sound and what Vidor 
called “panning and perambulating cameras” (Vidor, Tree 120–21).
The picture had been intended as a standard production, budgeted at 
$205,000, but when Thalberg saw the rushes during filming, he decided to 
promote it as a major feature. An exhibitor named J.  J. McCarthy, whose release 
of Ben-Hur  would shortly give MGM another box office hit, viewed the finished 
print and offered to promote it if more battle scenes and romance were added. 
Under pressure, Vidor added the weak Apperson family sequences toward the 
end and created the subplot with Apperson’s American fiancée. Since Vidor 
was already involved with his next project, La Boheme, director George Hill 
filmed additional night battle scenes at a cost of $40,000. This tinkering did 
not enhance the film, but it gave rise to the legend that Thalberg overhauled 
The Big Parade to make it a major release. Vidor later claimed that only about 
seventy feet of additional combat footage got into the final print (Baxter 
21–24). Certainly the film is strongest in its re-creation of combat and in the 
romantic bits Vidor dreamed up for Apperson and Melisande. The next-to-
closing sequences are conventional domestic soap opera.
With the studio firmly behind the picture, its New York release was heavily 
promoted. Vidor arrived in the city with a print of 12,800 feet. This running 
time was a bit too long for the distributor, who claimed that commuters in the 
audience would be put off their schedules by such a long film. The director 
was requested to pare 800 feet from his creation. Vidor was naturally averse to 
letting an editor hack away at the footage, so he took the print back to the coast 
with him. Each night, after a day spent working on La Boheme, Vidor snipped 
three frames from the beginning and end of each scene. Upon the completion 
of this labor, he was still 165 feet over the desired length, so he pruned one ad-
ditional frame on each side of every splice. At that point, the total eliminated 
came to exactly 800 feet. This process of excision would have been impossible 
with a sound film (Vidor, Tree 123–24).
The orchestral scores were written in New York City after the distributors 
received the truncated version. A full orchestra was in the pit at the Astor 
Theater, but Vidor’s idea of the single bass drum accentuating the foreboding 
walk into the forest was not used until the film opened at Grauman’s Egyptian 
Theater in Hollywood (Vidor, King Vidor 142).
The Big Parade (1925) was a moneymaker from the beginning. At the Astor 
alone, the picture took in $1.5 million during a ninety-six-week run. By 1930 
it had grossed more than $15 million nationwide. In 1931 it was rereleased 
with a musical sound track to capitalize on new audio technology. The final 
gross was in the neighborhood of $20 million. Vidor personally reaped little 
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of this bonanza. Originally he had owned a 20 percent interest in the film, 
but his own lawyer convinced him that a fixed directorial fee was safer than a 
box office percentage. Later in life he sourly remarked, “I thus spared myself 
from becoming a millionaire instead of a struggling young director trying to 
do something interesting and better with a camera” (Vidor, Tree 125).
CRITICS AND AUDIENCES RESPOND
Critics nationwide generally applauded the picture, which played well in urban 
and rural areas alike. Both Stallings and Vidor burned with the desire to show 
war realistically, and this realism was the most common point of admiration 
among the critics. Gilbert Seldes, for example, thought the war scenes were 
magnificent. Stallings’s friend Robert Sherwood was amazed that the war 
scenes actually resembled war (Seldes, review 169), while another admirer 
expostulated that “in every sense of the word, it is the war! ” (Finch 25). Military 
organizations also favored the film’s vision; that Vidor had used AEF veterans 
as technical advisers had been widely publicized.
The favorable critical reception reflected several themes infusing The 
Big Parade that were also congenial to Americans. The war was perceived not 
only as democracy’s war, in a righteous sense, but also as an intrinsic leveler 
of class differences. The spoiled rich boss, Apperson, quickly fuses interests 
with the steelworker and the bartender; in avenging Slim, he is mourning a 
friend. His romance with a peasant girl furthers the democratization process, 
and his rejection of his former way of life affirms his commitment to a simpler, 
unostentatious existence.
The combat sequences did not part substantially from heroic, adventurous 
patterns. Several critics mistakenly praised the film as antiwar because of the 
shell-hole incident in which Apperson balks at killing. But Apperson, Bull, and 
Slim do their share. A publicity still for the picture had the primitive steelworker 
simultaneously bayoneting one German and decking another with his free 
hand. Virtually all the war films of the era preached the litany of commitment, 
duty, heroism, sacrifice, and The Big Parade made no innovations in this regard. 
The heroics are individualized by dramatic convention. Apperson’s war is an 
intensely personal one: “I came to fight—not to wait and rot in a lousy hole 
while they murder my pal.” His sacrifice (which is double—a friendship and 
his own body) is rewarded in the fade-out.
In this context, The Big Parade offers a most admiring view of the American 
soldier and his war efforts. The doughboy is a committed civilian who, when 
aroused, becomes a dominant warrior, only to yearn for the blessings of peace. 
Here Vidor’s humanitarianism, which infuses the film, is unable to overshadow 
148 / Michael T. Isenberg
the ambiguities of Stallings’s relationship to the war. Stallings and most of his 
comrades could never admit the possibility that the whole thing had been 
unnecessary, meaningless, and disastrous. This reconsideration would have 
made the loss of life and limb unbearable as well as tragic. So the war became 
a legitimate theater for the heroics of the democratic fighting man, the GI as 
New World Cincinnatus.
The general critical tone indicated appreciation of an epic entertainment 
grounded in human emotion. No one wanted to applaud the war itself, but 
The Big Parade did not indict the war aims or practices of the United States nor 
those of any of the Allies. This statement by an industry reviewer unintentionally 
keyed the significant qualities of the picture: “It is the first production that I 
have ever seen that has caught the spirit of national pride that makes the United 
States Army the greatest fighting organization on earth—that subtle yearning 
to acquit themselves honorably in doing that which the situation demands, that 
brings heroes out of the slums and the mansions of wealth alike” (Finch 59; 
emphasis added).
The themes of nationalism, honor, duty, and egalitarian heroism are all 
common to the war-adventure genre. Plots threaded with them cannot make 
a coherent antiwar or pacifist statement, since the focus of such themes is 
individualistic rather than situational. When another member of the Algon-
quin Round Table, Alexander Woollcott, viewed The Big Parade, he observed 
among his fellow moviegoers pity for the dying doughboys and satisfaction in 
the scenes of German deaths (40). The individualism of the film is sketched 
in the positive attributes of friendship and democratic solidarity. Transferred 
to the emotional level of the viewer, these become the admirable qualities of 
loyalty, devotion, and dedication to service. Here, patriotic impulse overcomes 
the horrors of war, not vice versa.
The mass audience that saw the film was probably unaware of the am-
biguities actually underlying the plot. The Big Parade’s patina of realism was 
deemed to be significant comment in itself. Also, many in the audience doubt-
less shared these ambiguities without any intellectual tensions whatsoever. 
Thus, war could be applauded and excoriated at the same time. Thalberg in 
particular was convinced that his production marked a significant departure 
from earlier war films:
The only difference between it and the other war pictures was the different 
viewpoint taken in the picture. We took a boy whose idea in entering the war was 
not patriotic. He was swept along by the war spirit around him and entered it 
but didn’t like it. He met a French girl who was intriguing to him, but he wasn’t 
really serious about her. The only time he was interested in fighting was when a 
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friend, who was close to him, was killed. It was human appeal rather than patri-
otic appeal, and when he reached the German trenches and came face to face 
with the opportunity to kill, he couldn’t do it. In other words, a new thought 
regarding the war was in the minds of most people, and that was the basis of its 
appeal. (quoted in Thomas 129)
The producer offered a virtually complete list of mistaken reasons for the film’s 
popularity. The basic appeal of The Big Parade was adventure and romance. 
None of its ingredients were new; they were only packaged differently. The 
theme of war as a democratic leveler stretched back in movie time at least to 
Thomas Ince’s Civilization (1916). Rich boys democratized by war had been 
prominent in such earlier films as Edison’s The Unbeliever (1918) and McManus’s 
The Lost Battalion (1919). Apperson reaches romantic fulfillment with ingenu-
ous Melisande at the war’s end in spite of his being “not really serious about 
her.” Finally, it is difficult to reconcile the audience partisanship observed by 
Woollcott and applauded by many reviewers with a “human” rather than a 
patriotic appeal.
The Big Parade is flawed as an antiwar statement by the very individualism 
Thalberg regarded as its primary virtue. Years later Budd Schulberg would suc-
cinctly call the film “second-rate perfection” for exactly this reason (Schulberg 
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117). In Seldes’s terms, Vidor gave American audiences the spectacle of the war 
but “little else” (Seldes, “Two Parades” 111–12). As long as individuals stood 
apart from the mass and were made special through the devices of romance or 
action, the cinema could never come to grips with the true nature of twentieth-
century warfare. The protagonists of The Big Parade did not lay down their arms 
and refuse to fight, nor were they left numbed by the potential nihilism of their 
situation. They dwelled in a rational, if horrible, condition and responded to it 
in necessary and rational ways. The Big Parade was thus a prisoner of dramatic 
convention, and, judging from its reception, so was its audience.
Although English and French viewers naturally tended to resent the film on 
chauvinistic grounds, its real difficulty lay in a fundamental misapprehension 
of the war itself. If international combat is conventionally seen as a process with 
winners and losers, the screen in the 1920s transmuted these into heroes and 
villains. The Big Parade  marched in an intellectual arena heavily populated with 
the ghosts of nineteenth-century romanticism and the American cult of the 
individual. Here it tapped one of the deepest veins in the national character, 
and therein lay its success—not in any new conception of the war, for it had 
none. “No film dare show what [war] resembled,” wrote critic Iris Barry. As she 
saw it, The Big Parade “wreathes machine-guns in roses” (946–47).
Vidor himself later admitted that his love for documentary realism had 
been dominated by conventional screen action and romance. He saw the 
picture as late as 1974 and stated: “I don’t like it much. . . . Today I don’t en-
courage people to see the film. At the time, I really believed it was an anti-war 
movie.” Thus, even the director conceded that the basic appeal of the film was 
not the “parade” of young men marching toward the maelstrom of death but 
the romantic bits developed for Apperson and Melisande (Baxter 21).
What remains is nevertheless an exceptional piece of screen storytelling. 
By the standards of its day, The Big Parade’s battle scenes were realistic. A few 
critics derided the forest sequence as militarily inaccurate, but Vidor claimed 
to have received a letter from the War Department praising precisely those 
portrayals (Mitchell 180). The basic merit of the film lay in Vidor’s ability to 
maintain the action without interrupting overmuch with titles; in this sense, 
the picture is a choice example of mimetic art.
MGM’s box office success inevitably inaugurated a war-adventure film 
cycle throughout the industry. The cycle lasted for five years—at least through 
the release of Howard Hughes’s Hell’s Angels (1930). What Price Glory? and its 
brawling marines appeared in 1926, and William Wellman’s aviation epic Wings 
appeared the next year; both spawned dozens of imitators. Vidor’s original plot 
contributions became stale through reiteration, until Seldes finally threw up his 
hands in surrender when he wrote in the 3 July 1929 New Republic: “In all Ameri-
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can films since The Big Parade, if a regiment is marching away, or a thousand 
trucks roll by, the hero or heroine staggers through the lines, fighting off the 
men in the trucks, trying to make his or her way to the beloved and departing 
one” (179). Not until 1930, when Universal gambled with a screen adaptation 
of All Quiet on the Western Front, did the American public see an American film 
that was truly antiwar in intent and execution. Even then, films depicting war 
as a worthy arena for heroic adventure and romance were not extinguished. 
The genre survived to fuel the buildup to a new and greater war.
AFTER THE BIG PARADE
Stallings stayed with motion pictures, working as an editor of Fox Movietone 
newsreels and turning out journeyman film scripts, several for Vidor. Stallings’s 
documentary film The First World War (1934) was his harshest statement on 
the experience, but his bittersweet written history The Doughboys retained 
the essential ambiguities developed in Plumes, The Big Parade, and What Price 
Glory?  Thalberg continued his record of high-quality film production until his 
untimely death from lobar pneumonia in 1936. John Gilbert’s career faded in 
the late 1920s. His deterioration and early death, which also occurred in 1936, 
compose a case history that is often cited as a classic example of the decline 
and fall of a star. Vidor went on to become, by any standards, one of the fin-
est directors in Hollywood history. He tackled a wide variety of projects, from 
socialist symbolism (Our Daily Bread [1934]) to Western epic (Duel in the Sun 
[1946]), before finally closing the books with the routine biblical tale Solomon 
and Sheba (1959). His original concerns—humanistic, idealistic, fraught with 
optimism—remained remarkably consistent throughout a career that spanned 
five decades.
Vidor, Stallings, and Thalberg, all of them thirty or younger at the time, 
bear the essential creative responsibility for The Big Parade. The realistic vision 
of the war is Stallings’s; the aesthetic vision belongs to Vidor. Put another way, 
the story was an intensely personal one by Stallings, but the storyteller was 
Vidor. Their product is symbolic of an American view of the great crusade 
as seen from the 1920s, a vision that contrasts markedly with the traditional 
consensus to be found in elite histories and fictions.
Historian Otis L. Graham Jr., in a succinct study of continuity and discontinuity 
in the Progressive reform impulse, recently restated the traditional view. World 
War I was “the stimulus to private indulgence and social irresponsibility” (91). 
To Graham and many others, the war caused the spirit of reaction so evident 
in many of the social conflicts of the decade (109). This spirit suffused the 
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debates over fundamentalism, rekindled nativist sentiment, and heightened 
the tension between urban and rural sectors of America. Reaction, like almost 
all American social trends, had no distinctive class basis. Thus, films like The 
Big Parade cannot be analyzed as mouthpieces of social thought from either 
the Left or the Right.
Instead, The Big Parade is an indicator of a broad, classless climate of opin-
ion, circa 1925, concerning the nature of the Great War. Consensus is too strong 
a word, implying a reasoned decision based on choice. Evidence from films 
such as this resolves a seeming paradox concerning the historical analysis of 
the 1920s, which may be stated as follows: how can a decade usually classed as 
reactionary or conservative also be seen as one of intense antiwar sentiment? 
To be sure, conservatism and militarism do not always fit snugly, but the instinct 
for tradition and order implicit in the former camp usually finds a welcome 
home in the latter. There is sketchy evidence—for example, the empty pacifist 
idealism of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)—to indicate that hostility toward 
war can encompass reformers and conservatives alike. But such evidence is 
The popular consensus: World War I was an epic—albeit tragic—adventure.
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sparse and does not drive a lasting wedge between conservatism and militarism 
as patterns of thought and behavior.
The paradox vanishes when the elitist basis of traditional 1920s historiog-
raphy is recognized. Our evidence of the antiwar and antimilitarist condition 
of the period is drawn largely from professional cultural critics: novelists, jour-
nalists, artists, and others whose business it is to criticize. This is hard evidence 
and convincing in its sphere; the mistake lies not in accepting it but in allowing 
this material to dominate the historiography of the decade.
The Big Parade, touching a far wider audience than anything produced by 
cultural elites in the 1920s, departs from the common view. Its alternative vision, 
of course, does not stand alone—but neither should that of the antiwar elites. 
The foggy differentiation between art and entertainment, or high culture and 
popular culture, should not obscure the fact that in relying on film evidence 
to test the nature of American thought about the war, we are using precisely 
the same method as historians who rely on written materials. Only the nature 
of the evidence is different.2
The popularity of the war-adventure films of the 1920s strongly indicates 
that a considerable number of Americans retained an ambiguous relation-
ship to the war experience. For many, the image of war persisted as one of 
a legitimate theater for heroism and nationalistic endeavor. America had 
confronted Europe with ancient European wrongs; having righted them on 
the battlefield, the young giant of the West rejected involvement in the cor-
rupt diplomacy of a decadent continent. Thus, the feelings of frustration and 
disillusion strengthened the climate of isolation, which was indeed strong 
throughout the interwar period.
But isolationism is not antimilitarism. Intellectual elites might inveigh 
against the sword, but the qualities of patriotism, service, and social hierarchy 
implicit in a uniform remained positively symbolic of the essence of national 
idealism for many Americans. In this sense, the war was perceived as an un-
welcome task that had to be undertaken. The passionate excesses of the war 
years had dampened even before President Wilson’s debilitating stroke, but the 
conviction that the war was necessary survived in many quarters. The tragedy 
was thus not only one of lives destroyed and bodies shattered but also one of a 
task completed with an imperfect ending. Here there was no nation to forge, 
no sundered Union to reunite, no defeated Mexicans or Spaniards waiting to 
drop vast acreages into the lap of Uncle Sam.
In the final analysis, it was a war fought for ideals of the highest order. 
Human imperfection can suffer this strain for only so long, and the resulting 
disillusionment is compounded by the strength of the original moral fervor. 
The motion picture theater, however, is a house of dreams: there, ideals not 
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only achieve perfection but endure in screen time forever. The steadily un-
winding spools of celluloid may simultaneously reduce a world war to romance 
and enshrine it as a fit pantheon for heroes. American filmmakers were only 
beginning to learn the language of tortured ambiguity, and their audiences 
remained largely unreceptive to this language when it spoke of war.
So Vidor and the others failed, in a sense, to make their antiwar statement. 
Like all of us, they were culture bound, working in a medium that relied on 
broad cultural acceptance for its livelihood. The Big Parade  inspired no marches 
to the recruiting station, but neither did the film indict the war itself. An era 
rich in contradictions blandly ignored one of the most profound contradic-
tions of all—the reconciliation of militancy and pacifism under the symbolic 
blanket of democratic idealism.
NOTES
Isenberg’s original essay on The Big Parade  appeared in O’Connor and Jackson in 1979 
and is republished here as a particularly fine example of historical film analysis.
1. This is not to argue that historical impact is measured in numbers alone. I 
analyze the reasons for the mistrust of film evidence by the history profession in “A 
Relationship of Constrained Anxiety.”
2. We leave in abeyance the question of causation, which is exceedingly difficult 
to resolve in the context of intellectual history. This difficulty is true regardless of the 
nature of the evidence. I examine the contours of this question in “Toward an Histori-
cal Methodology.”
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TECHNOLOGY AND “REEL  
PATRIOTISM” IN AMERICAN  
FILM ADVERTISING OF THE  
WORLD WAR I ERA
7 / James Latham
Advertising and publicity are forms of commercial speech that motivate mov-
iegoing and shape the understanding of films. In fact, at times, advertisements 
are even more memorable, more evocative, and more widely seen than the 
films they promote. Although historians have studied the production and ex-
hibition of war-related films, they have paid less attention to how these films 
were marketed. Advertising did more than simply tout movies; it conveyed 
cultural meanings of patriotism and national identity, as well as reasons why 
the country was at war and why the public should participate. This case study 
of seven advertisements reveals the ideological power of what Christian Metz 
describes as cinema’s “third machine: after the one that manufactures the films, 
and the one that consumes them, the one that vaunts them, that valorizes the 
product” (14). Most of these advertisements promoted films exhibited in the 
latter years of World War I, when the United States and its film industry were 
fully engaged; other ads emphasized war-related issues that were of special 
concern to exhibitors, such as taxes on theater admissions.1
World War I–era advertisements for war films created rich rhetorical forms 
with words and images that could evoke the primal fear of victimization or the 
optimism of the modern technological age. Technologies were depicted in ads 
to encourage exhibitors to book movies and the public to see them. World 
War I marked the introduction or modernization of the submarine, machine 
gun, tank, airplane, artillery, radio, and chemical weapons, technologies that 
transcended conventional limitations of space and time to deliver destruction 
to distant military and civilian populations on an unprecedented scale. Film 
promotion both familiarized audiences with these technologies and used them 
rhetorically to signify the relative power of combatants and the righteousness 
of the Allied cause. When, for instance, ads depicted Americans with one of 
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these new weapons, “we” were portrayed as effective and morally justified; in 
contrast, when a German wielded a machine gun, he was inept or evil. In ad-
dition to new technologies, film promotion depicted conventional and even 
primitive weapons, including knives and clubs, sometimes staging allegorical 
scenes with figures such as Uncle Sam and Kaiser Wilhelm II. These melodra-
matic images condensed the war into a conflict between two familiar combat-
ants and alluded to the great historical significance, or the putative ancient 
animosities, of the democracy of the doughboy and the tyranny of the evil 
“Hun.” Film promotion even depicted nonmilitary technologies being used as 
weapons, such as mechanical presses that squeezed the Kaiser to death. Thus, 
images of technology often went beyond the literal content of the films they 
promoted, as is typical with advertising—a practice prone to hyperbole and 
other means of playing on the emotions of consumers.2
Like the films they promoted, advertisements functioned to rally support 
for the war effort and to exploit the conventional movie attraction of technology 
as spectacle in such forms as action, novelty, and raw power. War film promotion 
also valorized the medium of cinema, itself a modern form of communication 
and a powerful technological weapon that served “our” interests. Ads touted 
the capacity of film to provide news and spectacular images from the war with 
greater verisimilitude than any other medium. They praised cinema’s ability 
to serve the war effort, explaining how film could portray the leaders, heroes, 
villains, and victims of the war in ways that furthered national interests. Movies 
were likened to weapons such as the machine gun, with the information and 
persuasive content of film images being as powerful as bullets in combating 
the enemy. Alternatively, ads promoted cinema as a respite from the struggle, 
providing escapist entertainment that rejuvenated war-weary spirits. As pro-
viders of this potent new medium, local exhibitors were encouraged to see 
themselves not simply as merchants but as providers of a service for both their 
local communities and the country.
“REEL PATRIOTISM” AND THE EARLY WAR EFFORT
American film advertising from World War I depicted technologies in 
ways that benefited the U.S. government’s war effort while serving the film 
industry’s own business interests. Advertising promoted movies and also the 
technological, economic, and moral superiority of the United States as part 
of what Leslie Midkiff DeBauche terms the film industry’s wartime “reel pa-
triotism.” The industry’s direct cooperation with the government functioned 
to promote the war to often indifferent Americans, improve cinema’s public 
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image and profitability, and help the industry achieve what would become its 
long-standing dominance of the global film market. Indeed, this period was 
pivotal for the U.S. film industry, which was just beginning to migrate toward 
Los Angeles while vertically integrating and rapidly expanding its distribution 
in both domestic and international markets—an expansion caused partly by 
the war’s overseas socioeconomic and political disruption as well as America’s 
prolonged neutrality.
Although the June 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
precipitated the war in Europe, the United States remained officially neutral 
until April 1917, for reasons that included widespread public sentiments of 
isolationism and pacifism. When the United States finally entered the war, 
among the government’s immediate mobilization efforts was the formation 
of the Committee on Public Information (CPI), which conducted a massive 
advertising and public relations campaign to promote the war.3 The CPI was 
unprecedented in its scale, sophistication, and interplay with the private 
sector, providing a model for conducting warfare through the modern mass 
media. The CPI’s Division of Films enlisted the emerging Hollywood industry 
on many levels of production, distribution, and exhibition. Seeking cultural 
legitimacy and an outlet for its own patriotism, as well as the economic benefits 
of working with the government, the film industry responded by producing 
movies that derided Germany, praised the Allies, and urged public participa-
tion in the war effort. Film companies encouraged local exhibitors to show 
these movies and to promote the war to the public in various other ways, such 
as providing forums for the thousands of volunteer “four-minute men,” who 
gave patriotic speeches about the war in movie theaters during reel changes.4 
Studios and exhibitors also produced advertising that stimulated the demand 
for films with a wartime fervor.
During the period of U.S. neutrality, Germany was not especially vilified in 
American film promotion.5 Films about the war typically were not promoted 
in a manner that criticized Germany, and even some pro-German films were 
imported and distributed in the United States.6 Among the more common 
types of films about the war during these early years were newsreels showing 
footage from Europe, including what were purported to be the front lines. 
A trade journal ad for one such series, The Fighting Germans, was typical in 
this regard. The ad contains no call to arms or moralistic fervor but instead 
depicts more neutral imagery of battles and anonymous soldiers. It refers to 
the spectacle of “marvelous,” “bloody,” and “giant” scenes of warfare and to 
the authenticity of the images of “actual” battles filmed by A. K. Dawson, de-
scribed as “the most daring camera correspondent in the European war.” The 
film is described as “showing the horrors of a desperately fought battle from 
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the very beginning to the very end.” Overall, the ad emphasizes the realism 
of actual footage and the spectacle of warfare rather than the melodramatic 
clash of good and evil that would dominate film promotions in 1917–1918. 
The emphasis on realism is a long-standing appeal of documentary footage 
and may have been especially compelling for films of the World War I period. 
The technological limitations of movie cameras made it difficult to perform 
location shooting even under the best of circumstances, much less in combat 
situations. Outdoor events were often reenacted in safe locations—whether 
controlled studio environments or neutral territories such as Scotland—and 
presented to viewers as authentic, with varying degrees of verisimilitude. Thus, 
while promoting a particular newsreel series, this ad also implies the developing 
power of cinematic technology to capture moving images from anywhere in 
the world for geographically dispersed audiences to see up close in the safety 
and convenience of their local movie theaters. The four separate images in 
the ad support this sense of ubiquity.
Although this advertisement may valorize cinematic images of actuality, 
it also encourages exhibitors to contact local newspapers for possible cross- 
promotions. This encouragement may reflect hierarchical assumptions about 
the credibility of the more established print news organizations in contrast to 
the new entertainment-dominated medium of film. More likely, however, it is 
Moving Picture World 28.8 (20 May 1916): 1278–79.
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an attempt to encourage exhibitors to work with local newspapers instead of 
viewing them as rivals. Probably this message is promoting a tie-in campaign, 
with serialized newspaper stories appearing in conjunction with regular in-
stallments of the newsreel and perhaps containing images from the film, thus 
capitalizing on the synergistic potential of print and moving image media.
PROMOTING WAR FILMS AND TECHNOLOGIES
German warfare technologies that appeared in American film promotion 
included zeppelins, U-boats, airplanes, artillery, guns, and explosives. In film 
promotion before and after the war, these technologies did not signify an 
immediate danger to the United States and even had benign connotations as 
novelties or symbols of modernity. But during 1917–1918 German weapons 
technologies were criticized as symbols of military power (malevolent forces 
to be reckoned with) or mocked as comically inept (nuisances that were eas-
ily overcome), such as the reference to an ineffectual “rubber periscope” in a 
promotion for the Charlie Chaplin film Shoulder Arms (1918). 
Among the technologies most often depicted, zeppelins were usually as-
sociated with malevolent qualities and the entertainment value of spectacle. 
For example, a trade journal ad for The Zeppelin’s Last Raid (1917) shows a 
dirigible being attacked by several biplanes and exploding while a city below 
is in flames, apparently from the bombs dropped by the zeppelin.7 In addition 
to touting the involvement of producer Thomas Ince, a marketable name in 
1917,8 the ad emphasizes the entertainment value of dogfight imagery, explo-
sions, and flames, in part by quoting several reviews of the film attesting to its 
ability to “thrill, entertain and impress all who see it.” Although this image is 
ostensibly apolitical in its emphasis on spectacle as entertainment, in fact, it 
has an anti-German slant. The dirigible symbolizes ominous German power, 
although its destruction also suggests technological weakness; at the very 
least, it suggests that this particular lumbering airship is no match for the 
more mobile Allied planes. Thus, the message is that “they” may have modern 
weaponry, but “ours” is better. The strongest anti-German reference, though, 
may be the image of a city in flames; at least two church steeples are visible, 
and the one in the lower right is toppling. The violence of this image might 
have been compelling enough if it had depicted a battlefield, but showing 
“a raid upon a defenseless village” that might be located anywhere—perhaps 
even within the United States—likely enhanced the emotional and hence 
commercial impact of the ad.
In wartime film promotion, technology is often depicted serving the Al-
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lied cause, whether it shows American military might, the moral legitimacy of 
unleashing this power on the enemy, or the unified support among Americans 
for doing so. For example, an ad for The Greatest Power (1917), also known as 
Her Greatest Power, shows Ethel Barrymore (instead of a male soldier) dutifully 
grasping an artillery round at waist level and tilting it upward as she loads it into 
Exhibitor’s Trade Review 2.25 (24 Nov. 1917): 1961.
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the breech of a cannon (Exhibitors Trade Review 9 June 1917: 23). Promotion 
for The Submarine Spy, a film about the workings of a U.S. submarine, shows 
Uncle Sam as a colossus holding the submarine in a phallic position (Moving 
Picture World 12 Dec. 1914: 1460–61).
Although warfare typically involves a battle of the most advanced tech-
nologies, the weapons of war depicted in film promotion of this era were not 
always modern. An ad for the early Raoul Walsh film The Prussian Cur (1918) 
forgoes modern technology for hand-to-hand combat. Here the Kaiser is shown 
lurking in an alley or a cave in the lower right, cringing in fear or perhaps 
preparing to lunge with his long sword. He stands atop many victims whose 
facial features and hair seem to code them mostly as women. (These figures 
may simultaneously symbolize a captive Europe, allude to the abundant claims 
of German atrocities circulating in the Allied media during the war, and 
provide a counterpoint to the other, more visible female figure in the ad, the 
Statue of Liberty.9) Whether protecting Liberty or empowered by her, Uncle 
Sam dominates the scene,10 standing tall and erect with his sleeve rolled up 
and wielding a club in what is probably a reference to Theodore Roosevelt’s 
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famous 1903 proclamation that, in its foreign policy, the United States should 
“speak softly and carry a big stick.” Altogether, the blunt message here is that 
the Kaiser is an enemy to American values, institutions, and people; he must 
and will be beaten into submission.11 The Kaiser may have some technological 
superiority (the relatively modern sword versus the primitive club), but this 
potential advantage is trumped by American democratic values and Uncle 
Sam’s willingness to defend them. Thus, advertisers could have it both ways: in 
some images the enemy might be depicted as technologically inferior, whereas 
in others he might enjoy a degree of technical superiority but is ultimately 
defeated by other factors specific to “our” side.
Whereas some wartime film ads depicted premodern weaponry, others 
Moving Picture World 39.13 (29 Mar. 1919): 1753.
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referenced technologies that were not weapons at all but symbolized the powers 
associated with them. One example promotes Mutt and Jeff cartoons by depict-
ing the Kaiser cranking sausages out of a meat grinder into a container marked 
“Bill Hohenzollern and Son, Sausage Makers.” This image, which appeared in 
the months following the war, depicts the Kaiser’s son offering up Jeff, “der 
nice big fat von,” to which the Kaiser responds in equally accented English, 
“Dot’s nice! Chuck ’em in.” Overhead, Mutt points a pistol at the Kaiser, ready 
to save Jeff from the meat grinder. The rhetorical techniques employed here 
include manipulating people’s names, in one case by elevating filmmaker 
Bud Fisher to the status of “captain,” and in another case by diminishing 
Kaiser Wilhelm to the status of “Bill.” More significant, although the image 
does not depict battle scenes or German atrocities, it alludes to them, with 
the callous Kaiser and his son about to toss a sympathetic living victim into a 
meat grinder. Intended or not, this seems to satirize the relations among the 
German leadership, military, and public, especially late in the war, when nearly 
any adult male was deemed fit for active service. Thus, Jeff may symbolize a 
draft dodger being captured (his disguise has not saved him) and forced into 
the service of the German military.12 Subordinated to the state, he is turned 
into a faceless cog in a deadly war machine. He also may represent an Allied 
prisoner of war or even Europe itself, similarly threatened with destruction 
at the hands of the Kaiser’s war machine. Mutt’s pointing a pistol toward the 
Kaiser could symbolize the United States’ liberating Europe from evil, similar 
to Uncle Sam in the ad for The Prussian Cur. 
This image satirizes Germany’s role in the war as an absurd act of mass 
murder and conjures notions of a nation consuming itself and its neighbors and 
of people helplessly serving the twisted whims of their leadership. Further con-
notations include German desperation because of food shortages, the enemy 
as barbaric and cannibalistic, and the stereotyping of Germans as merchants 
(particularly butchers) and heavy consumers of processed meat. (Although this 
image likely had resonance for its period, it is even more chilling when viewed 
in relation to the later Holocaust, the epitome of modern Teutonic efficiency 
and mechanized mass murder.13) Finally, in the context of film promotion, 
this image may evoke the physical analogue between the meat grinder and the 
movie camera or projector, or even the industry in general. In a sense, cameras, 
projectors, and the industry crank out reels of film like sausages. If one observes 
this parallel, then it is possible to view Jeff here as a movie actor being turned 
into a character for the consumption of audiences “everywhere”; the Kaiser 
could be a director or producer figure conducting this commodification, with 
his lackey son being something like a casting director.
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PROMOTING THE WAR EFFORT TO EXHIBITORS
The film industry promoted the war effort for its own patriotic reasons but 
also because producers, distributors, and exhibitors had strong incentives to 
create goodwill with the national government, local businesses, and the film-
going public.14 This compliance enabled the industry in general, and theaters 
in particular, to become more integrated with the fabric of American life by 
providing entertainment, information, and places for communities to gather, 
which in turn facilitated economic growth and stability for the film industry. Yet 
within the industry there was resistance to the war effort, particularly among 
exhibitors, who were generally more susceptible to local tastes and cultures 
than the regionally and nationally oriented distributors and producers. De-
Bauche notes in Reel Patriotism that throughout America’s involvement in the 
war, there was an ongoing debate within the industry about what films should 
be made. Some believed that escapist entertainment best served the public, 
while others advocated films that were more directly engaged in contemporary 
issues. Regarding the latter films, there was concern that overtly propagandistic 
films might be unpopular with audiences, and therefore harmful to business, 
because of their inflammatory content as well as the pacifist or even privately 
pro-German sentiments of some American filmgoers.15 Exhibitors also resisted 
compulsory Monday theater closings for energy rationing, as well as war taxes 
that increased movie ticket prices.
The CPI and film studios responded to these concerns on several levels, 
as illustrated in the remaining images in this chapter. The studios carefully 
scheduled the production of war films so that they never constituted a dominant 
market share and overwhelmed audiences. The films were varied in genre and 
rhetorical tone to make them appealing to diverse audiences. Local exhibi-
tors were targeted with promotions arguing that they could contribute to the 
war effort while making profits. For example, war taxes could be justified to 
filmgoers as a way for them to support the struggle while being informed and 
entertained at the movies.
Among the advertisements that targeted the concerns of exhibitors is one 
for Francis Ford’s Berlin via America (1918). This image shows Ford dressed as 
an aviator along with an exhibitor; together they push the Kaiser through a 
meat grinder, with money pouring out the bottom and filling a “box office.” 
The roles from the Mutt and Jeff ad are now reversed; this time, the heroic 
figures are using the meat grinder to serve “our” pro-social purposes, and the 
Kaiser is suffering as he is pressed through the machine and turned into dol-
lars and cents. The costuming of the heroes facilitates a reading of them on 
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different levels, suggesting a soldier (the film’s star) representing the military 
and a civilian (the exhibitor) representing the general public. The moral 
value of a technology depends on who is using it, how, at what costs, and for 
what ends. The end in this case is defeating Germany while making money. 
The image asserts that war films and the broader war effort need not alienate 
audiences or channel revenues to the government or the studios. Instead, they 
allow studios and exhibitors to work together to make money because of the 
putative drawing power of the Kaiser and the war, especially when “big and 
timely stories [are] ably presented by artists of the highest order, and with Mr. 
Ford in the stellar role.”16
Moving Picture World 36.11 (15 June 1918): 1531.
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Another advertisement speaks to the same issue and depicts a similar 
scene, but with interesting differences. This image, promoting the war tax on 
movie theater admissions, depicts the Kaiser being crushed in a press—“the 
army”—that is activated by the tax. The implication is that the money collected 
goes directly to the army to crush the Kaiser rather than to governmental 
bureaucrats. Here again, technology symbolically kills the Kaiser, though not 
for the purpose of making money. In fact, exhibitors may be losing money be-
cause of the war; this loss is downplayed, though, in several ways. One involves 
the depiction of the tax payment in the form of loose change, suggesting a 
minimal expense; recall that the previous image showed dollar bills as well as 
coins coming out of the meat grinder. In addition, the hands dropping the 
money into the bag represent not exhibitors but film audiences (one of the 
anonymous hands is a woman’s, and another appears to be that of a child), 
thus minimizing the sense that the exhibitor is losing profits; instead, filmgoers 
are absorbing the cost of the tax. Also, the presence of multiple hands implies 
that costs are being distributed among a mass audience and that movies are 
popular even with a higher admission price. Finally, whatever burdens the 
tax may place on exhibitors or audiences, it is for a good cause and places far 
greater burdens on the enemy than on “us.”
Whereas some of the previous ads depicted meat grinders that could be 
Moving Picture World 35.2 (12 Jan. 1918): 232.
Ja
m
es
 L
at
h
am
 C
o
ll
ec
ti
o
n
168 / James Latham
analogues of movie cameras and projectors, a final one, for Paramount and 
Artcraft Pictures, more overtly associates cinema with a different technology— 
namely, the machine gun. This image depicts a battlefield scene of a dough-
boy firing a modern water-cooled machine gun; behind him, soldiers charge 
up from a trench toward an unseen enemy. A parallel scene of the home 
front depicts a projectionist cranking a movie projector for a theater full of 
middle-class filmgoers. This imagery draws parallels between the machine gun 
and film projector (and camera) in terms of their general construction and 
functioning. The rotating motion rapidly and continuously feeds a strip of 
individual frames (or bullets) through an apparatus and sends them through 
space to their “targets”—namely, movie screens or enemy soldiers.17 Perhaps 
Moving Picture World 35.12 (23 Mar. 1918): 1591.
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more significant in this wartime context, though, is the value of these devices as 
weapons in the war effort, with images being potentially as powerful as bullets 
in defeating the enemy. As the copy asserts, “It is just as important to project 
the right sort of pictures as to fire the right sort of cartridges.”
Probably alluding to the rectangular movie screen as a device that restricts 
our perception, the ad encourages exhibitors to keep Americans “in the right 
frame of mind” by showing the “right” kind of films—that is, those distributed 
by Paramount and Artcraft. This apparent certitude is undermined, however, 
when the copy simultaneously disparages “trashy entertainment” films and 
advocates films that evoke emotional responses of “laughter” and “tears.” These 
contradictions may reflect the diverse range of films offered by Paramount 
and Artcraft, as well as the broader ambivalence within the industry about 
what kinds of films best served the war effort.18 Curiously, the image does not 
show the film that is being projected in the movie theater, possibly to allow 
for this ambivalence. Perhaps the film is the scene shown on the left, and the 
audience is watching a movie about Allied soldiers rushing into harm’s way. 
Or perhaps it is an escapist entertainment film that ignores the war altogether, 
with the audience literally looking away from scenes of battle. In either case, 
the message instructs exhibitors that they can both serve the community and 
make money during the national struggle. Exhibitors are likened to domes-
tic soldiers, providing films that can inform or entertain, rally the public or 
provide a brief respite from everyday concerns; in so doing, exhibitors simul-
taneously help the war effort, serve the public, and generate revenues. This 
imagery is also consistent with an ongoing discourse in the trade press that 
depicted projectionists in heroic terms as people who served their customers 
(and theater managers) via their professionalism, technological prowess, and 
even bravery in risking their lives in the projection booths, where the highly 
flammable nitrate film stock could be deadly.
The depiction of technology in film promotion was only one of many elements 
in the larger campaign to persuade Americans to participate in both filmgo-
ing and the war effort. But this depiction served multiple—and sometimes 
contradictory—purposes. Technology worked to attract filmgoers to see ad-
vanced weaponry in action or to persuade reluctant exhibitors that audiences 
indeed wanted to see such things. Technologies were praised when serving 
“our” interests but condemned or belittled when used by the other side. They 
were flaunted as modern marvels or crude instruments of power. Advertising 
promoted the medium of cinema as a new and powerful tool in shaping the 
hearts and minds of mass audiences as well as distracting and entertaining them. 
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All these meanings and more were combined in ads that were seemingly simple 
yet participated in complex dialogues about the intersections of war, culture, 
technology, and power in the modern world—a world increasingly shaped by 
both the illusions and the harsh realities portrayed in the media.
As Hollywood developed from an industry struggling for a foothold in the 
media landscape into a global multimedia empire, the messages in its films 
and promotion expanded in quantity and quality. The film industry has par-
ticipated in new wars and reenacted previous ones, often perpetuating myths 
and sometimes revising them or creating new ones. Today, Hollywood and its 
audiences are more enamored than ever of new technologies, including those 
of warfare. The combatants and battlefields may have changed, and the ways 
of waging war through moving images may have proliferated, but the under-
lying fascination with technology continues to attract, inform, and entertain 
mass audiences across the divides of nation, language, and culture. The im-
ages discussed in this chapter come from a particular moment in early film 
history and reflect circumstances unique to that time. But they also speak to 
broader and deeper concerns about the human condition, including conflict 
resolution through violence. If, as suggested in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), 
the invention of tools was the pivotal moment in the transition from ape to 
human—and if the first tool was not the wheel or fire but the club—then 
these ads may serve as examples of how far and yet how little humanity has 
progressed through the millennia.
NOTES
A previous version of this essay appears in West Virginia University Philological Papers 51 
(2006): 61–76. I wish to thank Leslie Midkiff DeBauche, Kathryn Fuller-Seeley, and 
Mary Beth Haralovich for their thoughtful readings of this essay.
1. Although some of the advertisements examined in this chapter resemble post-
ers, all are from the trade press, whose readership was relatively small but also highly 
influential in terms of local theater programming and promotion. As I have written 
elsewhere, ads in the trade press encouraged exhibitors to acquire films and related 
products, including ads for films (“Promoting Otherness in Films”). In its form and 
content, promotion in the trade press often resembled more general promotion, but 
it also addressed issues that were of specific importance to the film industry (including 
how to best attract and satisfy audiences)—issues that were downplayed or absent in 
more public venues such as posters and fan magazines. As a case study, my work here 
examines only one part of the promotional apparatus of the film industry, but it is an 
important part.
2. Jane Gaines discusses how the movie poster and its antecedent form, the circus 
poster, often used hyperbole to go beyond the literal attributes of the products they 
promoted. With the poster’s garish colors and exaggerated scenes and verbal descrip-
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tions, the “pleasure afforded by hyperbolic representation is actually in this going 
beyond the literal” (35). Gaines associates this pleasure with the Barnumesque notion 
of “humbug”: the enjoyment of being tricked while knowing that one is not really being 
tricked, or being seduced by deceptions while not fully believing them.
3. For more on American wartime media propaganda, see Pratkanis, Rollins and 
O’Connor, Lasswell, Isenberg, and Vaughn.
4. Their name derives from both the Revolutionary War militiamen and the time 
limit on their speeches, which were monitored by the CPI to avoid “jeopardizing the 
hospitality of the theater owner” (Ross 245).
5. A search for promotional materials that overtly referenced “Germanness” in 
the fan and trade press from 1910 to 1925 yielded a total of 284 items, mainly adver-
tisements, publicity articles, photos, and editorial cartoons. Quantitatively, this search 
showed that references to Germanness were relatively and consistently marginal before 
and after the war and in the years before America’s involvement; the period covering 
America’s involvement in the war saw a major increase in references to Germanness, 
amounting to about half of all the collected references. Similarly, in qualitative terms, 
Germanness was depicted mainly as benign or positive before and after the war; there 
was some ambivalence from 1914 to early 1917, and Germanness was couched in highly 
negative terms from April 1917 to the end of the war and a few months thereafter. One 
reason for the lingering of propaganda film promotion after the war may have been 
that some films simply were not ready for release until that time. For a study of race and 
dehumanization in these materials, see my article “The Kaiser as the Beast of Berlin.”
6. A trade paper ad for a news film told exhibitors that they could “be neutral and 
still show your patrons the idol of the German army. The master mind on which the 
hopes of the German Empire rest—the man, who every day, bears the greatest weight 
of responsibility ever placed upon the shoulders of a human being—Field Marshall 
von Hindenberg” (Moving Picture World 13 Mar. 1915: 1698). This film supposedly con-
tained “the first motion pictures of this colossus of the military world, taken at Army 
Headquarters in East Prussia.” Another ad described official war pictures as having 
just arrived from Germany “by special permission of the Kaiser” and featuring “the 
latest German war news taken on the battle fronts,” providing “Germany’s side of the 
war”—what patrons wanted and otherwise could not get. The film was made by the 
Eiko Film Company, described as “the largest moving picture company in Germany” 
(Moving Picture World 15 May 1915: 1157).
7. The composition of this ad could suggest that the bottom image is for the other 
advertised Thomas Ince film, the Bessie Barriscale vehicleThose Who Pay, but the content, 
style, and position of this lower image in relation to the upper one make it more likely 
to be for The Zeppelin’s Last Raid.
8. The reference to Thomas Ince may be surprising to those familiar with his earlier 
and more famous antiwar film Civilization (1916). In fact, the story line of The Zeppelin’s 
Last Raid parallels that of Civilization. Ince’s earlier film depicts a war-loving Teutonic 
count changing his mind because of a peace activist and then purposely sinking his 
own ship and drowning himself as a sacrifice to peace. Likewise, the later film depicts 
a zeppelin commander persuaded by both his activist fiancée and German atrocities 
to become an opponent of the war. While on a climactic bombing mission, “the zep-
pelin commander refuses to attack a British sea town and begs his crew to follow his 
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lead and join his crusade for peace. They ignore his pleas and continue preparations 
for the raid, but rather than kill civilians, the commander blows up the zeppelin in 
midair, destroying his crew and himself ” (American Film Institute). Whereas the earlier 
Ince film was strongly antiwar, the later film apparently was more ambivalent, with its 
combination of anti-German rhetoric and antiwar sentiments affirming the German 
commander who makes the ultimate sacrifice to promote peace. The ambivalence of 
the film may reflect that of Ince or his perceived audience; put another way, the film 
may have been designed to maximize its audience by including elements that would 
appeal to both detractors and supporters of the war effort.
 9. The work of Dutch graphic artist Louis Raemaekers contains several related 
themes, including images of Uncle Sam confronting German military leaders or the 
Kaiser himself. One image by Raemaekers depicts the Kaiser and probably his son stand-
ing atop a pile of dead soldiers while surveying the battlefield landscape; an accompa-
nying poem by Eden Phillpotts, titled “A Higher Pile,” likens this scene to Golgotha, 
“all shattered, torn, and sped, a mountain for these royal feet to tread” (Raemaekers, 
Kultur in Cartoons 18–19). See also Raemaekers’ Cartoons and the three-volume Raemaek-
ers’ Cartoon History of the War.
 Pamela Grace suggested to me that this image of a modern tyrant standing atop 
his people may refer to ancient images of tyrants and pharaohs standing atop their 
slaves and other subjects, or to religious images of bodies writhing in agony or in hell. 
Image makers always have a vast cultural intertext from which to draw, consciously 
or not; for a historical study of visual depictions of war that suggests this vastness, see 
Perlmutter.
10. From his beginnings, possibly in the War of 1812, Uncle Sam represented 
values such as loyalty, common sense, and hard work. In peacetime his politics were 
rather fluid, and he could appear in advertising as a congenial and apolitical authority 
figure comparable to a product spokesman. But in wartime he embodied a strident 
patriotism, translating complex national issues into categories of right versus wrong, 
or good versus evil, and acting symbolically on behalf of America (see Leeming and 
Page 42–43). His presence here as a single figure—not flanked by comparable Allied 
figures—may suggest American independence or a self-image as the one country 
that has the power and values to make a difference in the war. The Statue of Liberty 
references France, though indirectly and as something both inspiring Uncle Sam and 
being protected by him.
11. Although this cartoonish scene does not appear in the film, it does reflect the 
film’s harsh anti-German animus. Indeed,The Prussian Cur  was eventually removed 
from distribution because of its Birth of a Nation–style scenes in which American patriots 
dressed as Ku Klux Klansmen heroically lynch a group of pro-German “traitors.” Appar-
ently, what could be done to African Americans in films of the time was not acceptable 
to the mass audience when done to Aryans.
12. The diminutive Jeff resembles a child wearing pajamas, possibly alluding to 
Allied wartime propaganda depicting Germans as evil baby killers. Jeff’s mask appears 
to be that of an animal, perhaps a dog. If so, this may add a layer of criticism leveled at 
violation of the Western taboo against eating dogs. Mary Beth Haralovich mentioned 
to me that this depiction may allude to an early Edison film, Dog Factory (1904), in 
which stray animals are turned into sausages. Indeed, the staging of this single-shot film 
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strongly resembles the ad discussed here, and in the background, among the labels for 
different kinds of sausages, is one prominently marked “mut.”
13. Julian Putkowski mentioned to me that this ad may allude to contemporaneous 
British rhetoric about the German “corpse factory,” where enemy corpses were allegedly 
turned into soap and other products (foreshadowing later Nazi practices).
14. Negative motivations included the possibility of the industry’s being shut down 
as “nonessential” during the war or being subjected to strong governmental censorship 
(DeBauche, “United States’” 138).
15. By 1900, more than a quarter of the U.S. population was of direct German 
descent (Gatzke 31). German Americans varied in their loyalty to the German govern-
ment, but many probably had deeper ethnic and familial ties to the homeland that 
complicated their attitudes toward the war, especially in immigrant communities such 
as Milwaukee and St. Louis.
16. Francis Ford’s younger brother John would direct some of the major feature 
films and documentaries about World War II, including They Were Expendable (1945) 
and The Battle of Midway (1942).
17. Flexible film stock and an intermittent mechanism were prerequisites for 
cinema. The machine gun may have provided a model for the latter development; 
the sewing machine certainly did (Thompson and Bordwell 15). Shooting was used as 
a synonym for filming by the 1910s.
18. In a conference paper, Kathryn Fuller-Seeley presented a study of Paramount’s 
ten-year public relations campaign that began in 1917 to promote not the studio’s films 
or stars but the psychic and social values of filmgoing itself, in a manner consistent 
with the promotion of other consumer goods at the time. This Paramount and Artcraft 
Pictures ad apparently was part of that larger campaign.
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CULTURE WARS AND THE  
LOCAL SCREEN
The Reception of Westfront 1918 and All Quiet on 
the Western Front in One German City
8 / David Imhoof
Six nights in December 1930 were all it took to make Lewis Milestone’s All 
Quiet on the Western Front (1930) the most controversial film in Germany be-
tween the world wars. For six nights it played in Berlin, with protests inside 
and outside the theater and across the country, until Germany’s Censorship 
Board reversed its earlier approval of the movie and banned it. For several 
weeks the conflict about the movie—Should it be shown or not? What does 
it mean for Germany?—grabbed front-page headlines, a singular feat that 
indicated the film’s significance for national politics. Like the thirty films 
about the Great War produced in Weimar Germany between 1925 and 1933, 
Milestone’s American film offered Germans a variety of ways to come to terms 
with a cataclysmic defeat (Kester 291–301). Since very few Germans actually 
saw All Quiet in 1930, it served chiefly as a political lightning rod in Weimar 
Germany. Its function as a symbol of the era’s conflicts and vitriol has marked 
its place in the history of interwar German cinema and politics.
By contrast, less controversial films such as G. W. Pabst’s Westfront 1918 
(1930) clearly illustrate the very real and significant function of the Great War 
in interwar German politics; it opened a dialogue among critics and viewers 
about the war through the era’s most important mass medium. To use Carl 
Schorske’s idea about a previous epoch, German politics in 1930 was performed 
in a “‘sharper key,’ a mode of political behavior at once more abrasive, more 
creative, and more satisfying to the life of feeling than the deliberative style 
of . . . liberals” (119). In that year of vituperative elections and street fighting, 
Westfront offered Germans across the political spectrum a rare opportunity to 
find common ground, whereas All Quiet served only to polarize.
This chapter analyzes reactions to Westfront 1918 and All Quiet on the Western 
Front  in the midsize German university town of Göttingen to investigate the pro-
cess by which cinema both reflected and shaped perceptions about the Great 
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War and its role in German politics. The history of these two films in Göttingen 
demonstrates that local perspectives and experiences helped determine how 
national cultural products took root in everyday life. Eventually the experience 
of integrating external ideas and images into local cultural life taught Germans 
how to make Nazism a part of their daily lives too. Indeed, discussions sur-
rounding these two films in Göttingen helped normalize ideas about culture 
and national identity that directly benefited Hitler’s movement.
No matter where motion pictures originated, Germans experienced them 
in their own towns and neighborhoods. More than is often recognized, local 
cultural purveyors, institutions, and discourses molded the development of 
mass culture in interwar Germany. Celia Applegate and Alon Confino have 
shown that the most important negotiation of political and cultural change in 
modern Germany took place at the local level.1 Like other cultural activities in 
Germany, local moviegoing in the interwar period aided the process of Nazifi-
cation as much as national and international political events did. Discussions 
about movies such as Westfront and All Quiet articulated a homegrown set of 
notions with which Nazi ideas could resonate.
Map of Germany after World War I.
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GÖTTINGEN AS MISE-EN-SCÈNE
To quote Clifford Geertz, anthropologists and cultural historians “don’t study 
villages . . . they study in villages. . . . The locus of study is not the object of 
study” (22). My analysis draws its significance from the fact that the location is 
both unique and representative. A city of about forty-five thousand between the 
world wars, Göttingen was large enough and diverse enough to experience a 
wide range of cultural activities, yet small enough to reveal the finer workings 
of local cultural practices. Located south of Hanover, Göttingen was a histori-
cally important trading and administrative city for the Kingdom of Hanover 
and then Prussia. Today it stands almost exactly at the center of Germany, 
along major north-south and east-west transportation routes. The George 
August University, which opened in 1737, has defined the city as a provincial 
intellectual center. The university has, for instance, produced more Nobel 
Prize winners than any other except Cambridge. Many of the scientists who 
worked on America’s Manhattan Project trained there, and the city has hosted 
a number of important Americans, including historian George Bancroft, poet 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, President William Howard Taft, and, briefly, 
The University of Göttingen’s Auditorium, circa 1930.
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Benjamin Franklin. The city’s peaceful surrender to American forces in April 
1945 helped engender good relations between Göttingen and the United 
States after the Second World War.
In the 1920s Göttingen was a conservative city: the many pensioners, mili-
tary personnel, students, professors, and bureaucrats there exercised more 
influence than the working class, which was smaller than that of more indus-
trialized German cities (Saldern 14–56). Cultural purveyors such as newspaper 
critics and cinema owners, in particular, reflected this social and political 
conservatism, since they often came from and worked closely with the local 
elite who held leadership positions in both the city administration and cultural 
organizations. Top city officials, who passed and enforced laws controlling 
cultural activities, remained much the same in terms of both personnel and 
perspective from before World War I through the end of the Third Reich.
Göttingen’s conservative politics shaped cultural activities themselves and 
the ways in which they were discussed in the media. City leaders, for instance, 
viewed the expansion of leisure activities, especially mass culture, with some 
apprehension. As the mass culture medium par excellence in the 1920s, cin-
ema was a particularly visible target for elite attempts to mold popular culture. 
Germany’s reactionary Motion Picture Law of May 1920 and its taxation rules 
in particular enabled local governments to encourage the showing of some 
films rather than others in their towns. City leaders and newspaper critics 
generally favored historical dramas, documentaries, and films based on clas-
sical literature over the more popular musicals, melodramas, comedies, and 
mysteries that dominated the silver screen during these years. They could use 
their own prerogatives to set the tax levels for films, which in turn influenced 
the prices of individual tickets. Allowing an “educational” film to show tax free, 
for instance, meant that the cinema owner could lower ticket prices to attract 
patrons. In Berlin a group of movie industry leaders and government officials 
actually decided which films were deemed “culturally valuable” per the 1920 
Motion Picture Law; local authorities then had the power to use those defini-
tions to grant tax breaks. Such policies alone might not determine the success 
or failure of a particular film, but they could shape the size of the audience 
and bring in revenue for the city from the more popular films. 
Cultural critics in Göttingen newspapers and periodicals, moreover, directly 
influenced how moviegoers thought about cinema by creating a common syntax 
for cinematic discussions that blended local, national, and international ideas 
and images. Commentators promoted cinema as a benefit to the local economy 
and civic prestige, offering tangible reasons for integrating mass culture into 
established local institutions and Göttingen culture. The cultural purveyors 
who regulated and promoted cinema in Göttingen pressed a traditional (essen-
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tially nineteenth-century) concept of culture, one that reinforced conservative 
politics in general. In particular, the Göttingen Magistracy, the highest elected 
body in the city, wrote local regulations for cinema and oversaw their applica-
tion by the police. Its stable membership and general approval of nationalism 
(in both cinema and government) helped legitimize the city council’s move 
toward the right that began in the late 1920s and culminated in a significant 
victory for nationalist parties in the May 1929 local elections. 
As the economy worsened after the American stock market crash that 
October, Göttingers were increasingly attracted to the solutions offered by 
Hitler’s party. The Nazis preached an antipolitics that rejected the efficacy of 
Weimar democracy and thus drew strength from both political maneuvering 
and cultural activities. Newspaper critics, who had also been slow to embrace 
cinema’s value, often connected these two different public activities. Since they 
generally preferred to act as boosters rather than critics, the more powerful 
conservative newspapers extolled celebratory rather than critical cinema. The 
papers exercised considerable influence on local perspectives about cinema, 
often using reviews of a national premiere to set the terms of discussion about 
a specific film even before it arrived in Göttingen. Together, civic leaders and 
cultural purveyors thus endorsed motion pictures with more “traditional” sub-
jects and positive visions of German history. Films based on the works of Goethe 
or Shakespeare, for instance, received tax discounts as “culturally valuable” 
films and positive reviews from critics, as did historical epics about Frederick 
the Great. By supporting such films over popular comedies or melodramas or 
any kind of critical treatment of the past, these influential Göttingers promoted 
a conservative vision of culture and ultimately helped politicize cinema in a 
way that fostered emerging Nazi notions about culture.
WAR FILMS AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
Fictionalized cinematic depictions of the Great War illustrated the spectrum 
of thought on cinema’s role in German society and politics. The First World 
War had served as midwife to both the Weimar Republic and the contemporary 
German film industry and therefore became integral to the post-1918 cultural 
scene. Memories and mythologies of the war defined and energized Weimar 
politics and ideology. Conservatives blamed Germany’s subsequent problems 
at home and abroad on defeat and the Versailles Peace Treaty and challenged 
any attempt to portray the war in terms other than glory, heroism, and sacrifice 
on the part of German soldiers. For Social Democrats, in contrast, the war 
served as the tragic impetus for a new Germany; they saw it as a terrible event 
that the new republic must never repeat. The German Communist Party had 
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actually formed as a result of a 1917 split over support for the war between 
the Independent Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party. A 
number of left-wing artists used these political sentiments to portray a society 
broken by the war and unwilling to cope with its aftermath. George Grosz and 
Otto Dix, chief among German visual artists, rendered the war’s effect: the 
glaring inequities it failed to change and the search for hollow sensation it 
engendered. Conservatives lamented what one columnist in Göttingen called 
the “pleasure craving” and “cocainism of the entertainment industry” that had 
been spawned by war and hardship (Tageblatt 2 Aug. 1925).2 War films made 
this politically charged issue a part of mass entertainment.
By 1930 the Great War had already been the topic of seventeen German 
motion pictures. Some were hard-hitting and controversial, such as the antiwar 
Nameless Heroes (1925) and films about war guilt such as The Double Murder of 
Sarajevo (1920) and The European Arsonist (1926). Many others were documen-
taries or sentimental features, including The Heart of a German Mother (1926) 
and German Women—German True (1928). American war films such as Havoc 
(1925), The Big Parade (1925), What Price Glory? (1926), and Wings (1927) had 
also played in Germany, as had French films such as Verdun (1929). Popular 
knowledge about the vicious anti-German propaganda movies made in the 
United States during World War I raised concerns about Hollywood’s fairness 
in portraying the conflict (especially if Germans chose to forget their own 
nation’s vitriolic cinematic campaign during the war). No matter who made 
them, filmed versions of war offered potentially greater controversy and com-
mercial windfall than did other cultural representations of the conflict (Saun-
ders 29–31). The year 1930 represented a high-water mark for movies about 
the war—six productions premiered that year—and for violent political clashes 
across the country, including in Göttingen. The films Westfront 1918  and All 
Quiet on the Western Front  highlighted major fault lines in German politics in 
1930 and the ways arbiters of culture articulated their differences.
WESTFRONT 1918
G. W. Pabst’s Westfront 1918 did not treat war romantically and seemed to 
advocate postwar rapprochement between France and Germany. Its realism 
prompted responses ranging from patriotic enthusiasm to strong antiwar senti-
ment, as had the 1927 UFA nationalist documentary The World War (Saunders 
44–45; Korte 206).3 Indeed, the various English translations of Pabst’s German 
title—including Comrades of 1918, The Western Front 1918, Four Infantry Men, 
Drums of Doom, and Shame of a Nation—underscore the film’s various valences. 
Westfront 1918 was based on Ernst Johannsen’s 1929 novel Four from the Infantry. 
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It was Pabst’s first effort with sound and the first German sound film about the 
war. The realistic representation of the horrors of trench warfare owed much 
of its power to the expressive cinematography of Fritz Arno Wagner, who also 
worked on the early silent classic Nosferatu (1922) and rich German sound films 
such as M (1931), The Testament of Dr. Mabuse (1932), and Amphitryon (1935).
Unlike All Quiet on the Western Front, which follows the hero’s personal 
narrative and loss of innocence, Westfront 1918 episodically portrays the 
daily experience of war. It is built on the connected stories of four seasoned 
soldiers—an aristocratic lieutenant, a wry Bavarian, a young student, and a 
middle-class family man named Karl—in the same company during the final 
year of the war. The love interests of two characters in particular illustrate the 
broader impact of war. The student falls in love with a French girl and volun-
teers for a dangerous assignment so that he can visit her. But his reward is a 
gruesome death at the hands of a French African, a scene that illustrates the 
implicit racism informing many Germans’ thoughts about the war and their 
enemies. When middle-class and long-suffering Karl goes home on leave, he 
finds that his wife is having an affair with a butcher’s assistant because she is 
lonely and hungry. Karl is bitter and wants to return to the front, preferring 
Westfront 1918: comradeship in the trenches.
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the comradeship of the trenches to the complexities of home. Likewise, the 
marked difference between the lieutenant’s zeal and the Bavarian’s mordancy 
encapsulates the breadth of attitudes about war. Ultimately, though, attitudes 
do not matter: for these four soldiers, death is the common outcome.
The film ends with a French soldier taking Karl’s dead hand and saying, 
“My comrade . . . not my enemy!” But Pabst is telling a cautionary tale: he 
closes the film with “The End?!” Reviewers in and out of Germany remarked 
on the film’s realism and its antiwar perspective (Kester 127–36). The New York 
Times’s Berlin correspondent, for instance, called it “the most vivid argument 
yet contrived against war” (Trask 4). The film’s popularity—it was one of the 
ten top-grossing films of the season in Germany and had the second-longest-
running premiere—indicates that Pabst’s realism might have shocked but did 
not necessarily outrage.
In Göttingen Westfront 1918 played in the Capitol Theater, the largest and 
most luxurious movie house in town. Ernst Heidelberg, the city’s leading figure 
associated with cinema throughout the interwar period, built the theater in 
October 1929. He used this substantial landmark to secure more of the big 
films coming to Göttingen than the other five theaters in town. Heidelberg 
Westfront 1918: ubiquitous death scene.
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and other theater owners often made local premieres into important events 
that helped glamorize and localize the experience of moviegoing. By emulat-
ing gala national premieres in Berlin, theater owners and newspaper review-
ers connected local activities and mass culture. At the grand opening of the 
Capitol, for example, one newspaper reporter concluded that this modern 
“big-city movie theater” would take up Göttingen’s “great cultural obliga-
tion” and fulfill “a cultural mission in our city” (Tageblatt 3 Oct. 1929). Since 
cinema and other forms of mass culture introduced new cultural products to 
Göttingen, this “cultural mission” meant that local institutions and individuals 
integrated external ideas into local life. The rituals of moviegoing—national 
premieres and discussions in local papers, then local premieres, reviews, and 
discussions—gave Göttingers a process by which they could make the images 
and ideas of cinema parts of their daily lives. As an important film about an 
important subject playing in an important movie theater, Westfront therefore 
acquired special significance.
When Westfront opened in Göttingen on 1 July 1930, its premiere coincided 
with several events that underscored the continued local impact of the Great 
War. Just the day before, Allied forces had completed their evacuation of the 
area around the Rhine River that marked Germany’s traditional western bor-
der, ending a humiliating legacy of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Marches and 
celebrations were organized by various groups in Göttingen and continued for 
several days thereafter. A collection of veterans’ associations hosted a “German 
evening” on 1 July in honor of the event. That same day former prisoners of 
war in Göttingen marched to protest unemployment among veterans. And just 
a month and a half earlier, on 17 May, the American Young Plan, organized 
by the U.S. government and banks to refinance Germany’s $9 billion wartime 
reparations payments, had gone into effect. Although this new payment plan 
attempted to address realistically Germany’s ability to honor its massive debt, 
the October 1929 stock market crash that sent the world into depression seemed 
to nullify its potential benefit. Nationalists in particular chafed at this most 
recent American intervention in Germany’s finances as the economic crisis 
intensified. In short, the loss of the war seemed doubly painful because the 
ramifications of the reparations payments hit vulnerable veterans especially 
hard. This mix of celebration, commemoration, and attention to the worsening 
depression meant that a movie about the Great War would be treated as a highly 
significant statement about something that directly impacted Göttingers’ lives. 
And given that parliamentary elections were just two months away, it promised 
to reflect—and perhaps shape—political perceptions.
Reviewers from the three main local newspapers, each of which represented 
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a different political perspective, enthusiastically endorsed Westfront 1918 for 
very different reasons. The ultraconservativeTageblatt (2 July 1930) gravely 
commended director Pabst’s depiction of valor and sacrifice, calling it “the 
cinematic gravestone of the unknown German soldier.” The Social Democratic 
Volksblatt (2 July 1930) praised Westfront as an “accusation against the war and 
National Socialist supporters of war.” Waxing literary, the cautiously liberal 
Zeitung (3 July 1930) maintained that the film reveals the “countenance of war” 
and condemns the “great senselessness” of 1914 to 1918. Both the Tageblatt and 
the Volksblatt mentioned one specific scene in which officers call the soldiers 
heroes. The conservative Tageblatt expressed approval, whereas the Volksblatt 
reminded readers that the sardonic Bavarian grumbles that if they really were 
heroes they would be home already. Likewise, the Tageblatt questioned the 
validity of a scene in which an officer tries unsuccessfully to rally the men to 
cheer, and the Social Democratic paper observed that the scene exemplifies 
one class’s forcing another to continue a pointless war.
The conservative Tageblatt review came from Heinz Koch, the newspaper’s 
local editor and chief cultural critic. Koch’s steady stream of writing on all 
things cultural and local throughout the interwar period in the city’s most 
widely read newspaper made him the premier cultural critic in Göttingen. 
Like many conservatives, Koch arrived late at the conclusion that cinema could 
serve a positive purpose, but he eventually became an ardent supporter and 
took his reviews of films as seriously as those of opera, music, theater, and art. 
Beyond noting the film’s political implications, his review situated Westfront 
within the broader contexts of the many books and films about the war and the 
development of sound films, lauding its technical and topical efficacy. Koch 
was a well-known conservative who helped make the Tageblatt a nationalist and 
right-leaning newspaper (his incendiary work even prompted authorities to 
shut the paper down temporarily in 1922). But in Westfront he saw not antiwar 
or anti-German sentiments but a powerful, empathetic portrayal of the war and 
of soldiers’ experiences. Anyone, he wrote, “who lived through those horrify-
ing, hopeless final months of retreating battle in the west must admit: it was 
just like that!” Apparently politically neutral in this review, Koch concluded 
that the French saying “C’est la guerre!” would also make a suitable title for 
this film (Tageblatt 2 July 1930).
Westfront 1918’s statement about the horrors of war was neutral enough to 
prompt discussion of the qualities of the film and to cause critics from across 
the political spectrum to praise it. As was the case for other cultural activities 
in Göttingen, though, this film’s ability to unite conflicting political opinions 
bolstered conservatives (like Koch), who had consistently lamented Weimar’s 
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fragmented political scene. The common condemnation of the suffering por-
trayed in Westfront in all three newspapers lent some support to the conserva-
tive desire to honor fallen soldiers rather than address difficult issues such as 
the validity of the war, the experience of guilt, and the justice of the ensuing 
peace. Such sentiments, clearly visible in reviews of Westfront, underscored 
the growth of nationalist political parties—especially the Nazis—beginning 
in 1929 and gave nationalists a set of powerful images with which their ideas 
could resonate.
ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT
In contrast to Pabst’s film, All Quiet on the Western Front had the effect of pour-
ing gasoline on an already fiery debate. Although the publication of Erich 
Maria Remarque’s book in January 1929 had prompted attacks and protests, 
detractors lacked a specific time and place to stage their demonstrations; these 
elements were conveniently provided by the film’s premiere. Controversy had 
already helped the novel become the world’s best-selling book. Everywhere 
the discussions and anger surrounding All Quiet reflected both postwar disil-
lusionment and malaise and disagreement about the Great War itself (Eksteins 
60). In Göttingen and across Germany, the brouhaha surrounding the film 
illuminated the mutually reinforcing relationship between mass politics and 
mass culture.
After German studios declined to make the film, Universal Studios in 
Hollywood undertook the project, with Lewis Milestone directing. Like the 
book, the film follows a group of idealistic German high school students and 
their natural leader, Paul Bäumer, during four years of war. It portrays their 
growing up and camaraderie through scenes of battle, celebration, bitter trips 
back home, and death. Its American release in May 1930 generated both sharp 
criticism and strong support, and it won the Academy Award for best picture. 
In Paris, London, and Brussels, All Quiet garnered enormous attention and 
generally good reviews. Anticipating opposition in Germany, Universal made 
some judicious edits before the German-language dubbed version premiered 
in Berlin on 4 December 1930 (Eksteins 61–62).
Much had happened in Germany in the months since Remarque’s book 
had been published and even since Westfront 1918 had debuted. Democracy 
and liberalism had taken some heavy blows. A grand national coalition of 
various opposing parties fell apart in March 1930. In July President Paul von 
Hindenburg and Chancellor Heinrich Brüning (Catholic Center Party) invoked 
article 48 of the Weimar constitution, using its emergency powers to dissolve 
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the existing Reichstag (parliament), call for new elections, and temporarily rule 
by presidential decree. (This move, aimed at squelching the Social Democratic 
opposition, provided precedent for Hitler’s use of the same constitutional 
provision in 1933.) In the September 1930 elections the Nazi Party earned the 
second-largest majority in parliament, and voters increased their support for 
the Communists as well. Thus, although the agencies governing film policy and 
policing had not changed between the releases of Westfront and All Quiet, the 
tenor of government had shifted in Berlin and in Göttingen ( Jelavich 157–90). 
In addition, just before All Quiet premiered, leftist artist Georg Grosz had been 
cleared of slandering the Catholic Church, invoking a storm of protests and 
outraged rhetoric from conservatives, who deplored his nightmarish postwar 
visions in which Germans embraced sex, violence, and brutality.
The 4 December 1930 opening night in Berlin proceeded without inci-
dent, and All Quiet garnered generally good reviews in most national papers. 
Protests began the second evening, most notably when Joseph Goebbels (then 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party propaganda director and head of 
the party in Berlin) and a group of Nazis halted that night’s showing by shout-
ing “Jewish film,” tossing stink bombs, and releasing mice in the aisles. Nazi 
agitators then used the film as an excuse to march, fight, and generally cause 
chaos at various points across Berlin for the next couple of days. Even though 
All Quiet had been approved by the national Censorship Board in November, 
elected representatives continued to debate fiercely in the Reichstag whether 
the film should be played. Together with the raucous protests in Berlin, direct 
appeals from politicians in Saxony, Brunswick, Thuringia, Württemberg, and 
Bavaria eventually convinced the Appellate Censorship Board to reconsider 
the approval of the film. Testimony from regional and federal government 
officials, some of whom had, in the meantime, reversed their opinions about 
All Quiet, gave the appellate board ammunition for labeling it anti-German 
and dangerous, and it decided to ban the film on 10 December 1930. Board 
members claimed that it represented a threat to public order and “German 
reputation” at home and abroad ( Jelavich 157–77).
Göttingen newspapers reported these protests and debates in great detail. 
Even more than in their Westfront reviews, the papers used the film’s debut and 
the ensuing scandal as vehicles to push their ideological lines about the war, 
the uneasy peace, and the republic that followed. The right-wing Tageblatt came 
out strongly against Milestone’s film, which it called “a new anti-German hate 
film,” and it celebrated the film’s prohibition—“at last”—on the front page as 
“Goebbels’s Victory!” (Tageblatt 8, 12 Dec. 1930). On 10 December the local section 
reprinted a speech by Hans Frick, an important regional Nazi Party minister, 
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in which he used the attack on All Quiet to promote the National Socialist fight 
against “cultural Bolshevism,” specifically the threats represented by “Jews,” 
“modernism,” and “materialism.”4 Certainly, in many conservative minds, the 
fact that Americans had produced All Quiet (whereas Germans had made 
Westfront) made it more reprehensible. But the animosity toward Milestone’s 
film says more about grave changes occurring in Germany during 1930 than 
it does about the films’ national origins.
The left-leaning Volksblatt (11 Dec. 1930) called Goebbels’s “hate speech” 
about the film a “witch hunt for Jews,” a provocation for riots, and a call to 
replace the Weimar Republic with a “Third Reich.” The Social Democratic 
paper also singled out the conservative press as a mouthpiece for Nazi ideas. 
Tageblatt 12 Dec. 1930.
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The Volksblatt’s front page on 12 December called the ban a “suppression of 
the truth” and featured a cartoon showing Prussian soldiers marching behind a 
triumphant (former) Kaiser Wilhelm II and crushing everyone in their way. The 
caption read: “This is how films must look to tell the truth in Germany.” The 
following day the Volksblatt ran another cartoon, this one of an aggressive and 
“happy” Mars, dressed as a Roman warrior and surrounded by skulls, thanking 
the “brave” Nazis for securing the All Quiet ban. The Tageblatt also featured a 
front-page cartoon on 12 December, showing a packed Berlin movie house at 
the premiere of All Quiet, half of which was filled by local police officers. The 
next panel portrayed all the patrons fleeing, except for a few Communists. 
The caption exclaimed, “For four years Germany held the world at bay! Must 
Volksblatt 12 Dec. 1930.
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a self-respecting nation [Volk] now just collapse?” The moderate Zeitung (9, 12 
Dec. 1930) carefully explained the reasons for the initial approval and the 
subsequent reversal, presenting both sides of the debate.
The controversy continued to dominate the Göttingen papers for days 
after the ban, and its echoes reverberated for months. A 12 December ban 
of a documentary about the Stahlhelm, a right-wing paramilitary group, for 
instance, demonstrated that the response to All Quiet had made film censors 
more cautious. Coverage in the Zeitung (13 Dec. 1930) about that prohibition 
ran as part of a front-page analysis of perspectives on war movies in and out of 
Germany. On its front page that day the Tageblatt  derisively called the Stahlhelm 
film ban “revenge for Remarque” and attacked the fear instilled in censors 
as “a new disgrace for Remarque-types!” The Tageblatt reported extensively 
through the end of the year on the “echo of the film ban,” detailing various 
reactions across Germany and beyond and describing the law and order that 
the ban had restored to the nation (Tageblatt 16, 19, 27–28 Dec. 1930). The 
Volksblatt also continued to cover the ban’s ramifications. A 19 December article 
reported that leaders of the Austrian government had responded positively to 
All Quiet at a private screening in Vienna, maintaining that it was a pacifist but 
not anti-German film. Soon, however, Austrian censors banned the production 
because of embarrassing protests and the potential strain in Austro-German 
Volksblatt cartoon.
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relations (Simmons 56). As late as 31 March 1931, the Volksblatt reported that 
the Social Democratic faction of the Reichstag had formally protested the “il-
legal” ban of All Quiet. 
The context of a recently empowered Nazi Party shaped perspectives about 
All Quiet on the Western Front at the local and national levels. Peter Jelavich argues 
that the ability of National Socialists to pressure the German government into 
banning All Quiet in many ways marked the demise of a “Weimar culture” that 
had previously promoted critical engagement, liberalism, and experimenta-
tion ( Jelavich 176; see also Gay xii–xiv). He attributes the “death” of Weimar 
culture around 1930 to the fear and passivity that the All Quiet ban engendered 
among potentially critical artists. Although this narrow slice of cultural activity 
did not often affect the lives of many Germans, the particular cause célèbre of 
All Quiet defined the events of 1930 as a major turning point in Germany when 
mass culture became both the medium and the message for more aggressive 
politics and a less critical culture.
CINEMA’S ROLE IN POLITICAL TRENDS
Different responses in Göttingen to Westfront and All Quiet highlight local 
trends in political behavior and cinema’s role as a vehicle for connecting po-
litical ideology with daily life, both of which explain the growing popularity 
of Hitler’s party. The traditional elite and university students had supported 
Hitler since the early 1920s; beginning in 1929 the deepening world depres-
sion pushed the “floating” middle-class vote toward nationalist parties that had 
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consistently challenged the Weimar Republic. Local elections in May 1929 gave 
a Nazi-led right-wing coalition an absolute majority on Göttingen’s city council 
and placed key party members in the elite Magistracy. The September 1930 
Reichstag elections prompted violent demonstrations in Göttingen against 
the national government and bloody street fighting between Nazis and left-
ists. More than one out of three Göttingen voters (37.8 percent) supported 
the National Socialists that year, more than double the party’s 18.3 percent 
showing throughout Germany (Marshall 272–327). This growing political 
power emboldened those in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany who went to 
such trouble to stop the showing of a film. Against a backdrop of conflict and 
violence, therefore, conservative support for the banning of All Quiet made 
sense to many in Göttingen who voted for a “nationalist” solution to Germany’s 
social and economic woes. Discussions in newspapers about the film’s provoca-
tive and divisive nature jibed with campaign rhetoric from right-wing groups 
about the need to move beyond an unstable democratic “system” that kept 
Germany weak and fractured.
For very different reasons, both Westfront 1918 and All Quiet on the Western Front 
bolstered conservative claims that ideological differences in the parliamentary 
system continued to divide Germans and that only “apolitical” solutions could 
unite them. Pabst’s film illustrated that “safer” treatments of the war could 
garner a broad audience, whereas Milestone’s epic underscored the danger 
of critical filmmaking. The controversy surrounding All Quiet, together with 
growing right-wing majorities in national, regional, and local governments, 
moved the national Film Censorship Board in a conservative direction. There-
after, critical and controversial movies such as Pabst’s Three-Penny Opera (1931) 
and the worker melodrama Whither Germany? (1932) lost some of their bite, 
as filmmakers censored themselves to assuage the Censorship Board. Yet they 
still faced difficulties passing the censors’ scrutiny (Willet 207–8). In contrast, 
nationalist historical dramas such as the more neutral and sympathetic Westfront 
1918  fared well in the early 1930s because of their established tradition in 
German film, their less overtly political messages, and their broad popularity 
among both elites and average Germans (Korte 250; Murray 234).
The many Weimar-era motion pictures about Frederick the Great, the 
Napoleonic wars, and other moments of perceived national greatness, for in-
stance, expressed nationalist sentiments in the context of a less controversial 
past. Such historical dramas formed an important thematic bridge between 
the Weimar and Nazi regimes, since Goebbels in particular liked to promote 
ideology through a two-pronged approach that celebrated the Third Reich 
in newsreels and entertained citizens through feature films that avoided con-
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troversial topics. Helmut Korte similarly points not to Hitler’s assumption of 
power in 1933 but to late 1931 and early 1932 as the start of a steady growth in 
the production of nationalist epic films such as Yorck, Blush of Dawn, Refugees, 
and Marshall Forward (122–26). And even after 1933, Hilmar Hoffmann argues, 
the Third Reich chiefly used documentaries and newsreels to communicate its 
ideology rather than heavy-handed and largely unpopular “Nazi” feature films 
such as SA Man Brandt, Hitler Youth Quex, and Hans Westmar (115–97).
The two World War I films discussed here likewise reinforced the tendency 
of civic leaders and newspaper critics in Göttingen to describe and control cin-
ema in a way that promoted conservative social and political values. Although 
Westfront 1918 was not beloved by Hitler’s National Socialists and was banned 
after they came to power in 1933, it did not elicit the ire of conservatives like 
Koch who, though not Nazis themselves, fostered many of the same ideas in 
their writing. This chapter has mentioned several possible explanations for the 
success of Westfront in contrast to the failure of All Quiet: xenophobia, episodic 
versus narrative structure, and especially the power over cultural decisions that 
electoral victories gave to Hitler’s party. Westfront allowed members of the Göt-
tingen Magistracy and leading cultural critics to promote film as an edifying 
medium and a potential source of tax revenue, whereas All Quiet generated 
only conflict that local leaders viewed as neither informative nor lucrative. 
The confluence of material interests and established conservative ideas meant 
that the debates surrounding these motion pictures in 1930 helped ensure 
that conservative films and reactions to them would have the most currency 
in Göttingen after 1930. This situation, in turn, helped normalize Hitler’s ag-
gressive nationalism in the two years before the National Socialist Party actually 
gained power in Germany.
More generally, the different experiences of these two films illustrate that 
culture and leisure pursuits mattered in interwar Germany. Indeed, these two 
films about the Great War helped make cinema an essential part of political 
life and mass culture a part of the syntax of interwar German politics. Cultural 
representations of politics raised the stakes of political difference because they 
were so pervasive and potentially powerful.5 By 1930 Göttingers and other 
Germans had grown all too accustomed to political fighting in the Reichstag, 
in their local governments, and on the street. Still, not everyone cared about 
politics—but almost everyone went to the movies. Nazis, Communists, Social 
Democrats, middle-class liberals, elitists, and mass culture advocates all rec-
ognized that the film All Quiet on the Western Front  had, to borrow a phrase, 
rewritten Remarque’s book “with lightning” (Rosenstone 191). To be sure, this 
conflict crystallized political responses in Göttingen to cinematic depictions of 
the war and, by extension, other controversial subjects. Perhaps more impor-
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tant, these films wedded discussions of cinema with local political discourse. 
More than reflecting ideological conflict, therefore, cinema functioned increas-
ingly as a popular platform for talking about politics. This synthesis of mass 
culture and mass politics would arguably become the Nazis’ most powerful 
tool for promoting their vision for a new Germany.
NOTES
1. Notable local studies that bear out this general argument include Allen, Koshar, 
Heilbronner, Jenkins, and Bergerson.
2. In subsequent references to Göttingen’s newspapers—the Göttinger Tageblatt, 
Göttinger Zeitung, and Göttinger Volksblatt, the city’s name has been omitted. Since Göt-
tingen newspapers of this era rarely numbered more than fifteen pages each day, I 
have likewise omitted page numbers. Reviews, when signed at all, were often merely 
attributed to initials that do not conclusively demonstrate the author’s identity.
3. The German Reich founded UFA (Universum Film-Aktien Gesellschaft) in 
1917 as a hybrid public-private enterprise that united several of Germany’s largest film 
companies. Originally designed to produce nationalist entertainment and propaganda 
during World War I, the company was privatized in 1921 and made many pathbreak-
ing films during the Weimar era, including The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919), Metropolis 
(1927), and The Blue Angel (1930). National and local reviews of The World War in 
Göttingen newspapers endorsed this documentary, but chiefly for reasons stemming 
from political ideology.
4. Later, as the Third Reich’s Minister of the Interior, Frick would draft laws that 
sent opponents to concentration camps, as well as the infamous 1935 Nuremburg 
race laws. He was one of the few Third Reich officials executed as a war criminal after 
World War II.
5. In a sense, the comparative impact of book versus film bears out the penetrating 
and psychological power that Walter Benjamin ascribes to motion pictures. Anton Kaes 
charts this relationship in more detail.
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THE PEACE, ISOLATIONIST, AND  
ANTI-INTERVENTIONIST MOVEMENTS 
AND INTERWAR HOLLYWOOD
9 / John Whiteclay Chambers II
In studying U.S. foreign policy in the period between the two world wars, 
scholars have recently produced some important work on interventionism and 
the film industry, but the relationship of antiwar groups to motion pictures 
has been largely ignored. Such neglect is clearly unwarranted, since surveys 
indicated that throughout the 1930s, the overwhelming majority of Americans 
opposed U.S. intervention in another war. As late as July 1941, the final Gallup 
poll on the question revealed that 79 percent still advocated U.S. neutrality 
(Gallup 290). This chapter is intended to provide a fuller and more balanced 
account.
My exploration of the relationship between leading antiwar groups and the 
film industry has produced some new insights into the foreign policy debate 
in the interwar era and contributes to a broader understanding of the place of 
movies in American public life. It indicates how some interest groups sought 
to filter and interpret motion pictures to their membership and demonstrates 
how, for most of the 1930s, pacifists and isolationists sought to use films in a 
positive manner and to build a working relationship with the motion picture 
industry. It was only in 1941, with the advent of a new, more extreme anti- 
interventionist movement, that a vituperative campaign was launched against 
the Hollywood studios.
Unfortunately, all those who were opposed to U.S. military intervention 
overseas are often linked together as isolationists, but they are more accurately 
analyzed as three separate entities, at least in the interwar period: pacifists, 
isolationists, and anti-interventionists. The peace movement was composed of 
a variety of pacifist and peace advocacy groups; internationalist rather than 
isolationist, they opposed military force and collective security and advocated 
nonviolent methods to address the causes or consequences of war. In contrast, 
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the isolationist movement was neither pacifist nor internationalist. Its member 
groups opposed U.S. political as well as military intervention overseas, but they 
supported military defense of the Western Hemisphere. The anti-interventionist 
movement, composed of an ad hoc coalition of groups ranging from the po-
litical Left to the Right, emerged in 1940 to prevent U.S. military intervention 
in World War II.
The archival records of groups from these three different antiwar move-
ments can disclose much more than merely how they sought to increase their 
membership and political influence—the standard use of such records.1 In 
this case, they reveal how such groups tried to shape members’ attitudes and 
actions toward motion pictures, the film industry, and U.S. foreign policy. 
Here, I focus on one group from each of the three movements: the pacifist 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); the peace-
oriented, isolationist-influenced National Council for the Prevention of War 
(NCPW); and the anti-interventionist America First Committee (AFC). Both 
the WILPF and the NCPW existed throughout the interwar period. The AFC 
was a temporary coalition organization that existed only from 1940 to 1941. 
The U.S. Section of the WILPF, founded in 1919 by Jane Addams and 
other women interested in working for peace and women’s rights, was one of 
the most important pacifist pressure groups. It consisted of more than 13,000 
women, most of them from the middle or upper class, in branches across the 
country. Mildred Scott Olmstead headed the influential Pennsylvania branch, 
and in 1934 she became chief administrator of the entire U.S. Section of the 
WILPF (Alonso; Bacon; Foster; Pois). The most influential umbrella orga-
nization that included an isolationist coalition was the NCPW, headed by its 
founder Frederick J. Libby. A large, assertive lobbying coalition made up of 
a wide spectrum of groups from the American Federation of Teachers to the 
Grange and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the NCPW mailed out nearly 2 mil-
lion pieces of literature each year to a large audience ranging from farmers 
and blue-collar workers to educators and editors (Kuusisto; Libby, To End ). 
The anti-interventionist AFC was headed by Robert Wood, chairman of Sears 
Roebuck and Company, and counted a membership of some 850,000 persons, 
the majority in the isolationist Middle West (Cole, America First; Doenecke, In 
Danger; Moser, “Gigantic Engines”).
During American intervention in World War I, pacifists had been appalled 
by Hollywood’s “hate the Hun” silent films.2 With the renewed peace and isola-
tionist sentiment of the late 1920s, some antiwar leaders expressed an interest 
in using the new talking pictures to engage the mass audience in the task of 
building a better and more peaceful world. Olmstead, already emerging as 
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a key figure in the U.S. Section of the WILPF, became a leading advocate of 
using cinema for peace. She was impressed by a December 1928 radio talk in 
which Harry M. Warner of Warner Bros. had called the moving picture “The 
New Ambassador of Good Will.” He suggested that sound films could “reach 
directly the heart and mind of the individual,” and he predicted that they 
could “contribute to abolishing war by engendering mutual understanding 
and empathy among the masses of every race and nation” (Weiss). By the 
following spring Olmstead was writing to colleagues that real “peace movies” 
were desperately needed, but she recognized that they were too expensive to 
be produced by peace organizations (Olmstead, letter to Fry).
In 1930 the film industry began to produce a series of antiwar films that 
appealed to an audience that was now disillusioned with World War I. The 
worldwide financial success of the book All Quiet on the Western Front by Erich 
Maria Remarque, a German veteran, led to an outpouring of similar “disil-
lusionist” books and films about the senseless tragedy and horror of modern 
warfare. Universal Pictures turned Remarque’s book into a powerful antiwar 
movie, released in the spring of 1930. Combining new sound technology with 
some fast-paced action editing, the film shocked audiences with its battlefield 
slaughter and its poignant conclusion. All Quiet on the Western Front played to 
Frederick Libby (left) of the National Council for the Prevention of War 
sends college students off to work for peace in their local communities 
after a summer institute at Duke University in 1934.
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packed houses around the world in 1930 and 1931 and was rereleased in 1934 
during the “merchants of death” hearings by Congress. An augmented version 
was released in the United States in September 1939, a shortened version was 
distributed worldwide in 1950 during the Korean War, and a color remake 
was produced in 1979 in the wake of the Vietnam War (Chambers, “All Quiet ”; 
Chambers and Schneider).
The awards and profits garnered by All Quiet on the Western Front demonstrat-
ed that such antiwar pictures, exciting as well as disillusioning, could produce 
major profits. Consequently, movie theaters between 1930 and 1934 were filled 
with disillusionist antiwar films both American and foreign, including Westfront 
1918 (Germany, 1930), distributed in America under such titles as Four from the 
Infantry and Drums of Doom; Journey’s End (England, 1930); Dawn Patrol (Warner 
Bros., 1930); and A Farewell to Arms (Paramount, 1932). Most popular with the 
peace and isolationist organizations were All Quiet on the Western Front and Broken 
Lullaby (Paramount, 1931). The latter, later retitled The Man I Killed, emphasized 
sorrow rather than action and centered on the guilt of a French poilu who killed 
a German soldier and later tried to make amends to the dead man’s family 
and sweetheart. The wave of disillusionist films ebbed by 1933–1934 with less 
well-known pictures such as The Eagle and the Hawk (1933), Ace of Aces (1933), 
and Crimson Romance (1934), many of which combined thrilling aerial combat 
with a condemnation of wartime slaughter and a plea for peace. So powerful 
was the disillusionist theme that it permeated many nonwar films as well, with 
references to the Depression’s unemployed veteran (the “forgotten man”).
ANTIWAR ORGANIZATIONS MOBILIZE
After the premiere of All Quiet on the Western Front in the spring of 1930, Mil-
dred Scott Olmstead began to create a list of films to recommend to WILPF 
members, and in 1931 she queried other peace-oriented organizations about 
their use of motion pictures. Their replies showed that they too saw movies as 
an important influence. The Federal Council of Churches, a liberal Protestant 
umbrella organization, reported that it had frequently protested against films 
with the “military spirit” (Gulick). Suffragist-pacifist Carrie Chapman Catt’s 
National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, a moderately conserva-
tive coalition of women’s organizations, had no film-related program, but Catt 
noted in a letter that “the moving picture is a tremendous education—a few 
times for good and a great many times for bad.” Most prominently, Libby’s 
NCPW had already recognized film’s potential for peace, compiling a list of 
short educational films that could be rented by local antiwar groups (“Educa-
tional Films”; “Motion Picture”).
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But as the antiwar organizations recognized, such limited efforts were 
inadequate. As a result, a gathering in 1930 hosted by the NCPW commis-
sioned a study by Raymond T. Rich, head of the World Peace Foundation. 
After consulting producers of newsreels and educational and feature films, 
Rich recommended that the peace organizations shift away from complaining 
about the films they did not like and begin active programs to promote and 
develop films that contributed to world peace. Rich suggested, for example, 
that peace organizations should have actively publicized All Quiet on the Western 
Front and urged their members to patronize its exhibitors. They had to dem-
onstrate that peace and antiwar films could be profitable. “The answer rests 
with box office receipts or other income,” Rich asserted, “for no business is 
more strictly business than is the motion picture business.”
“The field of visual education, as regards peace work, is practically un-
touched,” a WILPF executive concluded after the organization’s own survey. 
The reason was a lack of funds. “Until the peace organizations can supply the 
moving picture corporations with free reels depicting peace events, as the War 
Department now supplies them with free pictures depicting military manoeu-
vres,” a WILPF executive wrote, “we cannot do a great deal” ( Jones, letter to 
Schaffner). As a start, the WILPF established a Motion Picture Committee and 
began sending warnings to its members about newsreels or feature films that 
were particularly “militaristic.” It urged members to voice their disapproval of 
such films to local exhibitors as well as to Hollywood studios, but it also urged 
members to buy tickets for movies on the WILPF’s list of films “showing the 
cost, horrors, and futility of modern warfare” and those that portrayed what 
these pacifists called the “new patriotism,” which was “international rather 
than national” ( Jones, form letter; Springer).
The women’s peace organization took the campaign further in February 
1933 when Olmstead committed the WILPF to encouraging the production of 
motion pictures promoting international understanding and peace. In a letter 
to film distributors, she indicated that the WILPF would help them and local 
theater managers promote any film of an “antimilitaristic nature or any picture 
which would create a better understanding between nations.” The WILPF had 
already endorsed pictures that showed the common humanity between former 
enemies, among them G. W. Pabst’s German film Kameradschaft (1931), Ernst 
Lubitsch’s The Man I Killed (Paramount, 1932), and Frank Lloyd’s Cavalcade 
(20th Century-Fox, 1933) (Olmstead, letter to Goldman).3
The WILPF’s designation of Cavalcade  as an “antiwar” movie illustrates the 
complexity of categorizing films. Cavalcade, 20th Century-Fox’s Oscar-winning 
adaptation of a Noel Coward play, emphasizes disillusionment with the war and 
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its results, particularly the end of the old way of life among the two English 
generations it portrays. However, with a less preconceived antiwar view, the 
film could more accurately be seen as a fond if nostalgic portrayal of British 
society, and a picture that was more internationalist than pacifist.
The peace movement also made some films of its own. In 1932 the Peace 
Films Foundation, headed by Walter Niebuhr (related to theologian and social 
activist Reinhold Niebuhr), produced a five-reel educational sound film, Must 
War Be? According to Walter Niebuhr, the film, which focuses on the League of 
Nations, dramatically depicts the struggle “between the forces trying to orga-
nize permanent peace and those tending to perpetuate the war system.” It was 
shown to religious, educational, peace, and foreign policy groups throughout 
the Northeast. Olmstead praised the project. “It is through such popular forms,” 
she wrote to Niebuhr, “that we have to work to reach the millions of people 
who would not dream of attending a peace lecture. Yet these are the people 
who are the first to suffer in a war, and for many years after, and it is their 
votes which affect the most vital issues of war and peace. It is the mobilization 
psychology and the instinctive emotional reactions of the unthinking which 
must be changed if wars are to be averted.”
To bypass the film industry’s controlled distribution system, some peace 
Advertisement for Must War Be? This 
1932 peace film was shown in schools 
and churches.Sw
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advocates employed imaginative methods to bring antiwar and pro-peace films 
directly to the masses. The Peace Films Caravan was such an example. It was 
established by Francis Skillman Onderdonk, a religious pacifist of New York 
Dutch ancestry who taught architecture at the University of Michigan. Onder-
donk created a “peacemobile,” an automobile that he used to bring a traveling 
antiwar show to churches, clubs, fraternal organizations, schools, and colleges 
in half a dozen states in the early 1930s (“Biographical Sketch”).
In addition to lecturing and exhibiting devastating photographs from 
the war, this peace showman mounted a 16mm projector on top of his car, set 
up a ten-foot portable screen, and showed peace films at night in parks, town 
squares, campuses, and fairgrounds. All Quiet on the Western Front was initially 
his most popular film, even though Universal would only sell him the silent 
version.4 (Ironically, Onderdonk’s road show provided extended life for this 
silent version long after most American theaters had converted to sound 
or had closed their doors.) Several peace groups endorsed the Peace Films 
Caravan, which made nearly one hundred presentations to some seventeen 
thousand persons between 1930 and 1935 (Onderdonk, form letter to Dear 
Friend). Three peacemobiles brought antiwar films to an even larger audience 
in 1936 and 1937.
Although it excited the opponents of war, the flood of antiwar books and 
films between 1929 and 1934 dismayed others. The leadership of the American 
Legion, for example, denounced such works as distorted, “sentimental paci-
fism” and protested that they undermined patriotism and national defense 
(“Keeping Step” 28; “Real” 18). Some conservative civilian organizations sought 
to have them banned on the grounds that they were Communist propaganda. 
All Quiet on the Western Front was denounced by one conservative patriot as Com-
munist subversion that “undermines belief in the Army and in authority” and 
“will go far to raise a race of yellow streaks, slackers and disloyalists” (Pease; 
“Pease Porridge”). Despite calls from legionnaires to ban movies such as All 
Quiet on the Western Front, the American Legion’s headquarters ignored such 
films (“Sound Film”).
Even during the peak of the disillusionist antiwar films, Hollywood contin-
ued to churn out other pictures emphasizing the romance, excitement, and 
adventure of war and the military. Some dealt with World War I in sagas of love 
and glory with popular stars and upbeat endings, among them Hell’s Angels 
(Caddo, 1930), Today We Live (MGM, 1933), and Road to Glory (20th Century-
Fox, 1936). In addition, a slew of newsreel stories and feature films (dramas or 
even musicals) was made with the cooperation of the armed services. Although 
the peace organizations decried this cozy, self-serving relationship, recent 
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research indicates that there were often conflicting agendas, and the navy, at 
least, was not always cooperative with Hollywood (Suid, Guts and Sailing).
NEW THREATS TO WORLD PEACE
With the emergence of new threats to world peace in the early and mid-1930s, 
pacifists and isolationists were alerted to the possibility that the United States 
might face another foreign war. Mussolini’s fascist regime invaded Ethiopia 
in 1935, leading to a public outcry. The League of Nations proved ineffectual 
without the United States, but the Senate rejected even U.S. participation in 
the World Court. Consequently, a number of peace organizations, such as the 
WILPF, and peace-oriented isolationist bodies, such as the NCPW, joined in 
launching a nationwide Emergency Peace Campaign in 1936.
As part of the planning for the Emergency Peace Campaign the previous 
year, Frederick Libby of the NCPW had created a Motion Picture Department 
and hired Albert “Benny” Benham, an old Hollywood hand, to run it. Benham 
had worked at several Hollywood studios—United Artists, RKO-Pathé, and 
Paramount—in various capacities from script clerk to film editor, assistant 
director, and production manager. He had also served as vice president of an 
independent film production company. Libby explained the goal of the NCPW’s 
Mildred Scott Olmstead of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and  
Freedom, circa 1932. Sw
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Motion Picture Department in a form letter: “to lessen the great amount of 
militaristic propaganda in newsreels and features, and to increase the use of 
peace films.” Within a year, Benham had organized a national network of some 
two thousand persons connected with various organizations, newspapers, and 
magazines who would receive a biweekly newsletter, the NCPW’s Bulletin on 
Current Films. By labeling particular movies as pro- or antiwar, Benham sought 
to generate pacifist and isolationist pressures on exhibitors and studios (“Mili-
tarism” 118; Bromley; “Film Makers”).
One of the first feature films praised by the NCPW’s Motion Picture De-
partment was The President Vanishes (Paramount, 1935), produced by Walter 
Wanger. It portrays a cabal of American capitalists trying to whip up a mob 
spirit against the wishes of a pacifistic president in order to plunge the coun-
try into a European war and maximize their profits. However, the president 
pretends to be kidnapped and foils the conspirators’ plan. Castigated by con-
servatives, The President Vanishes was hailed by radicals and many liberals. The 
NCPW championed it as “a splendid peace document” that showed “how wars 
are made and who profits from them” (Bulletin on Current Films 22 June 1935: 
2).5 As with Cavalcade and many other films, The President Vanishes was open to 
different interpretations. Libby’s organization brought its own peace-oriented 
perspective to it, but Wanger was hardly a pacifist or even an isolationist. His 
ideological purpose was to address what he saw as the threat of fascism in the 
United States, and Wanger’s biographer indicates that the pacifist message 
had been added to the opening and closing purely as “bookends” to the film 
(Bernstein 97–102).
The threat to world order by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the beginning 
of German rearmament, and the increasing militarization of Japan coincided 
with a burst of Hollywood films that treated war as a just and exciting adven-
ture. Many of these movies were Kiplingesque melodramas, such as the highly 
popular Lives of a Bengal Lancer (Paramount, 1935), that glamorized the wars of 
the British Empire against threats to “civilization” in the nineteenth century.6 
Pacifist and isolationist organizations vigorously protested them. Assailing 
The Last Outpost (Paramount, 1935), which depicts “civilizing” British soldiers 
holding off onrushing hordes of “savage” Africans, the NCPW opined: “There 
is a strange similarity between the episodes in this film and Mussolini’s appar-
ent conception of his campaign in Abyssinia [Ethiopia]” (Bulletin on Current 
Films 20 Nov. 1935: 2). The Charge of the Light Brigade (Warner Bros., 1936) was 
a romantic swashbuckler, with Errol Flynn as a British cavalry officer leading 
successful charges against rebellious Afghans and expansionist Russians. The 
jingoistic, imperialistic nature of such films was obvious to the mainstream 
press as well as to antiwar organizations and came under considerable attack. 
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Not only did the NCPW protest them, but some of its chapters urged that the 
war-glorifying Charge of the Light Brigade be publicly boycotted (Bulletin on Cur-
rent Films 4 Dec. 1936: 2).
Opposing such films, the Emergency Peace Campaign expanded its 
own rating system, made more use of peace-oriented educational films, and 
increased its support for Frank Onderdonk’s Peace Films Caravan, which he 
billed as “not ‘another’ peace organization—rather [a] specialization in the 
visual techniques for peace” (Onderdonk, form letter to Dear Secretary; Peace 
Films Caravan brochure).7 Now with three peacemobiles, the Caravan was able 
to reach fourteen thousand people with presentations at fifty-six different high 
schools, colleges, churches, YMCAs, and union halls during the 1936–1937 
academic year (“Peace Councils”).
With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, a number of radical 
Frank Onderdonk (left) and associates with 
one of his three “peacemobiles” in 1936.Sw
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left-wing organizations joined with more moderate antiwar groups such as the 
WILPF and the NCPW to form the New Film Alliance to combat Hollywood’s 
production of films that were seen as hostile to peace and social justice. The 
organizational meeting in November 1936 included representatives of the 
YWCA, Federal Council of Churches, American Jewish Congress, New York 
branch of the WILPF, NCPW, National Student Federation, Teachers’ Union, 
National Negro Congress, and Communist-led American League Against War 
and Fascism (ALAWF).8 The Communists sought to control the organization 
and proposed to boycott not just offensive films but every film made by the 
studios that produced offensive films. This radical proposal worried Benham 
of the NCPW, who confided privately, “I do not think that such a move could 
be successful; and I think that if a movement, dominated by Communists, is set 
up to clean out films, Hollywood will retaliate by starting a campaign to glorify 
preparedness, etc., and to discredit the whole peace movement” (Benham, 
letter to Dale, 16 Nov. 1936).9
The mass boycott idea was dropped, and although Benham was appre-
hensive about Communist influence and the goals of the New Film Alliance, 
which were much broader than the prevention of war, the NCPW, WILPF, and 
Emergency Peace Campaign worked with the new organization, at least on 
issues of war and peace.10 In what they viewed as one of their major achieve-
ments, the NCPW and the New Film Alliance pressured 20th Century-Fox into 
canceling plans for The Siege of the Alcazar, a proposed celebration of a bloody 
victory by General Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War.11
In its attempt to keep the horrors of modern war in front of the public, 
the NCPW convinced owners of large, second-run movie theaters to show the 
full sound version of All Quiet on the Western Front during the Armistice Day 
holiday each year from 1935 to 1937. The showings filled the theaters, and 
local activists sometimes linked them to larger peace meetings (Benham, an-
nouncement card; Ohio State U Bureau of Educational Research Newsletter April 
1937: 3; Bulletin on Current Films 17 Nov. 1936: 2–3).
“The number of theatrical features like ALL QUIET is pitifully small,” 
Benham complained (letter to Dale, 25 Nov. 1936). Several newspaper col-
umnists, educators, and businesspeople joined the NCPW in advocating the 
production of more peace films and publicizing movies that they considered 
antiwar. Edgar Dale, director of the Bureau of Educational Research at Ohio 
State University, had published the results of a study emphasizing the influ-
ence of motion pictures, particularly on young people (Content ). In the 1930s 
he was also an activist in the Columbus, Ohio, chapter of the NCPW. Public 
opinion studies, he wrote to Benham, showed that there was strong public 
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interest in the production of peace films, antiwar movies, and pictures deal-
ing with relations among nations, races, and social groups (Dale, letter to 
Benham, 18 Dec. 1936).
“Motion picture producers have no mandate from the people for their 
overemphasis of war and violence on the screen,” Dale fumed. “On the contrary, 
the success of All Quiet on the Western Front, Cavalcade, and other peace movies 
shows that the reverse is true” (Dale, letter to Benham, [Feb.? 1937]).  Although 
many viewers undoubtedly appreciated the antiwar messages in the two films 
Dale cited, he ignored the fact that many other viewers had probably seen All 
Quiet as an exciting action movie, and others had enjoyed Cavalcade because of 
Noel Coward’s caustically witty dialogue and the film’s lavish Hollywood sets.
When Congress adopted a comprehensive neutrality act in May 1937, de-
signed to keep the United States out of foreign wars, the ad hoc Emergency 
Peace Campaign was ended because isolationists concluded that it had been a 
success. Traditional peace and isolationist organizations continued their own 
work, and during 1937 they expressed some optimism because antiwar films 
were being producing by two major studios—The Road Back (Universal, 1937) 
and They Gave Him a Gun (MGM, 1937). They were, however, disappointed in 
the final versions. Universal had miscast John King as the leading character 
in Erich Maria Remarque’s sequel, and MGM had watered down the powerful 
condemnation of war in William Joyce Cowan’s novel. Neither film fared well 
at the box office.
In response to pacifists’ and isolationists’ protests against newsreels glorify-
ing war and the military, managers at the newsreel companies in New York and 
Chicago countered that they were simply reporting current events, although 
they agreed to seek a reasonable balance. In Hollywood, studio executives re-
plied that their feature films were designed as entertainment, not propaganda.12 
Even studios that made antiwar films denied that they did so for propaganda 
purposes. They stressed the antiwar message to peace organizations and urged 
them to generate ticket sales among their members (Cochrane).
Isolationists and peace advocates had considerable success in obtaining 
Hollywood celebrity endorsements. They hailed Gary Cooper’s refusal to join 
the “Hollywood Hussars,” a quasi-military unit formed by pugnacious, British-
born actor Victor McLaglen, who starred in many jingoistic films. Even more 
helpful was Francis Lederer, a frequent male lead, who refused to star in a 
film glorifying war in 1935 and instead delivered more than eighty speeches 
on world peace to an estimated 100,000 people (Bulletin on Current Films 9 
July 1935: 1–2, 22 July 1935: 2). The NBC radio network carried a nationwide 
broadcast of the NCPW’s program “Women Want Peace” on 9 October 1935; 
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it was presided over by first lady Eleanor Roosevelt. To help finance the Emer-
gency Peace Campaign in 1936–1937, actresses Jean Muir and Anita Louise 
led off the purchase of “peace bonds.” Silent-era film star Lillian Gish began 
a public commitment against war that lasted until 1941, when she abandoned 
her opposition, claiming that she had been blacklisted for supporting the 
anti-interventionist AFC (Affron).
Clark Gable made a strong radio plea in October 1937 for the United 
States to keep out of war. The next month he starred in a radio play version 
of All Quiet on the Western Front (Bulletin on Current Films 18 Oct. 1937: 2). In 
October 1938 Swedish-born actress Greta Garbo, unmarried and retired, issued 
a statement that she would have no babies to be used as “cannon fodder.” Ad-
vocating a tactic used successfully by labor unions, Mary Pickford, also retired 
from stardom but still a successful businesswoman, called for women to refuse 
to work and to stage a universal “sit-down strike” in the event of war (Bulletin 
on Current Films 14 Oct. 1938: 3).
International tensions escalated in 1937 when Japan launched a war to 
conquer China. Many Americans condemned the savage aggression. Although 
Americans had long seen the United States as a special friend of China, they 
also viewed that country as continually plagued by floods, famines, bandits, 
warlords, and civil wars, a perspective shaped in part by Hollywood films from 
Movie stars Jean Muir (left) and Anita Louise buy “peace bonds” from 
Frederick Libby to help finance the NCPW’s peace campaign in 1936.
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Shanghai Express (Paramount, 1932) to The Good Earth (MGM, 1937). In 1937 
the horrors perpetrated by Japanese forces in the bloody siege of Shanghai 
and the “Rape of Nanking” were graphically displayed in newsreels in the 
United States (Fielding, American Newsreel  260). The NCPW believed that such 
images confirmed the terrible human costs of war and reinforced Americans’ 
disinclination to become involved in a land war in Asia. Antiwar activists were 
more concerned with the United States being drawn into a war in Europe.
SLOW RESPONSE TO THE NAZI MENACE
Rearmed and expansionist, Nazi Germany escalated its aggression dramatically 
in 1938 with the annexation of Austria and increased persecution of the Jews. 
On 9–10 November 1938—known as Kristallnacht, “the night of the broken 
glass”—German dictator Adolf Hitler let loose his thugs in a brutal campaign 
against the Jews of Germany. Hollywood studios had avoided any direct attack 
on the Nazi regime since Hitler took power in 1933, partly to avoid losing 
the lucrative German market, but in 1938 Hitler cut off their access to movie 
theaters in Germany (Vasey 155–56). American audiences were divided over 
the proper U.S. response to Nazi brutality. The newsreel companies could 
hardly avoid dealing with the repressive aspects of Hitler’s regime, and that 
year some began to focus on its evils, most prominently Henry Luce’s March 
of Time documentary Inside Nazi Germany (1938). The film showed an armed 
and regimented Germany preparing for aggression, but viewers differed over 
the nature of its message.13
With the public still divided over how the United States should respond 
to totalitarian expansion and repression, Hollywood remained reluctant to 
address the issue directly. In 1937–1938 the trade press debated what the film 
industry should do. From an antiwar perspective, Welford Beaton’s gadfly 
Hollywood Spectator asserted that the studios had both a moral obligation and 
an economic incentive to make films that reflected the widespread American 
sentiment for peace and isolationism (Bulletin on Current Films 15 Nov. 1937: 
1; 15 Mar. 1938: 2). Others suggested taking a stand against Nazism. Martin 
Quigley’s conservative and influential Motion Picture Herald countered repeat-
edly that propaganda had no place as a motive for motion pictures and that 
their sole purpose was to entertain (Bulletin on Current  Films 10 May 1938: 2–3). 
This was the position of most studio heads.
Although Hollywood remained aloof from the issues posed by Nazism, 
the film companies continued to churn out flag-waving, military service 
films—adventures, comedies, and musicals—much to the chagrin of the peace 
and isolationist movements (Dale, letter to Benham, 6 June 1936). But as 
210 / John Whiteclay Chambers II
President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a rearmament program in 1938, the 
armed forces adopted more stringent policies toward cooperating with film 
companies, demanding the right to control the way the military was portrayed. 
This new censorship policy angered the film industry as well as the antiwar 
movement.14 Antiwar activists were particularly incensed when the Army Air 
Corps pressured Paramount into eliminating all pacifist preachments in Wil-
liam Wellman’s saga of aviation, Men with Wings (1938), including dropping 
the original ending in which the heroine strongly denounces war (Bulletin on 
Current Films 2 June 1938: 1–2).
By 1938 it was becoming clear that the bloody Spanish Civil War (1936–
1939) was being lost by outgunned Loyalists defending the left-wing Republican 
government in Madrid against Franco’s right-wing forces supported by Nazi 
Germany and fascist Italy. Although the Loyalists were aided by Communists 
and left-wing groups from the Soviet Union and elsewhere, the Western de-
mocracies had declared neutrality; the resulting blockade of arms and other 
supplies hurt the Loyalists more than Franco’s fascist-supplied forces. Block-
ade (United Artists, 1938), Walter Wanger’s controversial Spanish Civil War 
drama, was touted by some as Hollywood’s first serious look at the challenge 
posed by the expansion of fascism. Henry Fonda played a peace-loving young 
Spanish farmer who takes up arms to defend his land and the elected govern-
ment against better-armed and brutal “militarists” who ruthlessly bomb towns 
and cities. The film ends with a plea by Fonda’s character for an end to the 
blockade, because the war in Spain is, he says, a new kind of war, a war against 
civilians: “Stop the murder of innocent people! The world can stop it! Where’s 
the conscience of the world?”15
In retrospect, the released version of Blockade is a rather mediocre melo-
drama. But at the time, even though the words fascists, Franco, Communists, 
and Loyalists were never mentioned (at the insistence of the Production Code 
Administration), the film intensified an ongoing and divisive debate over the 
Spanish Civil War. The New Film Alliance as well as many Communists and 
many left-leaning liberal internationalists applauded the film. But many Roman 
Catholics and conservatives attacked it because they supported Franco’s nation-
alists against the anticlerical, anticapitalist actions of Madrid. The Knights of 
Columbus, Legion of Decency, and Catholic Youth Organization denounced 
the film as “Marxist propaganda” and picketed exhibitors.
Many saw in Blockade what they wanted to see. Although contending that 
it might have been stronger in some places, the NCPW effused that, “just as it 
is, ‘Blockade’ is head and shoulders above any anti-war movie that has been 
made since ‘All Quiet on the Western Front.’ It strikes so loud a note not only 
in its cry against war but in its plea that the screen fulfills a mission deeper than 
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mere entertainment” (Bulletin on Current Films 20 June 1938: 1–2). This was 
certainly not what writer John Howard Lawson and producer Walter Wanger 
had intended. Lawson and Wanger were not antiwar but antifascist; they wanted 
to help the Loyalists win the war (Bernstein 129–38).
CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES
The brutality of the Nazi regime in Germany and the threat of expanding fas-
cism in Europe led a growing number of Americans, though still a minority, 
to urge the United States to take an active role abroad where moral issues as 
well as national interests were involved. In January 1939 President Roosevelt 
raised the possibility of boycotting what he called “aggressor governments.” 
Hitler occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and increased 
his demands on Poland.
Film industry spokesman Will Hays announced a change in Hollywood’s 
policy in January 1939, conceding that pure entertainment might not be 
enough with the world in such crisis. The film industry, he said, had a respon-
sibility to inform, not just entertain, the public. Beginning in 1939 Warner 
Bros. decided to make an army and a navy picture and half a dozen others 
with patriotic significance in the next two years, and other studios joined this 
“Americanism” campaign. Exhibitors started to play the national anthem at 
the top of each show. Some antiwar groups hoped that the campaign would 
emphasize democracy and the threat war posed to it, rather than the kind of 
flag-waving patriotism that, they feared, could easily become war fever (Bulletin 
on Current Films 20 Feb. 1939: 2).
As the studios produced a larger number of patriotic films, new antiwar films 
became increasingly rare. The most important antiwar film, French director Jean 
Renoir’s La Grande Illusion (1937), was released in a subtitled version mainly in 
art houses on the East and West coasts in 1938 (Bulletin on Current Films 14 Oct. 
1938: 4; 10 Jan. 1939: 3). In addition, the NCPW designated Idiot’s Delight (MGM, 
1939) an antiwar picture. An adaptation of Robert Sherwood’s stage play set in 
a hotel on the Swiss border at the outbreak of World War II (Bulletin on Current 
Films 14 Mar. 1939: 2), Idiot’s Delight can more accurately be characterized not 
as antiwar but as an early challenge to Hitlerism by Hollywood.
The NCPW vigorously protested the growing tendency of American news-
reels and feature films to create a war spirit by stirring up fear. In a letter to 
Will Hays, Albert Benham referred to half a dozen films, especially Confessions 
of a Nazi Spy (Warner Bros., 1939), that overemphasized the extent of Nazi 
espionage in the United States (Bulletin on Current Films 10 Jan. 1939: 2–3). A 
lesser-known film was Espionage Agent (Warner Bros., 1939), a domestic thriller 
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in which an American peace group is depicted as a Nazi front organization. 
Although Warner Bros. took the lead, it was some time before other studios 
began to make such stridently anti-Nazi films. Yet, even as the NCPW issued 
its warning against increasingly interventionist productions, it announced in 
October 1939 the closure of its Motion Picture Department, which was ap-
parently no longer considered a viable voice (Bulletin on Current Films 26 Oct. 
1939: 1).
EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICA FIRST COMMITTEE
The start of World War II in September 1939, and especially the German con-
quest of France and the bombing of Britain in the summer of 1940, began a 
shift in American opinion and launched a major debate over U.S. policy. The 
story of the isolationist-interventionist debate of 1939–1941 is an oft-told tale 
(see Langer and Gleason, Challenge and Undeclared; Divine; Cole, America and 
Roosevelt; Doenecke, Storm). New interventionist groups such as the Committee 
to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and Fight for Freedom were formed to 
mobilize sentiment in favor of assisting Britain and eventual U.S. intervention. 
Among antiwar groups, the internationalist peace movement saw membership 
plunge; isolationist support eroded more slowly but steadily.
Seeking to halt the decline, a diverse body of isolationists joined a new, ad 
hoc anti-interventionist coalition, the America First Committee, established in 
September 1940. Dominated by conservative, Republican elites, the new orga-
nization also drew on a wide range of support, including, for different reasons, 
some liberals and even a number of radicals on the Left. Largely isolationist 
and anti-Roosevelt, its leadership feared both the foreign and the domestic 
impact of U.S. entry into the war (Cole, America; Doenecke, In Danger). The 
AFC was headed by Robert Wood, chairman of Sears Roebuck, and it drew 
its greatest popular support from the Midwest. Although President Roosevelt 
and the interventionist organizations were the main targets of the AFC, it also 
focused on companies producing newsreels and feature films that seemed to 
be preparing Americans for war. In July 1941 the AFC created a list of such 
films, among them The Great Dictator (Chaplin, United Artists, 1940), Foreign 
Correspondent (Wanger, United Artists, 1940), The Mortal Storm (MGM, 1940), 
and That Hamilton Woman (Korda, United Artists, 1941); later that summer it 
called for boycotts of theaters showing such films.
Despite the flood of interventionist films after 1939, some of the most 
popular antiwar films continued to be shown. All Quiet on the Western Front was 
rereleased in September 1939, augmented with a new preamble that was anti-
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Nazi but also promised that “there shall be no blackout of peace in America!”16 
It played at theaters throughout the winter of 1939–1940 (Motion Picture Herald 
28 Oct. 1939: 70; 2 Dec. 1939: 73). Indeed, All Quiet on the Western Front stayed 
in circulation as late as April 1942, when protests led to its withdrawal (Glass-
man; Director).
To counter the horrible image of ground warfare portrayed so vividly in All 
Quiet on the Western Front, Warner Bros. produced two films that provided a more 
positive view of World War I. Although scholars differ on whether The Fighting 
69th (1940) and Sergeant York (1941) were preparedness productions, my own 
reading is that they were messages of support for a military buildup and ultimately 
for U.S. entry into the war against Germany.17 They certainly were celebrated by 
interventionists and decried by anti-interventionists at the time.
Desperate to counter the increasing support among the mass media and the 
entertainment industry for the United States’ movement toward war, the most 
extreme isolationists in Congress and the AFC decided to launch an attack on 
the major Hollywood studios, accusing them of unduly influencing Americans 
through pro-Allied propaganda. The resulting 1941 investigation by a Senate 
Antiwar, anti-Hollywood postcard, 
circa 1939–1941.
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subcommittee has been described by a number of historians. The records of the 
three antiwar organizations examined here indicate that the AFC, supported 
by the NCPW but not the WILPF, was responsible for that assault.18
BATTLE ON CAPITOL HILL
The AFC planned, initiated, and supported the attack on Hollywood. In Au-
gust 1941 the head of its New York chapter, John T. Flynn, a former columnist 
for the liberal New Republic who had turned against Roosevelt’s domestic and 
foreign policies, urged isolationist Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D-Mont.) and 
the AFC’s executive committee to expose “collaboration between the film 
magnates and the government to whip up [war] propaganda” (Flynn, letter 
to Wheeler; Flynn, letters to Wood).19 With AFC encouragement, Wheeler 
appointed an investigating subcommittee cochaired by isolationists D. Worth 
Clark (D-Idaho) and Gerald P. Nye (R-N.D.).20
Recent scholarship has shown that a number of the major film studios were 
consciously producing movies designed to emphasize the Nazi menace and 
encourage support for those nations fighting against it; in addition, the studios 
and newsreel companies were privately being encouraged to do so—actively by 
the British government, and cautiously by the Roosevelt administration (see 
Birdwell; Brewer; Cull; Mahl; Steele). But motion pictures were only one of 
the many foreign and domestic forces affecting the shift in American public 
opinion. Even more quickly than members of Congress, the American people 
recognized the magnitude of the Nazi threat and supported those nations 
fighting against it, although they continued to hope that American troops 
would not need to be sent overseas.21
The Senate hearings of September 1941 failed to demonstrate any con-
nection between the film industry and the government. They failed partly 
because of the ineptitude of the isolationist majority on the subcommittee 
and partly because of the skill of the studio heads and their spokesman, for-
mer GOP presidential nominee Wendell L. Willkie.22 But the primary cause 
of their failure—indeed, their collapse—was the charge of anti-Semitism. The 
hearings and the AFC itself were attacked and largely discredited by Willkie 
and the press, which charged, not without some basis, that they were engaged 
in a scheme to focus on foreign-born Jews in the motion picture industry as 
unduly influencing public opinion.23
Willkie’s charges gained credibility with the public when aviator Charles 
Lindbergh, at an AFC rally in Iowa on 11 September 1941, declared that the 
United States was being pushed toward war by the Roosevelt administration, 
the British, and the Jews. Lindbergh depicted Jewish Americans as a powerful 
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alien group that was acting against the interests of the United States (Berg 
425–28).24 Although Lindbergh’s anti-Semitic remarks reflected the privately 
held views of some of the more reactionary anti-interventionists, they were 
condemned by many pacifists, isolationists, anti-interventionists, and, of 
course, interventionists.25 They threw the entire antiwar movement into dis-
array (“Senate Isolationists” 21, 25; “Hollywood in Washington” 13; Straight 
363; Moffitt 1).
Less than two months later, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended 
the debate over intervention and brought the United States into World War II. 
The Senate subcommittee disbanded without issuing a report. Motion pictures 
would play an important role in the war, helping to forge national consent 
for wartime policies and build a public culture with a unity and reach never 
achieved before or afterward.
Without resuming the partisan debate of the 1930s, it should now be possible, 
with most of the relevant archives open, to explore more fully and fruitfully 
Gerald Nye (second from left) and Bennett Champ Clark (right) were among the 
sponsors of the Senate investigation of Hollywood propaganda in 1941. In this ear-
lier photograph, they and fellow isolationist senators Arthur Vandenburg (left) and 
Homer Bone (second from right) celebrate the passage of neutrality legislation.
Sw
ar
th
m
o
re
 C
o
ll
eg
e 
P
ea
ce
 C
o
ll
ec
ti
o
n
216 / John Whiteclay Chambers II
the relationships among the antiwar and interventionist movements, motion 
pictures, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the interwar era. The stan-
dard narrative emphasizes the shortsightedness and negativity of pacifists and 
isolationists, who are generally linked with anti-interventionists. It also stresses 
the timidity of Hollywood, which only belatedly began to alert Americans to 
the dangers posed by Nazi Germany.
The present study, like some other recent scholarship,26 indicates that the 
story is more complex. The antiwar movement, for example, did not simply 
bemoan what were considered war-mongering films. And despite the 1941 
diatribes of some anti-interventionist extremists such as Lindbergh and Nye, 
the antiwar movement did not, for the most part, employ anti-Semitic tactics 
against Hollywood. Instead, throughout much of the 1930s, the peace and 
isolationist movements, unlike the anti-interventionist America First Commit-
tee of 1940–1941, sought to use motion pictures in a positive manner. They 
employed antiwar movies and educational films in imaginative ways, such as 
peacemobile caravans and annual Armistice Day showings, to reinforce their 
messages. Rather than trying to foster animosity toward the film industry, the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and, for most of the 
period, the National Committee for the Prevention of War, unlike the America 
First Committee, tried to work with studios, distributors, and exhibitors, en-
couraging profitable nonchauvinistic motion pictures to educate the public 
in the interest of peace.
A related question, of course, is whether Hollywood could make films that 
explored larger issues or clarified policy choices in an educated, sophisticated 
manner. Most of the antiwar films of the early 1930s merely encouraged excite-
ment and revulsion against the horrors of warfare. Few of them explored in 
any depth the causes of wars or the moral issues raised by aggression. When 
Hollywood eventually became committed to the anti-Nazi cause in 1939–1941, 
the studios again produced rather simplistic, one-sided propaganda, this time 
in support of war. Admittedly, the chances for more complex explorations ei-
ther way were slim, not merely because of external forces, such as propaganda 
connections with the British, but more importantly because of a system that 
encouraged the use of generic plot structures. Hollywood was geared toward 
producing entertaining, moneymaking movies for a wide audience, not pro-
viding sophisticated education for the public.
It was widely believed at the time that motion pictures influenced public 
attitudes, but it was not clear how. The present study shows some of the ways 
pressure groups sought to filter films and interpret their meaning to their 
members. Research on spectatorship has emphasized the degree to which 
viewers bring their own preconceptions to the theater. These preconceptions 
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are sometimes shaped by ideological organizations. That helps explain why, as 
shown in this study, radically different messages can be, and often are, derived 
from the same film.
In the interwar period, leaders of the peace, isolationist, and anti- 
interventionist movements tried to actively influence the way motion pictures 
affected the public’s attitudes about war and peace. They did so in various ways. 
The traditional view of the antiwar movement and the film industry between 
the two world wars has ignored the significant diversity among the groups and 
their attitudes and policies with regard to war and the movies. The dominant 
perspective has focused on vigorous anti-Hollywoodism, culminating in the 
abominable anti-Semitic accusations that accompanied the Senate hearings of 
September 1941. But as my study has shown, exclusive focus on that deplor-
able episode distorts the larger and longer relationship between the antiwar 
movement—especially the peace and peace-oriented movements—and mo-
tion pictures. Wider research and broader perspectives have revealed more 
positive attitudes about movies and the film industry and active attempts to 
use the new technology of “talking pictures” to steer public opinion toward a 
culture of world peace.
NOTES
1. The organizations’ attitudes and actions with regard to motion pictures are 
ignored in their institutional histories, which focus on other, admittedly main, aspects 
of their agendas. For a discussion of the recent literature on interventionism and the 
film industry, see Chambers, “Movies.”
2. See, for example, the recent collection of essays in Schneider and Wagener.
3. Some motion picture executives and theater owners responded to the WILPF’s 
campaigns by seeking the women’s endorsement for films with pacifist or antiwar 
themes. Despite several entreaties, the WIPLF declined to endorse any films between 
March 1933 and October 1934. However, at the end of 1934 it gave enthusiastic sup-
port to two new antiwar films: The First World War, a documentary based on Laurence 
Stallings’s book of the same title, and The Man Who Reclaimed His Head, a feature film 
starring Claude Rains as a pacifist writer who struggles against manipulation by capitalist 
munitions makers trying to use him for their own selfish purposes.
4. Onderdonk’s program usually began with a thirty-minute sound film, The Next 
War, about the evolution of increasingly lethal weaponry. He also showed three short 
silent films—The Zeppelin Raid on London, The League of Nations, and New York’s 1934 Peace 
Parade  —followed by the silent version of All Quiet on the Western Front (Onderdonk, 
form letter to Dear Sir).
5. Two years earlier, Wanger had produced a somewhat similar political allegory and 
fantasy, Gabriel Over the White House (MGM/Cosmopolitan, 1933), involving conspirato-
rial forces seeking to block a U.S. president from achieving peace and justice.
6. The Motion Picture Herald, a trade journal for exhibitors, expressed the connection 
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as follows: “The thunder of hob-nailed marching feet of Mussolini’s Italian infantrymen 
. . . echoes with the roar of bombing planes from Abyssinia across 3,000 miles of ocean 
and then 3,000 miles of land, and Hollywood is listening” (“Hollywood Starts” 18).
 7. When Universal Pictures rejected his request for the sound version of All Quiet 
on the Western Front, Onderdonk continued to show the silent version, but in 1936 he 
began to emphasize the “talkies” he had, including The Man I Killed. In 1937 his other 
feature sound films included Dealers in Death, four reels on munitions makers and the 
international arms trade, and Drums of Doom (Four Infantrymen from the Western Front in 
1918 ), an English-dubbed, seven-reel version of G. W. Pabst’s Westfront 1918.
 8. American Communists joined with reformist groups in establishing the New 
Film Alliance as part of the Communist Party’s Popular Front policy of cooperating to 
oppose fascism during this period.
 9. Benham did not allow the New Film Alliance to control the NCPW’s Bulletin 
on Current Films; consequently, the New Film Alliance published its own weekly cinema 
bulletin, Film Survey.
10. The WILPF also worried about Communists in its own and other peace 
organizations—ideologically, because the Communists did not oppose all wars, and 
politically, because Communist members made the organization vulnerable. Yet the 
WILPF worked with organizations that were Communist influenced or even dominated, 
such as the American League Against War and Fascism, because of their larger member-
ship. This was true until 1937, when the WILPF broke with the ALAWF to work with 
the isolationist Keep America Out of War Congress, which relied on pacifist, labor, and 
socialist support rather than the Communist Party.
11. Joseph M. Schenck, president of United Artists, credited the NCPW and the 
New Film Alliance with Fox’s cancellation of The Siege of the Alcazar. Fox had received 
nearly four thousand letters of protest (Benham, letter to Dale, 28 Nov. 1936).
12. An executive of the March of Time series assured an isolationist Ohio manufac-
turer that the preparedness emphasis in a newsreel about the Spanish Civil War would 
be matched by a new release on the Sino -Japanese War that included a strong protest 
against U.S. involvement by House leader Bennett Champ Clark (de Rochemont).
13. Some active anti-Fascists such as Dorothy Thompson applauded Inside Nazi 
Germany as an appropriate attack on the German regime, but others denounced it. 
The Warner brothers banned it from their four hundred theaters because they said it 
appeared to be “pro-Nazi,” given its use of German propaganda footage, even though 
the narration condemned Nazism (Bulletin on Current Films 5 Feb. 1938: 1–3).
14. In an editorial reprinted in the Bulletin on Current Films, the editors of the New 
York–based trade journal Box Office declared that the military’s new policy suggested 
“a very definite warning that the move is launched to smack a military censorship on 
peacetime enterprise.” The motion picture industry, Box Office warned, “should seri-
ously watch its step to the end that it is not unwittingly caught in the meshes of rabid 
jingoism” (“New Brand” 1–2).
15. Blockade  was the first film to take a stand on the Spanish Civil War, but it was not 
the first to use it as a setting. The Last Train from Madrid, made by Paramount a year earlier 
(1937), was a thin melodrama set amidst the flight of civilians from the war zone.
16. Director Lewis Milestone later wrote that he had been appalled by the 1939 
version, which he saw as Universal’s response to isolationist sentiment.
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17. Daniel J. Leab (“Viewing the War”) asserts that The Fighting 69th and Sergeant 
York were not primarily designed to stimulate sentiment for war, as suggested by Bas-
inger (98) and Sklar (99, 105). Leab develops this argument further in “The Fighting 
69th: An Ambiguous Portrait of Isolationism/Interventionism.” My own view of these 
two films is that, although they did not praise war and even included some gestures to 
the still strong isolationist sentiment in the United States, they reversed the pessimistic 
emotional position of antiwar films that had portrayed the war’s senselessness and its 
breaking of the human spirit. Instead, the films of 1940 and 1941 emphasized the need 
for a patriotic willingness to do one’s duty for the nation and a view of combat that 
highlighted bravery, courage, camaraderie, and even redemptive glory. Granted, Warner 
Bros.’ primary aim was to earn a profit, and it made a handsome one, particularly on 
Sergeant York. But preparing the country to fight the Nazis was another important motive 
behind both films. The latest study of Warner Bros. agrees that Sergeant York became an 
interventionist vehicle for the studio and for Alvin York himself (Birdwell 131–53).
18. In fact, both the NCPW and the WILPF cooperated with the AFC beginning in 
the winter of 1940–1941, and they received some financial support from it (Doenecke, 
In Danger  59n). But only the NCPW supported the assault on Hollywood and its leaders. 
See Libby, letter to Stuart [AFC’s founder], and Detzer [WILPF’s lobbyist].
19. See also the confidential memorandum to members of the executive commit-
tee of the AFC. For Flynn’s plan, see Flynn, letter to Stuart. Earlier, Flynn had been 
research director for Senator Gerald Nye’s 1934 hearings on profits of the munitions 
industry during World War I, and he continued to be concerned with oligopoly, 
profiteering, and interventionism. The Scripps-Howard chain continued to publish his 
column after the New Republic dropped it in November 1940. See Doenecke, In Danger 
16; Stenehjem; Moser, Right Turn. AFC chairman Robert Wood later disingenuously 
wrote to an executive of Columbia Pictures that the Senate investigation was in no way 
sponsored by the AFC.
20. Wheeler, chair of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, introduced 
Senate Resolution No. 152, 77th Cong., 1st sess., on 1 Aug. 1941, to authorize the 
investigation. The full Senate was never given the chance to vote on the resolution. 
Instead, Wheeler simply appointed an investigating subcommittee. In an otherwise 
well-researched account, Steele, in Propaganda in an Open Society (65), misidentifies the 
cosponsor of the resolution as D. Worth Clark. Clark, an Idaho Democrat, was made 
cochair of the subcommittee, but Wheeler’s cosponsor of the resolution was actually 
Senator Bennett Champ Clark (D-Mo.). 
21. In a Gallup poll at the end of June 1941, 79 percent of respondents said that 
they would vote to stay out of the European war. Although that question was not used 
again by Gallup, when Americans were asked in October and November 1941 which 
was more important—that the United States keep out of war or that Germany be 
defeated—only 32 percent said that it was more important to stay out of war, and 68 
percent said that it was more important that Germany be defeated.
22. Nye and other isolationists on the subcommittee admitted that they had not 
seen the films they were condemning as propagandistic; their hostile questions were 
also offset by the lone interventionist on the committee, freshman senator Ernest Mc-
Farland (D-Ariz.). Industry leaders testifying included Barney Balaban of Paramount, 
Nicholas Schenck of Loew’s, Darryl Zanuck of 20th Century-Fox, and Harry Warner 
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of Warner Bros. Warner, in the most quoted testimony, asserted that his company’s 
films were not anti-American propaganda but were accurate and patriotic and that the 
American public should see the truth about Hitler and Nazism (U.S. Congress 57–60, 
91–116, 213–66, 338–48, 337–92, 427–31).
23. Indeed, Robert S. Allen, coauthor with Drew Pearson of the widely syndicated 
column “The Washington Merry-Go-Round,” reported confidentially to the intervention-
ist group Fight for Freedom before the hearings began, “The whole movie affair is part 
of a deliberate anti-Semitic campaign” to reinvigorate the flagging anti-interventionist 
movement. “I heard on the Hill yesterday that this was deliberately cooked up for 
the double purpose of terrorizing the Jews, on one hand to keep them from active 
participation in the anti-isolationist fight and on the other to arouse public prejudice 
against the interventionist cause on the Jew angle. This is one of the most sinister and 
vicious schemes yet undertaken by the isolationists and I think that the FFF ought to 
hit very hard with the biggest speaker it can get to do the job. . . . The whole purpose 
of these so-called hearings will be to drag up Jews in the movie industry and parade 
them across the headlines.”
The AFC’s main attack was clearly against the motion picture industry for present-
ing, as Nye said in the hearings, “one-sided” propaganda. However, there were some anti-
interventionists in the AFC and in Congress who were willing to play on anti-Semitism, 
most notoriously Charles Lindbergh and Gerald Nye. In a major radio address to an 
AFC rally in St. Louis on 1 August 1941, Nye declared that motion picture companies 
had “become the most gigantic engines of propaganda in existence to rouse the war 
fever in America and plunge this Nation to her destruction.” He named the heads of 
the eight largest film studios as the responsible parties. Although Nye talked about the 
studios’ economic connections to Britain and the number of British actors working 
in Hollywood, his recital of the names of seventeen men who were either Jewish or 
had Jewish-sounding names (Darryl Zanuck was Protestant), as well as his emphasis 
on their immigrant origins from central and eastern Europe, indicates a clear appeal 
to the strong current of anti-Semitism in the United States in the 1930s. Although 
the list of names is the same, some of the remarks in the printed version (Nye) differ 
from the broadcast version transcribed by a stenographer hired by Fight for Freedom 
(“Senator Gerald”). In describing his plan for the hearing, John T. Flynn thought it 
would help publicize the AFC’s case about Hollywood propaganda; he did not know 
whether “the movie moguls” would agree to come to the hearing. “But in any case, 
it will obtain our objective in focusing attention on the movies and on them” (Flynn, 
letter to Stuart). At the hearing, Nye emphasized the oligopolistic nature of the film 
industry, dominated by the “big eight” firms, rather than emphasizing the names of 
their leaders. This and a debate over the issue of anti-Semitism can be seen in U.S. Con-
gress 14–22, 26–29, 67–69. For an attempted defense of Senator Nye against charges of 
anti-Semitism, see Shapiro. Moser, in “‘Gigantic Engines,’” seeks unsuccessfully (in my 
view) to shift the Senate subcommittee’s main motivation from anti-interventionism 
and an anti-Semitic “witch hunt” to an ongoing effort by progressive insurgents against 
“the increasing corporatization of society” and in favor of greater regulation of the 
motion picture industry.
24. Two days after his radio address, Lindbergh returned to New York City and 
went to see Sergeant York. He noted in his diary that it was “good propaganda for war— 
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glorification of war, etc. However, I do not think a picture of this type is at all objec-
tionable and dangerous.” The next day he left for his home on Martha’s Vineyard, still 
believing, despite the public outcry, that he had spoken “carefully and moderately” in 
Iowa (Lindbergh 538–39).
25. Anti-interventionists were divided on the issue, but many of them, particularly 
in conservative circles, had been privately condemning Jewish interventionists for some 
time. Anti-interventionist Joseph P. Kennedy, U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, had 
warned studio executives in November 1940 that they, and particularly the Jews among 
them, would be in jeopardy because of their propagandistic war films (Fairbanks). 
For Kennedy’s anti-interventionism, see Kennedy 221–508. For condemnation of 
Lindbergh’s anti-Semitic remarks within the antiwar, isolationist, and anti-interventionist 
movements, see Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh 171–85, and Doenecke, In Danger  37–40. In 
the second week of October 1941, the Gallup poll asked, “What persons or groups do 
you think are most active in trying to get us into war?” Listed in decreasing order of 
frequency were the Roosevelt administration and the Democratic Party; big business 
and profiteers; British organizations and agents; American groups with pro-British 
sympathies; and Jews. The most frequently mentioned individuals or groups “trying 
to keep us out of war” were Charles Lindbergh, Burton Wheeler, and Gerald Nye; 
America First Committee; Roosevelt administration; Nazi agents and fifth columnists; 
and church groups (Gallup 302–3).
26. See, for example, Felicia Herman’s “Hollywood, Nazism, and the Jews, 1933–
1941,” which reveals how Hollywood films indirectly attacked Nazism before 1938. 
Herman acknowledges that the studios avoided explicitly anti-Nazi films for most of the 
1930s, but she contends that one of the many reasons was the fear by Jewish organizations 
that films that overtly condemned Nazism or directly defended Jewry would intensify the 
growing anti-Semitism. The 1941 Senate hearings raised the charge that Jews controlled 
Hollywood and were interventionists and propagandists. But instead of seizing on that 
accusation, the American press and much of the public repudiated it. See also Gabler 
338 – 47. Todd Bennett places Will Hays, the head of the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors Association, rather than the studio heads, at the center of Hollywood’s shift 
to anti-Nazi films beginning in 1939. Bennett contends that Hays asked for the Roosevelt 
administration’s help in reopening the British market, since London had frozen the 
American studios’ assets there to help the British balance of payments. In return for 
the administration’s success in getting the British government to unfreeze those assets 
a year at a time, Hays relaxed his previous ban on interventionist films, such as those 
directly attacking Nazism. Thus, London made an economic sacrifice to gain a political 
objective: increasing interventionist propaganda in the United States.
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THE B MOVIE GOES TO WAR IN 
HITLER, BEAST OF BERLIN
10 / Cynthia J. Miller
During the 1930s, the neighborhood movie house was a place of refuge for 
many. The pressures and strains of the world vanished amidst the laughter, 
thrills, and chills of the golden era of the B movie. In the world outside, 
people were weighed down by the burdens of the era—memories of family, 
friends, and neighbors who had died in World War I; the effects of the Great 
Depression; and the strife of the Spanish Civil War. But once they were behind 
those movie house doors, the tensions of everyday life melted away, as the Bs 
brought low-budget action, suspense, comedy, and melodrama into the lives of 
the moviegoing public. With a shriek, a pratfall, or a fiendish glare, B movies 
served up extra helpings of escapism; however, by the end of the decade, the 
boundaries between the world of the cinema and the world outside began to 
erode. The question of whether to become involved, once again, in Europe’s 
recurring struggles was beginning to creep into popular thought, and as the 
conflicts in Europe and Asia escalated, the film industry once again engaged 
with the more serious affairs of the world.
Hollywood’s “Poverty Row,” known for its quick, low-budget B productions 
pandering to the desire for over-the-top entertainment, produced a small 
film, Hitler, Beast of Berlin (1939), that played a striking role in the national 
tug-of-war over military preparedness. While other films of the interwar era 
whispered words of fear or caution in the ears of American moviegoers, Beast 
of Berlin screamed—it mocked, shocked, and menaced in defiance of the 
Third Reich. Dismissed by critics as an artistic flop but a masterful work of 
propaganda (Crowther; Morrison; Thirer), Beast of Berlin combined images 
of life inside the Third Reich and slap-in-the-face, exploitation-style public 
relations to create one of the first blatantly interventionist films of the prewar 
years, and also one of the first to openly cast the Nazi regime in a villainous 
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light. The film brought vivid, tangible oppression onto the screen and into 
the lives of theatergoers.
Produced by Ben Judell, Hitler, Beast of Berlin was one of the inaugural 
efforts of the small, independent Producers Distributing Corporation (PDC; 
renamed Producers Releasing Corporation in 1943), infamous for its low 
production standards and sensationalism. When the joint German and Soviet 
invasion of Poland in September 1939 produced widespread concern in Hol-
lywood, Judell’s low-budget studio was one of the first to act, and it did so in 
sensationalist form, setting aside other projects to rush into the production of 
Hitler, Beast of Berlin, based on the novel and screenplay Goose Step by Broadway 
producer-director Shepard Traube. In line with the studio’s lowbrow dedication 
to “high entertainment and exploitation values” (Fernett 99), Judell changed 
The press kit for Hitler, 
Beast of Berlin urges the-
ater owners to promote 
the film “boldly, and 
without reservation.”Cy
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the title to the more dynamic Hitler, Beast of Berlin, hoping to capitalize on 
the notoriety of the 1918 film The Kaiser: Beast of Berlin, which, during the 
previous worldwide struggle, had incited American audiences to anti-German 
riots in several cities. Subsequently the PDC project became Beasts of Berlin, 
but as public sentiment mounted in favor of the Allied cause, the Hitler title 
was reinstated and shouted at audiences from marquees and lobby posters. 
At the time of its official release (15 October 1939), Beast of Berlin was a “hot” 
item, regardless of its B status. Cited as prowar, inflammatory, and offensive 
to Germany, it was quickly shut down by the Production Code Administration 
and censorship boards in several states. After a month of editing, it reopened 
to reviewer praise as the first fiction feature to depict the terrors of life inside 
the Third Reich.
HOLLYWOOD AND INTERVENTION
Before 1936, the idea of meddling in world affairs was a complex and unpopu-
lar one, and it would continue to be so until it became clear that American 
involvement was unavoidable. At home, pressures and tensions ran high. 
The German-American Bund, with about twenty-five thousand dues-paying 
members, carried out a high-profile, often volatile campaign for neutrality, 
while influential figures such as pro-German aviator Charles Lindbergh and 
Senator Gerald Nye (R-Ohio) would soon create and support the nation’s most 
powerful isolationist group, the America First Committee. By 1937 the politi-
cal lines were drawn. On one side, President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned 
in his “quarantine” speech (15 October 1937): “If those things [war] come to 
pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape” 
(Akers 81). On the other side, Senator Nye spoke for the isolationists: “There 
can be no objection to any hand our government may take which strives to 
bring world peace to the world so long as that hand does not take 130,000,000 
people into another world death march. I very much fear that we are once 
again being caused to feel that the call is upon America to police a world that 
chooses to follow insane leaders. . . . Once again we are baited to thrill to a 
call to save the world” (Akers 81–82).
With the formal outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the de-
bate in the art, literature, and film communities took a more tangible form. 
Roosevelt still publicly pledged neutrality, but the Hollywood community was 
becoming a hotbed of debate between isolationists and interventionists (Bird-
well; Ross; Alpers). While Popular Front groups such as the Hollywood Anti-Nazi 
League used demonstrations, weekly radio shows, and their own newspapers to 
establish a public voice against neutrality, much of the Hollywood Left believed 
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that the Soviet Union was aligned with the world’s democracies against fascism 
and resisted U.S. action toward the Stalin regime. But in 1939, when Hitler 
signed a nonaggression pact with Stalin and invaded Poland, the Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee (with such prominent members as writers Dashiell Ham-
mett and Lillian Hellman) rapidly transformed into the Hollywood League 
for Democratic Action.
Economic factors complicated Hollywood’s position as well. As Allen 
Rostron points out, the advance of fascism and the outbreak of war in Europe 
offered enticing subject matter for films: “Wars have obvious dramatic po-
tential, and the studios knew a story ‘ripped from the headlines’ could draw 
audiences” (85). At the same time, studios had tangible reasons for their 
caution. Overseas box office receipts were a substantial part of their profits, 
while at home, most of America’s heartland was fervently isolationist. Films 
stepping too far into controversial territory risked hostile reactions, including 
censorship (Rostron 85).
And censorship was active in the late 1930s. The presumed power of the 
movies made their content a hot issue. Scores of cities and many states had 
set up censorship boards early in the century, and in the late interwar era, 
they were becoming more active. Fearing federal censorship or a breakup of 
the film industry, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America 
preached for Hollywood to purvey only “pure entertainment”—wholesome 
films that avoided social and political issues. The Motion Picture Production 
Code, which imposed stringent restrictions on the portrayal of a wide range of 
subjects both political and moral, had largely been ignored since its inception 
in 1930 but was reinvigorated in 1934, causing a sharp cutback in the treatment 
of social and political issues by the major studios (Bernstein). The war was an 
irresistible subject for Hollywood, but it also threatened the doctrine of “pure 
entertainment.” As the nation geared for battle, the movies became a prime 
instrument for public persuasion—so much so that Joseph Breen, head of the 
Production Code Administration, accused Hollywood (in particular, the Hol-
lywood Anti-Nazi League) of attempting to “capture the screen of the United 
States for Communistic propaganda purposes” (Koppes and Black 22).
In 1939 Warner Bros. broke through the barrier on political topics and 
premiered the controversial Confessions of a Nazi Spy, which revealed, in melo-
dramatic fashion, that Germany sought to conquer the world. The picture’s 
release netted a host of problems for the studio: an injunction from the 
German-American Bund; official protest from the German ambassador, Hans 
Heinrich Dieckhoff; and threats on the lives of Jack Warner and the film’s 
star, Edward G. Robinson (Shane 40; Birdwell 76). PDC’s low-budget but even 
more riveting Hitler, Beast of Berlin (shot in less than a week) was scheduled 
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to open soon after, but it ran into opposition from the Production Code Ad-
ministration as well as from local censorship boards. Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
and New York wanted Hitler deleted from the title (Fernett 103). The war still 
had not hit close enough to home, and the film’s detractors found it offensive 
to Germans and German Americans alike. Chicago and Providence turned 
the film down completely, as an organized opposition gathered steam. After 
a title change to Beasts of Berlin and a wide range of edits, including the dele-
tion of several remarks about Roosevelt, the film opened in New York in late 
November. Shortly after its premiere, a reviewer for Box Office cited the film as 
being “a timely picture, filmed with the realization of what was happening in 
Germany” (Fernett 103). The stage was then set for the appearance of a rapid 
succession of prointervention films, including Charlie Chaplin’s The Great 
Dictator (United Artists, 1940), I Married a Nazi (20th Century-Fox, 1940), and 
A Yank in the R.A.F. (20th Century-Fox, 1941). In 1939, however, only six titles 
dealt directly with Germany and the European situation, and of those, all but 
Hitler, Beast of Berlin were tales of espionage (Television Spy, Espionage Agent, The 
Lone Wolf Spy Hunt, They Made Her a Spy, and Confessions of a Nazi Spy).
THE RHETORIC OF INTERVENTION
Propaganda is a vague concept. As Koppes and Black note, “Propaganda is a 
bit like pornography—hard to define, but most people think they will know it 
when they see it” (49). And in Hitler, Beast of Berlin, critics, censors, and audi-
ences alike knew what they were seeing. In classic B movie fashion, viewers are 
dragged headlong into a Manichaean battle of good and evil, absolute right 
versus absolute wrong, where characters, dialogue, and ideological positions 
all work in concert to drive home the point that intervention in Europe is the 
only logical and moral course of action for the United States.
The film focuses on a small group in Germany’s underground, actively 
resisting the growing Nazi power until the male members are apprehended 
and sent to a concentration camp. Roland Drew plays Hans Memling, the 
group’s dedicated leader and a former pilot in the German military. Because 
of his combat background, Hans is not merely some easy-to-write-off idealist; 
his resistance to the Third Reich is rooted in moral and political principles 
rather than pacifism or fear.
Alan Ladd (as Karl) and Steffi Duna (as Hans’ wife, Elsa) play the doubt-
ers—sympathetic, yet raising all the arguments, questions, and what-ifs that a 
typical isolationist might entertain about the necessity of intervention, the costs 
of the fight for democracy, and the ethical dilemma of sacrificing individual 
happiness and comfort for the vague concept of a greater good. With a lack 
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of pretense and subtlety typical of B movies, the film blatantly foregrounds 
doubts about the wisdom of resistance in order to allay them. Elsa asks, “Will 
democracy happen in our lifetime? Are we fighting for something we’ll never 
see the results of ?” Karl presents the well-intentioned counter to intervention, 
taking an academic and historical perspective that there has never been a tyrant 
in history who has ruled permanently—that eventually, this Nazi regime too 
shall pass. Hans admonishes him that “people have to want democracy” and 
that Germans must experience true self-government to know what it is really 
like, and they must be willing to rise up in its defense. He responds to Karl’s 
fear of the futility of a small resistance effort by reminding him (optimistically), 
“We have friends everywhere.”
Finally, Anna (Greta Granstedt) is the modern American-type woman who 
has a sense of duty to her country and political convictions that override any 
feminine stereotype. Anna is paired with doubting Karl, in parallel to Hans 
and the fearful Elsa. Strong, independent, and dedicated, Anna places her 
ideal of the greater good before personal happiness. When Karl asks her to 
marry him, she says no—she needs to continue to work for the cause. “If we 
marry, the state will demand children of us. That’s what a woman is for in the 
New Germany.” Anna chooses “the fight” over marriage and children, as her 
means of resisting Nazi ideology.
Elsa (Steffi Duna) and Anna (Greta Granstedt) print handbills in support 
of the resistance fighters.
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Supporting characters run the gamut from good to evil. There is the 
sympathetic storm trooper who is punished for rejecting the brutality of the 
concentration camps yet still clings to the notion that “all will be corrected in 
time. Hitler will see that justice be done to all people.” In contrast are the cor-
rupt, high-ranking Gestapo officers, driven by ego and embodying the “insanity” 
and lack of reason that would later be used to characterize the Third Reich. 
This strategy of depicting good versus evil in the German characters—the hu-
mane yet faithful storm trooper, members of the resistance, and the dissatisfied 
but compliant townspeople versus the corrupt lawyers and dogmatic military 
officers—was also an effective means of assuring that Hitler, Beast of Berlin did not 
fall into the Production Code’s “hate film” category. Such films were subject to 
additional sanctions and editing because the “national feelings” section of the 
code required that “the history, institutions, prominent people and citizenry 
of other nations, shall be represented fairly” (Koppes and Black 29). And “fair-
ness,” in the case of motion pictures, meant that no group—be it national, 
ethnic, political, or occupational—could be portrayed as innately, overarch-
ingly evil. According to the code, immorality could be attributed to particular 
leaders of the Nazi regime but not to the German people as a whole.
The code-satisfying concept of “fairness” is established early in the film; 
it opens with newsreel footage of an ominous sea of storm troopers, parading 
by torchlight with Nazi flags flying, blended into fictional scenes of average 
townspeople complying with the Nazi salute but with resentful looks, subtle 
head shaking, and downcast eyes. Their demeanor forecasts the unrest of the 
story line, which begins in a secret room where members of the underground 
resistance are printing flyers to be disguised as official leaflets. The text reads: 
“To all Peace-Loving Germans: The National Socialist Party is leading the Ger-
man people to destruction and war. Hitler and his murderers have suppressed 
the true state of world opinion concerning what is happening within Germany. 
The entire world is horrified by the brutalities that have been visited upon 
our once civilized nation. This constant betrayal of the people can lead to but 
one end—complete annihilation of the German nation.” The rhetoric here is 
designed to convey an alignment between the audience and “real” Germans. 
It alludes to the horrors of the Nazi regime while reinforcing the notion that 
“civilized” Germans, who undoubtedly share the moral convictions of middle-
class American filmgoers, are unaware of foreign support for their plight.
As the film continues, so does its appeal to democracy and similarity on 
various social and ideological levels. Bracketed vignettes provide dialogue from 
characters who represent sectors significant to U.S. audiences, as they note how 
Hitler’s war machine has undermined the nation’s resources and economy. 
A woman in a grocery store complains bitterly that, under the Third Reich, 
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food prices have gone up while quality has gone down; rail workers grumble 
about the destruction of independent unions. A church sermon adds the issue 
of religious freedom to the mix, when a priest reminds his parishioners that 
“dissenters are suffering and dying to keep the love of God in the hearts of 
your children and your children’s children.” Even nature is invoked to support 
intervention, when—during a picnic—Elsa contemplates the tree she’s lying 
under and comments, “This is the Germany we love. This tree has been here 
since before Hitler and Goebbels and it will be here long after they’re gone. 
. . . Perhaps if they thought of that, they’d take it down.”
The counter to these positive images is, of course, demonizing images 
of the hostile, aggressive, overtly anti-American Gestapo and storm troopers. 
Stark lighting, melodramatic dialogue, and harsh camera angles invoke the 
power of the B film to create menacing Nazi figures eager to display their 
military power. One trooper asks another, “Do you think there’s going to be 
another world war?” His companion responds, “Let it come—today, we have 
the greatest army in the world. Today the German people are united. The 
English will never fight us.”
When the subject of world war is introduced again, the camp’s commanding 
officer tells his subordinates that he welcomes the prospect of battle. When his 
newspaper is delivered, he reads aloud, “Roosevelt appeals to Hitler for peaceful 
solution” and then tosses the paper to the floor with scorn. It is clear that the 
avoidance of confrontation, through either diplomacy or isolation, is seen as a 
sign of weakness by the Third Reich’s true believers. Although several of these anti-
Roosevelt scenes were allowed to remain in the final cut, one in which the colonel 
refers to Roosevelt as a “meddling fool” was excised by censors (Rostron).
In another scene, a direct confrontation takes place between Hans and 
the concentration camp’s commanding officer. After several days of numbing 
detention, an exhausted Hans is summoned for an “interview.” The colonel, 
who served with Hans in the army, attempts to turn his loyalties: “At Versailles, 
the rest of the world robbed Germany, the Fatherland, from everything we hold 
dear—our possessions and our honor. Now, with Hitler’s leadership and direc-
tion, Germany holds its head high.” Hans resists and ultimately counters: “If I 
find myself in a mad house and I’m still sane, I cannot believe I must submit 
myself to the rule of a lunatic!” In response to this cri de coeur, he is dragged 
away to be “reeducated.”
IMAGE POLITICS
Continuing the trend begun in the films of World War I and used heavily dur-
ing the Spanish Civil War, Hitler, Beast of Berlin used “factual” footage to blur 
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the line between fiction and reality. Utilized primarily at the film’s beginning 
and end, this footage frames the scripted drama in ways that were familiar to 
American audiences, who were regular consumers of the newsreel series March 
of Time. Beast of Berlin opens with newsreel scenes of storm troopers parading 
through small towns, dominating the otherwise peaceful landscape. These clips 
are intermingled with dramatizations of women, children, and elderly towns-
people with wary demeanors offering reluctant salutes—delivering an image 
of the Third Reich as a grim force choking the flow of everyday German life 
and reinforcing earlier vignettes of oppression. At the film’s end, Hans, Elsa, 
and their new baby escape to Switzerland, but Hans is determined to return 
to Germany. As Elsa begs him to stay, Hans attempts to explain to her why he 
must leave her, their child, and their newfound safety. A montage of newsreel 
images of warfare and death supports his admonishment that they can never 
truly be free as long as Germany is a dictatorship. The scene closes with Elsa 
winning him over by reminding him, “Here, you are free to tell the rest of 
the world what is happening in Germany, and that what is going on does not 
speak the hearts of the German people.”
Although the controversial Confessions of a Nazi Spy, released earlier that 
fall, was the first anti-Nazi film produced by a major studio and constituted 
the film industry’s wake-up call to American audiences about the Nazi threat, 
Beast of Berlin was the first to actually dramatize horrific Nazi excesses. Its con-
centration camp scenes were considered inflammatory to the Hitler regime 
at a time when diplomatic solutions were still being entertained, and many 
were lost to censorship edits (Rostron). Still, the remaining scenes effectively 
convey the hopelessness and brutality of the early camps. Arriving prisoners 
are told that they are under “protective arrest” and will be considered enemies 
of the state until proved otherwise. At intake, they are fingerprinted, weighed, 
and measured—objectified as the sum total of so much flesh. Once processed, 
they are beaten, humiliated, exercised in the yard, or worked on road crews 
until they drop from exhaustion and malnourishment.
As the resistance members acclimate to the camp, an already established 
prisoner is pointed out to them as being “not right”—insane. He shuffles 
through the barracks like a robot, disoriented and unaware of his surround-
ings. The ensuing dialogue reveals that his arrest was at the hands of his own 
son, who had joined the Hitler regime: “When he found out his son joined 
the Nazis, he tried to shoot him” rather than see his offspring betray basic 
German values and ideals. The old man is broken—handed over by the son 
he tried to save. When the two later meet in the barracks, the father pleads, 
“Wilhelm! Take off that uniform! Please!” The soldier reacts with scorn, grab-
bing his father by the shirt and hurling him onto the floor and then out into 
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the yard with the other prisoners—a vivid symbol of families torn apart by 
brutal dogmatism.
Another polarizing scene, illustrating the Nazi threat to the fabric of 
society, shows a guard tearing the rosary beads from around the neck of a 
priest and crushing them. A close-up shows the guard’s boot heel smashing 
the beads to bits, callously shattering the priest’s hope and faith underfoot 
and demonstrating that Catholicism—or any other competing ideology—is 
powerless against the Nazi regime.
The harshness of the Third Reich is also made tangible through depictions 
of the prisoners’ quarters. The barracks are concrete and barren, consisting 
only of bunks with a water trough for cleaning and drinking in the middle of the 
room. The specter of the ominous “Room 14,” where “instruction,” “convinc-
ing,” and interrogation occur, hangs over the prisoners. As the disappearance 
of several prisoners illustrates, it is a place from which there is often no return. 
When one of the resistance supporters fails to reappear in the barracks, Hans 
demands to know what happened to him. The guard smiles broadly and says, 
“He fell down the stairs and broke his neck”; he then becomes menacing as he 
warns, “And if you don’t mind your business, the same could happen to you!” 
Later, when Hans defies the commanding officer, he is taken off-camera to 
Room 14 and beaten senseless while his fellow captives listen to his screams. 
Hans (Roland Drew) is weighed and measured as he becomes a concen-
tration camp commodity.
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When he is subsequently returned to view, barely able to stand, he is forced 
into a torture box—an upright coffin with only a barred opening across the 
face—and left alone murmuring Elsa’s name.
EXPLOITATION GOES TO WAR
Mysterious deaths, implements of torture, shrieks of pain—this sort of gut-
wrenching B movie sensationalism was not unfamiliar to Ben Judell, who 
came to PDC with a track record in exploitation films. Prior to filming Beast of 
Berlin, his credits included a trio of 1938 celluloid scandals: Rebellious Daughters, 
Delinquent Parents, and Slander House, followed in 1939 by the pulp shockers 
Torture Ship, Buried Alive, and Invisible Killer, all produced either during or im-
mediately after Hitler, Beast of Berlin (Dixon). Suspense, terror, and melodrama 
drove the thin plots of these low-budget pictures, electrified by fiendish killers 
and mad scientists. Judell’s flair for exploitation led Hitler, Beast of Berlin to 
make its strongest mark on the politics of prewar films. The film’s promotional 
strategy was an odd mixture of the approach taken for earlier films such as 
Three Comrades (1938) and Blockade (1938), which expressly disavowed any 
propagandistic intent yet utilized a sensational publicity approach generally 
reserved for mainstream exploitation films. The main title image of Hitler, 
Hans requires convincing that Hitler will lead Germany to glory.
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Beast of Berlin announces that it reflects no bias, prejudice, or hatred of any 
individual, group, or nation; a critic for the New York Sun reported that this dis-
claimer prompted a roar of laughter (Creelman). The movie explicitly depicts 
brutal atrocities suffered by the resistance heroes, as well as verbal abuse and 
scorn toward not only the resistance but also Jews, Catholics, and, of course, 
fainthearted Americans.
Similarly, the press kit for Beast of Berlin contains a remarkable combina-
tion of material urging the aggressive exploitation of anti-Nazi sentiment 
while vehemently denying that the film takes any position either for or against 
Nazism. The posters and advertisements for the film contain ominous images 
of Gestapo officers standing over bloody and beaten prisoners: “A wail of an-
guish from a nation in chains,” screams the copy. The ads describe the film as 
“written with the hearts’ blood of innocent people” and made “as a monster 
ravishes a continent”; yet every review and publicity story prepared by the studio 
takes pains to disclaim that the film reflects any partisan intent. For instance: 
“Hitler, Beast of Berlin is not propaganda. It is not a preachment for or against 
Nazism. It is not a screen editorial. It does not violate good taste nor is it in 
any manner offensive.” In a prime example of this hypocritical juxtaposition 
of damnation and denial, one sentence in the promotional materials describes 
the film as “shorn of all propaganda and without prejudice,” while at the same 
time previewing the story line as the saga of a fearless young German risking 
all to bring down the Nazi regime so that his unborn children “shall not feel 
the iron heel of despotism.”
In the portion of the press kit meant for exhibitors’ eyes only, PDC encour-
ages theaters to adopt this same strategy of ambiguity. The studio requests that 
each exhibitor place a poster in a prominent lobby position bearing the text, 
“NO WAR, NO HATE, NO PROPAGANDA. Just eloquent and dramatic ENTERTAINMENT.” 
The press kit then recommends that “all exploitation should be BOLD and FLAM-
BOYANT!” Exhibitors were advised to hang giant blow-up photos of Hitler in their 
lobbies and on their marquees, and they were told that maps of Europe and 
provocative newspaper headlines about war would make an eye-catching lobby 
display under this caption: “A Madman Redrawing the Map of Europe with 
a Sword Dipped in the Blood of Innocent Children! Will America Be Next?” 
The press kit also suggests that each theater hire a “stockily built young man 
with Teutonic features, dress him in a Storm Trooper uniform with a swastika 
armband,” and have him stationed to open car doors and to attract attention 
in front of the theater. Finally, the kit recommends building a concentration 
camp “torture box” to drive home “the brutality of Hitler’s Gestapo.” The film 
“pulled no punches” in addressing a topic that no other American studio had 
as yet dared to touch (Boehnel).
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OPPORTUNISM AND OPPORTUNITY
Controversial in a way that was good for the box office, Hitler, Beast of Berlin was 
profitable for PDC. It took B movie melodrama and a stark moral battlefield 
to the controversy over intervention, creating a familiar framework for grap-
pling with the nation’s involvement. Judell’s exploitation-style strategies and 
blood-and-guts sensationalism offered, or perhaps confronted, audiences with 
new opportunities to consider Hitler and Nazi expansionism. While the film’s 
dialogue acknowledges isolationist arguments, it counters the heartland’s ob-
jections with even more compelling American values. “Good” Germans were 
not the cultural “others” of American film audiences; they were reflections of 
them. Viewed in that light, Germans not only deserved America’s help; their 
plight constituted a moral obligation to intervene.
These moral and intellectual appeals were supported by visual and tactile 
affronts delivered by the film and its promotion in ways that were largely unfa-
miliar to film-going audiences outside the exploitation genre. Judell brought 
the horrors of concentration camps onto the screens and into the lobbies of 
movie houses, forcing Americans not only to look at but also to feel and interact 
A neighborhood theater follows the studio’s promotion advice and flam-
boyantly beckons moviegoers.
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with the realities he constructed, blurring the boundaries between drama and 
fact. Newspaper ads and handbills asked, “What don’t they want you to see?” 
and advertised rewards for the return of “stolen” copies of the film. Cardboard 
stand-ups of Hitler looked on as moviegoers were encouraged to touch and 
open and even climb inside the torture boxes built for theater lobbies—to bet-
ter imagine the atrocities depicted in the film and identify with the fictional 
protagonists. The closer that identification became, the more difficult it would 
be to maintain a neutral stance.
As it was mobilizing political sentiments, Hitler, Beast of Berlin also made 
another contribution—to the movement to loosen the moralistic fetters on 
the motion picture industry. The stringent restrictions of the Production Code 
Administration (along with general pressure from the Catholic Church’s Le-
gion of Decency) had begun to “cut the film industry off from the realities of 
American experience” (Schlesinger 77), and a combination of government 
censorship and self-regulation threatened to suffocate creativity and social 
relevance in American films. Only Warner Bros. studio, with its production 
of Black Legion (1937) and Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), has received any 
significant recognition for making socially conscious films about Nazism prior 
to 1939 (Birdwell; Schwartzman). Despite the pressure against making “in-
terventionist” films (which would remain in force until the bombing of Pearl 
Handbills dare audiences to view the film exposé that no one wants 
them to see.
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Harbor in 1941), fifty anti-Nazi films were released between 1939 and December 
7, 1941 (De Grazia and Newman 60), and Beast of Berlin was one of the earliest. 
Judell’s bent for exploitation-style sensationalism broke new ground, and the 
film’s scandalous, rousing promotion made up for what was lost on the screen to 
censorship. In 1942, after the United States had officially joined the war, Hitler, 
Beast of Berlin was rereleased with even better box office returns and far less 
scandalous marketing, since war was now part of everyday American life. And 
instead of Hitler, another name now dominated Beast of Berlin’s marquees—Alan 
Ladd, Hollywood’s newest star to rise from the B list—and memories of the 
film’s role in shaping American prewar sentiment faded in its glow.
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WHY WE FIGHT AND  
PROJECTIONS OF AMERICA
Frank Capra, Robert Riskin, and the Making of 
World War II Propaganda
11 / Ian S. Scott
In an overview of America’s then-recent documentary tradition, Robert and 
Nancy Katz observed in 1948 that the welter of outstanding World War II 
documentaries had only a limited impact on the genre in the United States 
due to their restricted viewing at home. They reserved special praise, however, 
for the Why We Fight series directed by Frank Capra and for a series of films 
commissioned and organized by Robert Riskin for the Overseas Branch of 
the Office of War Information (OWI)—a series referred to here as Projections 
of America.1 According to the Katzes, “Frank Capra’s series set a successful 
pattern for the hard-hitting newsreel type of political education film, explain-
ing the causes of the war, the issues at stake, and helping the GI to know and 
appreciate his allies.” They also assert that “the Overseas Branch of the OWI, 
under the leadership of Robert Riskin and his group of documentary writers 
and producers, executed a number of films that are still outstanding in their 
field” (426–27).
The Katzes’ appreciation of these two series, and of the talents of Capra and 
Riskin in particular, was part of an argument for a distinctive gap between the 
kind of work emerging from the United States before and after the war com-
pared with the quality and sophistication of documentaries in other national 
film cultures. But the real significance of the Katzes’ assessment is that their 
article was virtually the last time Capra’s and Riskin’s films were mentioned in 
the same breath. Nearly a decade after the Katzes’ study, Douglas Gallez as-
serted that the Korean War had failed to produce anything like the quality of 
documentary filmmaking that had emanated out of World War II. The reason, 
thought Gallez, was that Korea was a limited war and therefore did not pose 
an all-encompassing global threat to humankind; nor was it able to galvanize 
the righteousness of the cause overlaid by the ruthlessness of the enemy be-
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ing opposed. Hence, Korea could not provide anything as melodramatic as, 
for example, Capra’s series: “Much of the content of Why We Fight hits us with 
great impact even today,” opined Gallez (133). In contrasting this collection 
with the work of John Ford and John Huston, he concluded that themes of 
humanism, the incalculable cost of war, and the need to be restrained and 
respectful of defeated peoples were motives endemic and necessary for the 
pattern of future wartime documentaries. By this argument, The Battle of Mid-
way, Memphis Belle, and the seven Why We Fight films had already defined the 
documentary motifs of World War II film.
Riskin’s series was absent from Gallez’s account, and the pattern became a 
familiar one. In the sixty years since the end of the war, Why We Fight has risen 
to become an exemplary stalwart of not just the World War II documentary 
tradition but of all propaganda filmmaking. In contrast, with the notable excep-
tion of his film about conductor Arturo Toscanini (1943) and Autobiography of 
Robert Riskin and Frank Capra—two visions of 
America.
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a Jeep (1944), Riskin’s Projections of America was seen by only a select few of the 
general public. The first question to ask is why this was so. Are we to assume 
that Capra’s series was simply better than Riskin’s? Were there issues over 
the permission and distribution of the material in each series? Was Capra’s 
name a bigger and better draw than Riskin’s, leading companies to believe that 
there was a market for Why We Fight beyond the war that could not be reached 
by Projections of America? There is evidence to answer all these questions.
At least some of the reasons for Capra’s ubiquitous popularity and Riskin’s 
relative anonymity had to do with the types of films the two made and com-
missioned, as well as the concerns they had about aesthetic and ideological 
conceptions. But the reception they each enjoyed also had to do with their 
respective outlooks on film. Riskin’s early wartime experiences in London, 
his interest in New Deal projects and the artists working for the various ad-
ministrations, as well as his humanist, egalitarian instincts toward repressed 
or disadvantaged people made him believe that film could improve and uplift 
society. He asserted quite vigorously at the close of the war that the German 
people could be rehabilitated in part by a diet of good feature films allied to 
documentaries extolling the virtues of American life (“Riskin”). And he was 
never afraid to assert the view that film and politics had always been closely 
related. He commented: “Hollywood has been in the political field ever since 
they made the first motion picture. Every picture that has to do or concerns 
itself with the interests of the people whether it’s social, or whether it’s an 
economic, or whether it’s a religious subject is definitely in the field of public 
opinion” (“ABC’s Town Meeting”).
Capra sought impact too, but his attention was drawn to the simple but 
challenging idea of rebuttal: a rebuttal of all things totalitarian. He found 
his answer by cloning the master-race histrionics and affirming a religious 
devotion to freedom through one overarching principle. “I needed one basic 
idea, an idea that would spread like prairie fire, an idea from which all ideas 
flowed. I thought of the Bible. There was one sentence in it that always gave 
me goose pimples: ‘Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free’” 
(330). Riskin saw his films as an extension of American liberty and freedom 
conveyed to a changing world in calm and measured tones. Capra, in contrast, 
beat a drum for the Allies against the obdurate fanaticism of the enemy. In 
their two approaches lay different but equally enduring aims: Riskin’s vision 
was to contribute to the rich and voluble American documentary tradition, 
while Capra’s was to make propaganda accessible and pertinent to the masses 
in a time of crisis and conflict. Both achieved spectacular results, but the real 
legacy and approbation have been somewhat misplaced.
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WAR AND MEMORY
What is the relationship between politics and propaganda? Indeed, what is 
the nature of the relationship between warfare and the modern aesthetic 
experience, between art and perception? How has a cinematic representation 
of war contributed to popular consciousness about the horrors and sacrifices 
of conflict? These are some of the questions posed by David H. Culbert and 
John Whiteclay Chambers in World War II Film and History. They suggest that 
the public memory of war in the twentieth century was conceived not out of a 
real or remembered past but from a manufactured one in which documentaries 
and fictions shaped popular recollection. Every film explores the relationship 
between art and society, they explain, between the culture where they were 
produced and the culture where the films are seen. They argue: “The unifying 
theme is that the visual representation of past wars is itself a cultural construc-
tion. To an increasing degree, memory of wars won and lost, like other public 
memories, is a social construct” (10).
The themes outlined by Culbert and Chambers are useful starting points 
Main title of Why We Fight, Episode Seven.
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in trying to understand both the concept and the ideology behind Why We Fight 
and Projections of America. Capra and Riskin understood the power of cinematic 
construction, and both had collaborated on fables that had repositioned 
American attitudes toward society and democracy during the Great Depression 
(1929–1941). Ensconced within a worldwide conflict, they were now charged 
with the task of shaping public consciousness about war, but each took his own 
path toward the building of memory, tradition, and ideology.
Bernard Dick in The Star-Spangled Screen provides an important clue to 
Capra’s outlook. Dick recounts the day he saw Prelude to War (1943), the first 
of theWhy We Fight films, in a Saturday double bill at his local movie theater. 
Its aim was to provide factual information of events leading up to the war. 
The implication, says Dick, was that such information had not been imparted 
before, at least in this context. Rather like an academic lecture, here was a 
summary of events set in the context of post–World War I history. “Capra ap-
plied methods of film to the lecture hall, by lumping Italian Fascism, German 
Nazism, and Japanese imperialism into one collective enemy. The Audience 
becomes the class called to attention by teacher Walter Huston who begs the 
question, ‘Why are we fighting?’” (4).
In Dick’s assessment, what was most interesting about the film was the way 
a variety of techniques that had characterized Capra’s fictional films—montage, 
superimposition, and newsreel footage—were all brought forth in the docu-
mentary context. History took on a well-defined narrative that encompassed 
a strong Christian ethos and was, he states, plainly interpretative. Suddenly, 
his understanding of what had been the limits of World War II up to that 
point differed from the claims being made in the film. “A date bears only a 
synecdochal relationship to an event, but is not the event. Chronology also 
was only sequence, not configuration,” Dick suggests. He remembers being 
transfixed by the idea that 18 September 1931 was the real start of World War 
II, according to Capra’s film. This was the day that Japanese troops invaded 
Manchuria and thus, according to Prelude to War, was the real initiation of the 
world’s descent into global strife (Dick 6–7).
Dick’s personal account offers the prospect of a unified spirit among 
people who were naïve about documentary propaganda, insinuating a naïveté 
to the point that the central tenet of the genre was not fully grasped: that it 
was produced on behalf of, and with the intention of promoting, the state. 
This basic philosophy was intrinsic to Why We Fight and, in truth, equally so 
to Projections of America. But herein also lies a distinction between the wartime 
oeuvre of the two filmmakers. Robert Riskin never felt that his films needed, 
and his writers and directors did not engage in, anything that explicitly af-
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firmed the principles of the state or the bankrupt corruptibility of ideas on 
the other side. Riskin’s history lesson, such as it was, only reaffirmed the status 
of the United States as a nation of immigrants unified by a vitality and belief 
in the country they had created. Projections films such as Cowboy (1943) and 
People to People (1944) were, by World War II standards, strangely restrained 
about victory and defeat, about the awakening from a “long night” (Dick 7). 
The series strove to be, instead, a quiet affirmation of life in America, of ac-
complishment, and, indeed, of social attainment and cultural appreciation. 
The films had a religious dimension that was broadly Christian in tone, rather 
like Why We Fight. Films such as The Town (1944) and Swedes in America (1943) 
observed a secular devotion to faith, hope, and charity but also took pains to 
spotlight communities, ethnic enclaves, and social and even class empathies, 
all working toward the cause of reaffirming democracy and freedom, but not 
proclaiming it from the rooftops. In the latter film, narrator Ingrid Bergman 
walks graciously around the American Swedish Historical Museum in Philadel-
phia, talking in measured tones of her immigrant people’s great contribution 
to the history of America.
The aim of these basic comparisons, practical as well as ideological, is not 
to provide a strict reevaluation of Why We Fight or to promote applause for Pro-
jections of America over and above its more famous contemporary. In a way, the 
interest here is in thinking through the approaches taken by each series and 
to ask why two filmmakers so in tune with each other’s cinematic sensibilities 
would produce such very different cinematic portraits. In addition, the analysis 
asserts that Projections deserved, and continues to deserve, a more honored 
place than it now occupies in America’s documentary heritage.
There are practical factors to consider when explaining the differences 
between the two collections. It should be noted that one major dissimilarity 
involved the management of the series. Riskin had far less hands-on involve-
ment with Projections. He was the overseer, the orchestrator of the project rather 
than the director or, conceptually, the dominant author. Capra was far more 
of a controlling force; when it comes to Why We Fight, it seems apt to describe 
him as director, producer, and—often—editor of the final cut. But it should 
also be remembered that Capra’s 834th Signal Corps, rather like the Overseas 
Bureau of the OWI, was a team that included many other prominent filmmak-
ers and producers. The 834th did in fact engage in a number of other projects 
made with Capra’s approval but not directly overseen by him; Know Your Enemy: 
Germany (1945) and The Negro Soldier (1944) are good examples.2 Nevertheless, 
Capra did not exactly recruit these people himself. In contrast, the personnel 
that Riskin engaged reflected his personal philosophy about filmmaking as 
248 / Ian S. Scott
well as his attitudes toward the world conflict. Staff members of the Overseas 
Branch were stylish, attentive filmmakers—people with wit, imagination, and 
social and cultural concerns. With the likes of Alexander Hammid, Willard 
Van Dyke, and Philip Dunne, Riskin’s filmmaking horizons appeared broader 
and more diverse than Capra’s. It should also be conceded that Capra worked 
from within the military—rather than a civilian agency—and so had additional 
restrictions placed on him. Why We Fight received a clear mandate from Gen-
eral George C. Marshall that Capra was, to a certain extent, obliged to follow. 
Therefore, to suggest that these films were the singular visions of Capra or 
Riskin is not accurate. Still, even allowing for such constraints on their work 
routines, there are important comments to be made about the films, their 
ideological outlook, and their legacies.
Robert Riskin, spokesman for American values.
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PROPAGANDA VERSUS DOCUMENTARY
Technically, conceptually, and structurally, Why We Fight is very different from 
Projections of America. As Charles Maland indicates, apart from some footage 
shot by Robert Flaherty for War Comes to America  and some specially composed 
Disney animation, the Capra films are compilations derived from enemy battle 
footage or prewar documentaries such as Leni Riefenstahl’s notorious Triumph 
of the Will (1935) (123). The example of Riefenstahl does much to demonstrate 
the attitudes of both Capra and Riskin when it came to the subject matter. 
Capra was startled by the power of her films, but to the point of having an 
almost revelatory exposure to documentary as propaganda. “Satan couldn’t 
have devised a more blood-chilling super-spectacle,” he shares in his autobi-
ography, barely able to believe that a film documenting the ascendancy of the 
Nazi Party could have such a profound impact (328). So dumbstruck was he 
by the force of Riefenstahl’s imagery that Capra felt compelled to resist it by 
using it. Thomas Doherty describes the director as “compulsively scaveng[ing] 
Triumph of the Will. Riefenstahl’s Nazis are not denied their power, only their 
affirming mythos,” he asserts, as though Capra could do no more than invert 
the mastery of the image in order to master it for his own means (74). But 
master it he did, and such were the timing and touch of Capra’s expropriation 
of footage from Triumph of the Will that he created caricature and buffoonery 
where they appeared impossible to exist. In the end, “Riefenstahl’s dynamic 
forces became Capra’s deluded automatons” (Doherty 407).
Riskin, meanwhile, staked his claim on a keen awareness of and admiration 
for documentary that had been instilled in him since arriving in Hollywood in 
the early 1930s. His choice of people at the Overseas Bureau was more or less a 
conscious wish list of filmmakers whose work he had applauded over the previ-
ous decade. As a consequence, although Projections did include some archival 
footage (Autobiography of a Jeep is a good example of a compilation film taken 
from other sources), the series was filled with new, original film shot largely 
on location. Josef von Sternberg’s short The Town, Helen Grayson’s filmThe 
Cummington Story (1945), and the pictorials of New York and Chicago (both 
1943) all featured fresh footage shot at the source. The result of these opposing 
techniques was clear to see: Capra’s triumph in Why We Fight  was to undermine 
Nazi iconography by using it against the enemy; Riskin’s achievement in Projec-
tions was to extend the scope and tradition of the American documentary by 
going back to the roots of the genre and its love affair with ordinary life.
In terms of the composition of both series, narration was clearly very im-
portant to Why We Fight, as was music. Commentaries by Walter Huston, Lloyd 
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Nolan, and John Litel, as well as the musical scores of Dmitri Tiomkin, Alfred 
Newman, and Meredith Willson, added dramatic effect and depth to the im-
ages, an indelible legacy in this field of filmmaking (Nichols 49). Projections  also 
used music and narration, but both functions became embedded elements in 
the narrative of Riskin’s series, not just overlaid accompaniments for effect. 
Riskin’s narration was not so much directed—as teacher or instructor—as it 
was incorporated into the cinematic fabric. The narration was not just au-
thoritative but attributable to the story, not just an implicit frame of reference 
but rather an explicit inducement to share in the values and ideals on offer. 
In Swedes in America, for example, Ingrid Bergman is both the messenger and 
the message; her personal pilgrimage to sites of Swedish cultural and historic 
interest is a counterpoint to the collective example of wider immigrant pride 
and heritage. In Toscanini, Riskin conceives of the maestro’s very presence in 
America, reaffirmed in the narration and through pieces such as Verdi’s La 
forza del destino  and the conductor’s own Hymn of the Nations —notably featur-
ing work by Beethoven, an important gesture in itself—as a call to arms for 
the world to understand that artistic freedom in the United States goes hand 
Another “big parade,” this time with motor vehicles, from Autobiography of a Jeep.
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in hand with other basic human and civil rights. “When the night of fascism 
darkened most of Europe,” Burgess Meredith informs in the commentary, 
“Toscanini brought his music and his democratic faith to the new world.”
WAR AIMS AND SMALL-TOWN VALUES
Only in the seventh and final Why We Fight episode, War Comes to America 
(1945), do the influence and images that Capra and Riskin employ come 
together in anything like a complementary way. The film was shot partly 
in California, but more importantly in its evocation of the fundamentals of 
American life, it spliced together footage that displayed the talents of New 
Deal filmmakers Pare Lorentz and Willard Van Dyke. But if the crossover in 
style and pastoral domesticity of America seemed familiar with this propaganda 
effort, it was because these filmmakers were the very people who were actu-
ally working on the Projections series for Riskin. Capra’s seventh Why We Fight 
episode (produced by him but directed by Anatole Litvak) goes on to extol 
Americans as hardworking but fun loving, committed to their communities 
and disciples of sport, leisure, and the outdoor life in an Edenic paean to the 
richness and vibrancy of American society. The tone was as close in aestheti-
cism and meaning as Capra’s films ever came to Riskin’s.
The social vision of War Comes to America is therefore inherent, translated 
through symbols and values, just as it was in many of the Projections films. 
But social causation was much more of a question for Riskin. Assimilation 
in particular, the melting pot ideal, ethnic and racial integration, urban and 
rural distinctions, and the value of governmental intervention and direction 
as a means of social and cultural advancement are not so much implied as 
heavily weighted investigations in many of Riskin’s films. Hans Borchers em-
phasizes the way many of these ideals came to fruition within the small-town 
locale: “Unquestionably, the myth of the small town was seen by the OWI as 
an important chapter; Steel Town and The Cummington Story exploit this myth 
in more or less subtle ways” (174). Although the latter film offers an agenda 
couched within a rural idyll, Borchers underlines the mythology at work in 
Willard Van Dyke’s account of  Youngstown, Ohio. In Steel Town (1945), the title 
place is not really a “small town” in the agrarian mold but a bustling industrial 
center. Nevertheless, immigrant integration is represented through the fac-
tory workers from different backgrounds; religious observance and tolerance 
are displayed in scenes of Christmas celebrations, and cultural attainment is 
presented via the town’s orchestra. As Borchers indicates, Steel Town involves 
no literal personification of the small town, but “the values conveyed by the 
film are central to the myth” (171).
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Both films preach communal tolerance and individual identity, but The 
Cummington Story goes further in examining the root-and-branch democratic 
ideals extending into such communities. The film’s rendition of a New En-
gland town meeting not only offers foreign audiences a glimpse of participatory 
politics, but it also casts a spotlight on a tradition of public involvement in the 
democratic process stretching back to the beginnings of Anglo-American settle-
ment. Indeed, the political content of the whole Projections of America  series 
speaks to a much more forceful and personal agenda at work in Riskin’s mind 
than was necessitated by Why We Fight, but aided also by Capra’s conservative 
instincts. Each series was catering to a different audience, of course—Capra’s 
principally a military one, Riskin’s initially a foreign civilian populace—but 
in taking on subjects like the Tennessee Valley Authority, immigration in mid-
western America, and the construction of the United Nations organization, 
Projections laid down a marker for liberal change and social responsibility that 
directly flowed out of the New Deal and into the postwar world. Indeed, Riskin 
could be seen as documenting a social and cultural optimism that would, in 
Henry Luce’s telling phrase, define an American century.
America’s children: citizenship as a journey inWar Comes to America.
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Riskin’s films clearly adhered to John Grierson’s idea of documentary as 
the “creative treatment of actuality” (Hardy 13). For him, documentary nar-
rative meant creating scenes and scenarios that followed a linear progression 
of ideas and discovery. One empathized with the people in Projections films 
because their story was symbolically cast as a meta-narrative for the story of the 
nation. Once this premise had been accepted, propaganda no longer needed 
to be assertive and demanding of the audience, only identifiable and recep-
tive. Riskin’s “eaves-dropping method” of filming, as he called it, was a marvel-
ous evocation of this approach (Crowther 3). It was concerned with national 
character, with communal hopes, beliefs, and values testified to by the people 
themselves in a lucid and sober style. As critic Bosley Crowther wrote at the 
time: “Significant in all this product is the simple and unpretentious way in 
which the character of America and Americans is displayed” (3). Indeed, one 
may suggest that Riskin never actually entered the debate that was subsequently 
characterized by Michel Foucault as the public battle for the memory of World 
War II (“Interview with Foucault”). With a few notable exceptions, Riskin’s films 
consciously disengage from situating the most profound iconographic images 
within the textual space, preferring instead to covertly ground their narratives 
in a dialogic counterreading of fascism and imperialism. In other words, the 
battle is not simply America repelling a totalitarian menace with democracy 
and freedom—which is certainly asserted in a number of the films—rather, it 
is striving all the time to come to terms with the ideals it has set for itself, such 
as assimilation, libertarianism, and individualism. Linked to these beliefs is a 
broadly Christian message of love thy neighbor, be true unto thyself, and stand 
by fundamental principles. In The Town, The Story of the TVA, Swedes in America, 
and the pictorials of New York and Chicago, Riskin places the city, the small 
town, and the people in these narratives in a familiar American context: they 
are all in the process of becoming. America, asserts Riskin in these films, has 
not arrived at some political, social, or even religious Shangri-La—a nod to his 
and Capra’s account of the mythic city in Lost Horizon (1937)—and that is the 
most potent argument against Nazism. Instead, the nation is forever striving to 
achieve the next state of being for its citizens: America is an unending  journey, 
states Projections, and that is the temperate but insistent message of all the films 
in the series. The promises of Hitler, Stalin, and Hirohito, therefore, remain 
fabrications, ideological constructs that hold a haven of state benevolence over 
the loyal citizenry but whose rhetoric always engenders the need for action, 
the striving for conquest. In other words, in their own brilliant ways, Capra 
and Riskin depict two different visions of the Axis’s passion for lebensraum. 
In Capra’s version, their ideology is conceived of as ridiculous and nebulous, 
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constructed through the lens of Riefenstahl’s carefully positioned camera 
and helped by her masterful editing. Riskin’s idea is to contrast lebensraum 
with American exceptionalism and visualize the United States as a gleaming 
city on a hill.
TWO LASTING LEGACIES
These two philosophies—Capra’s explicit rejection of tyranny and Riskin’s more 
subtle affirmation of the American way of life—both of which were wound into 
the fabric of the films they were overseeing, say something about the kind of 
filmmakers Capra and Riskin were and had become. In 1941 they made one 
of their most profound, striking, and ambitious social statements under the 
auspices of their own production company. The film was Meet John Doe, a fable 
considering the possibilities of fascist takeover in America. More important, 
it was the last film they ever made together, and Why We Fight and Projections of 
America are small demonstrations of why the two men’s working relationship 
ended the year World War II began for America. A rather harsh comparative 
reading of their careers from this point on would suggest that Riskin was the 
one who strove for meaning and depth in his work as he became concerned 
about postwar American society and began to reflect on its darker, ambiguous 
underpinnings; he wrote dialogue for The Strange Love of Martha Ivers (1946), 
was writer and producer for Magic Town (1947), and served as writer on Mr. 
880 (1950). Capra, in contrast, not only stopped striving but actually set about 
putting his social vision into reverse by reclaiming a nostalgic bygone era for 
America as well as for his own career with It’s a Wonderful Life (1946) and re-
makes in the form of Riding High (1949, previously Broadway Bill [1934]) and A 
Pocketful of Miracles (1961, previously Lady for a Day [1933]). Yet this assessment 
may be a little too harsh. Capra did make an intriguing postwar film about 
developments in American politics, State of the Union (1948), which was argu-
ably a more pointed and revelatory exposé of political culture than the more 
celebrated Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939). And Riskin, in contrast to the 
rich pickings noted above, harked back to light and airy screwball comedy in 
the decidedly underwhelming Half Angel (1950).
Nevertheless, beyond fictional screenplays, Riskin’s immediate postwar 
concerns were more politically and socially ambitious. His work for the OWI 
had given him an even greater predisposition toward progress and activism in 
the film industry once hostilities ceased. At the close of the war he directed his 
attention toward government and Hollywood in a bid to establish a documen-
tary film unit that would continue his work at the OWI. He was disillusioned 
and dismayed once the investigations of the House Un-American Activities 
Capra, Riskin, and the Making of World War II Propaganda / 255
Committee beckoned in 1947, and he felt that the industry was losing creativ-
ity and failing to fashion stories about people and events in the corporate, 
financially constrained postwar atmosphere. Riskin championed independent 
producers in the classic mold, such as David O. Selznick, who could maintain 
the levels of dynamism and originality that had so defined prewar output. “The 
independents have been around a long time,” he said. “They [are the ones] 
who built up this industry” (Scott 215). 
It was true that Capra had similar concerns, but Why We Fight seemed 
to bring out in him an omniscient fear about where too much propaganda 
might lead. He did not seek to embrace the power of his wartime filmmak-
ing so much as to reject it out of hand. Capra’s reflective mood at the end 
of the war was certainly engendered by the force of the propaganda he had 
witnessed, which seemed to oppose the American way of life so totally. But he 
also took on a renewed faith in religious principles, a faith that was reflected 
in the neo-orthodox movement emerging in America after the war. Some of 
this secular devotion had surfaced earlier in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington and 
Meet John Doe, whose heroes poignantly espouse biblical scripture. It also took 
a personally tragic form, derived from the loss of Capra’s young son John in 
1938. As a result, the director could not raise any great enthusiasm for the 
host of realistic, social inquiry films that emerged in the months after the war. 
He commented openly that he did not care for these social-reflections-on-the-
war-type pictures and their impact on society, pointedly dismissing his friend 
William Wyler’s immediate postwar success The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) as 
too grave and bleak. When asked what his first postwar film would be about, 
Capra said that he knew what it would not be; it would not be a film about the 
war (Capra 374–75).
Capra had, in fact, immersed himself so totally in fascist iconography 
that it almost infected his vision. He spent the next few years trying to drain 
it from his system but never really succeeded. Why We Fight was a masterpiece 
of sorts and the culmination of years of storytelling, political imagery, and 
cinematic technique honed into one striking articulation of the dangers of 
master-race ideology. But somewhere along the line, Capra realized that there 
was nothing else he could say on the subject.3 Riskin, it could be argued, was 
inspired and galvanized into action by his wartime filmmaking and was only 
just getting started on another phase of his career when creative and financial 
disputes—and then illness—intervened. Without these roadblocks, there is 
evidence that his writing and producing would have taken many different and 
creative turns. Indeed, his work in World War II almost confirmed a state of 
mind that he sometimes intimated during the conflict—that he had worked 
with Capra for the last time, and their paths had begun to diverge.
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A year after the end of the war, Philip Dunne, who had been Riskin’s 
chief of production at the Overseas Bureau, wrote a piece urging Hollywood 
to demonstrate more appreciation for documentary filmmakers, the work 
they were doing, and the contributions they had made during the war. Dunne 
praised what he called the factual film of World War II and went on to cite 
Why We Fight, claiming that “the Capra films are classics of their kind” (167). 
But for Dunne, the factual film was not made in the same vein or with the 
same predispositions as the documentary. For him, documentary conveyed 
ideas and philosophy; it could be factual as well as fantasy, inventive and even 
quirky. Moreover, he saw it as having traditions and a lineage that recent factual 
films, made for the emotional mood of the times, might be unable to sustain. 
“The true documentary,” wrote Dunne, “is usually limited in pictorial scope, 
though the idea it espouses may be as large as democracy itself. It strives for 
uniformity in quality and mood and, like the entertainment film, achieves it 
by shooting original material to express its central idea” (168).
In other words, for Dunne, the documentaries of World War II were part 
and parcel of an era that constituted another chapter in the American tradition 
of the genre. And he had no doubt that the tradition had been ably served. “I 
learned about documentaries the hard way,” he said, “in the process of directing 
the production activities of Robert Riskin’s [Overseas Bureau]. My associates 
and teachers were all veterans of the American documentary movement, such 
as Willard van Dyke, Irving Lerner, Sidney Meyers and Roger Barlow. I should 
guess that most of these names are unknown to a majority of Hollywood pic-
turemakers. They will continue to be unknown as long as some in Hollywood 
persist in looking on documentary as a poor relation of ‘The Industry’” (166). 
Dunne’s argument was not so much a putdown of Capra’s type of propaganda— 
and the use of the “Hollywood” director by some agencies—as it was an en-
dorsement of Riskin’s vision at OWI. Projections nurtured ideas and built an 
unprecedented team. The films followed no comprehensive pattern, but, 
as Dunne asserted, they encompassed a master theme that was the hardest 
one of all: to “make friends for America” (167). In the end, the Manichaean 
clarity of Capra’s vision won out when it comes to remembering World War 
II, but the complexity of Riskin’s vision deserves recognition and renewed 
appreciation.
NOTES
1. Projections of America was a common moniker for the series during the war but has 
since fallen out of usage—along with any recognition of the collection as a group. The 
films themselves are not even clustered under any unifying heading within the National 
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Archives or in any other special collections. The rehabilitation of the title in this chapter 
is therefore an important signal of Riskin’s contribution and the significance of the 
films overall. For recognition of the collective heading, see Pryor and Callender. 
2. See, for example, Charles Maland (121–22), who notes that William Wyler, John 
Huston, George Stevens, Stuart Heisler, and Robert Flaherty came to work for the 834th 
Signal Service Photograph Detachment.
3. McBride (497, 504 –6) tells two interesting stories in this regard. One involves a 
1982 interview with Bill Moyers, at which Capra turned up with pictures of the death 
camps from his personal files to justify that his propaganda role had been necessary, 
even though he was uncomfortable talking about it after the war. The second account 
comes from those close to Capra, principally Chet Sticht and Joe Walker, who noticed 
a major change in him after the war, when he became less happy-go-lucky, less carefree 
and enthusiastic. Capra turned to his faith and to a kind of neo-orthodoxy that was 
prevalent at the time and expressed in literary terms through the likes of Flannery 
O’Connor. For Capra, the close of the conflict put the events of the past few years into 
stark relief. It was as though his efforts to create the Why We Fight series had revealed to 
him how vicious and unrelenting man’s inhumanity to man could be, how harsh and 
unrelenting the world had turned out to be.
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ON TELLING THE TRUTH  
ABOUT WAR
World War II and Hollywood’s Moral Fiction, 
1945–1956
12 / Frank J. Wetta and Martin A. Novelli
THE HOMECOMING
There is a scene in The Best Years of Our Lives, the Academy Award–winning film 
of 1946, in which an army veteran of the Pacific war presents his teenage son 
with a souvenir—a samurai sword. The boy hesitates a moment and says flatly, 
“Thanks very much, Dad.” The father then holds up a Japanese flag and tells his 
son that he took it off “a dead Jap soldier.” He points out the various good-luck 
wishes inscribed on the flag. The son, looking at the object, instructs the father, 
“The Japanese attach a lot of importance to their family relationship.” With no 
little irony the father replies, “ Yah, entirely different from us.” Suddenly, the 
boy becomes interested in the conversation, remembering that his father had 
been stationed in Hiroshima at the war’s end. “Did you happen to notice the 
effects of radioactivity on the people who survived the blast?” he asks. “No,” the 
combat veteran says, “I’ve seen nothing.” The son takes the opportunity to tell 
his father that his high school physics teacher has been lecturing on the dan-
gers of nuclear war. “I should have stayed home,” the father states, “and found 
out what was really going on.” Later, as the boy is about to leave, his mother 
reminds him not to forget the war trophies. He picks up the sword and the flag 
and, with a pointed lack of emotion, says, “Gee, thanks an awful lot for—these 
things.” The scene predicts the problems the veteran will face in his return to 
normal life. Who can really understand his experience, since the home front 
he fought to save is out of joint with his perceptions?
The homecoming reflects Hollywood at its best; it demonstrates what the 
film industry was capable of producing—a truthful, moral statement about 
human behavior and the human condition. The film’s ultimate happy ending 
and celebration of the American Dream, however, have led skeptics, unwilling 
to accept its deeper moral meaning, to judge the movie to be a well-crafted 
260 / Frank J. Wetta and Martin A. Novelli
lie—a movie that did not have the courage of its convictions or the integrity to 
recognize the story’s potential for tragedy. Other critics have seen the film as 
realistic and a projection of moral truth. Which is it?
There are essentially two opposing positions from which to view Hollywood’s 
World War II and its consequences. The first school demands that war films 
represent the “real thing” in graphic detail—gaping wounds, traumatic amputa-
tions, disfigurement, and mental disorders. Those who take this view demand a 
grim documentary image of the experience of combat, even in fictional stories, 
and they hold that the film industry was at heart incapable of such truth. Their 
reasoning is that market interests and fear of government censure controlled 
the studios; as a result, producers, directors, and screenwriters were incapable 
of creating anything of lasting value. World War II, contrary to Hollywood his-
tory, was the story of tragedy, lies, and stupidity.
The second school contends that despite the economic, social, and political 
limitations and the compromises with reality, Hollywood was capable of picturing 
the truth about war and the American people. This school holds that myth is 
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about truth—truth reflected in moral fiction. True art, as novelist and literary 
critic John Gardner asserts in his controversial essay On Moral Fiction (1978), 
must be life affirming. Moral works seek meaning and provide hope even in 
hopeless situations. “In the past few decades,” he writes (in 1978), “we have 
shaken off, here in America, the childish naïveté and prudishness we see in . . . 
movies of the thirties and forties, in which killers say ‘Jeez’ and reporters say 
‘Gosh,’ but in our pursuit of greater truth we have fallen to the persuasion that 
the cruelest, ugliest thing we can say is likely to be truest” (126). But “when a 
novel or poem, a film or play, achieves some noble end,” he insists, “the critic 
should not hesitate to mention the fact and comment . . . on how the effect is 
achieved” (145). Thus, the question should be asked: was wartime and early 
postwar Hollywood capable of producing moral fiction?
TRAGEDY, LIES, AND STUPIDITY
Paul Fussell, in his Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War 
(1989), has nothing good to say about the war on celluloid. In his reflection 
on how Hollywood sold the war to the American people, Fussell presents an 
uncompromising indictment of Hollywood as a base propaganda shill in the 
service of government and industry seeking to cover up the ugly nature of war in 
the interest of national morale or corporate profits. Influenced by his own bitter 
personal experience of combat (Fussell was a second lieutenant with the 410th 
Infantry Regiment, 103rd Infantry Division, in World War II and was wounded 
in eastern France in the spring of 1945), he castigates all attempts to find this 
war (even if it was a necessary or just war) and its aftermath as anything but the 
history of petty tyrannies, deadly blunders, gruesome death, mutilation, sinful 
deception, and tragedy. Certainly, there was heroism, he acknowledges, and a 
general adherence to duty, but cowardice, desertion, lying, and atrocity were 
also characteristic of the so-called Good War. In truth, Hollywood’s Good War 
was no more realistic than MGM’s The Wizard of Oz (1939) or Disney’s Pinocchio 
(1940). According to Fussell, Hollywood consciously created a “fairy-tale world 
of un-complex heroism and romantic love, sustained by toupees, fake bosoms, 
and happy endings,” in contradiction to what was really happening (Wartime 
189). Fussell only admits that by 1945, “a Hollywood film could go so far as to 
suggest that wounded men scream and cry and the men losing limbs experi-
ence severe shock.” The true story of the war (292,000 killed in battle, 671,000 
wounded) subverted the false promise of a “silver lining” for veterans: “At home 
salvation waits, for their women will comfort them. In all these films, no matter 
how temporarily damaged the personnel, good triumphs, which means that the 
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success story, Hollywood’s dominant narrative model, was easily accommodated 
to the demands of wartime moral meaning” (Wartime 191).
Fussell finds no truth at all in “high-minded” prose and poetry, magazine 
advertisements, official and unofficial propaganda, or Hollywood war films. 
Truth lies only in the hard and bitter realities of war and the serviceman’s vile 
language—the “fresh idiom” of the common soldier and his “little folk-poems” 
of profane verse (Wartime  257). This language of “verbal subversion and con-
tempt” communicated the “conviction that optimistic publicity and euphemism 
had rendered their experience so falsely that it would never be readily commu-
nicable” (Wartime 268). His uncompromising disgust and loathing for his own 
experience has led film historian and Vietnam combat veteran Peter Rollins to 
conclude, “Fussell’s bitterness reads like a plea from someone with PTSD (Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder)” (106). Indeed, Fussell admits that he never got 
over his experience of combat: “The Second World War . . . has pursued me all 
my life and has helped determine my attitudes and my behavior. The point is, 
wars are not easily forgotten. They tend to linger socially and psychologically” 
(“Initial Shock”). Further, he asserts that only those who have actually been 
in combat, especially as infantry soldiers, can understand what really happens 
on a battlefield: “Some acquaintance with actual warfare ought to be a legal 
requirement for anyone writing about or giving his views about it” (Interview). 
In his view, only frontline soldiers have any right to comment on the hardships 
of war, which excludes Hollywood filmmakers and almost everyone else. If 
wartime combat films were, in Fussell’s view, dishonest in their depiction of the 
experience of combat, Madison Avenue was utterly disgraceful in turning the 
tragedies of war and a soldier’s longing for a normal life into an opportunity 
for a Saturday Evening Post advertisement.
MORALITY AND MATERIALISM
Advertisements, as well as Hollywood movies, reflected and exploited the desires 
of the returning American serviceman, whose simple hopes and aspirations 
included a wife, a home, and a good job: “Out here,” says a tank commander 
in a Nash-Kelvinator Corporation magazine ad of January 1944: “I dream of 
peace—and coming home to showers and clean sheets and Christmas trees and 
apple pies and my job . . . and the girl I love.” . . . “I’ll turn to the job I want to 
do, when I’m done with this job that must be done . . . and not before” (quoted 
in Nelson 134). Consider too, the potential home of one “Pvt. Perkins” in this ad 
by the same company: “Tomorrow’s Victory Home will have better living built in! A 
new age of electrical living is going to bring untold comforts and convenience. 
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There will be a place for everything and everything in its place . . . the kind of 
home we want” (quoted in Nelson 121, emphasis in original). Private Perkins 
and the tank commander will, the company hopes, return to new Nash-Kelvina-
tor automobiles, refrigerators, and ranges and “a new age of electrical living” in 
“tomorrow’s Victory Home,” all “compact, efficient, complete” (Nelson 121). 
“So acceptable were those (commercial) sentiments,” Fussell writes, “that the 
same message could have been conveyed without variation by radio, popular 
song, or film, to be greeted by universal applause” (Wartime 194 –95).
Madison Avenue was not necessarily without a conscience or motivated 
entirely by the desire to sell products or maintain brand loyalty. Nor were the 
American people uncritical of corporations’ exploitation of the war to promote 
their products. The story is more nuanced than critics will allow. An appeal run 
Fatigue: a reality of combat.
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by the Magazine Publishers of America in February 1943, for example, advocated 
participation in the Civilian Service Corps, a home-front organization commit-
ted to community solidarity. The illustration accompanying the message shows 
a dead marine on a beach. He is facedown in the sand with two holes in his 
helmet. One arm is draped over a machine gun. His right arm stretches out 
with his hand frozen into a claw. The script reads:
What did you do today . . . for freedom?
Today, at the front, he died . . . Today what did you do?
Next time you see a list of the dead and wounded, ask yourself:
“What have I done today for freedom?
What can I do tomorrow that will save lives of men like this and help them win 
the war?” (Nelson 133)
True, readers did not see the dead marine’s destroyed face, but the message was 
truthful as well as moral when it spoke to the wartime necessity of maintaining 
a commitment to victory and sacrifice. At the same time, of course, newspaper 
and magazine ads were overwhelmingly positive as well as self-serving, assuring 
Americans of both victory and prosperity.
American films echoed the consumerism proclaimed in advertisements. 
Audiences applauded because the aspirations of the Nash-Kelvinator ad’s tank 
commander were their own values. They were hopeful and, yes, materialistic; they 
were innocently optimistic in many ways, but guarded in their expectations.
Hollywood and Madison Avenue, of course, did not create the American 
Dream, but they portrayed its possibilities. Movie audiences at home and men 
at war hoped for a normal life and the material comforts that went along with 
it. It was returning veterans, men who had lived through the Great Depression 
and survived the war, who populated the mass-produced houses of the postwar 
suburb Daly City, California, the archetypal middle-class environment. These 
were the kinds of people with middle-class aspirations (veterans, perhaps, like 
the character Tom Rath in The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit) satirized in 1962 
by Malvina Reynolds, a socialist songwriter, in “Little Boxes”:
And they all play golf on the golf course
and drink their martinis dry
And they all have pretty children
And the children go to school. . . . 
And the boys go into business
And marry and raise a family
In boxes made of ticky tacky
And they all look just the same (quoted in Smith and Schimmel)
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In this same spirit, historian Michael C. C. Adams declares that it is time to 
recognize the “moral smugness” and “posture of moral innocence” that char-
acterized the Allied cause by 1945 (137).  A disciple of what might be called 
the “Fussell school,” he demands that Americans stop seeing World War II as a 
patriotic adventure sponsored by Coca-Cola with a score by Glenn Miller. In a 
chapter entitled “Mythmaking and the War,” he argues that Hollywood, more 
than any other agency, metamorphosed this brutal experience into “the best 
war ever.” The popular image of World War II reflects a collective need to find 
a useful past—a good war story that ignores the tragedy, lies, and stupidity at 
the heart of the real historical events. The movie industry, with the encourage-
ment of the government in Washington, explained the meaning of the war to 
the American people, who “preferred the film version” over the real thing (11). 
It was not the Good War or “the best war ever,” Adams reminds us. And it was 
certainly not “the best years of their lives” for the thousands of disfigured or 
traumatized combat veterans or, reflecting today’s emphasis on the litany of class, 
race, and gender, for the Japanese Americans, African Americans, homosexuals, 
and women who faced discrimination during the conflict. Fussell and Adams 
react to attempts by politicians, journalists, historians, advertisers, novelists, 
poets, and Hollywood filmmakers to glorify the gruesome, vile business of war 
or transcribe the cacophony of the battlefield into a romantic symphony. They 
staunchly seek only to recover the “memory” of what really happened.
Critics miss the appeal of the popular arts when they take this unvarnished 
“realism” approach. They also fail to realize or refuse to recognize that there is 
more than one way to tell a story and more than one truth to tell. Their general 
dismissal of Hollywood’s war ignores the role that motion pictures play in an 
optimistic, consumer society. Americans were aware of the artificiality of mov-
ies; filmgoers were not entirely innocent of the realities of war, but they were 
often enthralled by the stories and images of war on film.
Hollywood as a narrative center for America tapped into a deep human 
need for myth regarding the experience of 1941 to 1945. Despite its commer-
cialism and easy patriotism, Hollywood provided the American people with a 
usable myth—“that imaginative ordering of experience which helps the group 
or person giving it assent to enjoy or endure life and to accept death” (Oxford 
English Dictionary). Guadalcanal Diary (1943), for example, does not picture 
a wounded marine the way Richard Tregaskis describes it in his book of the 
same name:
His face and shoulders lay in the center of a sheet of gore. Face wounds rained 
blood on the ground. A deep excavation through layers of tissue had been made 
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in one shoulder. The other shoulder, too, was ripped by shrapnel. I could see now 
how he made the terrible noise. He was crying, sobbing, into a pool of blood. The 
blood distorted the sound of his wailings, as water would have done, into a bub-
bling sound. The sound still came in cycles, raising to peaks of loudness. One of 
the wounded man’s hands moved in mechanical circles on the ground, keeping 
time with his cries. (159–60)
That the movie does not show the bloody details or describe the horrible sounds 
uttered by the man demonstrates that, in important respects, the film is not 
“real” in the sense urged by Fussell and Adams, but that does not mean that the 
film is not “true.” Nor does it mean that Hollywood was dishonest, unmindful of 
moral obligations, or unrealistic about the nature of war. That Hollywood often 
failed to achieve its moral potential or that it failed to picture events through 
the lens of historical, social, or political realism, as Fussell and Adams demand, 
should not lead to a general condemnation.
Fussell insists on the experience of the combat infantryman as the only true 
experience of war. His contempt for Hollywood is an extension of his contempt 
for those who “fought” the Good War safe behind the front lines as staff officers, 
supply clerks, administrative assistants, USO entertainers, cooks, typists, artil-
lerymen, and the like. He is certainly right in this regard: out of the millions 
who served, only a few actually saw real or sustained combat. Few men merited 
the coveted Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) that the army awarded only to the 
real fighters—to those who actually faced the enemy in battle and endured the 
greatest danger and hardship. Despite this reality, others, civilians as well as 
veterans, have stories to tell about sacrifice and about the homecoming. These 
alternative stories (alternative histories?), though not as gruesome as Fussell 
and Adams would want, are no less true and honorable. They are not necessar-
ily dishonest or infected with moral smugness, even if they are told without a 
sense of guilt or remorse about the experience of war. “Yet perhaps if we have 
learned through our difficult passage out of the Vietnam era,” Philip D. Biedler 
writes, “that there is actually more than one kind of national experience of war, 
so perhaps we may now see that there is also more than one way to make a film 
that confronts the problems of return, especially to an America once flushed 
with victory and not without reason deeming itself the geopolitical hope of a 
new order of history”(6).
Consider, too, the limitations that politics imposed on filmmakers. Hortense 
Powdermaker notes that the moral vision of producers, directors, and writers 
was often based on the matrix provided by the motion picture industry’s Pro-
duction Code rather than on a firm foundation of moral values. According to 
the self-regulatory code created in 1933, a moral film was one that represented 
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good taste over hard reality. In relation to war films, this meant no words that 
repeated the vile lexicon of the combat soldier (the names of God and Jesus, 
for example, could not be used in vain, and SOB could not be used at all, even 
though real soldiers went much further with their creative profanity). The 
code was less strict regarding violence, but combat wounds or death in battle 
could not be shown in explicit detail. With a wisdom that suffuses her study 
of Hollywood, Powdermaker observes that “a system of morals which includes 
truthfulness, understanding and a concept of freedom cannot be achieved by 
men whose ideas of morality are limited by a set of taboos imposed out of fear” 
(79). For its part, the Office of War Information (OWI) wanted reality in film, 
but without excessive brutality: “The mortal realities of war must be impressed 
vividly on every citizen. This does not mean dwelling at length on pain, anguish, 
and bloodshed. Nor does it mean sugar-coating the truth” (quoted in Roeder 
21). Moviemakers did not have to be fearless to produce movies that reflected 
a basic honesty; rather, they needed a moral compass and enough integrity 
to see possibilities beyond their own immediate concerns for profit and the 
limitations of the Production Code or OWI guidelines. With such restrictions, 
how could filmmakers tell the truth?
MORAL FICTION
By 1945, the film industry assumed that the market for the genre had dried up, 
but it also produced three of its best war films at that time: The Story of G.I. Joe 
(released 13 July 1945), A Walk in the Sun (released 25 December 1945), and 
Battleground (1949). All are moral fictions in line with the aesthetic wisdom of 
Gardner and Powdermaker—a school of interpretation that accepts the idea 
that Hollywood can transcend its limitations and create moral and truthful films. 
Films like these, to apply Powdermaker’s standard, “are not necessarily great 
pictures, but they are all exceptional to the general run of movies because in 
each case someone, with power enough to leave his stamp on the film, really 
cared for and respected mankind—someone who was truly moral” (79). The 
courage to make moral films such as these emerged as World War II entered 
its final phase. By 1944, Americans understood that the Axis powers would be 
defeated; nevertheless, the hard fighting continued, and the last steps to the 
end were deadly and measured. Those who lived through the “duration” were 
impatient with the progress of the war by this time, but they were also much 
more aware of the true meaning of events and much less inclined to accept 
larger-than-life melodramas as the image of that experience. World War II was 
the “last war that involved the passions of a people, and even that is a gener-
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alization we have learned did not hold true for many Americans,” film critic 
Judith Crist conceded. “In our present cinematic sophistication (and perhaps 
it involves our psychological and social growth as well) most films of World 
War II will tell us relatively little about the long-ago conflict.” Yet, Crist argues, 
“they can tell us, largely through indirection, a great deal about the American 
people of the time—and therein is recorded history” (7).
Skeptics also miss or refuse to accept the fact that some of those who made 
war films spoke from experience. Director William Wellman (Wings [1927], 
Battleground, and The Story of G.I. Joe) served in World War I in the Lafayette 
Escadrille, was shot down in 1918, and received the Croix de Guerre for valor. 
Richard Pirosh, who wrote the screenplay for Battleground, was a combat veteran 
of the Battle of the Bulge and later toured the battlefield to jog his memories. 
Additionally, he based the plot on his diary and his observations of the men he 
served with in 1944 (McAdams 114). For his achievement, he won the Oscar 
for best screenplay in 1949.
THE STORY OF G.I. JOE 
The Story of G.I. Joe takes place in September 1943 during the march on Rome. 
It depicts urban warfare and the controversial bombing of the Monte Casino, 
the founding house of the Benedictine monks. Like A Walk in the Sun, the 
action is largely understated. The film tells the story of Company C of the 
18th Infantry and is based on the reporting of Ernie Pyle (played by Burgess 
Meredith), the news writer who became famous for chronicling the tale of the 
common soldier. One sequence, based on the real death of Captain Henry 
Waskow of Belton, Texas (Langman and Borg 556), comments on the death 
of an infantry officer, Captain Bill Walker (Robert Mitchum). Critics praised 
Mitchum’s “underplayed demonstration of exhaustion, disillusionment, and 
deep care for his men” (Dolan 56). His acting was a true and moral statement 
about combat and leadership As the scene is played out, soldiers come by to 
honor their deceased leader. One holds the dead man’s hand; another tenderly 
touches his face. Fussell nevertheless judges that Pyle’s reporting, like that of 
all other journalists, was “fueled [by] . . . misconceptions” and characterized by 
“gentle vagueness” about how men really die in battle. Movies, even good ones, 
lack a commitment to hard truth. Fussell demands more, unsatisfied unless the 
story of the death of GI Joe is told his way: “Where was his wound? How large was 
it? Was it a little hole, or was it a great red missing place? Was it perhaps in the 
crotch . . . ? Were his entrails extruded . . . ? How much blood was there? Was the 
captain’s uniform bloody? Did the faithful soldier wash off his hands?” (Wartime 
287–88). Such are the “probing” questions of a realist. Reviewers, nevertheless, 
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have been nearly universal in their praise for the film’s careful depiction of the 
experience of combat. G.I. Joe  “avoids inflated rhetoric, grandstand heroics, and 
stereotyping that characterized most other World War II films” (Auster and Quart 
7). For his part, James Agee, novelist, screenwriter, and film critic, thought it 
true enough and moral. The dead were not shown as they would have been in 
a real killing zone, but “with a slight shift of time and scene, men whose faces 
have become familiar (during the course of the film) simply aren’t around 
any more. The fact is not commented on or in any way pointed; their absence 
merely created its gradual vacuum and realization in the pit of the stomach” 
(172). Agee understood that—at critical moments in the arts—understatement 
can be more persuasive and powerful than the blare of trumpets or the sight of 
blood and guts. He called it a “war poem.” The scene may not be bloody, but 
“the sudden close-up . . . of a soldier’s loaded back, coldly intricate with the life-
and-death implements of his trade, as he marches away from his dead captain, 
is as complete, moving, satisfying, and enduring as the finest lines of poetry.” 
Agee thought it as good as anything by Walt Whitman, the poetic memorialist 
of the American Civil War (173–74).
A WALK IN THE SUN
Based on the 1944 novella by Harry Brown, A Walk in the Sun is a “gritty tone 
poem” (Rotha 466) that spoke honestly to the audience about the nature of 
war. In September 1943, a Texas platoon lands on the shore at Salerno, Italy; the 
American GIs advance six miles inland and capture a German-held farmhouse. 
The platoon exists in a self-contained world, isolated from the rest of the landing 
force. The greater war is remote and over the horizon. The story is simple—no 
love interests, no complex relationships, and certainly no Hollywood heroics. 
The movie focuses narrowly on the intimate world of the combat infantryman. 
It is less a combat film and more a commentary on the infantryman’s fears, 
anxieties, humor, inner thoughts, and dedication to getting the job done. The 
men talk to themselves and to one another about the futility of war, their loved 
ones, and the return home:
PRIVATE FRIEDMAN (George Tyne): You ever think you’ll live long enough to make 
corporal?
PRIVATE RIVERA (Richard Conte): Baby, I just want to live long enough to make 
civilian.
The nervous breakdown of Sergeant Porter (Herbert Rudley) illustrates the 
psychological pressures of combat. Sergeant Tyne (Dana Andrews), who moves 
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up to take Porter’s place in command, is the model of a noncommissioned of-
ficer capable of leadership. Violence in the movie is understated. For example, 
during the approach to the beachhead, Lieutenant Rand (Robert Lowell) is 
hit in the face by a shell fragment as he looks out over the side of the landing 
craft through field glasses. Moviegoers do not see the wound, as they would in 
post-Vietnam films, but the scene is powerful nonetheless—half his face is blown 
away. Later, a Nazi fighter plane strafes the unit. One soldier is intent on going 
back to see what is happening on the beachhead, and his curiosity results in 
his death. The platoon stages an ambush and destroys a German armored car. 
The film ends with the successful attack on the farm building.
By the time A Walk in the Sun appeared in 1945, American audiences had a 
“widespread sense of the reality of combat.” War “was a subject about which 
people (not just combat veterans) knew something about and felt deeply” (Rotha 
466). The film communicated a “genuine feeling for its melting-pot infantry 
unit’s fear and anxiety about fighting and dying” (Auster and Quart 7). This 
was no sugarcoated view of war.
Fussell admits that the book was “honorable,” but for him, neither this 
book nor any other novel or film would ever convey the “real war” to those 
who had not experienced it, and there was no way of “persuading readers that 
the horrors have not been melodramatized” (290). Adams, too, concedes that 
this film is one of the “dissonant voices” of wartime Hollywood (14). Indeed, 
A Walk in the Sun provided “a high note of quality and maturity,” observes film 
historian Clyde Jeavons, “to conclude Hollywood’s contribution to the war ef-
fort” (140). Important to this discussion is that, for Fussell and Adams, this film 
and a few others were surprising aberrations in a four-year wartime history of 
cinematic whitewashing.
BATTLEGROUND 
Battleground is also narrowly focused on the intimate experience of combat. It is 
the story of a company of the 101st Airborne at the Siege of Bastogne during the 
German winter offensive of 1944 (the Battle of the Bulge, 20–26 December). If 
A Walk in the Sun is about inner thoughts and dialogue and The Story of G.I. Joe 
is about comradeship, Battleground is about the imagery of battle, without the 
compulsion to describe the physical trauma in gruesome detail.
The movie depicts the experience of combat as a series of discrete encoun-
ters with both the enemy and other soldiers. The film does not build up the 
usual momentum of plot device “A” leading to plot device “B” and so on to the 
end. Each episode seems nearly self-contained, with an occasional overlapping 
reference to something that came before. The role of Denise (Denise Darcel) is 
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illustrative of the film’s approach. Early in the film, the men take shelter in her 
home. There is some flirtatious banter, especially from Pfc. Holly (Van John-
son), but nothing comes of it. Then the men move up to the front lines—such 
as they are—and Denise disappears from the film. No one speaks of her or 
refers to the time spent with her. Much later, during a lull in the action, Pfc. 
Holly races back to her house, obviously in pursuit of some kind of intimacy, 
only to find that a new guy, Jim Layton (Marshall Thompson), is already there 
enjoying a bottle of cognac.
Battleground does not indulge in pulp heroics. Only at the very end, as the 
weary troops march away from the battlefield, does the sound track provide the 
kind of swelling chords so common to war films. The one big combat scene is 
an accidental ambush of some German soldiers. The survivors are rounded up 
and taken away as prisoners, and nothing more is said. The American casualties, 
such as Johnny Rodriquez (Ricardo Montalban) and Abner Spudler ( Jerome 
Courtland), are mourned briefly, but the emphasis is always on surviving and 
avoiding foolish risks. The film stresses character, and each man is given a dis-
tinctive touch, but in a very low-key fashion. Donald Jervess ( John Hodiak), a 
journalist before the war, reads Stars and Stripes and compares what he reads to 
Battleground dramatizes the anxieties and exhaustion of combat infantrymen. Sgt. Kin-
nie (  James Whitmore) is at far right.
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what he is experiencing. Kipp Kippton (Douglas Fowley) is more concerned 
about his false teeth. His comments are mostly gripes about army life. Ernest 
“Pop” Stazak (George Murphy), scheduled to rotate home as the battle begins, 
finds himself trapped at Bastogne along with everyone else. The men endure 
a variety of hardships, including winter in the Argonne forest, but in the end, 
they can march away from their battlefield proudly counting cadence.
It is unlikely that any real soldiers sang as they marched away from battle, 
but the film is making a comment about the men’s relief at surviving and the 
pride in their achievement. It may be the one false note in the movie. Although 
the scene is certainly unhistorical, it is not dishonest. In any event, there is no 
suggestion that some great homecoming awaits them, but they have not been 
so traumatized, the film implies, that they will not be able to function as civil-
ians and citizens.
The commitment to telling the truth about the war in The Story of G.I. Joe, 
A Walk in the Sun, and Battleground carried over to three films about the war’s 
consequences: Pride of the Marines (1945), The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), 
and The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1956).
Donald Jervess (right), played by John Hodiak, tries to stay warm in the foxhole he 
shares with another paratrooper in this scene from Battleground.
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PRIDE OF THE MARINES
Pride of the Marines (based on a biography by Roger P. Butterfield titled Al Schmid, 
Marine) was released in August 1945. It tells the true story of a marine blinded 
by a Japanese grenade. The film opens with Al Schmid ( John Garfield) living in 
a boardinghouse, where he falls in love with Loretta (Ann Todd). They hear a 
radio announcement of the Pearl Harbor attack, and Al joins the Marine Corps. 
The film’s short battle scene (lasting about ten minutes) in which Schmid is 
wounded is so realistic that one commentator thought it could serve as a train-
ing film on the proper use of the .30-caliber machine gun. In reality, as well 
as in the film, Schmid is a machine gun loader with the 1st Marine Division 
at Guadalcanal (August 1942), where the men are holding out against inces-
sant enemy attacks. After the gunner (  Johnny Rivers—a Native American) is 
killed and a corporal (played by Dane Clark) is wounded, Schmid takes over 
firing the gun until he is severely injured in both eyes by hot metal fragments. 
Nevertheless, he continues to fire his pistol even though he can no longer see. 
(Schmid and his comrades may have killed as many as two hundred Japanese 
infantrymen during the night of continual attacks.)
The film implies that Schmid will regain at least partial vision (which was 
not the case in real life), and in one scene “men debate postwar prospects in an 
immaculate San Diego veteran’s hospital,” where they can be optimistic. Though 
wounded, their “military experience culminated in upward mobility—a societal 
expression of personal fulfillment,” and “they expect their prewar fantasies to 
be realized” (Koppes and Black 308).
The film argues that it will take teamwork, optimism, and a patient wom-
an—the standard ingredients of a happy ending—to reintegrate Al into society. 
Curiously—and awkwardly for the Fussell and Adams school of war stories—that 
is what actually happened to Schmid. Not surprisingly, real life was more com-
plex than the movie depicted. After initial indications that he might regain 
some sight in his right eye, that prognosis proved wrong. Schmid adjusted to 
his blindness by relying on his wife and even kept up an elaborate masquerade 
that convinced many, long after the war was over, that he was not blind at all. 
Decorated for his bravery, he tried to play the role of national hero: “Like many 
other twentieth century soldiers, much of what Al knew about how he should 
behave as a soldier and a patriot, and then a hero, came from both oral tradi-
tions that the soldiers, beginning in basic training, hand down to one another, 
and war movies he had seen” (Gerber, “In Search” 6–7). The Marine Corps, 
always astute about public relations, encouraged hometown folks to watch Pride 
of the Marines as a recruiting event and then sponsored it at various Guadalcanal 
Day banquets across America (Caute 495). The message was simple: “We can 
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make it work in peace as we did in war” (Dick 229). The movie is “sincere and 
realistic (notably in its handling of the climactic battle scene in which Schmid 
receives his wounds) and spoke with a liberal voice” about anti-Semitism, social 
class, and hopes for a better life ( Jeavons 159). Warner Bros. was apparently 
worried at first about moviegoers’ reception of its grim subject, because at least 
one lobby card showed Garfield, Todd, and Clark dancing down the street arm 
in arm as if in a musical, though another showed that the hero was blind.
John Garfield lived with the real-life hero of the film for a while in prepa-
ration for the role. In a periodic series in the Saturday Evening Post titled “The 
Role I Liked Best,” Garfield said that the movie “told the story of the boy’s 
struggle to adjust himself and work out a romance to a happy conclusion after 
returning from the war. . . . I found him the kind of kid we like to think of as 
the wholesome American type—brave, determined, resourceful, fun loving, but 
not without some of the faults that are American, too.” Schmid thought that 
Butterfield’s biography was more accurate than the film, but both told the true 
story of a common man thrown into uncommon circumstances—an American 
“Everyman” (Gerber, “In Search” 1). Thus, “the thing Al believes most strongly,” 
Butterfield writes, “is that he is no different from any other young American 
in uniform. He expects no special credit or sympathy for what he did, and he 
feels no bitterness over his personal tough luck” (13).
Initially disgusted, angered, and fearful about his fate, Al Schmid survived 
the war and his brief moment of fame to lead a productive and, by all appear-
ances, a relatively happy if unremarkable life until his death from cancer some 
forty years later.
THE BEST YEARS OF OUR LIVES 
Of all the films released in the postwar era, certainly The Best Years of Our Lives 
is still the most famous and probably the most influential. The interlocking 
stories of three veterans who meet when they hitch a ride home to “Boone 
City”(obviously in the American heartland) concentrates on Al Stephenson 
(Fredric March), a banker who served as an army sergeant with the 25th “Tropi-
cal Lightening” Division in the Pacific; Fred Derry (Dana Andrews), a soda 
jerk who rose to captain as a bombardier in the Eighth Air Force in the war 
over Germany; and Homer Parrish (Harold Russell), who served in the navy 
and lost both hands in a fire. Stephenson has a wife and two children and his 
banking career to restart; Derry, after being an officer, does not wish to return 
to his menial prewar role; and Parrish is apprehensive over how he will cope 
with his traumatic disability.
Despite the surface tranquility of Stephenson’s life, he must cope with a 
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drinking problem. Derry must deal with his reckless and unfaithful wife, Marie 
(Virginia Mayo), and the unexpected developments when he falls in love with 
Stephenson’s daughter, Peggy (Teresa Wright). Parrish must face the fear that 
he will be burdening his fiancée with his handicap, and he initially rejects any 
thought of marriage. The film slowly unravels these fears and concerns and 
leads to a reconciliation and a modest sense of hope that a better future awaits 
all three veterans, despite the trauma of their wartime experiences and the 
obstacles before them.
Stephenson, back at the bank, risks his career by advocating for “character 
loans” to veterans, even when they have little or no collateral. To counter the 
argument that the bank would be gambling with shareholder money by making 
such loans, Stephenson argues, successfully, that the risk is worth it because 
“we’ll be gambling with the future of America.” The film, in this regard, is an 
ode to the virtues of small-town capitalism, but Stephenson knows that the 
purpose of the bank is to make profits and that unsecured loans, even to salt-
of-the-earth veterans, are a risky investment. In addition, his patient wife, Milly 
(Myrna Loy), convinces him to give up the drinking habit that he, and many 
others, brought home from the service. It is truly an uneasy peace.
Derry meets and falls in love with Stephenson’s daughter, and the feeling 
is mutual. Derry is still married, however, although he is coming to realize that 
his marriage is an empty charade, so he acquiesces when Stephenson asks him 
to stop seeing Peggy. Derry finally breaks with his wife when he sees her with 
another man; then he loses his job and decides to leave town. As he waits for 
a flight, he visits an aircraft “graveyard” and sits in one of the abandoned B -17 
Flying Fortresses, reliving his days as a captain flying raids over Germany. (In 
fact, director William Wyler used an actual site in Ontario, California, where 
the junked aircraft were stored.) By chance, a work crew salvaging metal from 
the discarded bombers comes along, and Derry lands a job converting swords 
into plowshares—the building of suburbia.
Parrish, after nearly losing the girl he loves because of his anxieties, comes to 
accept that his disability has not affected her feelings for him, and he decides that 
they should marry after all. At the wedding the three men meet again, and Derry, 
now free of his philandering floozy of a wife, can honestly court Stephenson’s 
daughter. It is a happy ending for all three veterans—a model for the nation.
The government never “encouraged Hollywood to concoct happy endings 
or painless outcomes” (Roeder 90), but a movie like The Best Years of Our Lives 
could help “man understand himself and his complicated world, and thereby 
reducing his confusion and fear . . . could also be considered a moral matter” 
(Powdermaker 79). Agee argues that to judge a film by a standard that always 
insists on surface realism misses an opportunity to see its underlying meaning 
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and purpose. Though he is clear about the problems in The Best Years of Our 
Lives—“the movie has plenty of faults, and the worst of them are painfully ex-
asperating” (221)—he concludes that “it is easy, and true, to say that it suggests 
the limitations which will be inevitable in any Hollywood film, no matter how 
skilful and sincere. But it is also a great pleasure, and equally true, to say that 
it shows what can be done in the factory by people of adequate talent when 
they get . . . the chance” (226). The happy ending in The Best Years of Our Lives 
is a celebration of the American culture and a hopeful message about survival 
and recovery.
In an essay published in 1947 in Partisan Review entitled “The Anatomy 
of Falsehood,” Robert Warshow contradicts Agee, stating that The Best Years 
of Our Lives is simply unrealistic about the realities of postwar American life. 
“The falsehood has many aspects,” he observes, “but its chief and most general 
aspect is the denial of real politics, if politics means the existence of real in-
compatibilities of interest and real social problems not susceptible to individual 
solution” (128). Manny Farber, known for his acerbic film reviews, is harsher, 
condemning the film as “a horse-drawn truckload of liberal schmaltz,” one of 
those “solemn goiters” that pretends to high “ART” (15). Time  film critic Richard 
Schickel, writing about his memories of movies during the war, shares Farber’s 
view, calling it “the last great wartime lie, a fantasia of good feelings . . . eerily 
out of touch with human reality” (270). Audie Murphy, the boy-hero of World 
War II turned movie actor, is especially scornful, calling the “part with the kid 
with no hands” not serious drama but “a kind of circus act” (quoted in Graham 
146). (This response may have had less to do with the quality of the film than 
with Murphy’s postwar struggle with combat flashbacks.)
As the film accurately suggests, the vast majority of veterans adjusted amaz-
ingly well to civilian life. These young men, and their wives, “threw themselves 
into civilian life with unanticipated success,” historian William O’Neill notes. 
“The men went to school in astonishing numbers” and “the women supported 
them and bred prodigiously. Together they created a domestic environment of 
exceptional health and vigor and a unique if controversial social ethic” (6–7).
One postwar study of the World War II veteran came to this conclusion: “It 
is true that some men were physically ruined by the war and others bear scars 
which will never disappear. Others broke under the strain.” Nevertheless, “there 
seems little reason for doubting the reabsorption of the vast majority of American 
soldiers into the normal patterns of American life” (Stouffer et al. 643). These 
were middle-class men who, in the words of Adams, were “dull, anti-intellectual, 
and obsessed with buying right and looking right” (152). Film scholar and 
biographer David Thomson notes, “No one should forget that Best Years spoke 
for 1946 with a directness that helps reveal film’s eloquence as a kind of history” 
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(257, emphasis added). The vast majority of veterans felt no shame in the lives 
they were creating, nor did they exhibit “personal bitterness” about the recent 
experiences they had been forced to endure (Kennett 232). America at the end of 
World War II was not only victorious; it was the richest and most powerful country 
in the world. More than that, it was the richest and most powerful country in 
the history of the world. Americans may have been smug and materialistic, but 
they were also rightly proud of the achievements of the American military and 
American industry. The GI Bill, veterans’ reward for service, offered opportuni-
ties only dreamed of by the majority of men before the war.
Harold Russell, for his part, had a difficult time conveying Homer’s anger 
and humiliation because of his own rapid recovery, natural optimism, and 
patriotism, despite his initial anger and outrage (Gerber, “Heroes and Misfits” 
567). Here was a unique backstory in Hollywood history. Russell really was a 
disabled veteran—a former paratrooper who had lost both hands when a de-
molition exercise went horribly wrong (one of sixty-four veterans who suffered 
such wounds in World War II). Russell, against the odds, recovered emotionally. 
Years later, he reflected on his survival and that of America as well: “I could give 
you a long lecture on what went wrong. However, the important thing is that the 
postwar years were a great period for our country, and you had a tremendous 
feeling just being alive, periods of adjustment are always difficult, but they are 
interesting. We had problems, sure, but they didn’t dominate us; we face the 
same things now, and we despair” (quoted in O’Connor and Jackson 162).
The Best Years of Our Lives reflects a truly “realistic” national experience—a 
happy, middle-class ending. Al makes his peace with the Cornbelt Loan and Trust 
Company; Fred, now divorced from his narcissistic and unfaithful war bride, 
finds happiness in the arms of a devoted woman and fulfillment in a job build-
ing new housing developments. Homer, secured by his disability pension and 
the love of his girlfriend, is able to adjust to his condition. The protagonists of 
the film find—as millions of real veterans found—a certain peace and material 
success, even though they still have anxieties about the future. Powdermaker 
observes that Americans believe in the American Dream but are never quite 
“sure of the happy ending” (307). As Butch (Hoagy Carmichael), the owner 
of the bar where the veterans gather from time to time, says to Homer: “Give 
’em time, kid; they’ll catch on. You know your folks’ll get used to you, and 
you’ll get used to them. Then everything’ll settle down nicely. Unless we have 
another war. Then none of us have to worry because we’ll be blown to bits the 
first day. So cheer up, huh?” 
The Best Years of Our Lives is an “American masterpiece” because it “came 
as near perfection as popular art contrives to be. . . . It showed Americans as 
they are, presented their problems as they themselves see them, and provided 
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only such solutions—partial, temporary, personal—as they themselves would 
accept” ( Jeavons 159).
THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT 
The films discussed so far in this chapter all appeared within the first four 
years after the end of the war. Moving into the next decade—the 1950s—the 
depiction of veterans continues to reveal an obsession with the memories of 
their experiences, both combat and noncombat; anxieties about the future; 
and, importantly, the belief that reconciliation, along with peace and material 
success, can be found.
Sloan Wilson’s best-selling novel The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit appeared 
in 1955; the film version, directed by Nunnally Johnson, opened in New York 
in April 1956 and was a popular success. Gregory Peck hoped the film would 
be another Best Years of Our Lives. The central figure, Tom Rath (Peck as a for-
mer paratrooper), survives both the European and Pacific wars, but at great 
personal cost. At one point Tom tells his wife, Betsy ( Jennifer Jones), that he 
killed seventeen men, one of them a teenage German soldier he first attempted 
to strangle and then stabbed to death. More traumatically, Tom lives with the 
memory that he accidentally killed his best friend, Hank Mahoney, with a hand 
grenade while attacking a Japanese pillbox. The film provides flashbacks to 
both incidents, including Tom’s unwillingness to accept his friend’s death and 
his demand that the corpse receive medical attention. It is, however, a third 
set of memories that both provokes a crisis in Tom’s life and finally leads to 
reconciliation with his war experiences. While stationed in Rome between the 
end of the European war and his transfer to the Pacific theater, Tom has an 
intense love affair with a young Italian woman. He then leaves for the Pacific 
and never hears from her again, and by 1955, he has only his memories of their 
relationship to balance his memories of combat.
In a plot twist, Tom accepts a new job with the United Broadcasting Cor-
poration television network as an assistant to Ralph Hopkins (Fredric March), 
the dominating founder and president of the company. There, Tom discovers 
that an elevator operator in the UBC building is a former comrade and, even 
more surprisingly, is married to the cousin of the woman in Rome. He is told 
that he has fathered a child and is asked to make some small contribution to 
support mother and son. Tom, depicted as a “good man,” feels compelled to 
reveal to his wife the story of his affair and the existence of the child. Naturally, 
his wife is devastated, but she soon comes around to both understanding and 
accepting the situation, especially after Tom reveals the extent of his combat 
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experiences, including his certainty that, after surviving the war in Europe, he 
would surely be killed in the Pacific. 
As the film concludes, Tom and his wife arrange for a $100-a-month depen-
dence allowance for the woman and child. The film ends with their driving off 
to suburbia—if not into the sunset, at least into the sunshine of a happier and 
more honest relationship. Tom prospers materially as well. Hopkins takes a lik-
ing to him, even though Tom tells his boss that he cannot and will not become 
a work-obsessed figure like Hopkins. Family comes first, he tells Hopkins, who 
accepts Tom’s decision, especially in the light of his own dysfunctional private 
life. The film makes it clear that Tom has a hard time adjusting to civilian life, 
both emotionally and morally. He is addicted to martinis and cannot forget 
the war. But in the end, Tom gets over it. His generation stands in contrast to 
contemporary America and its “Culture of Trauma”—a preoccupation with 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Shepard 385–99) and the image of Vietnam 
veterans’ combat experience (Shewring 65). Tom survives his experience and 
his nightmares. He is able, in the end, to find a mature happiness, just as most 
American veterans did. Like most other veterans, he welcomes the material 
Tom Rath’s (Gregory Peck) wartime affair with a young Italian woman (Marisa Pavan) 
will complicate his adjustment to peacetime in The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit.
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comforts of Middle America and comes to terms with the agony of combat 
memories (Gladwell). 
MacKinlay Kantor, in Glory for Me, the verse novel that was the initial basis 
for The Best Years of Our Lives, speaks for all these celluloid heroes about the 
American Dream—for Homer Parrish, Al Stephenson, Fred Derry, and, by 
extension, Al Schmid and Tom Rath—in a passage that describes the neigh-
borhoods in which these veterans find happy endings—in their dreams:
The street was lilac in its lengthened ease—
Some maple trees, some elms, a vacant lot,
And houses set above their sloping lawns . . . 
And boys rode bicycles in circles
With auto traffic thin.
An old man walked; he turned to talk
With someone sitting on a porch.
It was the sober, verdant kind of street
Where God is middle-class. (29)
Hollywood’s moral fiction was, in the words of John Gardner, “a game played 
against chaos and death”(6). The producers, screenwriters, directors, and ac-
tors created a certain kind of history—part myth and part reality, yet essentially 
true to the American experience of war.
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JAMES JONES, COLUMBIA PICTURES, 
AND THE HISTORICAL  
CONFRONTATIONS OF  
FROM HERE TO ETERNITY
13 / J. E. Smyth
James Jones spent his career writing about the average American soldier’s 
experience immediately prior to and during the Second World War, from his 
“fictional” combat trilogy From Here to Eternity (1951), The Thin Red Line (1962), 
and Whistle (published posthumously in 1978) to his popular history World War 
II (1975). Nevertheless, historians and literary critics have tended to downplay 
his investment in the Second World War as a site of historical speculation and 
critique and have emphasized instead the more limited, historically ambivalent 
discourses of personal memory controlling the popular novelist’s creative drives 
(Giles; MacShane). Because the content of From Here to Eternity originated from 
Jones’s own experience in the peacetime army on Hawaii between 1939 and 
December 1941, his potential historical perspective on this period could be 
marginalized or ignored in favor of vaguer arguments about “social protest” 
or “personal vision.” Jane Hendler’s recent study of From Here to Eternity and its 
1953 film adaptation by Columbia Pictures assesses Jones and the filmmakers’ 
preoccupation with prewar army life as “the nostalgic recreation of a world in 
which males coexisted outside the confines of domesticity” (30). Rather than 
being a historical re-creation of prewar army life at the frontier of America’s 
Pacific empire, Hendler views the novel and film as contemporary texts expos-
ing “the postwar crisis in masculinity.” According to Hendler and other film 
scholars, the historical contextualization of From Here to Eternity in 1941 Hawaii 
serves only to alleviate the conflicted gender dynamics facing American men 
in 1951 and 1953; the past functions as pure nostalgia, as masculine myth, 
where contemporary cultural contradictions can be reconciled temporarily 
(Bell-Metereau 92).
Both these views in American literature and film studies neglect From 
Here to Eternity’s critical historical attitude toward the 1941 peacetime army as 
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well as Jones’s class-based indictment of traditional historiography on prewar 
America and the military. Although not discounting the novel’s and film’s status 
as icons of the 1950s controversy over the representation of sex, violence, and 
language (Bell-Metereau 102–3), this chapter asks new questions about From 
Here to Eternity’s production history, its place within Hollywood’s World War II 
genre, and its unconventional attitudes toward national history.
Jones’s historical sensibilities, though neglected by critics, had a power-
ful impact on the development of the film adaptation between 1951 and 
1953. The novel, Jones’s original screenplay, and Daniel Taradash’s adapted 
script were written deliberately as prewar narratives of the lives of marginal 
Americans—Robert E. Lee Prewitt, a southern cracker enlistee; First Sergeant 
Milton Warden, the perfect soldier with no identity outside the army; Angelo 
Maggio, an Italian American enlistee from Brooklyn; Lorene, a Hotel Street 
prostitute; and Karen Holmes, an army wife. Although Columbia’s filmmak-
ers showed some deference to the Production Code by editing the novel’s 
explicit sexual content and language, film historian Lawrence Suid’s series of 
interviews with director Fred Zinnemann, screenwriter Taradash, and others 
from the Department of Defense’s Motion Picture Production Office reveals 
the controversy over filming such a representation of the U.S. military (Suid, 
Guts 117–29). While Suid relates Columbia’s partial accommodation of the 
military’s demands, other film critics such as Peter Biskind claim—without any 
tangible evidence—that From Here to Eternity was essentially a “conservative” film 
(222), reinforcing the dominant 1950s corporate ideology. This chapter, which 
focuses on the extant production correspondence and script notes, reveals that 
the filmmakers’ major concerns were to retain Jones’s portrayal of a corrupt 
and brutal American military system and to engage the myth of the officer-
hero, the U.S. Army, and Pearl Harbor through multiple personal narratives of 
American misfits. This chapter also reexamines Jones’s preliminary script for 
Columbia and the extent to which he and others shaped the film’s historical 
content, for the film is more than a controversial adaptation of a controversial 
best seller, and more than a reflection of contemporary gender conflicts. From 
Here to Eternity represents a major revision of the World War II genre and a 
partial reversion to the conventions of the popular prewar historical cycle. Its 
antiheroicism and historical structures combine to undermine both the visual 
and the textual establishment histories of the war.
JAMES JONES AND REVISIONIST HISTORY
Jones would express his distaste for traditional historical writing in his 1975 
account of the Second World War, heading an entire chapter with the ques-
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tion, “Is History Written by the Upper Classes for the Upper Classes?” (World 
War II 70). For Jones, traditional histories of World War II were inescapably 
constructed from the mind-set of officers, who shared the same privileges and 
social background as historians. Historical writing was therefore “always filtered 
through the ideals system [that the historian] and other members of his class, 
the commanders, shared and adhered to.” Soldiers like Jones could therefore 
read histories of campaigns in which they had fought and realize that “the his-
tory doesn’t at all tally with the campaign [they] remembered.” There were two 
competing historical discourses of World War II, but establishment histories 
tended to dominate public perceptions of the war. Jones’s work, both popular 
history (World War II ) and historical fiction (From Here to Eternity, The Thin Red 
Line, Whistle), not only was an antidote to the grand studies of foreign policy 
and military biography proliferating since the mid-1940s but also attempted 
to reconcile the discrepancies among soldiers’ memories, military history, and 
popular consciousness.1
There was never any doubt about Jones’s historical loyalties. World War II 
is a soldier’s perspective, a history from below that mixes rarely seen graphic 
art with memories of his combat experience at Guadalcanal, where he was 
wounded and later decorated. But World War II is not just a memoir; it was 
designed and marketed as a popular history by Grosset & Dunlap. As Jones 
writes, “The whole history of my generation’s World War II has been written, 
not wrongly so much, but in a way that gave precedence to the viewpoints of 
strategists, tacticians and theorists, but gave little more than lip service to the 
viewpoint of the hairy, swiftly aging, fighting lower class soldier” (71).
Jones had been practicing his unique revisionist history since 1951 and 
From Here to Eternity. His on-the-job research began in 1939, when he joined 
the U.S. Army Air Corps. In the space of a few weeks, however, he was trans-
ferred to the more proletarian infantry. On Sunday, 7 December 1941, he was 
at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, eating breakfast, when the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor. After being wounded at Guadalcanal in 1942, he was shipped 
back to the States. Struggling with depression and injuries, he went AWOL, was 
thrown into more than one army prison, and was finally discharged in mid-1944 
(MacShane 60–70). In 1948 Norman Mailer’s The Naked and the Dead made 
the American war experience in the Pacific even less idyllic than it seemed in 
World War II combat films and on the pages of Time and Life magazines, but 
Jones’s novel was unique. It was the first sustained portrayal of the pre–World 
War II army on Hawaii, and it was not flattering. Graft, corruption, sadism, 
adultery, prostitution, and homosexuality were all part of not only the prewar 
army but also prewar America. By writing about men and women like Milton 
Warden, Robert E. Lee Prewitt, Angelo Maggio, Lorene, and Karen Holmes, 
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Jones attacked traditional historical accounts on two fronts. These were the 
stories of average people, unknown to traditional narratives of military culture 
and the war. But more significantly, these men and women lived their lives 
outside the myth of the old army and of continental America itself. Pushed 
beyond the borders of the United States into a new, peripheral twentieth- 
century American “frontier,” these people projected an oppositional perspec-
tive on the “Stateside” nation’s social and cultural norms.
When From Here to Eternity was at the proofs stage, Jones’s editor at Scrib-
ner’s, Burroughs Mitchell, sent it out to several prominent American novelists, 
including Norman Mailer and John Dos Passos. Mailer’s response was generally 
positive; he would later meet Jones in New York, and the two would remain 
friendly. But Dos Passos, whose U.S.A. trilogy (The 42nd Parallel [1930], 1919 
[1932], and The Big Money [1936]) was then one of the most ambitious and 
well-known works of twentieth-century American historical fiction, had a more 
specific comment: “It is an impressive book. People will buy it for the smut but 
there’s more to it than that. Prewitt and Angelo and Sergeant Warden and the 
rest of them reach something of the greatness of figures of tragedy because their 
hopeless dilemma expresses so glaringly the basic tragic dilemma of our time. 
There’s considerable valuable folklore in the book, and as history . . . well it’s 
the only account of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor I’ve seen that doesn’t 
have some damn selfserving axe to grind” (quoted in Mitchell, 3 Jan. 1951). 
Dos Passos recognized that Jones’s work both resonated with contemporary 
America and offered a powerful synthesis of American myth and history. Its 
most obvious historical ties were to the attack on Pearl Harbor, an event that 
triggered national involvement in the global war and became the basis for a 
modern American myth. Dos Passos was well aware of the way the disaster at 
Pearl Harbor had been used as a propaganda tool, as a means of justifying the 
internment of Japanese Americans and focusing on Japanese treachery rather 
than on the incompetence of the military establishment.2
From the moment that news of the attack reached Washington, Pearl 
Harbor was censored, managed, and packaged as a national myth. Within the 
first few months of the war, the public was inundated by press coverage, but 
the information was limited, restricted mostly to set text and official quotations 
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The New 
York Times’ spread on 7 December included no photographs at all. In fact, the 
naval department, evidently frightened by the potential public reaction, did not 
release photos of the damage until they appeared in the February 1942 issue 
of Life, and not until December 1942 was Life allowed to publish an extensive 
spread (“Pictures”; “Pearl Harbor”). Instead, the government identified Pearl 
Harbor with simplified slogans and later a carefully vetted series of images 
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emphasizing  Japanese treachery and selfless American heroism, whether 
through FDR’s rhetoric to Congress (“Always will we remember the character of 
the onslaught against us”) or director John Ford’s government-approved filmed 
reconstruction December 7th (1943) (Rosenberg 20–21). During wartime, the 
government exerted substantial control over the production of history, whether 
setting the rhetorical tone for its popular remembrance or commissioning a 
canned version for movie theaters. It had not always been that way.
THE FEAR OF FILM AND HISTORY
During the 1930s and early 1940s, Hollywood specialized in high-profile histori-
cal films and war epics (The Last of the Mohicans [1936], The Buccaneer [1938], 
Gone with the Wind [1939], The Fighting 69th [1940], Sergeant York [1941]), 
attracting audiences and cultural power that mainstream historians could 
only dream of. But after Pearl Harbor, the studios gave up major American 
historical productions for contemporary war films such as Across the Pacific 
(1942), So Proudly We Hail (1943), and Objective, Burma! (1945)—films that re-
lied increasingly on a sense of immediacy, a borrowed documentary aesthetic, 
and realistic violence (Smyth). The relationship between the studios and the 
federal government was necessarily close during World War II. The Office of 
War Information (OWI), established in June 1942, was essentially a centralized 
propaganda agency that liaised with the studios (Schatz 268–80; Koppes and 
Black; see also chapter 11 in this collection). In exchange for supporting the 
armed forces and the government in an unequivocal way, Hollywood received 
massive foreign distribution rights. John Ford and Gregg Toland’s December 
7th was a product of this new era of Hollywood filmmaking and was the first 
attempt to narrate the attack and its effect on the nation. This government-
approved history, though claiming to be the definitive view of Pearl Harbor, 
with voice-over narration and document inserts, had almost no actual footage 
from 7 December. Although they shot “on location,” the attack footage was 
nothing but simulated reenactment, process photography, rear projection, and 
miniatures (Basinger 128; Skinner). Nevertheless, the film was marketed and 
received as a true documentary, supplemented by text inserts in the opening 
sequences in which Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox asserted that the film was “factual.” Like many great American war 
myths, the government ripped the event from the tangle of classified political 
and military details and used the press and culture industries to revision it as 
a set of often spurious printed documents and reconstructed images. 
When Harry Cohn, head of Columbia Pictures, paid James Jones $82,000 
for the film rights for From Here to Eternity in 1951 (New York Times 6 Mar. 1951), 
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his decision signaled a return to the old-style war films made in the 1930s, when 
the studios routinely paid high prices for the rights to best-selling memoirs 
(Sergeant York), historical novels (Gone with the Wind ), and other presold material 
(The Roaring Twenties [1939]). Unlike the modern war features produced during 
the time of U.S. combat involvement, which were frequently based on cheap 
original scripts churned out by studio writers, From Here to Eternity was intended 
as a major prestige production. It was based on a historical novel published 
ten years after Pearl Harbor, and the accuracy of its historical content would 
prove to be the major source of contention in terms of censorship and army 
cooperation. To make From Here to Eternity, Cohn had to enter into censorship 
negotiations unlike any faced before by the Hollywood studios. Even though 
the OWI had effectively been disbanded after the war, filmmakers still had to 
handle the armed forces carefully. If the film in any way remained faithful to 
the novel, it promised to revise the heroic war genre, correcting the fallacies 
of December 7th. It would also break with the carefully monitored propaganda 
of Hollywood’s wartime genre (Wing and a Prayer [1944]; Objective, Burma!; 
Back to Bataan [1945]). But in order to film with any degree of authenticity, 
December 7th and the constructed documentary footage.
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the studio needed the army’s cooperation to shoot at Schofield Barracks in 
Hawaii (Suid, “Zinnemann” 50; Bell, letter to Towne). 
Jones’s book was a bit too historically “authentic” for the army. He literally 
created the problem with his author’s note: “This book is a work of fiction. The 
characters are imaginary and any resemblance to actual persons is accidental. 
However, certain of the stockade scenes did happen. They did not happen at 
Schofield Barracks post stockade but at a post within the U.S. at which the 
author served and they are true scenes of which the author had first-hand 
knowledge and personal experience.” Jones trod a fine line as a historical 
novelist—the major officers who had served at Schofield were still alive and 
could sue successfully for libel. Asserting its fictional basis in a disclaimer was 
a standard safety mechanism, but Jones mischievously problematized this con-
vention by mentioning his personal story. He and his editor had to word the 
note with care. At one point, they even submitted it to Scribner’s lawyer Horace 
Manges for comment. Manges responded that the note was “extremely dan-
gerous to the book, from the point of view of libel” (10 Nov. 1950). Filmmakers 
concurred. As director Fred Zinnemann recalled, “The book, fiercely critical 
of the pre-war U.S. Army, had created a sensation . . . filming a book so openly 
scathing about the peacetime army . . . was regarded by many as foolhardy if 
not downright subversive” (Autobiography 117, 119). In a letter to Harry Cohn, 
Ray Bell, the studio’s Washington representative, estimated that there would 
be four major sources of trouble if the studio tried to release the film: military, 
censorship, religion, and politics. But the first two really worried him.
From the Pentagon point of view the Army personnel are most unfavorably 
shown. Corruption, incompetence, goldbricking, and preoccupation with sex 
and gambling seem to be the army’s sole concern. I do know that there exists 
in Washington a feeling against this book because, according to an officer who 
volunteered this information, “the book portrays a rotten and corrupt army, it 
propagandizes against officers and the traditions of the service, and it could be 
a demoralizing influence at a time when this country’s trying to build a big army, 
draft eighteen year olds and win the confidence of parents and Congress.”
Bell knew that the U.S. military’s involvement in Korea in 1951 made From 
Here to Eternity an especially irritating and even dangerous project. Embroiled 
in an increasingly unpopular, limited war, the army must have taken one look 
at Cohn’s plans and wished for reinstatement of the OWI. Studio employees 
were fazed at first by the government’s attitude; a week after Bell’s report, an-
other studio employee submitted that “this story must be Pro-Army.” He also 
attacked the antiofficer slant of the book and said that “99% of the dialog in 
this book cannot be transferred to the screen. . . . We intend to show all of our 
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officers as intelligent officers of whom the army would be proud” (Report). 
A military adviser, Colonel E. P. Hogan, had similar criticisms and concluded, 
“The flag should be waved more.” At first, Cohn paid attention to the army 
perspective, but the postwar relationship between Hollywood and Washington 
was becoming strained. Bruised by the House Un-American Activities Commit-
tee hearings and crippled by the 1948 Paramount antitrust decision, Hollywood 
had been shouldering burdens from an increasingly antagonistic Washington. 
Cohn, tired of knuckling under government pressures, was tempted to produce 
a faithful, high-profile production of Jones’s work.
But for the first year of preproduction, Cohn and Columbia tried to nego-
tiate the novel’s historical controversy by bringing in a series of advisers and 
commentators. Columbia officials were very nervous about acquiring Pearl 
Harbor footage (From Here, conference notes; Towne memo, 2 Apr. 1953). 
For this film, historical authenticity mattered so much that no one even con-
sidered restaging Pearl Harbor. Ironically, though, the army did not hold the 
copyright to the combat footage of Pearl Harbor. Fox Movietone cameraman 
Al Brick had been up early that morning, getting some authentic Pearl Harbor 
material for the feature To the Shores of Tripoli (1942), when the Japanese began 
their attack (Doherty 231–32). The government declassified the combat footage 
in December 1942, so From Here to Eternity’s filmmakers had the best of both 
worlds and combined Brick’s actual combat footage with extensive sequences 
from Toland’s reenactments for December 7th. However, the army threatened 
to prevent crews from shooting at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii if the script 
were not tailored to its specifications. As Colonel (later General) Frank Dorn 
wrote, “Army cooperation in production of this film is extremely doubtful” 
(letter to Columbia Pictures).
Dorn, the U.S Army’s deputy chief of information, was particularly con-
cerned with the screen representation of Private Angelo Maggio, the working-
class Italian American who voices some of Jones’s toughest critiques of the 
military. Dorn advised Columbia to portray Maggio as “a parasite on society” 
because he failed to fit in with the army. Colonel Clair Towne of the motion 
picture section of the Defense Department’s Office of Public Information was 
equally against Maggio, but he also disliked the cynical Warden and the indi-
vidualistic Prewitt. Towne thought that he had a solution, though: “By making 
it clear that while Warden, Prewitt and others might dislike their officers, this 
dislike stems from the realization that they, as individuals, do not have the stuff 
to become officers . . . the officers might be placed in a better light” (undated 
comments). In effect, the army was working overtime to label any of its ethnic 
or critical components as aberrant and to rewrite Jones’s working-class social 
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history, where traditionally marginalized, “voiceless” men could not speak. As 
Jones memorably writes in his novel, “The clerks, the kings, the thinkers: they 
talked and with their talking ran the world. The truckdrivers, the pyramid 
builders, the straight-duty men; the ones who could not talk, they built the 
world out of their very tonguelessness—so the talkers could talk about how to 
run it, and the ones who built it. And when they had destroyed it with their 
talking the truckdriver and straight duty man would build it up again, simply 
because they were hunting for a way to speak” (130).
Even before Cohn bought the film rights, Jones and Mitchell had low 
expectations of Hollywood. In one exchange, the editor commented, “God 
knows what Hollywood would do with your book,” and Jones replied, “I don’t 
give a damn what they do to the movie” (Mitchell, 26 Apr. 1950; Jones, letter 
to Mitchell). Columbia evidently cared, for in an unusually brave move, Cohn 
hired Jones to write the script in early 1951. Jones did not push for an accurate 
adaptation. His preliminary script, dated 16 May 1951, indicates the extent to 
which he saw From Here to Eternity as a traditional historical film along the lines 
of Young Mr. Lincoln (1939) and Citizen Kane (1941). The narrative opens with 
a flashback to Harlan, Kentucky, in 1932. Sergeant Warden narrates the film in 
a voice-over, which had been a standard component of the biopic genre since 
the 1930s. Jones also employed other tricks of historical filmmaking, including 
montages and document inserts. The montage covering Prewitt’s youth and 
early army experiences was an extraordinarily lengthy fifteen pages, ending 
with Prewitt’s arrival at Schofield ( Jones, preliminary treatment 3–18). But 
Jones’s use of these old historical signifiers had an innovative edge: Prewitt was 
not a famous, successful man like Abraham Lincoln or Charles Foster Kane; 
he was an unknown, Depression-era “forgotten man.” It was no accident that 
Jones named him Robert E. Lee Prewitt. He may have been just as proud and 
devoted to the army as his namesake, but Prewitt was not a privileged West 
Point graduate from Virginia. He was a twentieth-century rebel who had grown 
up in a depressed southern mining community. He had seen his father and 
uncle killed by the police during labor riots, and he had watched his mother 
die of tuberculosis. Prewitt left home to ride the rails as a kid and was raped 
by an older man. He joined the army in 1936 because he had nowhere else 
to go. Prewitt was not just a literary exception; during the Depression, many 
young men joined the army to avoid unemployment and starvation ( Jones, 
From Here 367; MacShane 38).3
Surprisingly, even Jones’s script shows evidence of the self-censorship that 
was endemic in much of classical Hollywood. Perhaps as a means of placating 
the censors, he turns the adulterous Karen Holmes into “the Captain’s younger 
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sister.” Also, the corrupt Captain Dana Holmes of the novel is transformed into 
a good guy who pressures Warden to “lay off ” his hazing of Prewitt. In this early 
version, Prewitt is killed by a Japanese Zero pilot rather than by American soldiers 
from another unit, thereby absolving the army of any blame for his death. Even 
Prewitt’s term in the stockade is construed as a misunderstanding after another 
soldier lies about his confrontation with Prewitt. Major Thompson, the head of 
the stockade, eventually busts Fatso Judson for killing Maggio, so the army looks 
better on all fronts. Jones did not document his feelings about the script, and it 
is difficult to assess how much of it was his own idea and how much was dictated 
by Sylvan Simon, the producer then in charge of day-to-day preproduction. Nev-
ertheless, it is significant that Jones was willing to adopt old-fashioned historical 
elements and censorship in these early stages.
Jones did not remain a screenwriter for long, and the job was eventually 
given to Daniel Taradash. Cohn hoped to bring Jones back on the project, but 
he declined, stressing his frustration with Simon’s pressure to make Captain 
Holmes a more sympathetic character. In a 29 June letter to Jones, Cohn tried 
to change his mind, citing his own anger at the need to pacify the army:
Have we not changed certain characters in order to pacify the Army and thus 
lost the quality and theme which you tried to put forth in your novel? I feel that 
the implications in the novel of officer laxity and improper use of authority were 
so astonishing that it opened the eyes of all who read it. If in making the movie 
we eliminate this entirely, then we have bastardized the book and cleaned it up 
to present it for screen purposes without integrity or purpose. It is my candid 
opinion that we do not have to lose this idea.
Jones still refused to participate. 
After getting the army’s temporary approval based on the novelist’s ex-
purgated script, Cohn kept any further rewrites quiet for a year (Brown).4 
The secrecy worked in Cohn’s favor for a while. As Suid has pointed out, even 
Taradash’s carefully revised script of February 1952 took a year to receive 
the army’s grudging approval (Guts 120; Towne memo, 11 Feb. 1953; Towne 
letter, 30 Mar. 1953). Ironically, though, most of the military’s requests for 
changes involved issues more suited to the Production Code: changing the 
New Congress Club from a bordello to a nightclub, editing language, eliminat-
ing the suggestion of Karen’s other affairs, making Holmes “a more positive 
character who exerts an influence for good on Prewitt” (Hogan), removing 
Warden’s drunk scene, and cutting Maggio’s descriptions of his beatings in 
the stockade. Most of these requests were carefully ignored (Towne letter, 21 
Jan. 1953; Adler).Taradash’s main concession was to have the U.S. Army brass 
dismiss the incompetent Holmes rather than promote him. 
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Taradash kept the harsh edge of Jones’s original, which pleasantly surprised 
Hollywood critics in August 1953, when the film was finally released (see reviews 
in Cue, Hollywood Reporter; Weiler). Even the culture of Hotel Street prostitu-
tion, which Taradash semidisguised as a “private club,” was easily translatable: 
“There has, for example, been no attempt to make angels of the playful girls 
in the New Congress Club,” wrote one critic after the premiere (review in 
Variety). Film publicity in the press book emphasized Lorene’s commodified 
sexuality (“Sure I’m nice to you. We’re nice to all the boys”), and in a New York 
Post interview with Archer Winsten, actress Donna Reed mused on her role, 
“How would I have made all that money in two years, enough to buy a house 
back home, join the country club, become respectable. I couldn’t make that 
much just being a dance hostess. No, I suppose it wouldn’t make much sense 
unless you were a prostitute.” But From Here to Eternity was not just remarkable 
for its frank discussion of female sexuality in the 1950s; it was a startling, criti-
cal picture of the much-honored American army that helped win the war. The 
book’s and film’s representation of the army’s long-standing exploitation of 
women added a new historical dimension to the popular understanding of 
the recent national past.
TARADASH AND ZINNEMANN’S HISTORICAL ICONOGRAPHY
From Here to Eternity was a turning point in the World War II film genre for 
another reason. Although films made about the Pacific campaigns began to 
“document” World War II events with more historical text toward the end of 
the 1940s (Battleground [1949], Sands of Iwo Jima [1949]), it was not until 1953 
and From Here to Eternity that Hollywood really looked at World War II as a finite 
historical era. Perhaps it was partially because America was involved in another 
war in the Pacific, this time in Korea.
But From Here to Eternity certainly did not supply a “Good War” alternative 
to the increasingly unpopular stalemate in Korea. Instead, the film makes mili-
tary apathy and incompetence a feature of World War II’s historical context. 
The revised final script begins with an intertitle, “June 1941,” and Taradash 
introduces key scenes with a soldier reading a newspaper with headlines such 
as “JAPS ADVANCE IN CHINA” and “LOU GEHRIG DIES” (Taradash 1, 17, 60). When 
outlining the 7 December attack, Taradash’s script notes, “Stock shots bombing 
Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor from ‘December Seventh’ and 
other available material” (148, 152). During the 1940s, newsreels and fictional 
films about the war used reconstructions and limited government and military 
combat footage (often not from Pearl Harbor). Even during the 1930s, Hol-
lywood had borrowed footage from the military to make films about World 
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War I (The World Moves On [1934], The Roaring Twenties [1939]). The World 
War II footage in war films of the 1940s was contemporaneous and largely in-
terchangeable with the cinematography of the “fictional” Hollywood footage. 
But in From Here to Eternity there is a definite visual contrast in the quality of the 
documentary and “fictional” cinematography. The 1953 shots of the fictional 
historical content are in clear, sharp black and white. The documentary foot-
age is grainy, dark, and blurred, with abrupt editing cuts. Even the character 
of the sound is different—the engines, guns, and bombs in the documentary 
footage are almost deafening compared to the scenes of Sergeant Warden at-
tempting to manage the chaos in Schofield after the attack. The footage acts 
like a historical artifact—something from the vaults of history. This is what the 
American Stateside public saw in 1942 and at intervals in newsreels thereafter, 
but in 1953 it had aged visibly and did not fit with the pristine cinematography 
and modulated sound of the rest of the narrative. The filmmakers’ refusal to 
conceal this obvious contrast in cinematography and sound foregrounds a 
sense of historical discontinuity.
Is this simply a case of seamless Hollywood fiction juxtaposed with rough 
documentary accuracy, a historical touch added to bolster a romantic fabrica-
From Here to Eternity’s historical intertitle.
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There is an obvious visual contrast between the fictional and documentary footage. 
Here, Zinnemann’s history of 7 December captures First Sergeant Milton Warden 
(Burt Lancaster).
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The “official view”: Al Brick’s documentary footage shows its age in 1953.
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tion of Hawaii in 1941? Hardly. These contrasting forms of cinematography 
and sound represent equally contrasting historical views of Pearl Harbor. What 
Zinnemann shows Americans in 1953 also happened in 1941 Hawaii—the 
disparate, private, painful stories of Prewitt, Lorene, Maggio, and Karen. 
Taradash’s script streamlined the 850-page narrative and connected four 
of the protagonists to devastating personal stories: Karen’s miscarriage and 
hysterectomy, Lorene’s decision to become a prostitute, Prewitt’s accidental 
crippling of his best friend during a boxing match, and Maggio’s death scene, 
in which he tells Prewitt of repeated beatings in the stockade. These kinds of 
people never made the headlines; they were not interviewed after Pearl Harbor. 
Their stories, related in the film as lengthy personal narratives, were lost to 
traditional history, which emphasized Japan’s treachery and the horror of the 
attack. In contrast, the filmmakers retain and expand the marginal narratives, 
making them central to their film.
From Here to Eternity reuses much of the iconography of the old historical 
film—the opening intertitle identifying the historical locale and period, the 
use of dates (such as one glimpse of a calendar reading “7 December” on 
the wall beside Warden), the documentary footage and location shots, the 
contrasting personal narratives. But ironically, it lacks one of the hallmarks 
of the genre: a credited military adviser or endorsement. Although the army 
allowed Zinnemann to photograph army personnel around Schofield, it “did 
not authorize Columbia Pictures to include in the picture the fact that Army 
cooperation had been given” (Parks). Zinnemann, however, may have real-
ized that obtaining and displaying army approval in the credits would have 
invalidated the accuracy of Jones’s perspective. Instead, the film constructs a 
historical world that does not rely on the spurious endorsement of the estab-
lishment. Zinnemann’s vision was not confined to the events of Pearl Harbor 
and World War II. He heavily underlined passages in his copy of Jones’s novel 
where the Depression is credited with causing Prewitt to enlist (Zinnemann, 
marginalia 7, 676, 854–55). As he commented after reading Taradash’s script, 
he did not want to lose the feeling of history in the novel: “If at all possible, 
reference should be made to Prew’s childhood—the fact that he was from 
Harlan County, Kentucky, that he grew up in the Depression—bummed all over 
the country and finally got into the Army because, ‘he wasn’t ready to starve 
yet’” (Zinnemann, notes 6). Zinnemann also underlined an unusual passage 
in which Jones, via Prewitt, speculates on the untold histories “written” in the 
scars on a soldier’s body. “Each one had its own story and memory, like a chap-
ter in a book. And when a man died they buried them all with him and then 
nobody could ever read his histories and his stories and his memories that had 
been written down on the book of his body” (marginalia 669). Prewitt is a work 
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of living history: “Robert E. Lee Prewitt, a history of the U.S. in one volume, 
from the year 1919 to the year 1941, uncompleted, compiled, and edited by 
We the People.” But Jones recognized the tenuousness of the historical trace 
left by the ordinary soldier, and Zinnemann, though intrigued, never pushed 
Taradash to incorporate it in the script.
Taradash did retain some aspects of Jones’s comments on the frontier 
myth and its relevance to the 1930s army. In the novel, Prewitt’s and Warden’s 
different attitudes toward the army are based on the conflict between the tra-
ditional, nineteenth-century frontier discourse and a more skeptical view of 
America’s international, twentieth-century frontiers. Prewitt had been drawn 
to the army by stories told by his uncle John, who had briefly served during 
the Spanish-American War (1898). Later, Jones explicitly links Prewitt’s desire 
to join the army to the old nineteenth-century frontier myth and a desire to be 
an active participant in history. According to Jones, farming—associated with 
1920s agricultural depressions, southern tenant poverty, stasis, and anonymity— 
is the antithesis of American romanticism. Although Prewitt is convinced that 
the agrarian ideal kills the American spirit, the army “impressed him with a 
sense of seeing history made,” since it carries on the “noble” frontier tradi-
tion (17). So he moves out of the South and heads west—as did millions of 
Americans during the Depression.
The frontier no longer exists: Prewitt wins no new territory, but he does fol-
low in the footsteps of many pioneers by forming a relationship in Hawaii with 
a “native” Asian woman, whom he later discards.5 Like the pioneers and their 
historians from George Bancroft to Frederick Jackson Turner and Theodore 
Roosevelt, Prewitt forgets this mixed-race union in order to pursue individual 
achievement. But even though he doggedly hangs on to the idea of the past, 
others remind him that it is only a myth. A friend warns him (Warden in the 
film), “Maybe back in the old days, a man could do what he wanted to do, in 
peace. But he had the woods then. . . . And if they followed him there for this 
or that, he could just move on. There was always more woods up ahead. But 
a man can’t do that now” ( Jones, From Here 11).6 To a certain extent, Jones 
attributes the prevailing public romanticism of the army to the dominance of 
an officer culture: “It is hard to be Romantic about the cavalry when you have 
to curry your own horse, and it is hard to be adventurous about the uniform 
when you have to polish your own boots. And this explains why officers, who 
are above such menial tasks, are capable of such exciting memoirs of war” 
(79). These memoirs and their heroic, establishment-derived discourse would 
later become the foundation for historical interpretations of U.S. conquest 
and “development.”
Jones undercuts these myths of progress and development with Warden’s 
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and Maggio’s perspectives on officers. Both believe that there is no essential 
difference between nineteenth- and twentieth-century army life. Class clashes 
are not defined by historical change, and there is no such thing as nostalgia 
or historical progress; the army has always been a grim place for the common 
soldier. When Maggio complains to Prewitt about the corruption and nepotism 
in their infantry company, he growls, “This is the Army, they can give it back to 
Custer” (40). Warden, too, uses the Custer analogy to describe Captain Holmes. 
“Boots and Saddles,” he sneers at his egomaniacal chief’s back, a pointed refer-
ence to officers whose greatest feats of military incompetence (such as Little 
Big Horn, in 1876) are written into memoir and history as tragic-heroic events 
(Slotkin). For Jones, Pearl Harbor was America’s next Little Big Horn.
Not without irony, Taradash and Zinnemann decide that Lorene should 
have the last word in From Here to Eternity—not the heroic Warden or any high-
ranking army officer. From Here to Eternity is a series of untold narratives excised 
by establishment history, related by people who have literally been pushed 
to the very edges of America. But even these personal histories begin to be 
corrupted by the effects of Pearl Harbor. The events of 7 December unleash 
a rabid historical consciousness. Within minutes of the bombings, Hawaiian 
civilians are calling the event “history” ( Jones, From Here 763). On their way 
home, Lorene and Georgette meet a professor who is already planning a book 
about the attack. As soon as the new draftees begin arriving, Washington pres-
sure groups begin to close down the Hotel Street brothels, wiping the peace-
time army experience from the islands. But Lorene’s final personal narrative 
is the most sustained example of reconstructing the past in the aftermath of 
the attack. Lorene, who has fallen in love with Prewitt, remakes herself into 
a prosperous businesswoman. Once she has enough money, she tells Prewitt, 
she will refashion her identity in the States and become an upper-middle-class 
housewife. Soon after Prewitt is killed, she begins to “fix” her official story in 
the same way that Warden managed the infantry company’s records. On board 
a ship that will take them back to the States, Lorene tells Karen Holmes that her 
“fiancé” was killed during the Japanese bombing of Hickam Field. According 
to her, Prewitt was a bomber pilot and was awarded the Silver Star. Although 
Lorene retains Prewitt’s southern heritage, she transforms the poor white 
cracker and common soldier into a fine gentleman and a pilot. The war has 
just started, and already the civilian population is joining the army in rewrit-
ing its history, in constructing a heroic image. Although Karen recognizes that 
Lorene’s story is false, she does not challenge the myth.
More than ten years separated the attack on Pearl Harbor from the pub-
lication and film production of From Here to Eternity. Were Jones’s novel and 
Hollywood’s adaptation of it merely reflections of the cultural mythmaking that 
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began in December 1941, or was the historical perspective more defined? In her 
recent study of Pearl Harbor in American memory, Emily Rosenberg contests 
the discursive divide between serious history and popular memory (of which 
historical fictions are a part), writing that “memory and history are blurred 
forms of representation whose structure and politics need to be analyzed not 
as oppositional but as interactive forms” (5). Although the recent interest in 
memory studies has elevated the method’s importance as an interpreter of his-
tory, the effort has been to see collective, public memory as a constructed and 
managed form of historical interpretation, much like traditional historiography 
(Rosenberg 4 –6; Halbwachs). And there persists a sense that memory, regard-
less of its oppositional stance on historical issues, does not have the clout of 
official history. Jones had a lifelong distrust of traditional history and official 
views because of their tendency to obliterate other perspectives on the past. 
Historical fiction, rather than the more traditional memoir or military history, 
enabled him and Columbia Pictures to place marginalized perspectives on Pearl 
Harbor back into the popular understanding of American history.
Recent scholarly studies of homosexuals in the World War II military 
(Allan Bérubé’s Coming Out Under Fire) and the racial and sexual tensions in 
wartime Hawaii (Beth Bailey and David Farber’s The First Strange Place) do not 
raise new questions about the wartime military. Decades before a revamped 
cultural studies began to alter the perspective of American historical research, 
James Jones and Columbia Pictures wrote their own controversial versions of 
Pearl Harbor and the American military. But Jones, Taradash, and Zinnemann 
were not just unconventional historians whose iconoclasm spurred develop-
ments in American social and cultural history of the 1990s. In his novel and, 
to a certain extent, in his original screenplay, Jones was equally concerned 
with the authenticity of history, the politics of memory, and the fragility of 
historical experience. Harry Cohn, Daniel Taradash, and Fred Zinnemann 
also pursued these ideas as contrasting forms of narrative and cinematog-
raphy. In foregrounding the myth, in drawing attention to the discrepancy 
between popular views of American militarism, heroism, and World War II 
and the more complex social histories of Depression-era America, Jones and 
Columbia’s filmmakers did what other historical novelists and filmmakers be-
fore them had done only rarely—confronted the process by which Americans 
reconstruct a mythic past.
NOTES
1. See, for example, U.S. Army; Halsey; Kimmel; Hoehling; Waller; Brownlow; 
Baker; and Editors.
300 / J. E. Smyth
2. Among the many accounts and analyses of Pearl Harbor are Clark; Lee; Flynn; 
and Sweeny. For more contemporary accounts, see Lord; Melosi; Collier; Prange, At 
Dawn and Pearl Harbor; and Stinnett. 
3. During the 1920s the army was scaled back to around 150,000 men; by 1939, it 
had only 174,000 men, most of whom never saw action until 1941.
4. Rebecca Bell-Metereau mistakenly states that From Here to Eternity never received 
army approval (104).
5. Prewitt’s relationship with this native woman was not included in any of the 
early scripts.
6. Jones’s idiomatic syntax is retained throughout.
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HOLLYWOOD’S D-DAY FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE  
1960S AND 1990S
The Longest Day and Saving Private Ryan
14 / Robert Brent Toplin
Cinematic history from Hollywood is intriguing not only for its perspectives 
on the past but also for what it says about the times in which the films were 
being produced. Often the creators of motion pictures address concerns of 
the present when they fashion stories about the past. This characteristic is 
certainly evident in the case of movies depicting events associated with World 
War II. For instance, Bataan (1943) shows U.S. forces fighting bravely in the 
face of an overwhelming enemy. The movie’s tragic conclusion, in which all 
the Americans die, symbolizes the difficult position of American soldiers in 
the Pacific during the early war (Basinger 45–46). In another example of 
present conditions weighing heavily on a cinematic treatment of the past, the 
creators of Patton (1970) planned to tell the story of a heroic general as they 
moved their project toward production in the 1960s. By the time they were 
ready to begin major photography, however, controversies over the Vietnam 
conflict made the intended gung-ho portrait of General Patton problematic. 
Consequently, the filmmakers shaped their story and advertising in ways that 
suggested a complex and sometimes critical portrait of their subject’s militarism 
(Toplin, History 163–64).
It is useful, then, to consider the message and appeal of two films that are 
among the most influential American movies about the Second World War: 
The Longest Day (1962) and Saving Private Ryan (1998). Both deal with the inva-
sion of France’s beaches on 6 June 1944; each became a blockbuster, drawing 
large audiences in the United States and abroad; each proved to be a surpris-
ing success, because in both 1962 and 1998 the traditional war film seemed 
to have run its course; and each film was the project of a leading Hollywood 
mogul who had racked up a long list of movie successes. Darryl Zanuck was 
the major force behind The Longest Day (he produced the movie and directed 
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more than half its scenes), while Saving Private Ryan owed its success largely 
to Steven Spielberg.
Why did these movies resonate with audiences in 1962 and 1998? In what 
ways did Zanuck’s and Spielberg’s films address different or similar concerns 
of the American people in 1962 and 1998? How did critics’ reactions differ, 
and in what ways do these distinctions throw some light on changing attitudes 
toward war? Above all, did these films contribute to the public’s appreciation 
of history, even though each communicated very different impressions of 
warfare and history?
THE LONGEST DAY
Darryl Zanuck took a substantial risk when he made The Longest Day. After years 
of splendid successes (including many Academy Awards) as a producer and 
as head of production at 20th Century-Fox, he seemed to be losing his magic 
in the early 1960s. Zanuck’s work on Cleopatra turned out to be a fiasco (the 
The Longest Day features a large cast of notables: Steve Forrest (as Captain Harding), 
John Wayne (as Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort), Tom Tryon (as Lieuten-
ant Wilson), and Stuart Whitman (as Lieutenant Sheen).
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long-delayed picture eventually appeared in theaters in 1963). That expensive 
historical epic left Fox stretched financially. Yet, while Cleopatra was in produc-
tion, Zanuck proposed to make the most expensive black-and-white war epic 
in Hollywood history. His $10 million gamble succeeded magnificently. The 
Longest Day grossed $17 million in the United States and reaped millions more 
abroad, and it is still shown on network TV at least once annually.
Zanuck’s movie carries a symbolic message about the Cold War: it shows 
that American, British, and French troops could cooperate to defeat a com-
mon enemy. In 1944 the Allies had successfully challenged Nazi Germany; in 
the 1960s, the movie seemed to suggest, those same allies could successfully 
confront the Communists (Ambrose, “Longest Day”). Zanuck made this mes-
sage more workable by depicting the German leadership with a modicum of 
empathy. German military commanders in The Longest Day seem confused, 
fumbling, and sometimes comic. They are not enthusiastic about Nazi poli-
cies, and in one telling moment, a general complains about Hitler’s foolish 
leadership, blaming the Führer for the failure of the German counteroffensive 
(Custen 362). Zanuck’s rather friendly portrait of America’s erstwhile enemy 
was appropriate for the times; Germany, of course, was a democratic ally of 
the United States in 1962 and represented an important pillar in the West’s 
strategy of collective security in Europe.
Americans soon needed to practice Zanuck’s preachment about collective 
security. In October 1962, just a few weeks after The Longest Day appeared in 
American theaters, the Cuban Missile Crisis flared. During that confronta-
tion, President  John F. Kennedy relied on support from European and Latin 
American allies. As in the assault on Normandy’s beaches in 1944, the successes 
of October 1962 depended on multilateral cooperation.
Zanuck employed two techniques to make his three-hour war film appeal-
ing to the audiences: he engaged numerous Hollywood stars, and he tried to 
make the war scenes look authentic. The Longest Day’s all-star cast included 
forty-two notable actors appearing in various roles, often in cameos. Among 
them were John Wayne, Henry Fonda, Robert Mitchum, Peter Lawford, and 
Richard Burton. This technique helped audiences follow the movements of 
the many characters in the story, since they could recognize the famous faces. 
The only woman to have a significant role was Zanuck’s mistress at the time, 
Irina Zemick, who played a French resistance fighter. She had met Zanuck at 
a cocktail party. “This creepy old man started asking me out on dates,” she re-
ported. “He was so ugly and obnoxious, but he offered me a part in the movie, 
so I thought, ‘What the hell. I’ve nothing to lose’” (quoted in Silverman 85). 
That role won Zemick international attention.
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To make his war story look realistic, Zanuck incorporated a veritable army 
and navy in the production, obtaining many ships, planes, tanks, and trucks 
from the NATO allies. The French loaned him two thousand soldiers, even 
though France was involved in a long and difficult war at the time against 
guerrillas in Algeria (Suid 172). One amused observer claimed that Zanuck 
was in control of the ninth biggest military force in the world when he staged 
the invasion of Normandy for the silver screen (Time 19 Oct. 1962: 91). The 
Pentagon came through with men and equipment too, but its participation 
became controversial because The Longest Day shows Allied troops shooting 
Germans who are attempting to surrender. Overall, the availability of thousands 
of men and considerable military hardware allowed Zanuck to give his film a 
documentary look. As one reviewer noted, the movie was “a tour de force of 
audio-visual verisimilitude—surely if this is not precisely how it was, it’s as close 
to the genuine article as any imitation is likely to come” (Gill 188).
Zanuck spent a lot of money to obtain authentic-looking airplanes, ships, 
and tanks for his film, but with regard to another aspect of authenticity, many 
critics blasted him for failing to deliver. They noted that The Longest Day 
depicts combat death as rather painless. The sensibilities of critics and audi-
ences in 1962 called for a more realistic portrayal of the idea that war is hell 
and that soldiers suffer terribly. Many reviewers expressed disappointment 
in the movie’s presentation of slaughter on the beaches. Hundreds of extras 
fall into the sand, they observed, but each victim appears to be unscathed. 
The troops “die handsomely and intact, with their box-office appeal unim-
paired,” reported Jay Jacobs in The Reporter: “One gets the impression that 
each death is instant, sanitary, and the result of a mercifully accurate shot to 
the heart. Nobody has the bad taste to be shot in the face or the belly” (18 
Nov. 1962: 50–51). Time’s critic complained that “Zanuck shamelessly sugars 
his bullets—men die by the thousands, but not one living wound, not one 
believable drop of blood is seen on the screen” (19 Oct 1962: 91). Similarly, 
Newsweek’s reviewer observed, “Nobody bleeds, or groans, or cries out”; the 
critic noted that although the director seemed determined to show audiences 
that 6 June 1944 was a big day, he also needed to indicate that it was a terrible 
day (15 Oct. 1962: 105).
Even before The Longest Day appeared in theaters, various Hollywood 
filmmakers had been more honest in depicting the impact of war on soldiers, 
although much more realistic depictions would be possible once the Produc-
tion Code Administration was no longer an obstacle. More grisly images of 
combat became available to audiences through Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986) 
and Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987).
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SAVING PRIVATE RYAN
No movie portrays the violence of wartime combat more memorably than 
Steven Spielberg’s 1998 classic Saving Private Ryan. David Denby of New York 
magazine succinctly identified the significance of Spielberg’s film: “In this one 
scene [near the beginning], as in another battle at the end, Spielberg knocks 
into oblivion every World War II movie ever made, and not even Platoon or 
Full Metal Jacket has brought us so close to the experience of men facing live 
fire at close range” (17 July 1998: 44).
More than any other aspect of the movie, critics and audiences focused 
on the emotional impact of watching the first half hour of Ryan. They sensed 
the soldiers’ fear in the midst of danger, chaos, and confusion on the beaches. 
Through abundant use of the shaky handheld camera, numerous loud and 
distinct noises, occasional silences, and shocking imagery, Spielberg gives his 
movie the appearance of a documentary shot by combat cameramen. These 
opening sequences lack the heroics that might be expected from such figures 
as John Wayne or Robert Mitchum in earlier war movies. Men traveling on 
the Higgins boats vomit from seasickness and fright; many are cut to ribbons 
Darryl Zanuck provides an expansive view of the battlefield in The Longest Day. 
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as they charge the beaches. Others fall quickly in horrible deaths that involve 
mangled torsos and spilled intestines. Some cry in fear.
Spielberg relied heavily on Stephen Ambrose’s book D-Day for the details 
in the movie’s first twenty-seven minutes. Those memorable scenes of chaos, 
confusion, and bloodshed are described at length in Ambrose’s volume. Even 
the lead character in the movie is based, to some degree, on a figure described 
by Ambrose. Tom Hanks’s role as the likable Captain Miller resembles the 
character of Tom Howie, a mild-mannered teacher of English literature before 
the war. Howie led his men brilliantly in the actions immediately following 
D-day. He died in combat, and Life magazine described “The Major of St. Lo” 
as a hero (Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers 74–76.)
Is Saving Private Ryan an antiwar film or a celebration of courage in com-
bat? It is both. Spielberg’s complex message communicates the sensibilities of 
Hollywood and the American people at a time quite different from the 1960s, 
when Zanuck created The Longest Day. In fact, Saving Private Ryan communicates 
attitudes about warfare that are different from today’s outlooks as well.
For many Americans in 1998, combat in foreign wars seemed largely a thing 
of the past. Americans had enjoyed relative peace for several years. When the 
Saving Private Ryan stars: Tom Hanks (as Captain Miller), Matt Damon (as Private 
James Ryan), and Edward Burns (as Private Richard Reiben).
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nation’s soldiers became bogged down in Somalia’s troubles in the early 1990s, 
Americans were horrified. They reacted strongly to the disturbing news that 
eighteen U.S. troops had been killed in urban fighting—with some of the bod-
ies dragged through the streets. Sensitivities over combat losses in that African 
nation weighed heavily on President Bill Clinton as he contemplated action in 
later international crises during his two terms in office (1993–2001). Clinton 
demonstrated a reluctance to commit U.S. soldiers to combat. When interven-
tion seemed necessary in the Balkans, Clinton operated primarily through air 
campaigns. Military actions by the United States and NATO in 1998 brought 
down Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic without American combat fatalities. Saving 
Private Ryan’s reminder of the horrors of warfare nicely served an American 
and global population that held strong hopes for cost-free international strides 
toward peace in the post–Cold War world.
Yet Ryan is also a commentary on history, and in that regard, it provides an 
inspiring message about the nobility of sacrifice for a greater cause. It portrays 
World War II in the way many Americans recalled it in the 1990s—as the “Good 
War,” a worthy struggle against the evils of tyranny, oppression, and militarism. 
Spielberg opens his film by showing the U.S. flag flapping in the breeze, and 
he leaves audiences with the memorable question of whether the aged Private 
Ryan has led a life worthy of the tremendous sacrifices made to rescue him. 
Spielberg reminds audiences that sometimes wars are, indeed, necessary, and 
for good causes (Doherty).
The director delivers a useful commentary for the time. For years, many 
Americans had been sharply critical of military engagement because of their 
disillusionment over the Vietnam conflict. Spielberg shows audiences that some 
battles are worth fighting, and the men who risk their lives in worthy causes 
deserve to be honored. Film reviewer Karen Jaehne identified the public’s sense 
of distance from the war experience at the time, as well as the public’s need to 
recognize war’s potential to serve noble purposes. “Ultimately,” she states, “we 
watch this film as a generation of Americans who have never risked their lives to 
defend the free world or gone hungry because there was scarcely enough food 
for the entire family. In short, to those of us who have never made a personal 
sacrifice for the greater good, Steven Spielberg brings us the ersatz opportunity 
of the experience we missed because of the Pax Americana” (39).
Although the combat scenes are largely a product of Spielberg’s genius 
(and that of cinematographer Janusz Kaminski, who worked with Spielberg 
previously on Schindler’s List, Amistad, and The Lost World: Jurassic Park), the 
structure of the story emerges largely from the imagination of writer Robert 
Rodat, who cleverly mined numerous elements of old World War II combat 
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movies to make an interesting tale. Most young movie patrons of 1998 were 
unfamiliar with these techniques, but some of the older audience members 
may have recognized them. Perhaps Rodat honed his skills by reading  Jeanine 
Basinger’s magnificent primer on the genre, The World War II Combat Film. For 
instance, Saving Private Ryan features a small U.S. military unit made up of 
diverse ethnic types. There is a smart aleck from Brooklyn, a Jew, a religiously 
inclined southern sharpshooter (who resembles Sergeant York), and other 
stereotypes that fit right into Basinger’s formula for the World War II combat 
film. Some of the soldiers in Saving Private Ryan doubt their mission, and there 
is tension between the captain and his troops. Combat waxes and wanes, and 
during quiet periods the soldiers talk about their girls back at home and jest 
with one another. When a soldier violates military discipline, an enemy sniper 
shoots and kills him. The message: follow orders in combat situations (Bas-
inger 37–82). In these and many other ways, Saving Private Ryan references 
the combat genre. It borrows many of its principal characteristics, but, as in 
all successful war pictures, it also tweaks and revises traditions of the narra-
tive to meet the needs of the age and to respond to the constantly changing 
expectations of movie audiences.
Soldiers prepare to rush the beach in Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan. 
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CINEMA HISTORY: FACT, FICTION, AND “FACTION”
Which film offers a better depiction of history? Does The Longest Day or Saving 
Private Ryan present a better and more informative portrayal of the past? At first 
glance, The Longest Day appears to win the contest for historical verisimilitude. 
After all, Darryl Zanuck’s production, based on Cornelius Ryan’s book of the 
same name, portrays the experiences of real-life people; the book relies on 
interviews with numerous participants in the 1944 invasion. Lawrence H. Suid, 
author of an important study of war films, praises The Longest Day considerably 
but takes Steven Spielberg to task for relying mainly on fiction rather than 
fact. He notes that Spielberg “appropriated virtually every scene in Saving 
Private Ryan from other films” and complains that “nothing on the screen 
actually happened, despite the violence, blood, and gore” (627). He also 
claims that many of the events depicted in the movie could not have hap-
pened. Spielberg’s film, Suid concludes, “strains and even far exceeds the 
limits of dramatic license” (630).
Nevertheless, we can recognize and appreciate the achievements of these 
two fine movies by noting the distinctive conditions of their production. The 
Longest Day appeared when Hollywood was still making the traditional big-
budget, big-cast epics. That movie’s didactic style, brimming over with details 
about strategies for the invasion of Europe, was suitable to filmmaking in the 
early 1960s. Zanuck’s technique was not easy to imitate, as the makers of Tora! 
Tora! Tora! (1970) and Midway (1976) discovered. The expectations of audi-
ences changed, and cinema changed as well, partly because of the expansion 
of television. A vision of the future appeared in the mid-1970s when network 
television introduced The Missiles of October  and Eleanor and Franklin, character-
driven stories that became identified as “docudramas.” Soon cable television 
would expand the offerings, as numerous biographical films and documenta-
ries about historical events appeared on PBS, the History Channel, HBO, and 
other venues. By the 1990s, Americans expected to receive semieducational 
entertainment on the small screens in their homes; they ventured out to movie 
theaters for a different kind of experience.
Experience  is the right word to employ when considering modern cinematic 
histories (Turan). In recent years, such movies’ primary contribution to histori-
cal appreciation relates to the audience’s emotional connection to another time, 
place, and situation. Steven Spielberg’s motion picture accomplishes that goal 
splendidly by giving viewers the feeling of combat and sacrifice on the beaches of 
Normandy and in the cities of France (Rosenstone 19–24). The movie’s success 
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in touching emotions was abundantly evident as patrons left the theaters—many 
of them in complete silence. To speak would have been tantamount to dishon-
oring the men who had lost their lives on the altar of freedom.
Saving Private Ryan is a much more modern combat film thanThe Longest 
Day. It contrasts notably with the old-fashioned war films of the 1940s, 1950s, 
and early 1960s. Ryan accentuates the experience of combat but offers few 
historical markers about the purpose and strategy of the war planners. There 
are no speeches about Hitler’s tyranny or comments about the events that led 
America to join the fight in Europe. It communicates messages about the past, 
but in distinctive ways.
Saving Private Ryan, like most of today’s cinematic history, is what I call 
faction, and we cannot hold faction to the traditional standards of authentic-
ity. In faction, the history we are familiar with through our textbooks is in the 
background, but the stories of people in the foreground—the narratives featur-
ing lead characters—are pure fiction. Faction is the format in Titanic (1997), 
The Patriot (2000), U-571 (2000), and many other modern historical films. The 
litmus test for judging faction’s value in advancing historical appreciation can-
not relate solely to its treatment of historical details. This genre demands, by 
its very nature, a great deal of creative and artistic license (Toplin, Reel History 
94–97). Faction cannot be truthful in its many small details. Our judgments 
of it must be based on a film’s potential for delivering larger truths in sophis-
ticated ways. By that measure, Saving Private Ryan succeeds as an important 
cinematic commentary on the past.
Both The Longest Day and Saving Private Ryan engage audiences impres-
sively, but in very different ways. Saving Private Ryan is more emotion driven. 
Ryan offers representations of World War II to moviegoers who, for the most 
part, have little or no personal connection to the war. By contrast, The Longest 
Day is essentially information driven. It provides historical interpretations of 
epic proportions for Americans who participated in the war themselves or 
whose parents were intimately connected to it. The cinematic approaches of the 
two films are quite distinctive, yet the movies’ impact on audiences is similar. 
As visually stunning depictions of historical situations, both films arouse the 
public’s interest in reading and learning about the past.
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COLD WAR BERLIN IN THE MOVIES
From The Big Lift  to The Promise
15 / Thomas W. Maulucci Jr.
Although a sizable literature exists on the “Berlin film” (Byg), relatively few 
authors have explored filmmakers’ use of Berlin as a political space during the 
twentieth century. They have devoted considerably more attention to issues 
such as modernity and postmodernity, gender, urban culture, and aesthetics.1 
After 1945, however, filmmakers represented Berlin not only as an important 
part of their mise-en-scène but also to comment on life in divided Germany and 
on the larger Cold War itself. These symbolic presentations evolved over time 
in several distinct patterns that closely coincided with changing developments 
in the city. In the late 1940s, as the Cold War was beginning to unfold, the 
cityscape communicated ambiguity and uncertainty about the future of Ger-
many. During the next decade, however, both Western and German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) filmmakers began to portray the “other” Berlin as a source 
of danger, both in the political and in the cultural sense. The construction of 
the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 was a major turning point. Until 1989, East 
German filmmakers continued to portray the GDR as a safe haven, but the 
Wall itself became a taboo theme for them. In contrast, Western filmmakers, 
both German and non-German, frequently minimized the Wall’s function as 
a divider in a return to the more ambiguous themes that characterized the 
immediate postwar years.
POSTWAR BERLIN MOVIES IN THE EARLY COLD WAR
In films made in Berlin right after the Second World War, the shattered 
cityscape represents the morally ambiguous human landscape and the still fluid 
and uncertain political situation of postwar Germany. These “rubble” films stress 
the need for a clean break with the past and a new start, although the future 
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remains uncertain. In Berlin Express (1948), a Hollywood production, the Nazi 
threat is still overt. An American, an Englishman, a Frenchwoman, and a Rus-
sian on a military train from Frankfurt to Berlin unite to thwart an attempt by 
Nazi underground agents to kill a prominent German resistance member. At 
the end of the film, the four Allied heroes and the resistance member go their 
separate ways under the shadow of the Brandenburg Gate; it is unclear whether 
they will cooperate in the future (Fujiwara 150–57; Christopher 68–69).
German rubble films set in Berlin did not ignore the Nazi past but were 
much more concerned with the problems of everyday life and themes such as 
the redemption and reconciliation of “normal” Germans (Shandley). By 1948 
some of them were also cautiously addressing Cold War themes, a difficult task 
due to the need to secure Allied licensing for films. ’48 All Over Again [Und 
wieder ’48] (1948), a production of DEFA studios in the Soviet zone, tells the 
story of students involved in a film production on the 1848 revolutions. Songs 
from a cabaret scene make a plea for German unity (also the official Soviet 
position in the late 1940s and early 1950s) but also imply that the failure to 
establish a democratic, united Germany in 1848 eventually led to Nazism and 
the present-day division of the country (Shandley 141–48). Instead of going 
one hundred years into the past, The Ballad of Berlin [Berliner Ballade] (1948), a 
film licensed in the American zone, starts off one hundred years in the future 
in a prosperous, modern Berlin. In doing so, it validates the current struggles 
of the city’s population and effectively encourages it to keep going despite the 
Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate was behind the Wall.
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onset of the Berlin Blockade in June 1948. In this popular parody of previous 
German rubble films, the hero, Otto Normalverbraucher (Otto “Average Con-
sumer,” played by Gert Fröbe), represents the average Berliner who is increas-
ingly caught between East and West and is uncertain about the political future 
(Shandley 174–79). In the film, the city and its citizens “are transformed from 
perpetrators to victims of international disputes” (Shandley 179).
The Big Lift, a 1950 Hollywood production written and directed by George 
Seaton, tells the story of the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift. It is one of the last rubble 
films and also the first true Cold War Berlin film. Shooting began even before 
the airlift ended with the full cooperation and encouragement of the U.S. Air 
Force, which also provided most of the actors (Seaton 119–33; Lipschutz 16–18, 
25). Central to the plot are uncertainties about the reliability of the Germans 
as new partners in the Cold War. Danny McCullough (Montgomery Clift) and 
Hank Kowalski (Paul Douglas) play two American servicemen in the air force 
with very different views on the people they are aiding. Danny is sympathetic 
toward the Berliners and tries to learn their language, while his friend Kowal-
ski, a Polish American and a former prisoner of war, has difficulty even being 
In The Big Lift, Danny MacCullough (Montgomery Clift) and Frederika Burkhardt 
(Cornell Borchers) find love among the ruins of Berlin.
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civil to them. He believes that were the situation reversed and the Americans 
in need of aid, the Germans would sooner kick them in the teeth.
Berlin’s geography demonstrates similar doubts. The Soviet zone is por-
trayed as a potentially dangerous place; indeed, Soviet border guards arrest 
Berliners and seize their goods with impunity. But as Danny’s German girl-
friend Frederika (Cornell Borchers) points out, the zonal boundary is impor-
tant only for the Allies—Berliners travel back and forth across it all the time. 
In some circumstances, moreover, the Soviet zone can be a haven. Günther 
(Fritz Nichlicsh), once a German camp guard, unsuccessfully tries to flee to 
the Soviet zone to escape his vengeful former charge, Kowalski. Danny stops 
Kowalski from beating Günther senseless just as American MPs arrive. However, 
Danny is temporarily out of uniform due to an accident, and because of this 
disciplinary infraction, he and Frederika must cross the border themselves to 
escape the MPs. There follows one of the most memorable scenes in the film 
in which the zonal boundary itself seems to be fluid. Soviet guards apprehend 
the two just as they are about to cross Potsdamer Platz back into the West, but 
this is exactly where the Soviet, U.K., and U.S. zones meet. American and Brit-
ish MPs physically prevent their arrest until the officers present can resolve 
whether the interzonal border runs fourteen meters from this curbstone or 
that curbstone. Forgotten in the jurisdictional debates, Danny and Frederika 
slip off unnoticed.
Further complicating Berlin’s geography is the fact that spies are every-
where. While visiting Frederika’s West Berlin apartment building, Danny meets 
Herr Stieber (O. E. Hasse), who cheerfully informs him that he is a Russian 
spy whose job is to record the number and type of Allied planes landing at 
Tempelhof Airfield. The Soviets doubt the accuracy of the official figures pub-
lished daily in the newspapers and are especially pleased when Stieber neglects 
to record a few aircraft, which makes Western reports look exaggerated. He 
never pays for these omissions because the Soviet spy checking up on him is 
his own brother-in-law. Stieber estimates that there are fifteen thousand Soviet 
and ten thousand Western spies in Berlin and at least five hundred double 
agents. He himself is helpful, honorable (although not totally honest), and an 
admirer of the United States due to his past travels there. The film portrays 
the spy situation in an almost comical manner. But it also sends the message 
that Stieber and many other Berliners are willing to collaborate with either 
the Soviets or the Western powers in order to get along.
The Big Lift also uses two love affairs to demonstrate German unpredict-
ability. While Frederika is working to clear rubble from the city streets, Danny 
confronts her about the lies she told concerning her family’s resistance activi-
ties during the Third Reich. Frederika excuses her actions by pointing to the 
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“sewer” that the Berliners live in and comparing the Berliners themselves to 
“rats.” “Look around you—that’s why we lie,” she tells him. As Danny walks away, 
part of a building behind Frederika crumbles to the ground, as if to symbolize 
their relationship. Yet after seeing scenes of intense devastation and privation 
during a walk through the streets, Danny accepts the truth of her statement, 
and they are reconciled. Just before they are to be married, however, Danny 
learns from Stieber that Frederika is using him solely as a means to get to the 
United States, where she plans to rejoin her real husband, a former SS man, in 
St. Louis. Frederika is indeed a rat and a “bad” German, and Danny breaks off 
their relationship. She contrasts poorly with Gerda (Bruni Lobel), Kowalski’s 
girlfriend, a “good” German who learns the true meaning of democracy.
COLD WAR BERLIN BETWEEN THE BLOCKADE AND THE 
WALL, 1949–1961
George Seaton was right when he said that The Big Lift “wasn’t really anti- 
Russian” (131). It was more about the Germans and their uncertain future. 
Over the next decade most of the ambiguities in films about Berlin faded as 
the Cold War intensified. Despite assertions by both German governments that 
there was only one city, events clearly belied this claim. During the blockade, 
separate administrations sprang up and asserted control over public services 
in their respective halves of the city, which increasingly began to operate inde-
pendently. Urban planners tried to turn their halves of Berlin into showcases 
for their respective systems (Ladd 178–89; Large 417–25). Personal contacts 
between East and West Berliners, as measured by indicators such as mail traf-
fic and Eastern visitors attending West Berlin cultural events, also seemed to 
decline across the board between 1949 and 1961 (Merritt 170–73). Even if both 
halves of the city remained united by their relative poverty in the 1950s—due 
to its “island” status, West Berlin did not enjoy the full fruits of the “economic 
miracle” of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and, like East Berlin, 
remained dependent on government subsidies—they were obviously drifting 
apart as municipalities.
The city also became an ideological battlefield. West Berlin “represented 
the door in the Iron Curtain. It became the meeting point for East and West. 
It was a showplace of Western Civilization that countered the influence of 
Communist indoctrination and provided an outlet for psychological pressures” 
(Engert 151). West German and Western Allied authorities realized that their 
part of Berlin served as an open provocation to the communist East and did 
what they could to emphasize its function as an “outpost of freedom,” including 
making discounted cultural and educational opportunities available to East 
322 / Thomas W. Maulucci Jr.
Germans (Large 416; Engert 451; Fehrenbach 234–53). As a 1953 short docu-
mentary produced by West Berlin authorities put it, their city was an “island 
of hope” [Insel der Hoffnung] for those who had fled the “people’s prison of 
the GDR” (Heimann 90–91). Between 1949 and August 1961 an estimated 2.6 
million East Germans—approximately one-sixth of the population—crossed 
the still-open municipal border and were received in refugee camps before 
being relocated in the FRG (McAdams 5). West Berliners themselves were 
intensely politicized during the 1950s, with approximately one-half regularly 
taking part in mass demonstrations, most of them directed against communist 
policies (Prowe 265). East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) chairman Walter 
Ulbricht was not totally off the mark when he claimed that West Berlin was 
being used as a “front-city” for Western aggression and “subversion” directed 
against his state (McAdams 29ff.).
The deep ideological cleft that sundered the city in the years between the 
blockade and the Wall was reflected in the Berlin films made by both West-
ern and communist filmmakers. Each half of Berlin had now become a clear 
danger to the other side, and the political loyalties of the Berliners, though 
sometimes initially hidden from outsiders and even from the audience, were 
increasingly clear-cut. Night People (1954) stars Gregory Peck as CIA Colonel 
van Dyke, whose job it is to free a young GI who has been abducted in East 
Berlin. In exchange, the Soviets want a former German general involved in the 
20 July 1944 plot against Hitler; they intend to turn him over to some former 
SS men who want revenge.2 Van Dyke’s moral dilemma is resolved when the 
general and his wife decide to commit suicide rather than face the prospect of 
certain death in the East, but now he has no one to exchange for the soldier. 
He and his colleagues then successfully substitute a “bad” German woman, 
their associate “Hoffy” (Anita Bjork), after discovering her true identity as a 
Soviet agent. 
Escape to Berlin [Flucht nach Berlin], a 1960 American–Swiss–West German 
production, dramatizes East German farmers’ resistance to collectivization. 
One of the farmers flees across the open border to West Berlin, where he is 
followed by one of the SED officials sent to his village who has had his own 
falling out with the party. Frank Arnold has described Flucht nach Berlin, as 
well as other Western films made after the construction of the Berlin Wall and 
having a similar escape motif, as a genuine cinematic “Go West!” movement. 
GDR films could counter it “with only the rhetorical movement forward into 
a better future” (Arnold 11).
These Western productions found their counterpart in the GDR’s Berlin 
films of the 1950s, which had a common theme of portraying West Berlin as 
an unjust society and a source of social pathologies such as crime and delin-
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quency (Feinstein 59–60). DEFA now stood under communist control, and 
its films from the early 1950s were painfully true to the party line (Allan 6–11; 
Schittly 39–69). Kurt Maetzig’s 1952 film Story of a Marriage [Roman einer jun-
gen Ehe] portrays a marriage between two actors, Agnes ( Yvonne Merin) and 
Jochen (Hans-Peter Thielen), who live in West Berlin. Jochen succumbs to the 
temptation of furthering his career there and takes roles that Agnes believes 
are crude attacks against the East or celebrate militarism. Moreover, she sees 
cultural figures from the Nazi era rehabilitated in the FRG. Agnes eventually 
decides that her future lies in East Berlin, where she recites a poem in Stalin’s 
honor to workers who are building the Stalinallee (this construction project 
is one of the film’s leitmotifs). For his part, Jochen objects to his wife acting in 
what he believes are propaganda films for the GDR. But after he witnesses East 
German peace demonstrators being beaten by West German police, he sees 
the light, deciding to follow his wife and reconcile with her (Schenk 61).
Yet another DEFA film from 1952, Fates of Women [Frauenschicksale], is about 
three East Berlin women who have bad experiences with the same dashing but 
heartless West Berlin Casanova, Conny (Hanns Groth). They then succeed in 
building new lives in East Berlin (another woman, a member of the communist 
Free German Youth, turns Conny down during their first encounter). Besides 
contrasting the two halves of the city and implying that women’s emancipa-
tion is possibly only in the East, director Slatan Dudow demonstrates that 
personal happiness can be realized only in the context of the creation of a 
socialist society.3
Director Gerhard Klein and screenwriter Wolfgang Kohlhaase made a trio 
of important films about Berlin between 1953 and 1958, a period in which 
GDR filmmakers enjoyed a relatively more open political atmosphere follow-
ing the death of Stalin. Horst Claus writes that this work “established [both 
men] as creators of the so-called ‘Berlin-Filme’—films set in Berlin during the 
first two decades after World War II which focus on the personal experiences 
of working-class people under twenty-five in the divided city. Though rooted 
in fiction, these films are generally regarded as the most authentic portraits 
of a generation which was expected to realize the dream of a fair and equal 
German society in the East” (94). Even though both men were far more in-
terested in neorealism than socialist realism, their Berlin films drew a clear 
contrast between the two halves of the city that fit within the official communist 
paradigm (Claus 96–110; Schenk 127–31).
Alarm at the Circus [Alarm im Zirkus] (1954) is a children’s film about two 
working-class West Berlin boys, Max (Ernst-Georg Schwill) and Klaus (Hans 
Winter), who have very limited prospects for the future. The economic situation 
is so bleak that they cannot hope for a position or even proper job training. 
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Many young people they know are being “ruined” by American music and 
cheap comics. Max and Klaus dream of becoming champion boxers—if only 
they could afford the gloves. In the meantime, local West Berlin thugs are 
plotting to steal valuable horses from an East Berlin circus with the complicity 
of American soldiers. They hire the boys to help them without fully initiating 
them into their plans. The boys visit the circus themselves and meet the East 
German girl Helli. She informs them of her plans to attend university, which 
they cannot hope to do in the West, although they are from the same social 
class. Klaus later discovers that he and Max are actually involved in an attempt 
to steal the horses and tries to warn the authorities. When the West Berlin au-
thorities do not respond, he gets Helli’s father to call the East German police, 
who foil the crooks after a chase and a shoot-out. At the end of the film both 
boys are rewarded by the circus with the desired boxing gloves.
A Berlin Romance [Eine Berliner Romanze] (1956) tells the story of an East 
Berlin teenager working in a department store on Alexanderplatz who dreams 
of a modeling career in the West. Uschi (Annekathrin Buerger) is encouraged 
when a major Berlin paper runs a picture of her in an amateur fashion show. 
While strolling along the Kurfürstendamm she encounters Hans (Ulrich 
Thein), an unemployed West Berliner. Hans is smitten with Uschi, manages 
to win her, and finds several jobs to help pay her tuition at modeling school. 
But he is soon injured due to inadequate safety precautions at a demolition 
site. Realizing the foolishness of having run away to live in West Berlin and 
faced with her inability to pay her own tuition, Uschi returns home. After a 
talk with her mother, she asks Hans to come with her to East Berlin, where he 
finds a good job as a mechanic. The film presents West Berlin as glamorous 
and attractive but also as cold and materialistic, while human warmth, common 
sense, and full employment prevail in the East.
Finally, in Berlin—Schönhauser Corner [Berlin—Ecke Schönhauser] (1957) Klein 
and Kohlhaase attempt to present the problems of working-class youth who 
are enthralled with Western and especially American pop culture, the so-called 
Halbstarken (“teddy boys,” or “hooligans”).4 The protagonists spend much of 
their time hanging out on a street corner under an elevated train provoking 
the passers-by with their rock-and-roll dancing and fresh comments. It is clear 
that their behavior originates in conditions such as problems at home, bad 
parenting, frustration with regimentation, and generational conflict. However, 
West Berlin also exercises an enormous attraction. Karl-Heinz (Harry Engel) 
becomes involved in an illegal money-changing operation and unsuccessfully 
tries to get two of his friends to join him. Fearing that they will be charged with 
murdering Karl-Heinz after a confrontation, the friends flee to West Berlin 
and have an extremely unpleasant experience in a refugee camp, where one 
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of them dies. Berlin—Schönhauser Corner  marks something of a shift in East Ger-
man cinematic portrayals of a divided Berlin. Joshua Feinstein remarks that 
previous DEFA films had presented “the GDR as a place where dreams—or at 
least the aspirations of the working class—came true.” In Berlin—Schönhauser 
Corner  the characters abandon their fantasies about the West; however, now 
the alternative offered by the East is not a dream but “the realization that 
their own lives are already sufficient” (60). The film was a popular success in 
the GDR, and both East and West German critics praised its realism, although 
it drew fire from GDR cultural critics due to the “predominance of misfits” 
among the main characters (Feinstein 45–77).
FILMS OF THE SECOND BERLIN CRISIS
The Second Berlin Crisis (1958–1962), which culminated with the construc-
tion of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961, represented the height of the 
Cold War propaganda battle in Berlin. It also saw the premiere of two films, 
one Western and one Eastern, whose tenor directly reflected the ideological 
shouting match.
One, Two, Three, director Billy Wilder’s 1961 political satire set in Berlin, 
did not appeal to most critics. Some still dislike its madcap pace, driven by 
James Cagney’s abrasive and jingoistic performance as Coca-Cola executive 
President John F. Kennedy visits Berlin in August 1961 and rides with 
Mayor Willy Brandt and President Konrad Adenauer. In his remarks JFK 
declares, “Ich bin ein Berliner.”
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C. R. MacNamera, which they believe limited opportunities for both plot and 
character development (Dick 72–73; Chandler 240). Supposedly, the film 
also oversimplified the political situation and even threatened to complicate 
American-Soviet relations, which were at a boiling point already (Armstrong 
5; Dick 70). Many contemporary critics simply found it crass and shallow. The 
final blow came when the Wall went up just before filming finished on location 
in Berlin. This compelled Wilder both to construct a papier-mâché version 
of the Brandenburg Gate and other exteriors in Munich (where the interior 
scenes were being shot) and to attach a short prelude spoken by MacNamera 
(Cagney) referring to the events of 13 August 1961 (Sikov 453–65). Nonethe-
less, audiences found One, Two, Three’s subject matter already outdated when 
it appeared in theaters. Wilder’s lighthearted treatment of the Cold War also 
seemed, in his own words, “a great miscalculation [at a time when] people 
were being shot trying to climb the Wall” (Chandler 237–38; Wilder, “Billy 
Wilder” 107; American Film Institute 125). The film bombed at the box office 
(Sikov 465). However, more than thirty years later, One, Two, Three was rediscov-
ered in unified Germany, where it is still shown in theaters and on television 
(Chandler 242; Crowe 165). On one level, it is a successful throwback to the 
screwball comedies of the 1930s;5 on another, it seems far ahead of its time 
in its treatment of American culture—in this case, Coca-Cola—as a powerful 
weapon in the Cold War.6
MacNamera’s boss from the Atlanta headquarters, Wendell P. Hazeltine 
(Howard St. John), asks him to take care of his hot-blooded seventeen-year-old 
daughter Scarlet (Pamela Tiffin) on the Berlin segment of her European tour. 
Scarlet is known for her multiple wedding engagements. Although her arrival 
will cause major difficulties for MacNamera’s family, including the cancella-
tion of their vacation plans, he can hardly refuse. He has ambitions to become 
leader of Coca-Cola’s European operations in London, and he is on the verge 
of a major coup that he thinks will secure the job for him: a deal with three 
commissars from the Soviet Trade Commission to sell Coke for the first time 
behind the Iron Curtain. Scarlet’s two-week visit turns into two months due to 
an illness and her secret romance with an East German communist, Otto Piffl 
(Horst Buchholz). The MacNameras are alarmed when she does not come 
home one evening, but the next morning she turns up in MacNamera’s office 
and announces that she is married and that she and Otto are planning to leave 
that day for Moscow, where Otto will begin his studies as a rocket scientist.
After each defends the merits of his respective system (MacNamera: “To 
hell with Khrushchev!” Otto: “To hell with . . . Frank Sinatra!”), MacNamera 
rigs a booby trap to get rid of the problematic Otto. This involves giving him a 
“ Yankee Doodle” cuckoo clock wrapped in the Wall Street Journal as a gift and 
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secretly putting a “Russki go home” balloon on the exhaust of his motorcycle. 
On cue, Otto is arrested as soon as he crosses the Brandenburg Gate on his 
way home to pack. Unfortunately for MacNamera, it turns out that Scarlet 
is pregnant and that her parents are arriving the next day. He races to East 
Berlin and spends the entire night at a seedy hotel pretending to peddle his 
sexy German secretary, Ingeborg (Lilo Pulver), to the three Soviet commissars 
in exchange for their help in freeing Otto. They successfully intervene with 
the GDR police but get a big surprise when MacNamera puts his hopelessly 
obsequious personal assistant Schlemmer (Hanns Lothar) in Ingeborg’s dress 
before making the exchange. Just before his release, Otto confesses to being 
an American spy after being tortured by the repeated playing of the song 
“Itsy-Bitsy, Teeny-Weeny, Yellow Polka-Dot Bikini.” He can no longer return 
to the East, and the remainder of the film depicts Otto’s implausible instant 
conversion into a German count and Coke bottling plant manager in an effort 
to make him acceptable to Scarlet’s parents.
One, Two, Three  does a good job of evoking the political tensions of the time. 
One of the first scenes in the film portrays mass demonstrations in East Berlin 
featuring posters of Khrushchev and signs with slogans such as “What’s Going 
on in Little Rock?” Balloons, as well as other flying and floating devices, were 
indeed used to carry political slogans across the zonal boundaries as displayed 
in the film. Wilder also parodies a West German society that only twenty years 
earlier had firmly supported National Socialism in the form of the heel-clicking 
West Germans on MacNamera’s staff and several scenes with references to the 
Third Reich. Unlike the Berliners in The Big Lift, these Germans are clearly 
on the side of the West, although MacNamera has good reason to question 
whether they are being completely honest about their past activities. Moreover, 
the Second Berlin Crisis is always lurking in the background. Again and again 
the political situation in the city is referred to as dangerous or explosive.
The basic East-West divide is also present. West Berlin is clearly the more 
desirable place to live. MacNamera explains early in the film that one of his 
major problems is East Berliners who bring Coke home and then forget to 
return the bottles. To make this point, Wilder wildly exaggerates the poverty 
of East Berlin, even though by 1961 the GDR government had already devoted 
considerable resources to renovating the downtown government districts 
around Unter den Linden, which are supposedly featured in several scenes 
(Sikov 458). There are a few brief mentions of the actual refugee crisis, and 
one of the Soviet trade commissars, Peripetchikoff (Leon Askin), decides to 
defect so that he can go into business in the West (and be with Ingeborg). In 
the process, he preemptively betrays the other two commissars, who have simi-
lar plans, to the communist authorities. Disgusted at Peripetchikoff’s actions 
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and at the tactics used to secure his own confession, Otto decides to renounce 
communism as well as capitalism. In the funniest exchange in the film, he 
cries out, “Is everybody in this whole world corrupt?” to which Peripetchikoff 
matter-of-factly replies, “I don’t know everybody.” Wilder is saying, as he did 
in his 1948 Berlin film A Foreign Affair, that people are people, regardless of 
the political and social system, and they have the same basic desires and, per-
haps, the same capacity for shenanigans. Yet he clearly thinks that it is much 
better to be corrupt in the prosperous West than in the poor and politically 
repressive East. If Otto and Scarlet’s baby grows up to be a socialist, at least he 
or she will be a rich one.
Look at This City [Schaut auf diese Stadt], an East German documentary, pre-
miered exactly one year to the day after construction began on the Berlin Wall.7 
Its director, Karl Gass, remarked that he and his colleagues wanted to “create a 
national document” that made the historic importance of 13 August clear (“Gass’ 
Experimentierküche” 45). Film historian Hans-Jörg Rother’s appraisal of the film 
is far more accurate: “Never before and never again in the history of the DEFA 
documentary film would a work turn so hard-heartedly and maliciously against 
its own public.” It was arguably the most polemical and “hateful” documentary 
by Gass, a filmmaker known for his ideological fervor (95–96).
Look at This City, which is based primarily on GDR newsreel footage, pres-
ents a history of Germany and Berlin since 1945 from a communist perspective. 
Beyond the film’s undisputable technical qualities, it is interesting for two rea-
sons. First, it faithfully repeats the SED’s official rationale for building the Wall 
as an “anti-Fascist protective bulwark” designed to preserve the achievements 
of socialism in the GDR.8 The screenplay was even written by Karl-Eduard von 
Schnitzler, who, as chief commentator of the GDR’s Deutschlandsender [Ger-
many Service], was “the public voice of the East German cause” (Hanwehr 
92–94); he would remain in that role in radio and television until the fall of 
the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Second, preparations for the film began 
even before construction of the Wall. As Gass states, events transformed a 
film initially intended merely to highlight West Berlin’s “abnormal [anomal ]” 
situation into a “national document” (“Gründlicher analysieren” 46; Rother 
95). Therefore, Look at This City provides the clearest and indeed most wildly 
exaggerated version of the “West Berlin as a danger” motif evident in pre-Wall 
GDR feature and documentary films.
This theme, by the way, was not a new one in Gass’s work. His 1960 docu-
mentary Freedom . . . Freedom . . . über alles [Freiheit . . . Freiheit . . . über alles], 
which deals with contradictions between political rhetoric and actual condi-
tions in the West, begins with theme music and broadcasts from the Voice 
of America and the Radio in the American Sector (R I A S) in West Berlin. At 
Cold War Berlin in the Movies / 329
suitably ironic points it also features the chimes of West Berlin’s Freedom Bell 
[Freiheitsglocke] located in the Schöneberg Rathaus (Kleinert). An exact model 
of the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia cast to commemorate the Berlin Airlift, it 
rang every Sunday just before the noon broadcast of R I A S Berlin, which always 
started with a spoken “Liberty Oath.” These sounds, as well as the images of 
radio towers, would have been very familiar to East German and especially East 
Berlin audiences (Baumgärtel; Kundler).
Look at This City argues that even though the people of West Berlin have 
the same desire to work, live, and love as their compatriots in the East, they 
allow their city to be used by imperialists who want to overthrow the GDR. West 
Berlin Lord Mayor Ernst Reuter’s appeal to the people of England, France, 
and America during the 1948 Berlin Blockade to “look at this city” as an out-
post of freedom becomes the film’s ironic leitmotif. West Berlin’s streets are 
filled with Western troops and jazz and rock and roll music, “strange sights 
and sounds for a German city.” Its street names commemorate “warmongers” 
such as General Lucius D. Clay and revolts in the GDR (the Straße des 17. Juni 
honored the major uprising in 1953). West Berlin is home to the RIAS and 
other organizations that continually stir up trouble and even sabotage in East 
Germany. The imperialists abuse the transit routes across the GDR by sending 
their troops to West Berlin and allowing East German refugees out of it, the 
latter mainly by air. West Berlin also hosts conferences of expellees, German 
veterans, and, in July 1961, the Evangelical Church (the tenth annual Evan-
gelischer Kirchentag). All these groups are anticommunist and, in the case of 
the first two, also revanchist. To underline this theme of Western subversion, 
Reuter’s appeal to “look at this city” is repeatedly paired with the statement 
by his successor as Lord Mayor, Willy Brandt, that he is proud that West Berlin 
is a troublemaker [Störenfried] for the GDR. If Wilder makes the East German 
population appear militant, Gass does the same with the West Berliners.
One can also “look at this city” to see high rates of criminality, suicide, and 
unemployment (based on actual statistics from the FRG), along with other 
forms of social depravity. Gass contrasts the state of affairs in West Germany 
with repetitious footage of workmen, apartment houses, schools, and a mother 
with child to emphasize the positive accomplishments of the East German social 
state. To make West Berlin harmless, the obvious solution is to construct the 
“anti-Fascist defensive bulwark” along the dividing line long established by the 
Western powers. Although portrayed as a heroic act, footage of the construc-
tion of the Wall is literally tacked on to the end of Look at This City and in no 
way changes the film’s basic arguments about the Berlin situation.
Look at This City also skillfully employs music to underline the differences 
between the two parts of Berlin. Classical music provides the sound track 
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when the GDR or the USSR is featured. The “fate theme” from Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony is used to demonstrate East German and Soviet heroism and 
resolve, such as when East German militia secures the Brandenburg Gate on 
13 August 1961. Shostakovich’s Symphony no. 7 (the Leningrad Symphony) 
plays during scenes of the Soviet conquest of Berlin. Finally, music by Johann 
Sebastian Bach (who, like SED chairman Walter Ulbricht, was from Saxony) 
figures prominently whenever the GDR’s accomplishments are being featured. 
According to Wolfram von Hanwehr, Bach represents a perfected harmonic 
order; therefore, the use of his music “represents the order of the East Ger-
man state contrasting the ‘decline and fall’ of the order of the capitalist world” 
(337). In contrast, Gass uses rock and jazz to accompany images of West Berlin. 
“ Yakety Yak” (“Take out the papers and the trash”) and “Take the A-Train” 
play when GIs appear. British troops march to the World War II hit “Hanging 
out the Washing on the Siegfried Line” (an ironic reference to the poor U.K. 
performance in the first years of the war), and NATO troops to “Lili Marlene,” 
a Nazi favorite. The popular West German song “Tomorrow [Morgen]” (“To-
morrow, tomorrow, life will finally be beautiful again”) and the Hitler Youth 
song “Today Germany Is Ours, Tomorrow the Whole World [Heute gehört uns 
Deutschland, Morgen die ganze Welt]” are used in tandem to represent German 
revanchism (Hanwehr 300–58).
A Berlin sign reflects the city’s divided consciousness.
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THE GREAT DISAPPEARING BERLIN WALL
One, Two, Three  and Look at This City represent an era in Berlin’s history in which 
the two halves of the city were drifting apart and communication between them 
represented a shouting match rather than a dialogue. The construction of the 
Wall, of course, completed the city’s division. In his book The Ghosts of Berlin, 
Brian Ladd argues that the Wall “was antithetical to the mobility and circula-
tion characteristic of a modern city.” Pollution, radio and TV signals, and the 
sound of rock concerts still passed across it, and it was possible for Westerners 
to travel underneath it through the city’s historical central district (Berlin-Mitte) 
on two subway lines that linked the northeastern and southeastern parts of West 
Berlin. Otherwise, the Wall now blocked streets and tram lines, and even gas 
and water mains had been cut. East German guards would kill at least seventy-
eight people trying to cross it illegally (Ladd 18–19, 24). The inner-German 
détente of the 1970s and 1980s did relatively little to revive personal contacts 
in the divided Berlin, even after East Germans received increasing opportuni-
ties to visit relatives in the West starting in 1984 (Merritt 174–81; McAdams 
166–67). The city also clearly began to drift apart economically. In the words 
of Der Spiegel magazine in 1966, West Berlin and its 2.2 million residents had 
become “the glittering thing” (Ladd 469). Even though East Berlin enjoyed 
the highest standard of living in the communist bloc, the GDR’s economy as 
a whole went into a long and irreversible decline during the 1970s. Its inhab-
itants realized that West Berliners had it much better (Ladd 463–515; Maier 
59–107; Fulbrook 37–38).
By the mid-1980s some observers were also pointing to a much more 
serious source of division that was psychological in origin. Political scientist 
Richard L. Merritt wrote in 1985 that “as each year passes, the underlying basis 
of political community in Berlin as a whole erodes a bit more. . . . In place 
of community, estrangement was growing” (183). East and West Berliners 
had lived parallel but separate lives for too long. Three years earlier, Peter 
Schneider had similarly noted in his influential novel The Wall Jumper: A Berlin 
Story [Der Mauerspringer. Eine Berliner Geschichte] that “it will take us longer to 
tear down the Wall in our heads than any wrecking company will need for the 
Wall we can see” (119).
Cold War Berlin films made after 1961 display a similar radical break 
between East and West. After the early 1960s the Berlin Wall—and indeed 
the East-West conflict as a whole—began to disappear from the East German 
cinema. There were several reasons why GDR filmmakers began to avoid ad-
dressing the problems of the divided city. Everyday life in East Berlin was no 
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longer dominated by the open border and its temptations, so GDR directors 
started to focus instead on the social world of Berlin’s residents and the dif-
ficulties they faced (Richter; Claus 110–14). Documentary filmmakers, too, 
turned their view inward, often in the hope of creating an attractive image for 
the GDR’s welfare state (Rother 108).
If some East German filmmakers initially believed that construction of 
the Wall would give them more artistic freedom, which seemed desirable to 
attract more visitors to movie theaters, they soon found that they were sorely 
mistaken (Schittly 101–24; Allan 11ff.). Mid-1960s films that tried to depict the 
division of Germany in a nuanced way, such as Konrad Wolf’s 1964 film Divided 
Heaven [Der Geteilte Himmel ] (based on Christa Wolf’s 1963 novel), enjoyed a 
controversial reception. East German critics disliked the heroine Rita (Renate 
Blume), who, despite her commitment to socialism, was a “weak” and “passive” 
character, torn between the GDR and her lover who had fled to West Berlin. 
They accused both the book and the film of making the division of Germany 
look like a greater misfortune than West German “imperialism” (Richter 175; 
Schittly 125–27). Starting with its Central Committee’s Eleventh Plenum in 
1965, the SED increasingly demanded that works of the GDR’s artistic com-
munity conform to its ideological line. In response, the party banned twelve 
films from theaters in 1965 and 1966. After construction of the Wall, the SED 
de-emphasized national unification in order to dwell on the construction of 
socialism in East Germany, and by the early 1970s it had normalized relations 
with the West, including the FRG. Therefore, any film that addressed the East-
West divide risked official disfavor.
Last but not least, it was difficult for East German filmmakers to portray 
the Berlin Wall in a positive light in any way that was plausible and believable. 
It hardly represented a “victory” for socialism and in fact had been constructed 
against the wishes of the majority of the East German population. DEFA pro-
duced only four feature films in the 1960s in which the Wall played a central 
role. Two of them, . . . And Your Love Too [ . . . und Deine Liebe auch] (1962) 
and The Hook to the Chin [Der Kinnhaken] (1962), deal with East Berliners who 
try to get to their West Berlin jobs on 13 August 1961.9 A third, Sunday Drivers 
[Sontagsfahrer] (1963), is a comedy  about several Leipzig families whose attempt 
to flee to West Berlin by car on 13 August is frustrated by the construction of 
the Wall. Since not all the passengers wish to leave the GDR, the disloyal ones 
can be portrayed as unsympathetic caricatures. Although . . . And Your Love 
Too has some cinematographically important sequences that use documentary 
techniques to re-create the bustle of Berlin’s streets, none of these films was 
popular or a critical success. The final film, Stories of that Night [Geschichten 
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jener Nacht] (1967), attempts to justify the Wall in four vignettes, but it can 
also be understood primarily as a declaration of party loyalty by its directors, 
two of whom, Frank Vogel and Gerhard Klein, had their films banned after 
the Eleventh SED Plenum (Richter 164–71).
After Stories of that Night, both the division of Germany and the Wall itself 
became virtually taboo subjects in GDR cinema. Only in 1990 would an East 
German director, Jürgen Böttcher, focus on this theme with his documentary 
The Wall [Die Mauer], which, notably, depicts its fall (Richter 171; Allan 11). It 
was much safer and more effective to concentrate on unfavorable developments 
in West Germany’s capitalist society such as high rents, on laws that unfairly 
favored business, or even on the few cases of West Germans who decided to 
settle in the GDR. These themes were made more credible to audiences by 
the fact that the West German media also discussed them openly, as most 
East Germans would know from their consumption of Western television and 
radio (Heimann 99–100). Yet even such comparisons found limited appeal 
because of another trend, which found East German directors concentrating 
on the portrayal of everyday life rather than the progress made in “construct-
ing socialism.”10
For Western filmmakers, Cold War Berlin with its Wall had an obvious 
appeal as a setting for escape films featuring tunnels (Escape from East Berlin 
[1962]), buses (in Alfred Hitchcock’s Torn Curtain [1966], Paul Newman and 
Julie Andrews flee from Leipzig to East Berlin by bus on their way to Sweden), 
and trains (Durchbruch Lok 234 [1963]) (Arnold 11). In some cases they were 
based on true stories, such as the American made-for-TV film Berlin Tunnel 
21 (1981) and the German miniseries The Tunnel [Der Tunnel ] (2001), about 
the business of tunneling under the Wall that flourished for a brief time in 
the early 1960s. An escape to West Berlin is even the central plot element in 
a rather forgettable comedy called The Wicked Dreams of Paula Schultz (1968), 
starring Elke Sommer as an East German athlete who wants to defect. The 
good Westerners and bad East Germans are played by the lead actors from 
the T V series Hogan’s Heroes.11
However, most filmmakers in the FRG joined their East German col-
leagues in avoiding portrayals of the inter-German border. In a book that first 
appeared in 1985, West German film critic Hans Günther Pflaum noted:
If foreigners totally unfamiliar with the German situation were to view those films 
set in West Berlin, they would hardly become aware of an essential aspect of this 
city: the wall that effectively seals off the western part of the city from East Berlin 
and the German Democratic Republic. No other taboo has been so consistently 
observed by German filmmakers in recent years than the taboo of the border 
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between the two Germanys. The causes of this restraint are most likely to be 
found in the feature films produced during the cold war era, especially American 
productions. No director of the new German cinema wanted to be associated 
with any of those films, and most of them systematically avoided the problem of 
the border, which, as recently as 1982, was the subject of an American film with 
a decidedly propagandistic tone, Mit dem Wind nach Westen [Night Crossing ], a 
Walt Disney production. (97)
This observation seems even more remarkable when we consider that West 
Berlin was an important center for the FRG’s movie industry and, for that 
reason alone, an obvious setting for films (Pflaum 91).
Yet it is not true that the Wall disappeared from Western films. American 
and British directors never shied away from it, and Pflaum acknowledges that 
a few younger West German filmmakers such as Helke Sander and Reinhard 
Alec Leamas (Richard Burton) 
and Nan Perry (Claire Bloom) are 
caught on the Wall between East 
and West.Ph
o
to
fe
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Hauff featured it in their films. In the late 1980s they would be joined by a 
number of others. What had changed, however, was that the most significant 
Western films on Cold War Berlin had lost their propaganda function and 
instead returned to the ambiguities of the late 1940s in their portrayals of the 
divided city. Especially by using the genre of the spy film, some filmmakers 
blurred the distinction between East and West politically and tended to make 
both sides appear amoral or even immoral in their behavior. Meanwhile, West 
German filmmakers began to de-emphasize the physical barriers between East 
and West Berlin. In these films the Wall is no longer a particular obstacle to 
movement, and the city itself is portrayed as an organic whole. Finally, due to 
Peter Schneider’s direct influence, filmmakers began to emphasize that the 
true walls dividing Germans were internal instead of external, psychological 
instead of physical.
THE BERLIN WALL AND THE WESTERN ESPIONAGE FILM
Starting in the mid-1960s several important Berlin films appeared with the 
theme of international espionage. By then directors could draw on a consider-
able number of popular spy novels set in that city, either in whole or in part, 
as the basis for screenplays (Mews; Kamm). Of course, this was also the era of 
the James Bond films starring Sean Connery, which inspired many imitators 
on both the silver screen and the television screen (G. Miller 80). In 1965 John 
Le Carré’s novel The Spy Who Came in from the Cold was filmed, followed a year 
later by Len Deighton’s Funeral in Berlin. Gritty realism and a sense of history 
pervade these films. Although not devoid of charm and sophistication, Le 
Carré’s Alec Leamas (Richard Burton) and Deighton’s “Harry Palmer” (the 
nameless Cockney spy in his early novels played in several films by Michael 
Caine) are expendable foot soldiers instead of glamorous superspies.12 Leamas 
and Palmer are assigned to the often cold and dreary Berlin, not to the sunny 
locales frequented by 007. They do not battle megalomaniacal supervillains 
armed with high-tech gadgets but instead have to deal with plausibly conceived 
representatives of the Soviet bloc’s security agencies using primarily their own 
wits. The Spy Who Came in from the Cold and Funeral in Berlin also represent a 
return to the ambiguities found in the Cold War Berlin films of the late 1940s. 
Leamas and Palmer are not sure who is friend and who is foe or, more impor-
tantly, whose side in the Cold War holds the moral high ground.
Throughout The Spy Who Came in from the Cold the East and West are por-
trayed as moral equivalents. Control (Cyril Cusak) informs Leamas, “I’d say 
since the war, our methods, our techniques that is, and those of the commu-
nists have become very much the same . . . yes. I mean, occasionally we have 
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to do wicked things, very wicked things indeed. But you can’t be less wicked 
than your enemy just because your government’s policy is benevolent, can 
you?” Leamas tells his lover Nan Perry (Claire Bloom) much the same thing, 
even saying, “communism, capitalism. It’s the innocents who get slaughtered.” 
Nan is portrayed as naïve, not so much because she is a British communist but 
because she is a true believer in a cause. During the film’s climactic dialogue 
she asks Leamas, “How can you turn the whole world upside-down? What rules 
are you playing?” To which he replies, “There is only one rule—expediency.” 
The character Nan is also of interest because she participates in the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament, which reminds us of the nuclear anxieties prevalent 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s and suggests another area in which parallels 
can be drawn between the superpowers.
In the film East and West are also linked by anti-Semitism. In his mission 
to eliminate the head of East German intelligence operations, Hans-Dieter 
Mundt (Peter van Eyck), Leamas plays a defector. He confirms the suspicions 
of Mundt’s deputy, Fiedler (Oskar Werner), that his boss is a double agent 
working for the British. Fiedler is an honest man who is in some respects like 
Nan: he thinks that spies should at least work for a cause they believe in if 
they must commit evil acts. His colleagues also know that he is a Jew and dis-
like him for that reason. As it turns out, Mundt is actually London’s man in 
East Germany, and Leamas unknowingly has been sent as part of a scheme to 
save him from Fiedler’s investigations. Helping to seal Fiedler’s fate is doubly 
bitter for Leamas. Many British agents that he controlled in Berlin had been 
eliminated by the “bastard” Mundt, and he has grown to respect Fiedler. Yet he 
believes that something else is rotten about the situation, too. “London made 
us kill him,” he tells Nan, “kill the Jew.” Four years after the verdict against 
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, the film raises the ultimate damning analogy, 
comparing Cold War espionage to the Holocaust.
“Berlin,” or, more precisely, a massive reconstruction of the Berlin Wall (the 
film was shot in England and Ireland), appears as a setting only twice in The 
Spy Who Came in from the Cold, but it also frames the entire movie. In the open-
ing scene, accompanied by Sol Kaplan’s haunting theme music, the camera 
pans back very slowly from barbed wire on the Eastern side toward Checkpoint 
Charlie, giving the viewer an impression of the immense obstacles separating 
East and West. It is the middle of the night, and Leamas is waiting nervously 
for Karl Riemek, an East German spy in his charge. He must watch helplessly 
as the East German border guards shoot Riemek down just as it seems that he 
will cross to West Berlin without incident. In the closing scene, once again at 
night, but this time on the Eastern side, Leamas and Nan are on the verge of 
climbing over the Wall when they are betrayed and killed. Thus these scenes 
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at the Wall underscore the film’s portrayal of international espionage as char-
acterized by death, betrayal, and drabness. In being drab, Berlin is no differ-
ent from London or any other locale in the movie, another parallel. Director 
Martin Ritt intentionally filmed in black and white to create the dreary world 
in which Leamas and other intelligence agents live and in which there are no 
clear standards of right and wrong (G. Miller 81, 85; T. Miller 113).
Funeral in Berlin is the second Harry Palmer film. Due to his criminal past, 
Palmer’s bosses in British intelligence are sure of his loyalty: he must either 
do as they say or serve time in prison for theft. In a comparable situation are 
two other agents, J. B. Hallam (Hugh Burden) and Johnnie Vulkan (Paul 
Hubschmid), who are plotting to secure $2 million stolen from Jews during 
World War II and locked away in a secret Swiss bank account. Hallam, who 
provides Palmer with aliases, eventually loses his job because he is considered 
a “security risk”; the film subtly implies that he is a homosexual. Vulkan is 
Palmer’s contact in West Berlin, as well as a former guard at Bergen-Belsen 
and the son of the Nazi who deposited the stolen money. His real name is Paul 
Louis Broum. Broum is supposed to be dead, and British intelligence keeps 
his identity papers on file to ensure Vulkan’s loyalty. If Hallam can get Vulkan 
these papers by issuing them as an alias to the unsuspecting Palmer, both men 
will have access to the bank account.13
Before these plot details fully unfold, Palmer has been to Berlin twice, 
the second time as “Broum,” to arrange the defection of Soviet Colonel Stok 
(Oskar Homolka), head of the KGB’s Berlin section.14 The colonel insists that 
he is not a traitor and is still a good communist, but unfortunately, his record 
in preventing people from fleeing to West Berlin has been poor lately. He 
recommends that West German underworld figure Otto Kreuzman (Günter 
Meissner), the most successful people smuggler in the city, be hired to get him 
across the Wall. Palmer has many reasons to suspect that Stok is lying but finally 
authorizes the flight attempt. Kreuzman’s team poses as undertakers to get the 
colonel through the checkpoint at the Bornholmer Straße bridge in a hearse. 
When Kreuzman’s corpse is found in the coffin, it is obvious that the “funeral 
in Berlin” has gone awry. Being right about the colonel is of little consolation 
to Palmer, who has not only blown his mission but also lost Broum’s papers. 
His boss Ross (Guy Doleman) then tells him to eliminate Vulkan, who can no 
longer be blackmailed and may sell himself to the highest bidder in the Cold 
War, but Palmer now has to worry about the Israeli secret service too.
Funeral in Berlin has a less somber tone than The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold, if no less somber an ending. Palmer cracks jokes throughout. Moreover, 
the film was shot in color and on location and portrays downtown West Berlin 
as the “glittering thing,” complete with transvestite cabarets. The Wall features 
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prominently, but the majority of the outside scenes were filmed around the 
Zoologischer Garten and Kurfürstendamm in the West, including atop the 
newly built, twenty-two-story Europa-Center, with its revolving Mercedes-Benz 
symbol. While in the bar at the Berlin Hilton, another major symbol of postwar 
reconstruction,15 Vulkan agrees with Palmer’s comment that the division of the 
city has not hurt business and adds that many people “make a great living out 
of the Wall.” Yet the films are similar in portraying spying as a dirty business. 
A West Berlin police official tells Palmer how much he hates Western agents 
because they operate in league with every criminal in the city. Although he 
pretends that he works only for money, Palmer is troubled by his situation. He 
agrees with Stok that Kreuzman is a “fascist,” but he does not like sending him 
to his death. Nor does he want to kill Vulkan in cold blood, in part because 
he recognizes that their cases are similar. Ross underlines this point. When 
Palmer asks, “Do you mean Her Majesty’s Government employs ex-Nazis, sir?” 
he replies, “And thieves, Palmer.” By the end of the film Palmer has demon-
strated that he does indeed have some principles, but we are left wondering 
whether British intelligence is any better than the KGB.
A West German variation on the themes in Funeral in Berlin appeared in 
1976, when Roland Klick directed a film based on Johannes Mario Simmel’s 
novel Dear Fatherland [Lieb Vaterland magst ruhig sein] (1965). Tunnels are a 
central plot element. A small-time East German crook is told by the authorities 
that he will be pardoned if he helps kidnap the West Berliner responsible for 
smuggling people out. In West Berlin he becomes a double agent in the hope 
of starting a new life there with his lover. He is to expose the East Germans try-
ing to crack the smuggling ring but finds that he cannot trust his new Western 
bosses either, who see him as expendable.
Spy stories were not the only way filmmakers could demonstrate that both 
sides in the Cold War sat in the same boat when it came to their principles. 
Kenneth Loach’s 1987 film Singing the Blues in Red is about an East German 
writer and singer, Klaus Drittemann, who is kicked out of the country by the 
authorities. When he arrives in West Berlin, those who hope to make a propa-
ganda coup out of his expulsion are shocked to find that Drittemann is just 
as critical of Western capitalism as he is of communism (appropriately, his 
surname means “third man”) (Canby).
THE WALL IGNORERS AND THE WALL JUMPERS
By the mid-1980s many West German filmmakers had begun minimizing or 
even ignoring the Wall’s significance as a physical divide. Peter Timm’s Meier 
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(1985) is about a young East German who inherits a considerable sum of 
money, 30,000 deutsche marks, from his father, who had settled in the West. 
After making a world tour, the young man uses the rest of the funds to buy a 
counterfeit West German identity card and thereby secure the right to travel 
whenever he wants, the dream of all GDR citizens. When officials from the East 
German State Security [Stasi ] catch him and ask whether he is West or East 
German, Meier automatically replies, “all German [gesamtdeutsch].” Although 
he decides to remain in the East, it is clear that he is not quite at home in 
either the FRG or the GDR (Nadar 252).
Once to the Ku’damm and Back [Einmal Ku’damm und Zurück] (1985) is an 
adventure-romance based on a true story from 1974. Thomas Stauffer (Chris-
tian Kohlund), a cook at the Swiss embassy in East Berlin, is well known to the 
border guards since he travels back and forth between the two halves of the city 
every day. He meets the East German woman Ulla Haferkorn (Ursela Monn), 
who is a secretary at a government ministry. Ulla gets the urge to visit the fancy 
shops on the Kurfürstendamm, and one day she hops in his trunk and goes. 
One trip leads to others, until the authorities discover and stop them. Ulla goes 
back to East Berlin, no sentences are leveled, and the love affair simply dies. 
The real-life couple, Peter and Christa Gross (née Feurich), disliked the film, 
and with good reason. It does not portray how an informal Stasi collaborator at 
the Swiss embassy betrayed them just as Christa attempted to permanently flee 
to the West (as opposed to merely making another shopping trip, as portrayed 
in the film). It also ignores the almost five years each spent in jail and their 
later marriage. According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Once to the Ku’damm was 
practically an informational film for the Stasi, which imprisoned more than 
seventy-two thousand East Germans for “fleeing the Republic [Republikflucht]” 
during the Wall years (Schade; “Einmal Ku’damm”). In comparison to reality, 
the film is a fleeting fairy tale.
Other West German films suggest that in spite of the Wall, Berlin is united 
through a common past and a common humanity. In the documentary Location: 
Berlin [Drehort Berlin] (1987), director Helga Reidemeister interviews people 
from both halves of the city in an attempt to capture the rhythms of life there. 
She strives to demolish the prejudices, clichés, and sheer ignorance about the 
“other side” that developed in Germany as a result of the Cold War (Hickethier). 
Although the Wall and the city’s politicized history are present throughout the 
film, the audience is repeatedly left guessing whether the people are from East 
or West. A decade earlier, Sander’s Redupers, or the All-Around Reduced Personal-
ity [Die allseitig reduzierte Persönlichkeit] (1977) also highlighted the similarities 
between the two halves of the city through the pictures taken by members of a 
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women’s photography collective. The main character, Edda (played by Sander), 
mentions that contrary to popular wisdom, it is actually the West Berliners who 
are trapped behind the Wall, not the East Berliners (Knight 83, 87).
Wim Wenders’s Wings of Desire [Der Himmel über Berlin] (1987) also plays fast 
and loose with geography, since its main characters are angels who can move 
about the city freely. Although most of the scenes are shot in West Berlin, the 
location is never entirely certain except when there are outward signs such as 
automobiles, advertising, clothing, and the occasional landmark. The Wall is 
present, but politics plays a limited role. The sole important exception comes 
when Damiel (Bruno Ganz) chooses to transform himself into a human 
being—with all the senses, feelings, and emotions he lacks as an angel—at the 
Wall. It is unlikely that Wenders chose this site randomly, and the scene might 
be interpreted as a protest against the dehumanizing role of Cold War politics 
in Berlin. But Wenders has said that his angel characters like to walk at the Wall 
simply because it is quiet there. Otherwise, it has been around for such a short 
time compared to them that they are not impressed by it (Fusco 16).
Besides humanity, history is another factor that could unite Berliners in 
Wings of Desire. In one scene, the angel Cassiel (Otto Sander) pictures the 
destroyed Berlin of 1945 in his mind while driving through the streets in the 
1980s. In another, the elderly Homer (Curt Bois), accompanied by Cassiel, 
returns to the site of the Potsdamer Platz, once Europe’s busiest traffic center 
but now a ghostly, divided wasteland due to the Wall. He knows where he is 
but cannot understand why he no longer sees his favorite cigar shop, café, 
and other familiar sights. One gets the impression that few Berliners in the 
film besides Homer and the angels are conscious of the city common’s his-
tory anymore. In fact, it was the intention of screenplay writer Peter Handke 
for Homer to lose his human audience in order to suggest a general loss of 
innocence (one line in the film states, “if a nation loses its storytellers, it loses 
its childhood”) ( Johnston).
On one level, these West German films from the 1970s and 1980s that al-
low movement between the two halves of Berlin or that stress the similarities 
shared by both parts of the city offer a critique of the Cold War. They suggest 
in various ways that the postwar division of Berlin and Germany, though un-
derstandable, probably permanent, and even justifiable, violates an underlying 
unity of the human beings who live there, their way of life, and their history. By 
largely ignoring Berlin’s political divisions, they can focus on more universal 
human issues. Wenders, for example, uses Berlin as a metaphor not only for 
his own country but also for the entire world and the human condition in 
general (Fusco 16; Caltvedt 122; Paneth 2). However, on another level, these 
films and their characters frequently convey uneasiness, incompleteness, and 
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indeed division—Meier’s inability to be happy in either the East or the West, 
Edda’s dual roles as worker and mother, Damiel’s desire for true human feel-
ings. In the “New German Cinema” of the 1970s and 1980s, the real divisions 
in Germany were those in the national community, especially those that led 
to the catastrophe of the Third Reich. Neither of the postwar German states 
was ideal, but to a great extent, both they and their defects were simply lega-
cies of a fractured national life from before 1945 (Elsaesser 239–78). Wenders 
said, “It is only in Berlin that I could recognize what it means to be German 
. . . for history is both physically and emotionally present. . . . No other city 
is to such an extent a symbol, a place of survival” (Paneth 2). Perhaps these 
films are also trying to tell us that Germans during the Wall years were united 
by their divisions.16
Finally, in two films whose screenplays Peter Schneider helped write, the 
thesis of his novel The Wall Jumper is followed. The films emphasize that the true 
walls dividing Berliners and, by implication, Germans are internal or ideological. 
The protagonists can travel easily enough across the Wall, at least on occasion, 
but being able to do so does not bring them happiness. The first film is The 
Man on the Wall [Der Mann auf der Mauer] (1982), which features one of the 
characters from The Wall Jumper, Kabe (Marius Mueller-Westernhagen). Kabe 
lives in East Berlin and is obsessed with jumping over the Wall. After repeated 
attempts lead to his being thrown into a mental institution and then jail, he is 
finally allowed to settle in the West, but he then finds that he is unhappy because 
he is separated from his wife. So Kabe begins jumping again, but in the wrong 
direction for most people.
Schneider also cowrote the screenplay for Margarethe von Trotta’s The 
Promise [Das Versprechen] (1994), which is really a “microhistory” of divided 
Germany from 1961 to 1989. Two East Berlin lovers, Sophie (played by Meret 
Becker and Corinna Harfouch to reflect the passage of time) and Konrad 
(Anian Zollner and August Zirner), are separated when she successfully flees 
with a group of friends through the sewer tunnels under the Wall. The police 
arrive just as Konrad is about to go through the manhole cover. He can only 
shout to Sophie that he will follow later. He never does and instead becomes 
a successful astrophysicist in the GDR. The Promise shows how their lives drift 
apart, including in material terms, despite the fact that they meet on several 
occasions. During an extended stay in Prague in 1968, Sophie becomes preg-
nant with their son Alexander (Christian Herrschmann and Jörg Meister). 
Forced to leave Czechoslovakia due to the Soviet invasion, they find that for 
various reasons they are unwilling or unable to continue to live together. By 
the 1980s Sophie is living in West Berlin with her French boyfriend, while in 
East Berlin Konrad has married and has another child. He is able to visit So-
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phie briefly while at a scientific conference in West Berlin, but direct contact 
between them is now superseded by preteen Alexander’s visits to his father. 
Unfortunately, his first meeting with Konrad’s family at their apartment goes 
poorly. Young Alex has culture shock and painfully, albeit unintentionally, 
reminds the family that they do not enjoy the life of privilege that he does. 
Eventually, the Stasi will prevent him from visiting East Berlin altogether. Yet 
his parents will meet again. The film closes with Sophie and Konrad simply 
staring at each other on the Bornheimer Bridge in Berlin on 9 November 
1989, as people all around them celebrate the fall of the Wall. Although they 
are physically together once more, it is obvious that the emotional distance 
that separates them has become immense.
Trotta uses a number of strategies to create a very convincing illusion of 
historical realism throughout The Promise, which was filmed on location in Ber-
lin and Prague. Several scenes feature re-creations of the Berlin Wall and its 
guard posts, and the crowd scenes on the Bornheimer Bridge closely resemble 
news broadcasts of the opening of the border in 1989. Other parts of the film 
incorporate actual newsreel or television footage. These include the opening 
scenes of the creation of the Wall in August 1961, the depiction of the Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and an East German broadcast of a GDR May 
Day parade in the 1980s that Sophie watches in her apartment in the West. The 
Promise  “draws the Wall and the division of Germany as a larger-than-life tableau 
of the fantasies and aspirations of the 1960s generation” (Byg). Its last scene 
in particular suggests the ambivalence of the German “New Left” about how 
reunification took place. Some critics have disparaged The Promise’s conclusion 
because it contrasts so starkly with the joy that most Germans felt. Others found 
it too sentimental and believed that its portrayal of the GDR was unrealistically 
negative (Wydra 201–6; Hehr 50). Nonetheless, due to its sweeping vision and 
its sense of history, it remains the definitive film on the division of Germany.
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE WALL
Since 1989 there has been little reason to doubt the actual existence of the 
cleft between East and West Germans addressed in The Promise. It includes a 
stubbornly persistent gap in income, employment, and living conditions, but 
also important psychological divisions. Residents of the old West Germany re-
sent what they see as a drain of their resources on behalf of Easterners, while 
the latter believe that they are negatively stereotyped and forced to assimilate 
into a new state on terms that were not of their making (Naughton 12–22). 
The invisible barriers have proved more difficult to overcome than the visible 
ones, just as Schneider predicted.
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The Promise  appeared at a time when German filmmakers had discovered a 
new interest in themes relating to national unification. Starting around 1990, 
a wave of documentaries appeared that the German film industry collectively 
labeled the “Wall film.” Although not all of them dealt directly with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, they explored issues relating to life under communism and 
the events leading to reunification (Naughton 98–101). In feature films, notes 
Leonie Naughton, the division of Germany is still perceptible. Most West Ger-
man productions about unification, which have ranged from docudramas to 
comedies, focus on what happened after the Wall fell. They also tend to present 
an idealized view of East Germany as “part rural idyll and part preindustrial 
paradise” (Naughton 239), in an often condescending attempt to positively 
address existing tensions. In contrast, in East German productions the events 
of 1989 often represent the climax of the film rather than the departure point, 
and the personal costs of unification also figure prominently (in these respects, 
The Promise is an atypical Western unification film). Despite these differences, 
Naughton remarks, “unification films from both the east and west present a 
generally consistent portrait of German-German relations. Mostly, these films 
suggest that those relations do not exist. No alarm is displayed about this situ-
ation, which is accepted as perfectly normal. . . . What these films ultimately 
effect is a segregation of East and West Germans” (242–43).
Several recent films on Cold War Berlin heavily reflect the current Ostalgie 
(a combination of the words East and nostalgia) phenomenon among former 
East Germans who want their everyday lives under communism validated, even 
if they do not wish to return to the past politically (Theil). Accordingly, the 
popular 1999 comedy Sonnenallee depicts life in the shadow of the Wall in East 
Berlin during the 1970s as rather bucolic and safe. Wolfgang Becker’s Goodbye, 
Lenin! (2003), which also has its farcical elements, is a serious statement about 
the problems many former GDR citizens experienced in adjusting after the 
Wall came down.
Robert Brent Toplin has noted that “cinematic history speaks to the pres-
ent” (41). This survey of films about Cold War Berlin confirms his point. Cold 
War Berlin continues to fascinate filmmakers and moviegoers who themselves 
remain divided about life in Germany since reunification.
NOTES
1. Exceptions include Schulte-Sasse and Heimann.
2. This plot device probably did not bother 1950s audiences, who were used to 
equating “Red” and “Brown” totalitarianism (Gleason).
3. Despite this ideologically correct message, GDR cultural authorities criticized 
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the film. They could not understand why a figure like Conny was the “hero” of a so-
cialist production. Dudow, of course, intended the women to be the heroines (Schenk 
74–76; Schittly 60).
 4. On the Halbstarken in East and West Germany, see Poigner.
 5. Wilder based the film’s plot on Egy, ketto, három [One, Two, Three], a 1930 one-
act play by Ferenc Molnár featuring a fast-talking banker and his socialist would-be 
son-in-law, but he changed the setting from Sweden to Berlin. The plot also echoes 
that of a 1939 comedy whose screenplay Wilder helped write, Ninotchka, about a Soviet 
agent, played by Greta Garbo, who succumbs to the temptations of capitalism while on 
a mission in Paris to retrieve three wayward commissars (Dick 28–29, 70–72). Wilder 
also had Duck Soup (1933) in mind and wondered how the Marx Brothers would have 
approached the Cold War as a subject (Chandler 237).
 6. A point made by Crowe (165). Wilder, however, had other motivations for 
picking Coke as a central plot device: “I happen to think Coca-Cola is funny. A lot of 
people didn’t. Maybe that’s why the picture bombed out. I still think it’s funny. And 
when I drink it, it seems even funnier” (Sikov 465).
 7. Icestorm International recently released the original film with English subtitles 
as Look at This City. The dubbed English-language version from the 1960s was called 
Berlin Wall, but this title was neither an exact translation nor particularly accurate in 
terms of summarizing the film’s content (Hanwehr 1–2).
 8. East German authorities officially prohibited use of the word wall [Mauer] to 
describe it (Ladd 18; Large 454; Wyden 358; Ward).
 9. This was not an uncommon occurrence. In August 1961 fifty-three thousand 
East Berliners still worked in West Berlin, and twelve thousand West Berliners had jobs 
in the East (Engert 151).
10. This is a major theme in Feinstein.
11. This film is so bad that it has achieved cult status. Quentin Tarantino references 
it in Kill Bill, Volume II (2004).
12. Burton was nominated for an Academy Award for his portrayal, but director 
Martin Ritt had to get him to tone down his romantic leading man persona in order 
to play the Leamas role convincingly (G. Miller 80).
13. Since Hallam is a proper British bureaucrat, stealing the papers is not an option. 
A signature (in this case, Palmer’s) is required before they can leave his office.
14. In the novel, a Soviet scientist, not Stok, is supposed to defect.
15. Like the Europa-Center, the Berlin Hilton was built to see over and to be seen 
from both sides of the Wall, thereby suggesting to the East Germans what they did not 
have (Wharton 71–88).
16. Of course, the Wall could also be used as a metaphor for other types of divisions 
that had nothing to do with Germany in the Cold War. In Andrzej Zulawski’s Posses-
sion (1981), Isabelle Adjani plays a Berlin housewife who suffers from schizophrenia 
and goes on a murder spree. She and most of the other characters have not only split 
personalities but also look-alikes with different character traits from the “originals.” 
Ewa Mazierska and Laura Rascaroli note that in Sander’s Redupers, “the Wall stands for 
sexual difference, as argued by some feminist critics, or for the divisions of the female 
self.” In Park Kwang-Su’s Berlin Report (1991), the city represents the divided Korean 
peninsula (Mazierska and Rascaroli 118–19).
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INVADERS OF THE COLD WAR
Generic Disruptions and Shifting Gender Roles 
in The Day the Earth Stood Still
16 / Susan A. George
In The Fifties, David Halberstam writes, “In retrospect the pace of the fifties seemed 
slower, almost languid. Social ferment, however, was beginning just beneath 
this placid surface” (ix). He further notes, “Few Americans doubted the es-
sential goodness of their society. After all it was reflected back at them not 
only in contemporary books and magazines, but even more powerfully and 
with even greater influence in the new family sitcoms on television” (x). TV 
programs such as The Donna Reed Show and Leave It to Beaver belied any sense 
of turmoil or tension, yet while these programs showed, in black-and-white 
simplicity, American families leading idyllic lives in the suburbs, the nation 
was in the grip of rapid social, political, and economic changes. Besides the 
beginning of the Cold War, a wide range of other issues was contributing to 
the anxiety of the era, including postwar affluence, the development of atomic 
power for defense and its promise of unlimited energy, the Korean War, and 
the beginning of the civil rights and women’s movements. The apparent ad-
vances, benefits, and changes in the 1950s were met with excitement, but also 
with a great deal of anxiety.
Hollywood was also affected by these changes. From the mid-1940s through 
most of the 1950s, a new conservatism took root in Hollywood. Still shaken 
from the House Committee on Un-American Activities’ trial of the “Hollywood 
Ten” and the communist blacklists that put more than three hundred directors, 
technicians, writers, and actors out of work, Hollywood vowed, in the words of 
Eric Johnston, head of the Motion Picture Producers Association, “We’ll have 
no more films that show the seamy side of American life” (quoted in L. May 
145). Though many Hollywood figures such as Arthur Miller, Paul Robeson, 
Lester Cole, Dalton Trumbo, and the rest of the Hollywood Ten stood firmly 
against this trend, others were naming names, confessing their past communist 
affiliations, asking for forgiveness, or adding their voices to the vanguard of 
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conservatism that culminated with Ronald Reagan’s election as president of 
the Screen Actors Guild in the early 1950s. As Paul Carter notes, “Hollywood 
had always been chicken-hearted about social and political controversy. . . . 
The Cold War reinforced these intrinsic tendencies” (209). Hollywood’s goal, 
if not to support Cold War ideologies openly, was to stay on the right side of 
the controversy.
Cultural artifacts of the 1950s, including film, provide a less than complete 
picture of the time. Wheeler Winston Dixon notes that “mainstream films tell 
us what we wish to remember about the 1950s, as seen through the lens of the 
dominant cinema, but not what is necessarily an accurate record of the times 
as we lived them” (8). He states that another difficulty with understanding 
the 1950s has to do with the films that scholars and critics have chosen to 
discuss: “One of the essential problems with any canon, filmic or otherwise, is 
that it limits one’s scope of inquiry” (9). By focusing on A films, the cultural 
importance of B, C, and D films, including the subject of this study—science 
fiction—is often lost or forgotten, leading to the misconception that there 
was one unified voice emerging from 1950s Hollywood, a voice concerned 
with playing it safe.
Even with pressure to produce films that supported dominant ideolo-
gies, some films—either by design or by accident—resisted or were critical of 
hegemonic narratives and ideologies. Marginalized films—what Dixon refers 
to as “phantom” films or “purely entertainment” genres—such as horror and 
science fiction, were often allowed special license. This is not to say that all 
popular genre films were critical of the politics of the time; many science fiction 
films, for example, supported and promoted dominant values. In This Island 
Earth (1955), much of the opening sequence features a Lockheed jet, and the 
ensuing dialogue ensures that everyone is aware that it is a Lockheed product. 
The film also stresses the importance of continued technological research and 
development, made possible by government contracts with private industry. It 
was common practice for the military to lend or rent equipment to filmmak-
ers as long as the subject matter of the film did not conflict with the military’s 
agenda (Turner 80). As Lawrence Suid notes, “The military has seen these films 
as a superb public relations medium” (8). And since the equipment enhanced 
the documentary style of many science fiction films, studios “regularly sought 
assistance from the armed forces in the form of technical advice, men, and 
hardware” (Suid 8). The arrangement not only gave an “authentic” look to 
the films but also provided free advertising for the military.
Other science fiction films, however, particularly invasion films, were criti-
cal of the social and political status quo, often challenging narrowly defined 
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gender roles and Americans’ fear of the “Other.” These films, such as the one 
examined here—Robert Wise’s 1951 classic The Day the Earth Stood Still—provide 
important alternatives to dominant cinema’s “record of the times,” presenting a 
more “accurate record” of the tensions and anxieties that plagued the postwar 
era (Dixon 8). By disrupting narrative conventions of the genre—specifically, 
the representation of gender roles, the hero, and the alien Other—Wise’s film 
addresses and interrogates not only 1950s masculinity and conformity but also 
Cold War ideologies.
GENDER IN THE 1950S
THAT GENDER WAS A CENTRAL ISSUE IN 1950S M EDIA IS NOT AT ALL SURP RISING. AS ELAINE 
TYLER MAY NOTES, “FEARS OF SEXUAL CHAOS TEND TO SURFACE DURING TIM ES OF CRISIS AND 
RAP ID SOCIAL CHANGE,” AND THIS WAS TRUE OF THE TURB ULENT 1950S (93). A VARIETY OF 
CULTURAL ARTIFACTS WERE EDUCATING AM ERICANS AB OUT THE P ROP ER ROLES FOR WOM EN. 
THIS KIND OF INFORM ATION fiLLED THE P AGES OF P OP ULAR WOM EN’S M AGAZINES SUCH 
AS Redbook, McCall’s, Housekeeping Monthly, and Ladies’ Home Journal, as well as 
Federal Civil Defense Administration pamphlets and popular guidebooks by 
doctors and other “experts.” For example, in The Modern Woman: The Lost Sex 
(1947), Ferdinand Lundberg and Dr. Marynia Farnham blame feminism and 
career women for an assortment of social problems. They warn that “the more 
educated the woman is, the greater the chance there is of sexual disorder, 
more or less severe. The greater the disordered sexuality in a given group 
of women, the fewer children do they have. Satisfactory sexuality, therefore, 
is linked for a woman with wanting and having children” (270–71). In their 
opinion, women who decide not to have children or who choose to stay single 
are deviant. More important, they claim that women’s mental health depends 
on their focusing on the roles of wife and mother. 
Being a good woman in 1940s America was not always an easy task, as 
Philip Wylie announced in his book Generation of Vipers (1942). Wylie discusses 
two types of women: the Cinderella, who wants only to marry a “good-looking 
man with dough” who will reward her “for nothing more than being female,” 
and the mom (46, 47). “Mom” is the central target of Wylie’s chapter “The 
Common Women.” In his “sermon,” he charges that overindulgent, over-
bearing, or obsessively nurturing moms are to blame for the sad state of the 
American male(xxii). The power of “momism” and its effects are far-reach-
ing, Wylie warns: “Good-looking men and boys are rounded up and beaten 
or sucked into pliability, a new slave population continually goes to work at 
making more munitions for momism, and mom herself sticks up her head, 
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or maybe a periscope of the woman next door, to find some new region that 
needs taking over. This technique pervades all she does” (193–94). According 
to Wylie, momism was creating a generation of dependent, foolish, and weak 
men who were easy marks for all sorts of corrupting forces, including the al-
lure of communist ideology and unfettered sexuality.
Besides Lundberg and Farnham, Wylie, and Dr. Benjamin Spock, popular 
genre writers such as Mickey Spillane were warning that female desire and 
sexuality, if not properly contained, could distract men, destroy families, and 
make the nation ripe for communist infiltration. Female sexuality, in fact, was 
quickly linked to the destructive power of the atom. Not long after the atomic 
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the concept exploded in the American 
popular imagination. Businesses were having “Atomic Sales,” and bars were 
mixing “Atomic Cocktails” while people danced to the “Atom Polka” (Boyer 
10–11). General Mills “offered an ‘Atomic Bomb Ring’ for fifteen cents and a 
Kix cereal box top” (Boyer 11). As Benjamin Shapiro notes, the “link of atomic 
power with female sexuality has been widely noted as a broad phenomenon in 
American popular culture. The bomb dropped on Bikini Island, for example, 
was itself nicknamed for femme fatale ‘Gilda’ and adorned with a picture of Rita 
Hayworth,” who played the title role in the 1946 noir film (109).
Science fiction films such as The Leech Woman (1959), The Attack of the 50 
Foot Woman (1958), and The Wasp Woman (1960) exploited the link that already 
existed between technology and the feminine, featuring females made powerful 
and monstrous by science. These characters are the science fiction equivalents 
of the vamp or female vampire figures that have “sucked men dry physically, 
financially, or morally for centuries on stage, in literature,” and more recently 
in film (George 1). Janet Staiger observes that the vamp appears as a staple in 
early U.S. films such as D. W. Griffith’s The Mothering Heart (1913) and Frank 
Powell’s A Fool There Was (1915). The tales of the science fiction vamps, like 
the stories of their predatory sisters before them, provide cautionary tales as 
they feed on an assortment of male figures from innocent and unsuspecting 
men to criminal and deviant ones.
A different strategy needed to be developed to deal with the new global 
politics and the changing gender roles evident in postwar America. That strat-
egy was “containment” on all fronts, foreign and domestic. George Kennan 
first offered the political policy of containment in a 1947 Foreign Affairs article 
about the Soviets. “Containment,” as Eric F. Goldman states, “better than any 
other term, was the expression of the emerging Truman policies in foreign 
and domestic affairs” (80). The policy of containment, like the power of the 
atomic bomb, quickly became a significant tenet of the popular imagination. 
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Socially, containment signaled a concentrated effort by the media, government, 
and business to force women out of the workforce and back into the home. 
For instance, a 1955 issue of Housekeeping Monthly noted, “A good wife always 
knows her place” (“Good Wife’s”). She is to stay at home and make sure the 
children are good citizens. Her goal is to “try to make sure [her] home is a 
place of peace, order and tranquility where [her] husband can renew himself 
in body and spirit” (“Good Wife’s”). In the domestic sphere, containment was 
accomplished through marriage and the establishment of a “nuclear” family 
residing in the suburbs, with a husband as the breadwinner and a woman as 
his hausfrau.
The nuclear family: a post–World War II ideal.
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THE MYSTIQUE MODELS
MANY FEM ALE CHARACTERS IN 1950S SCIENCE fiCTION INVASION fiLM S, THOSE M OST OFTEN 
REM EM B ERED B Y FANS AND SCHOLARS ALIKE, fiT THIS P RESCRIB ED M ODEL. THESE CHAR-
ACTERS EXEM P LIFY WHAT BETTY FRIEDAN WOULD DESCRIB E IN 1963 AS THE “FEM ININE 
M YSTIQUE.” THEY ARE CONSTRUCTIONS OF HEGEM ONIC FORCES SP EAKING FOR THE STATUS 
QUO AND DOM INANT IDEOLOGIES. THESE ARE THE 1950S WOM EN WHO WERE FEATURED 
IN COUNTLESS M OVIE TRAILERS AND LOB B Y P OSTER DISP LAYS: HIGH-HEELED, WELL-DRESSED 
DAM SELS WHO SCREAM  WHEN THREATENED AND WHO REP RESENT TRADITIONAL AM ERICAN 
NOTIONS OF HEARTH, HOM E, AND FAM ILY. THEY INCLUDE ELLEN FIELDS (BARB ARA RUSH) 
IN It Came from Outer Space (1953) and Cathy Barrett (Lola Albright) in The 
Monolith Monsters (1957). The social and political forces that produced what I 
call the “mystique model” were so powerful that some female science fiction 
characters became case studies in or step-by-step manuals on how to behave.
One fine example is Sylvia Van Buren (Ann Robinson) in the big-budget 
adaptation of H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds (1952). Although Sylvia starts 
out as an educated and intelligent woman, she quickly transforms into a mys-
tique model. When a strange object crashes outside a small Southern California 
town, the townspeople, including Sylvia and some vacationing scientists, all go 
to investigate the crash site. From the beginning, it is clear that Sylvia is rather 
“star struck” with the scientist hero of the film, Dr. Clayton Forester (Gene 
Barry), even though she has never met him. When she does, she fails to rec-
ognize him in his casual fishing clothes and a few days’ growth of beard. She 
tells the vacationing stranger what she knows or presumes about the “meteor” 
and predicts that all their questions will be answered when Dr. Forester, who 
is the “top man in astro- and nuclear physics,” arrives.
As she goes on about Forester, a medium close-up shows her smiling, 
admiring face. He comments that she seems to know an awful lot about this 
“Forester fellow,” and she tells him that she wrote her master’s thesis on modern 
scientists; it would seem that he was her favorite. At this point in the narrative 
Sylvia speaks for the many U.S. women who went to college after World War II. 
The GI Bill increased the number of veterans in college, and there was also an 
increase in the number of women entering college (E. T. May 78). While many 
of these women got married and dropped out to help support their husbands, 
Sylvia completed her degree. In addition, after graduation Sylvia was able to 
find a job in her area of study—something most women of the decade found 
difficult, if not impossible. When the film begins she is an instructor of library 
science at the University of Southern California.
Later, when the meteor turns out to be a spacecraft and the aliens demon-
Invaders of the Cold War / 355
strate their hostile intentions, the film shifts its focus away from Sylvia’s educa-
tion and knowledge. Indeed, as the alien threat increases, Sylvia’s objectivity 
and IQ seem to rapidly decrease, and when troops arrive to take charge of the 
situation, Sylvia’s role becomes completely domestic. The next sequence shows 
her wearing a Red Cross volunteer armband and serving coffee and doughnuts 
to the men mobilizing a defense. Her new role as a symbol of all that needs 
protecting (hearth, home, white womanhood) is emphasized when General 
Mann (Les Tremayne) arrives. When she is introduced to him all she says is, 
“Hello, General, would you care for some coffee?” She then hands him a cup 
and moves on with her tray. This scene marks the beginning of her transforma-
tion from active participant—a bright young woman who knows about meteors 
and modern scientists—into inactive damsel, a perfect mystique model.
Sylvia’s position as someone who needs caring for and protecting—and 
as a commodity of exchange—is highlighted later in this same sequence. She 
lives with her Uncle Matthew (Lewis Martin), who is the town pastor. As the 
military prepares to attack and eliminate the aliens, Uncle Matthew decides 
that someone should first try communicating with them. 
MATTHEW: I think we should try to make them understand we mean them no 
harm. They are living creatures out there.
SYLVIA: But they’re not human. Dr. Forester says they are some kind of advanced 
civilization.
MATTHEW: If they are more advanced than us they should be nearer the creator 
for that reason. No real attempt has been made to communicate with them, 
you know.
SYLVIA: Let’s go back inside, Uncle Matthew.
MATTHEW: I’ve done all I can in there. You go back. Sylvia, I like that Dr. Forester. 
He’s a good man.
After this dialogue, Sylvia returns to the bunker, and Uncle Matthew attempts 
to communicate with the invaders. With his Bible held out in front of him and 
reciting the twenty-third psalm, “though I walk through the valley of the shadow 
of death,” he approaches the spacecraft, blocking its advance. In response, 
the ship incinerates him as the others watch from the bunker. This scene, 
linked with the first scene between Sylvia and Forester, lays the groundwork 
for her affections and attention to pass, with Uncle Matthew’s blessing, from 
her father-daughter relationship with him to the compulsory and “proper” 
heterosexual love relationship with the “good man” Forester. 
Sylvia’s transformation, the mystique models in many other science fiction 
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films, and the cautionary tales of the science fiction vamps make Helen Benson 
(Patricia Neal) in The Day the Earth Stood Still a unique and curious aberration 
as she offers an alternative to these representations. Though she is not the lone 
hero in the film, she plays a central and active role in the narrative and, by do-
ing so, rejects the Cold War values exemplified by the mystique model and the 
fears of female sexuality and power evident in the science fiction vamp films.
THE DAY THE EARTH STOOD STILL
The Day the Earth Stood Still begins when a very human looking alien, Klaatu 
(Michael Rennie), comes to earth with a message of welcome and a warning 
for humankind now that it has discovered atomic power and can venture into 
space. He is the spokesman from a group of planets where the inhabitants have 
given their power “in matters of aggression” over to powerful robots so that 
they can “pursue more profitable ventures. At the first sign of violence [the ro-
bots] act automatically against the aggressor.” Unfortunately, Klaatu is wounded 
by a nervous soldier before he can deliver his message; when he is later told 
that the current political landscape makes a meeting of all the world’s leaders 
impossible, he decides to find out what humans are really like and whether 
they are worth the trouble of saving. He takes a room in a Washington, D.C., 
boardinghouse under the name Carpenter and is introduced to Helen, her 
son Bobby (Billy Gray), and her boyfriend Tom (Hugh Marlowe).
From the beginning, Helen appears to be a different kind of woman. 
Charles Ramírez Berg observes that, in most science fiction films, a character 
from “the less powerful group is often typed along a spectrum of possibilities 
from harmless and childlike to dangerous” (6). However, these stereotypical 
possibilities are never consistently applied to Helen. She is presented as an 
intelligent and capable person. A working war widow supporting herself and 
raising her son, she is thoughtful, understanding of the alien’s point of view, 
and she is usually placed in a powerful position within the mise-en-scène. For 
example, early in the film, when the boarders are all having breakfast and lis-
tening to a radio broadcast regarding the invader’s recent escape from Walter 
Reed Hospital, Helen sympathizes with the alien’s position and takes an active 
role in the discussion:
HELEN: This space man, or whatever he is, we automatically assume he’s a menace. 
Maybe he isn’t at all.
MR. BAR LEY: Then what’s he hiding for? Why doesn’t he come out into the 
open?
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MR. KRULL: Yea, like that Heatter fella says, “What’s he up to?”
HELEN: Maybe he’s afraid. [. . .] After all, he was shot the minute he landed here. 
I was just wondering what I would do?
CARPENTER/KLAATU: Well, perhaps before deciding on a course of action, you’d 
want to know about the people here.
Helen is seated at the head of the table and is the focus of much of the scene. A 
medium shot shows her filling her coffee cup and that of another boarder, but 
this “domestic” act does not hinder her participation in the conversation, as it 
did with Sylvia in The War of the Worlds. Instead, this domestic scene places the 
woman, Helen, and her thoughts at the center instead of on the periphery. 
In addition, the fact that Bobby, Helen’s son, is a bright, friendly child 
and not on the verge of delinquency because of a lack of paternal love, as is 
the case in many 1950s family melodramas, further validates Helen’s position 
within the film. She is a different kind of woman, one who can work, have her 
own opinions, and still raise a healthy, well-adjusted son.
By declining Tom’s (Hugh Marlowe) marriage proposal, Helen (Patricia Neal) 
rejects both the gender standards of the decade and the masculinity represented by 
Tom.
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Helen does not break the narrative trajectory of the mystique model com-
pletely, since she is dating an insurance salesman named Tom, who, early in the 
film, asks her to marry him. When Tom is introduced to the narrative, generic 
expectations dictate that he will be the protagonist who protects Helen and 
Bobby from the invader so that, when the crisis has passed, they can become a 
typical postwar family. Instead of fulfilling this convention—common in other 
invasion films such as It Came from Outer Space (1953), The Beast from 20,000 
Fathoms (1953), and 20 Million Miles to Earth (1957)—this film takes another 
direction. Later, when Klaatu tells Helen who he is and why he has come to 
earth, she decides to help him evade the authorities long enough to deliver 
his message to the scientists that Professor Barnhardt (Sam Jaffe) has man-
aged to assemble. Meanwhile, Tom has decided to go to the military with his 
information about Klaatu. Helen tries to change Tom’s mind but fails. Earlier, 
Helen has told Tom that she needs time to think about his marriage proposal, 
but during the following exchange, she makes up her mind:
HELEN: That’s what I’m trying to tell you, we mustn’t do anything about it. Believe 
me Tom, I know what I’m talking about.
TOM: He’s a menace to the whole world. It’s our duty to turn him in.
HELEN: But he’s not a menace. He told me why he came here.
TOM: He told . . . he told you, oh don’t be silly, honey, just because you like the 
guy. You realize, of course, what this would mean to us. I could write my own 
ticket. I’d be the biggest man in the country. [. . .]
HELEN: [. . .] Tom you mustn’t. You don’t know what you’re doing. It isn’t just 
you and Mr. Carpenter, the rest of the world’s involved.
TOM: I don’t care about the rest of the world. You’ll feel different when you see 
my picture in the papers.
HELEN: I feel different right now.
TOM: You wait and see. You’re gonna marry a big hero.
HELEN: I’m not going to marry anybody. [She exits.]
While 1950s cultural politics and media representations were telling women 
that their role was to find a good husband, stay at home, and raise the requi-
site number of children, Helen rejects the prevailing standard. Her rebuff of 
Tom’s proposal disrupts both dominant ideologies and the “drawing together 
of the heterosexual couple,” which “occurs with such consistency [in science 
fiction films] that we may consider it an integral part of the generic formula” 
(Shapiro 108).
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In addition, when Helen rejects Tom, she rejects a masculinity forged and 
supported by Cold War values that “demanded ideological vigilance, crew-
cuts, and a talent for rigid self-control,” in favor of the gentler masculinity of 
Klaatu/Carpenter (as well as Barnhardt and Bobby) that would not be widely 
acknowledged in the United States until the 1960s and 1970s (Ehrenreich 
104). Since the film resists the temptation to have Helen and Klaatu develop 
into a couple, she becomes more autonomous and functions as a hero in the 
film. Through Helen’s role as hero and the contrasting masculinities presented 
by Tom and Klaatu, The Day the Earth Stood Still draws into question dominant 
ideologies about gender and containment in ways that other 1950s science 
fiction films rarely did.
K laatu’s (Michael Rennie) gentler masculinity presents a different 
role model for young Bobby (Billy Gray).
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However, Tom serves as more than just a foil to Klaatu; he also foregrounds 
the fact that alongside the preoccupation with getting women back into the 
home and containing female sexuality, there was also a crisis in masculinity. 
Returning veterans found more than a grateful nation when they returned; 
they also found a changing political and social landscape. Although some 
veterans were able to return to the jobs they had left behind, displacing their 
replacement workers, others were not so fortunate. The influx of servicemen 
and their new families added to the existing housing shortage, forcing many 
young couples to live with their parents or in makeshift arrangements—even 
trailers and campers. Halberstam notes that in Chicago the housing crisis was 
so severe that “250 used trolley cars were sold for use as homes,” and other 
newlywed veterans were living in army Quonset huts (134). These factors 
and the added stress of readjusting to civilian life left many veterans feeling 
ill equipped to fulfill their roles as breadwinners and providers. Moreover, 
the definition of masculinity, of what it meant to be an American male, was 
undergoing major revisions.
Early in U.S. history John Locke and Adam Smith made popular the notion 
“that there is a natural and harmonious relationship between the desires of indi-
viduals and the demands of social necessity, that individuals who act out of self-
interest will automatically move the society as a whole in the direction of natural 
perfection” (Samuels 210). This notion of “natural harmony” was predicated 
on the belief that nothing in the system—including class, gender, religion, or 
race—could prevent people from achieving their goals. Thus, any failure on 
the part of the individual was a result of personal shortcomings, not social or 
political impediments. The individual, then, was the proper driving force in the 
development of the society. This archetypal image of the rugged individualist 
was a staple of U.S. social policy and narrative tradition at least as far back as the 
novels of James Fenimore Cooper and the tales that grew out of the exploits of 
historical figures such as Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett, but it came under fire 
in the 1950s. There was a new, strong desire for conformity—a conformity that 
would lead to a united and stable nation able to repel the threat of communist 
infiltration as well as withstand domestic problems such as the rising divorce 
rate and juvenile delinquency. Conformity and maintaining the status quo were 
the new standards of the decade, and they were being examined, promoted, 
and critiqued in a wide range of cultural texts, including David Riesman’s best 
seller The Lonely Crowd (1950), William Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956), 
and Sloan Wilson’s The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1955).
In The Day the Earth Stood Still, Tom is well aware of the new model of 
masculinity. He is concerned with respectability and upward mobility, and 
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he knows that “compliance with the system” is the road to success (Samuels 
207). He tells Helen that “turning in” Klaatu will allow him to “write my own 
ticket. I’d be the biggest man in the country.” In a decade in which loyalty 
oaths and “turning in” friends, coworkers, or family members who might have 
communist leanings or were simply outside the norm in terms of individual-
ity, sexual orientation, or race had become commonplace, Tom speaks for 
the new conformist masculinity of the time. Tom’s actions attest not only to 
his understanding and acceptance of conformity but also to the xenophobia 
generated by Cold War rhetoric. Furthermore, Tom’s dismissive treatment of 
Helen is indicative of the decade’s attitude toward women. As William O’Neill 
observes, “Sexism flourished. Today nothing about the postwar era seems more 
peculiar than the universal indifference to women’s rights. At the time gender 
stereotyping and discrimination, far from embarrassing anyone, were staples 
of humor” (39). They are also staples of Tom’s behavior.
In addition to the scene quoted above, in which Tom dismisses the no-
tion that the “spaceman” would entrust Helen, a woman, with the purpose of 
his mission, several others demonstrate Tom’s sexism. For example, on the 
day he wants to propose, Helen has no one to watch Bobby. She suggests that 
they take Bobby with them, but Tom is less than keen about the idea. When 
Carpenter/Klaatu offers to stay with Bobby, Tom quickly and enthusiastically 
replies, “Say, that would be great!” Helen is not so sure, and she gives him a 
sideways look of caution; she is concerned about leaving her son with a virtual 
stranger. While her apprehension is lost on Tom, Klaatu understands her con-
cern, assuring her that he and Bobby had “a fine time yesterday afternoon” 
and that he was hoping Bobby “might like to show [him] around the city.” 
Helen is still not convinced and gives Tom another meaningful look that he 
clearly does not comprehend. Finally, they decide to leave the choice up to 
Bobby. Once Carpenter exits, Helen, still unsure, asks Tom, “You think it’s 
all right?” and with vigor he replies, “Sure.” In this scene Tom is more than 
ready to speak on Helen’s behalf regarding arrangements for her son and is 
completely oblivious to her valid concerns.
As the film continues, Tom’s actions become more hypocritical and his 
attitude more patronizing. Tom finds Helen talking to Mr. Carpenter when he 
arrives for their next date and becomes jealous, making a rude remark within 
earshot of Carpenter. When Helen comments on his behavior, Tom, who only 
days before had willingly left Bobby in Carpenter’s care, tells her, “I guess I’m 
just tired of hearing about Mr. Carpenter. . . . I don’t like the way he’s attached 
himself to you and Bobby. After all, what do you know about him?” Helen is 
speechless. Her only reply is a look of unbelieving irritation before she coolly 
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leaves the room to get her things. By the end of the film Tom is ready to turn 
Klaatu in to the authorities, saying that he “never did trust him.”
Tom’s behavior sets Klaatu’s masculinity up as an attractive alternative. 
Besides running contrary to the generic conventions established for the white 
male love interest in science fiction films, Tom’s character destabilizes audience 
identification with the male protagonist. Film scholar Laura Mulvey and oth-
ers have noted that the assumed or “perfect” film spectator is the white male, 
and “as the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist he projects his 
look onto that of his like . . . so that the power of the male protagonist as he 
controls events coincides with the active power of the erotic look, both giving 
a satisfying sense of omnipotence” (34). As Tom’s behavior becomes more and 
more suspect, the identification process is disrupted, and the spectator has to 
look toward other characters to identify with, others who are not “of his like” 
(including an alien, a woman, an aging scientist, or a young boy), thus calling 
into question not only Tom’s attitude and behavior but also the spectator’s 
own assumptions about masculinity in the atomic age.
To be fair to Tom and the military (the other representative of patriarchal 
authority in the film), in most cases they would be correct in thinking that 
Klaatu presents a threat and should be destroyed. Most alien invaders of the 
era are bug-eyed monsters with only one thing on their minds: the destruction 
of the planet and the extermination of the human race. Klaatu is quite differ-
ent, a figure that Berg terms a “sympathetic alien.” Spectators of science fiction 
films today have become familiar with this figure through characters in films 
such as ET: The Extra-Terrestrial (1982), Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977), 
and Star Man (1984), but the “wise, understanding extraterrestrial was an oddity 
back in the 1950s when it appeared in the memorable form of Michael Rennie’s 
Klaatu” (Berg 4). Klaatu is so conscious of the effects of his actions that, when 
he arranges to have the electricity neutralized all over the world at noon (as a 
demonstration of his power), he makes sure that “hospitals, planes in flight, 
those sorts of things” are not affected. Still, the military and Tom mark him 
for extermination. What, then, is Klaatu’s crime? He is an elusive and powerful 
Other who cannot be contained and therefore cannot be tolerated or allowed 
within the rigid confines of 1950s masculinity and society. What Robin Wood 
observes about the treatment of the Other in Westerns is evident in Tom’s and 
the military’s response to Klaatu; it is “a classic and extreme case of the projec-
tion onto the Other of what is repressed within the Self, in order that it can be 
discredited, disowned, and if possible annihilated” (199).
This rather unusual science fiction invasion film disrupts narrative expectations 
and Cold War values on several levels. By placing the woman in an active role, 
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breaking the narrative conventions of the genre, and questioning the notion of 
gender containment, the film challenges the status quo. It shows that the best 
prospect for survival and peace may lie not in military prowess and personal 
gain but in “oppositional values and meanings” of those that are typically la-
beled “Other.” Raymond Williams notes that both alternative and oppositional 
values and meanings exist within a dominant culture. He writes that “there is a 
simple theoretical distinction between alternative and oppositional, that is to 
say between someone who simply finds a different way to live and wishes to be 
left alone with it, and someone who finds a different way to live and wants to 
change the society in its light” (Williams 11). The characters in this film clearly 
want to change society. By shifting the focus of the narrative and visual images 
away from Tom and the military and centering on the actions, reactions, and 
reasoning of Helen and Klaatu, the film suggests a “different way to live”—a 
way based less on aggression and more on tolerance and understanding.
The Day the Earth Stood Still can also be read as an antiwar film that is critical 
of U.S. expansionist tendencies and national myths and 1950s xenophobia. For 
example, while Helen, Bobby, and Barnhardt accept Klaatu, those with politi-
cal and social power treat him like a monster come to earth to wreak havoc. 
Their reaction to Klaatu, like the reaction to real bug-eyed monsters in other 
films such as the giant queen ants in Them! (1954) and the “Gillman” in The 
Creature from the Black Lagoon (1954), demonstrates that the national response 
to the Other was still entrenched in Cold War rhetoric and negative stereo-
types. Few science fiction films were able to negotiate the issue of difference, 
especially when difference could not be easily seen or “lack[ed] fixity,” as in 
the case of the all too human Klaatu and “takeover” films such as Invasion of 
the Body Snatchers (1956) and Invaders from Mars (1953) (Ono and Sloop 44). It 
mattered little if the invader was a bug-eyed monster, took the form of a loved 
one, or was a soft-spoken humanoid; from the 1950s standpoint, all aliens were 
dangerous invaders that needed to be destroyed.
Moreover, by altering generic conventions, the film cast a critical gaze on 
conformist masculinity. Though the film fails to present complete alternative 
models or strategies to replace dominant ones, it does disrupt the conventions 
of a popular genre enough to raise questions about men’s roles in the atomic 
age. Still, the concluding sequence confirms that the most significant generic 
variation is the representation of Helen. In most invasion films the woman 
watches from afar or is completely absent from the closing scenes as the male 
protagonist saves the day so “the status quo can be maintained” (Berg 7). In 
The Day the Earth Stood Still it is Tom, the model of 1950s masculinity, who is 
missing from the closing sequence. The military, though present, is ineffectual 
and barely visible in the distance behind a group of assembled scientists and 
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religious leaders, both male and female, of many races, nationalities, and eth-
nicities. In a series of medium close-ups, it is the faces of these people, rarely 
seen even in the crowd scenes of most 1950s invasion films, and Helen and 
Klaatu who are the central figures in the closing scene.
Helen Benson is presented in stark contrast to the dominant culture’s 
“poster woman,” the mystique model. Though she has her moment of weak-
ness, including the obligatory blood-curdling scream, she still offers the 1950s 
woman alternative choices as she remains a good mother and a working 
woman and functions as the film’s protagonist as well, while still maintaining 
her femininity and her keen fashion sense. Her characterization suggests 
that a woman can think for herself, choose to stay single (or widowed, as in 
Helen’s case), and be an active participant outside the home without her child 
Significantly, Helen and the alien Other, K laatu—not Tom 
or the military—are the central figures in the film’s closing 
sequence.
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paying for it—disproving the denunciations about “mom” made by Lundberg 
and Farnham, Wylie, and other pundits of the day. Unfortunately, 1950s science 
fiction films contain far more mystique models who “serve the interests of the 
ruling class” and are rewarded with the promise of marriage for maintaining 
traditional gender roles than women like Helen (Wright 41).
Many film theorists claim that genre films are solely tools of the dominant 
culture, so it is not surprising that mystique models outnumber any other type 
of woman in science fiction films. The dominant culture, as Christine Gledhill 
notes, repeatedly tries to “turn artistic practice to it own ends,” but is not always 
successful. As she explains: “Due to a complex of contradictions in the socio-
economic and cultural conditions of the mass media and aesthetic production, 
the hegemony of the dominant ideology is always in question. Despite the 
claim that all mainstream production is tainted with realist reaction, genre 
has been seized on by radical cultural analysts as the ground on which ‘pro-
gressive’ appropriations may be made of bourgeois and patriarchal products” 
(10). The Day the Earth Stood Still opens a space for emergent ideologies and 
“progressive appropriations” of “patriarchal products” such as the narrowly 
defined or “traditional” gender roles imposed on women and men, the move 
from individualist to conformist as the model for masculinity, and the fear of 
the Other that permeated the era. Moreover, the film offers a different world-
view, one in which the earth is saved not through dominant cultural dogma but 
through the progressive vision of those who are traditionally marked as Other 
and thus less valued in the culture, such as “other people, women . . . [and] 
children” (Berg 4). Therefore, the film stands as another “phantom” produc-
tion that offers an oppositional voice and a more complete understanding of 
what Goldman identifies as the “crucial decade.”
WORKS CITED
Berg, Charles Ramírez. “Immigrants, Aliens and Extraterrestrials: Science Fiction’s 
Alien ‘Other’ as (Among Other Things) New Hispanic Imagery.” CineAction! 18 
(1989): 3–17.
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the 
Atomic Age. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1994.
Carter, Paul A. Another Part of the Fifties. New York: Columbia UP, 1983.
The Day the Earth Stood Still. Dir. Robert Wise. 1951. Videocassette. 20th Century-Fox 
Film Corp., 1979.
Dixon, Wheeler Winston. Lost in the Fifties: Recovering Phantom Hollywood. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP, 2005.
Ehrenreich, Barbara. The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983.
366 / Susan A. George
George, Susan. “Pushing Containment: The Tale of the 1950s Science Fiction Vamp.” 
Reconstruction: Studies in Contemporary Culture 5.4 (Fall 2005). <http://reconstruction 
.eserver.org/054/george.shtml>.
Gledhill, Christine. “Klute 1: A Contemporary Film Noir and Feminist Criticism.” Women 
in Film Noir. Ed. E. Ann Kaplan. 1978. London: British Film Institute, 1994. 6–21.
Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade—And After: America, 1945–1960. 1956. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1960.
“The Good Wife’s Guide.” Housekeeping Monthly 13 May 1955. 
Halberstam, David. The Fifties. New York: Villard Books, 1993.
Lundberg, Ferdinand, and Marynia F. Farnham, MD. The Modern Woman: The Lost Sex. 
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.
May, Elaine Tyler. Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era. New York: 
Basic Books, 1988.
May, Lary. “Movie Star Politics: The Screen Actor’s Guild, Cultural Conversion, and the 
Hollywood Red Scare.” Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold 
War. Ed. Lary May. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989. 125–53.
Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Screen 16:3 (1975). Rpt. in Is-
sues in Feminist Film Criticism. Ed. Patricia Erens. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990. 
28–40.
O’Neill, William L. American High: The Years of Confidence,1945–1960. New York: Free 
Press, 1986.
Ono, Kent A., and John M. Sloop. “Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and 
California’s ‘Proposition 187.’” Personal copy of unpublished manuscript. 2001.
Samuels, Stuart. “The Age of Conspiracy and Conformity: Invasion of the Body Snatch-
ers.” American History/American Film: Interpreting the Hollywood Image. Ed. John E. 
O’Connor and Martin A. Jackson. 1979. New York: Ungar, 1988. 203–17.
Shapiro, Benjamin. “Universal Truths: Cultural Myths and Generic Adaptation in 1950s 
Science Fiction Films.” Journal of Popular Film and Television 18.3 (1990): 103–11.
Staiger, Janet. Bad Women: Regulating Sexuality in Early American Cinema. Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 1995.
Suid, Lawrence H. Guts & Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film. Lex-
ington: UP of Kentucky, 2002.
This Island Earth. Dir. Joseph Newman. 1955. Videocassette. Universal Pictures Com-
pany, 1983.
Turner, George. “Howard Hawks’ The Thing.” Cinefantastique 12 (1982): 78–85.
The War of the Worlds. Dir. Byron Haskin. Prod. George Pal. 1952. Videocassette. Para-
mount Pictures, 1980.
Williams, Raymond. “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.” New Left 
Review 82 (1973): 3–16.
Wood, Robin. “An Introduction to American Horror Films.” Movies and Methods. Ed 
Bill Nichol. Berkeley: U of California P, 1985. 2:195–220.
Wright, Judith Hess. “Genre Films and the Status Quo.” Jump Cut 1 (1974): 16–18. Rpt. 
in Film Genre Reader II. Ed. Barry Keith Grant. Austin: U of Texas P, 1995. 41–49.
Wylie, Philip. Generation of Vipers. New York: Rinehart, 1942.
Using Popular Culture to Study the Vietnam War / 367
USING POPULAR CULTURE TO 
STUDY THE VIETNAM WAR
Perils and Possibilities
17 / Peter C. Rollins
The Vietnam War is not over for the United States. It is still being fought in 
our popular culture, and the struggle provides rich opportunities for research-
ers and teachers of contemporary literature, mass media, and culture. The 
secret for exploiting this opportunity has less to do with identifying the kinds 
of materials to use in the classroom than with defining the right approach to 
them, for while there are possibilities, there are also perils. Existing Vietnam 
texts are short on hard, irreducible facts and long on bias; as a result, histori-
ans should look upon popular culture as a subjective prism of intense feeling 
rather than as Clio’s reliable mirror.
Disagreements about interpreting Vietnam can lead to heated debates 
that echo the confrontations of the 1960s. For example, James Webb (later to 
become a U.S. senator from Virginia) stepped on a rhetorical land mine at a 
1985 conference on “The Vietnam Experience in American Literature” when 
he defiantly questioned the willingness of assembled academics to consider 
perspectives other than those that portrayed America as exploiter, manipulator, 
and villain. As a highly decorated marine combat veteran who believed that 
our cause in Vietnam was not only just but also vindicated by the post-1975 
experience of the “killing fields” and the boat people, Webb deplored the uni-
formity of perspective along academe’s postwar paper trail. Although Webb’s 
position is overstated—he is well known for his combativeness—it deserves 
consideration, especially his complaint about what he calls the influence of an 
“academic-intellectual complex”: “In media and publishing circles, support-
ing government policy of almost any sort becomes akin to selling out. Such a 
writer is quite often viewed by his peers and by critics to be either stupid or 
a pawn. Awards are lavished on those who discover new ways to question or 
attack government policy. Sometimes it takes more courage to confront the 
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hostility of one’s peers than it does to attack that amorphous dragon called 
government policy” (Lomperis 18–19).
Many present at the conference complained that Webb’s remarks were not 
helpful, although a few of the assembled authors who were veterans confirmed 
Webb’s charges by recounting their own struggles with publishers who rejected 
manuscripts that “did not exhibit enough guilt” (Lomperis 22). Scholars who 
have taken an empathetic stand toward government policies or who have de-
fended public figures such as General William C. Westmoreland against attacks 
by programs such as The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception (1982) have been 
picketed at conferences and blacklisted from speaking engagements. (During 
a job interview, one veteran I know was refused employment and called “war 
criminal” for serving in the armed forces during the Vietnam conflict.) Thus, 
although Webb’s statement oversimplifies, it points to a real question: in pub-
lishing, on television, and in the classroom, have Americans been exposed to 
a full spectrum of perspectives on our tragic experience in Vietnam?
I think not. The purpose of this chapter is to briefly illumine the problems 
of using existing histories, fictions, films, and television programs to study 
Vietnam. I do not wish to argue that these materials should not be used— 
indeed, I feel that the opposite is the case, that they provide excellent teaching 
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instruments. What I do offer is that while there are wonderful possibilities in 
using existing texts in the classroom, there are also perils. The opportunity 
exists to show that the study of Vietnam—like virtually every other war era—is 
rich with differing perspectives and redolent with many “truths.” The danger 
lies in relying on any one document for the total picture. The first half of this 
chapter surveys the various documents and indicates potential pitfalls in using 
them; the second half tries to account for the biased consensus of approach 
to Vietnam. Along the way, I speculate about the possible impact of two Gulf 
wars on our evolving, retrospective images of Vietnam.
GENRES USED TO INTERPRET VIETNAM
Novels and Autobiographical Fiction
Vietnam fictions are so charged with feeling because veteran authors strive to 
dramatize the trauma inflicted on them and their friends. Shortly after gradu-
ating from the Marine Corps’ Basic School for officers at Quantico, Virginia, 
Philip Caputo found himself in Vietnam as an infantry platoon commander; 
A Rumor of War (1977) is his elaborate novelistic effort to depict himself as a 
youthful victim of war. W. D. Ehrhart’s Vietnam-Perkasie: A Combat Marine Memoir 
(1983) similarly traces the frontline devolution of a young boy fresh from the 
backwoods town of Perkasie, Pennsylvania. James Webb’s Fields of Fire (1978) 
Is Iraq Vietnam? What are the lessons to be applied?
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traces the combat experience of officers and men in a tightly knit marine in-
fantry platoon; in an unusual coda for this literary genre, the narrative follows 
one of the protagonists back to a university campus, where he rebukes the 
college peace movement for taking the easy way out. Personal narratives such 
as Michael Herr’s Dispatches (1977) promote empathy for the pain and death 
Herr witnessed during his psychedelic tour as a “new journalist” for Esquire. 
Each of these writers faithfully recounts his personal story; each comments 
implicitly and explicitly on the “big picture.” Webb and Herr create an intense 
identification with their subjects, whom we gradually see as the victims of an 
inept, but dangerous, killing machine: the hateful war itself. Caputo’s work is 
more narrowly autobiographical; much of the novel tries to explain how the 
Marine Corps and America have brought young Philip to commit murder and 
perjury. These infantry fictions are colorful evocations of Vietnam; what makes 
them perilous as documents is that the authors ask that their personal tales 
be accepted as reliable microcosms. Most of these “corruption of innocence” 
books draw heavily on the American Adam motif, a topic discussed later in 
this chapter. The motif has deep roots in our Romantic culture, but it clearly 
skews interpretations toward a melodramatic mode of good versus evil rather 
than promoting a wiser, tragic sense of life. Historians have long understood 
that a participant in a historical event may lack the perspective needed to 
identify larger patterns of meaning. War viewed from a foxhole shows vivid 
pyrotechnics, but the view is often as narrow as it is intense.
Letters, Diaries, and Oral Histories
Likewise, anthologies of letters, diary entries, and collected oral histories from 
Vietnam have their perils. Although such collections are promoted as argument 
free, their editors inevitably shape the presentations. Stanley Beesley’s Vietnam: 
The Heartland Remembers (1987) is a case in point. Beesley’s own tour in Vietnam 
came during the later years of the war. He believes—with many others—that 
the Vietnam War had two phases for the ordinary fighting man: during the first 
phase (1965–1969), units were committed to the field after training together; 
in the second phase (1969–1973), replacements were inserted as individuals 
among complete strangers. As a result, according to this interpretation, the 
second phase was characterized by a breakdown of discipline and a precipitous 
decline in morale. According to Beesley, second-phase army units refused to 
go out on combat operations; furthermore, such insubordination did not lead 
to disciplinary action. Vietnam: The Heartland Remembers appears to be merely 
a collection of oral history statements from veterans across the state of Okla-
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homa, but the evocative anthology misleads the reader by painting the entire 
war with second-phase colors. 
The New York State Vietnam Veterans Association collected a similar 
volume of letters entitled Dear America: Letters Home from Vietnam (1985). Inter-
estingly, that book does not try to pour the experience into a preconstructed 
mold; instead, the anthology clusters letters around such topics as arrival in 
country, the experience of battle, what it means to be “short” on time, and 
other “generic” experiences (Edelman). In 1987 HBO came out with a special 
broadcast (very) loosely based on the anthology. This program could be used 
as a textbook in media manipulation. The visual rendering of Dear America 
places more than 70 percent of the anthology’s letters out of chronological 
order to support the “two-phase” thesis. Filmmaker Bill Couturie, with the 
help of actors Charlie Sheen, Matt Dillon, and others, transforms an act of 
devotion into a diatribe. HBO’s Dear America was circulated theatrically in 1989 
so that it could be considered for an Academy Award. (It won an Emmy and 
a Sundance Film Festival Award.)
The lesson from these experiments is that oral histories and anthologies 
of personal documents are indeed perilous if approached as mere reposito-
ries of “fact.” When the subject is Vietnam, many anthologists find it hard to 
avoid shaping the raw materials into their own messages about the evils of a 
purposeless war.
Television
Our students are visually oriented, if not visually literate: some brag that they 
have seen major Vietnam movies more than once; others own large off-air 
collections of Vietnam documentaries. Yet the visual route can be the most 
perilous of all, because teachers are often as ill prepared as their students to 
analyze the visual rhetoric that the media giants of both coasts, and places in 
between, have so effectively mastered.
There are a number of prominent documentaries that purport to probe 
issues related to Vietnam. As late as 1983, the Organization of American His-
torians’ newsletter recommended Hearts and Minds (1974), directed by Peter 
Davis, as a perfect companion to Vietnam: A Television History, a series purveyed 
by WGBH-TV (Boston)—one of the major centers for educational television in 
this country. The reviewer’s suggestion was right, but not in the positive way it 
was intended. In an early review, even Time magazine noticed that the histori-
cal interpretation of Davis’s Hearts and Minds was simplistic, that its rhetoric 
was strident. By 1977 April Orcutt had laboriously dissected the propagandist 
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techniques of Davis’s Hearts and Minds in an excellent master’s thesis. (See 
chapter 21 for a discussion of the influence of the Davis blockbuster on later 
war films.)
That much-touted, prize-winning WGBH-TV series has not lacked its 
informed critics. Vietnam: A Television History was first broadcast in the fall of 
1983. Shortly after the third episode aired, Vietnamese refugees incensed by 
the programs staged demonstrations in Paris, London, Washington, D.C., 
New Orleans, Houston, and Los Angeles. The grievances against the series 
were consolidated by James Banerian in a book entitled Losers Are Pirates 
(1984), a volume that analyzes the flaws of the series, episode by episode. 
Accusations of bias are substantiated in prolix detail. Editor Banerian and 
his staff also took Stanley Karnow’s best-selling companion volume to task. 
Of Vietnam: A History, they ask rhetorically, “Has history come to this?” (36). 
Historians joined the criticism. Writing for the Newsletter of the Organization of 
American Historians in 1984, R. C. Raack noted that the series “developed no 
sufficient methodology and seemed to be unaware of the nagging problems 
deriving from missing as well as mendacious documentation.” As a result, 
Raack concludes, “They failed to confront the ‘television war’ and made up 
their own television war” (8). Despite such criticism, the WGBH series won 
numerous awards and was purchased for instructional purposes by countless 
school systems and universities.
In 1984 Accuracy in Media (AIM), a Washington-based public interest 
group, received a controversial $30,000 grant from the National Endowment 
for the Humanities (NEH) to produce a video critique of Vietnam: A Television 
History. (NEH had previously awarded WGBH more than $1 million to produce 
the series in a “noncontroversial” grant.) Two programs emerged from a Wash-
ington, D.C., conference called by AIM to examine the PBS series. Television’s 
Vietnam: The Real Story (1985) spells out some of the points later made by Ba-
nerian in his book-length critique. Some of WGBH-TV’s own consultants appear 
on the program to voice objections to the Boston station’s historiography. As 
Banerian observes, WGBH saw Vietnam as “America’s war. America’s mistake. 
America’s responsibility” (28). With Banerian, AIM’s conference faulted WGBH 
not only for showing bias in favor of the communists but also for displaying 
an unremitting, almost racist view of our allies, not to mention the terrible 
portrayal of America’s fighting men as drug addicts and war criminals. AIM’s 
video critique was itself criticized (but its major arguments found accurate) 
by an Inside Story Special broadcast by PBS in the fall of 1985. The Real Story has 
received a number of awards from Vietnamese groups worldwide for setting 
the record straight (from their point of view). It was favorably reviewed by the 
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New York Times and TV Guide. A number of PBS stations carried the rebuttal as 
a fourteenth episode when they reran the WGBH series in 1985 and 1986. 
A second program from AIM entitled Television’s Vietnam: The Impact of 
Media (1986) focuses on the Tet Offensive of 1968, comparing news reports 
with contrasting versions of the same stories by diplomats and soldiers involved 
in the actions. Drawing heavily on Peter Braestrup’s Big Story (1977), Impact of 
Media dramatizes the now widely accepted notion that the Tet Offensive was so 
misreported by our media that a North Vietnamese military defeat in Vietnam 
was transformed electronically into a psychological victory in the United States. 
To support its thesis, the program examines three microcosmic stories from the 
Tet Offensive of 1968: the Saigon embassy incident, the Battle of Khe Sanh, and 
the Colonel Loan photograph. In each case, the media image is contrasted with 
what actually happened. Although Impact of Media does not eschew point of 
view in its presentation, it states its bias up front rather than smuggling it into 
the work sub rosa. Because the AIM shows are so candid about their point of 
view, Dr. Martin Medhurst describes them as “bad” propaganda—as opposed 
to the WGBH shows, which he ironically praises as “good” propaganda (192). 
It would seem that there are many perils for students and teachers when they 
The media record ignores the heroic performance of our South Vietnamese ally.
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approach “good” propaganda programs in search of truth. (Both AIM pro-
grams were rereleased on DVD in 2007, with special features that include a 
thirty-minute video with the director, along with substantive articles and reviews 
readable with Adobe software. See “AIM store” at www.aim.org.)
The publication of Burton Benjamin’s Fair Play: CBS, General Westmoreland, 
and How a Television Documentary Went Wrong (1988) revived interest in a CBS 
Special Report entitled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception (1982). That 
program promised to reveal “shocking decisions made at the highest level of 
military intelligence to suppress and alter critical information on the number 
and replacement of enemy troops in Vietnam.” Once again, General Westmore-
land was the villain of a CBS melodrama, and a long and inconclusive libel trial 
resulted. Subsequently, books such as Don Kowet’s A Matter of Honor (1984) 
allege that producer George Crile and media star Mike Wallace cooked up their 
own brew of deception in The Uncounted Enemy. In addition, a CBS internal 
report by Burton Benjamin was published after it was “leaked” to the press by 
in-house sources who felt that the general was being treated unfairly. (This 
“source” was subsequently identified and fired by CBS.) Perils indeed seem to 
lie ahead for those who put their trust in this and other network exposés.
Hollywood Cinema
Hollywood’s Vietnam has also been laden with tendentious metaphors and 
allegories. Coming Home (1978) is the story of a paraplegic veteran who makes 
a successful adjustment to civilian life and finds love. The film teaches that in-
dividuals should avoid military service because there is no moral basis for our 
involvement in far-off lands. In addition, viewers are asked to believe that antiwar 
activists have better sex than whose who serve. That same year, The Deer Hunter 
attempted a mythopoetic approach to Vietnam as it follows the tour of duty of 
steelworkers from Pennsylvania who are physically or emotionally crippled by a 
repulsive Asian war. In Apocalypse Now (1979) the American presence in Vietnam 
is depicted as an unmitigated “horror” that deserves the purging incineration 
it receives at the end of the film.
Within a twelve-month period in 1986–1987, five films saturated the Viet-
nam target. Viewers of Oliver Stone’s Platoon are led to believe that American 
troops regularly shot civilians, that our field commanders used troops as “bait,” 
and that our servicemen were so undisciplined that they spent nearly as much 
time “fragging” one another as they did pursuing an elusive enemy. Platoon’s 
Hollywood auteur comments broadly about American history when the most 
sympathetic father figure in the film, Sergeant Elias, explains, “We’ve [the 
United States] been kicking ass for so long, it’s about time we had ours kicked.” 
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Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket looks back on the marines: the first half of 
the film shows how basic training perversely redirects the natural energies of 
young men from love to war; the second half of the film traces the degrada-
tion that occurs in combat to the point where the narrator, “Joker,” reflects, “I 
am in a world of shit, but I am alive and I am not afraid.” Such is the result— 
Hollywood’s Kubrick, looking backward, asserts—of Marine Corps brainwash-
ing and Vietnam service. In Good Morning, Vietnam, Robin Williams is given his 
best screen opportunity for nonstop hilarity. Between riffs, the film stresses 
that the United States is fulfilling a French imperialist design—although the 
notion itself goes unexplored. Looking within the American “Establishment,” 
the film portrays those who plan American policy as hypocritical, manipula-
tive, and—like the top brass in Platoon—willing to endanger the precious lives 
of young men. These messages are particularly memorable because Williams, 
himself, is genuinely funny. (The real  Adrian Cronauer gladly lectures on the 
notable differences between his Vietnam experience and that portrayed by Good 
Morning, Vietnam—for which he provided the original screen treatment.)
Two films stand out from the 1986–1987 pack. Hanoi Hilton (1987) tells the 
story of American pilots held captive in the Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi from 1964 
to 1973. Director Lionel Chetwynd’s film is unlike its contemporaries because 
Which platoon was real—the disciplined or the undisciplined?
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it portrays American servicemen as dedicated professionals whose military 
training gives them inner strength and discipline. The North Vietnamese, in 
contrast, are shown as cruel and manipulative captors. Finally, the American 
peace movement is criticized for its naïveté. For taking such unorthodox posi-
tions, Hanoi Hilton was condemned by the Hollywood community and major 
critics. David Denby of New York Magazine challenged the research behind the 
film, decried its treatment of Jane Fonda, and concluded by describing the “te-
dious” production as suffering from “the grinding vindictiveness of an old Pat-
rick Buchanan column” (91). Stanley Kauffman of the New Republic  dismissed 
Hanoi Hilton as “filth” (26). In response to critical denunciations, Canon Films 
withdrew the offending film from circulation soon after its release, followed 
by a mini-revival of interest when veterans groups—including the POWS 
depicted—protested to local distributors.
A combat film entitled Hamburger Hill (1987) can be viewed as a cinematic 
rebuttal to Stone’s Platoon. The film shows troops working together cohesively, 
respecting military discipline, and fighting courageously to complete their as-
signed mission, despite occasional friction within the unit. Like Hanoi Hilton, 
Hamburger Hill quickly disappeared from theaters. As Harry Summers of U.S. 
News and World Report observed in an early review, critics “will reject it as they 
rejected Hanoi Hilton, because it recalls shameful [wartime] events that they 
would rather not remember.” Former Colonel Summers (who died in 1999) 
was right about the rejection, but his attempt to identify its motivation needs 
further thought.
UNDERSTANDING THE VARIOUS FRAMES  
OF INTERPRETATION
Ideological Elements
Objections by Those Who Served: Can They Be Ignored?
A cursory study of statistics from a 1980 Louis Harris poll shows some glaring 
contradictions between the depressing portrait of the American fighting man 
in Vietnam novels, documentaries, and feature films and the self-image of large 
numbers of veterans who were not  part of the literary and movie communities. 
The executive summary of the Harris poll brings the following disturbing con-
clusions to light (28–33): 90 percent of those polled were happy to have served, 
54 percent enjoyed their experience, and 79 percent denied that the United 
States had taken advantage of them.1 Harris and later pollsters also found that 
Vietnam veterans were more likely to have gone to college and to have pur-
chased a home than others of their age; they were also more likely to have a 
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better income than their peers. Syndicated editorialist Tom Tiede responded 
to these and other “surprising” statistics with the following observations:
Ticking bombs? The people who were on duty in Vietnam are nothing of the 
kind. And they did not kill babies in the war. Rare exceptions to the contrary, 
the American troops were good, moralistic, and compassionate, and those are 
the principal characteristics for which they should be remembered.
But they probably won’t. The ugly image of the Americans in Vietnam may be 
permanent. It was a war in which slander became a national obsession, in which 
Jane Fonda is remembered while the heroes are forgotten, and in which we didn’t 
have the determination to win or the good sense to abandon before losing. (1)
Tiede’s statement underscores the frustration of veterans (and some veteran 
correspondents) when they see negative images of the American fighting man 
in popular culture. 
An American soldier’s 
noon-hour recreation: not 
every moment was stressful.U
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The Wish to “Freeze” History
During the Vietnam conflict, opponents of the war depicted America’s pres-
ence in Southeast Asia as the cause of regional suffering. Alas, when the 
United States withdrew in 1975, the predicted era of peace and tranquility 
did not come to pass; instead, Americans saw “killing fields” in Cambodia and 
“reeducation” camps in South Vietnam. Some 2 million Cambodians lost their 
lives during the murderous reign of Pol Pot. During the 1980s, Vietnamese 
American students on my campus reported that their fathers had died from 
malnutrition or from unattended health problems while in communist gulags; 
these wonderful kids strove for perfect academic records as a tribute to their 
lost fathers. And in 2007, news headlines showed that Vietnam still imprisons 
religious and political dissidents to encourage proper “reeducation.”
The revelation of these cruelties should have cast a new light on the mean-
ing of the American struggle in Vietnam. For many, it did. There has been a 
“Second Thoughts” movement led by Peter Collier and David Horowitz, two 
former editors of the New Left magazine Ramparts. They were shocked by the 
unwillingness of their colleagues on the American Left to criticize the postwar 
outrages in Vietnam: “No matter that our old allies the National Liberation 
Front were among the first to be crushed; no matter that South Vietnam was 
conquered by the North; no matter that the Khmer Rouge, which we had sup-
ported with great enthusiasm, had embarked on a policy of genocide. There 
were no enemies on the Left” (19). Collier and Horowitz claim that they were 
forced to reconsider their antiwar positions because of world developments 
after 1975, including the reluctance of the American Left to criticize commu-
nist excesses. These “lefties for Reagan” began to realize that “the Communists 
were every bit as bad as American supporters of the war said they would be” 
(26). For rethinking their historical commitments, former members of the 
New Left were ostracized by their erstwhile comrades. Jeffrey Herf, once a 
leader of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), reports that “to take 
such a political position was just more than a number of old friends on the left 
could stomach. At their initiative, old friendships ended or cooled” (quoted 
in Collier and Horowitz 30). 
The roster of those who have changed their minds is formidable. In addi-
tion to Collier, Horowitz, and Herf, there is Lloyd Billingsley, a leader of the 
antiwar movement, and David Ifshin, Michael Dukakis’s transition team leader 
who, in his student days, broadcast over Hanoi Radio. Michael Medved cohosted 
the PBS version of Sneak Previews and went on to be a syndicated, conservative 
talk-show host, but in the 1960s he was chairman of the Vietnam Moratorium 
in Connecticut. That student group succeeded in forcing the ROTC off the 
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Yale University campus—and it is still off in 2007. Stephen Schwartz, a leading 
Trotskyite during the 1960s, now works with a conservative think tank in San 
Francisco. The list of those who have had second thoughts is long (Collier 
and Horowitz 263–67).
However long the list, the majority of those who participated in the an-
tiwar movement—including those who were eligible for the draft but found 
a way to avoid it—have a vested interest in “freezing” history circa 1968. By 
retaining the United States as the international villain, their opposition to the 
war during the 1960s continues to be vindicated. Unwillingness to serve their 
country in the war goes unquestioned. Even Tonight Show host Johnny Carson 
could observe that Platoon was a movie that reflected well on the draft dodger. 
What sensible person would want to serve in such a dispirited and conflicted 
army? And how could those who did serve emerge as anything but desperately 
wounded—psychically, if not physically? As one indignant reviewer of Platoon 
observed, “Needless to say, there are many people who think this movie is a 
tribute to those Americans who died in Vietnam. Needless to say, people who 
think so never knew anybody who went anywhere near Vietnam—Canada, yes, 
and Sweden, but not Vietnam” (Podhoretz). More research is needed to probe 
The narrator of Platoon associates Staff Sergeant Barnes (Tom Berenger) with Her-
man Melville’s demonic Captain Ahab.
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how and why Vietnam stories (and some popular histories) are designed to 
vindicate the judgments of those who opposed the war. Why are auteurs unwill-
ing to reevaluate their positions in the light of subsequent developments? Do 
they truly believe that the “radical chic” of the 1960s caught the real nature 
of events?
Radical Chic in Hollywood: From Cuba to  
Vietnam to Nicaragua and on to Iraq
Traditionally, certain artistic people in Hollywood and the media in general 
have been attracted to utopian radicalism. In the 1930s and 1940s John Howard 
Lawson, Dalton Trumbo, Lillian Hellman, and others clung overlong to the 
dream of a “Soviet America.” In the 1960s the Beverly Hills and New York radi-
cals tuned their political antennae to Fidel Castro of Cuba and then switched 
channels to Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh. Chairman Ho was portrayed as a Jefferso-
nian democrat who reluctantly turned to communism when we rejected him, 
a preposterous view reiterated by George McGovern at an Air Force Academy 
Military History Symposium in 1990.
Many of these creative people still share the desire of the Left to cling to 
1960s myths about Vietnam, despite the tragic repression in Cambodia and in 
Vietnam after 1975. For some, it would be spiritually disastrous to admit that 
support for the North Vietnamese army brought about the deaths of millions 
and the misery of thousands of “boat people,” some 300,000 of whom died 
gruesomely at sea.
Central American was chic in the late 1980s. To many media celebrities, 
Daniel Ortega looked like a Jeffersonian democrat, while Mrs. Ortega became 
a special darling of the “cocktails for Nicaragua” crowd in Beverly Hills. TV star 
Edward Asner established a nonprofit organization that financed aid to rebels 
in El Salvador, some of whom have been identified as terrorists. The election 
of  Violeta Chamorro to the presidency of Nicaragua came as a big surprise and 
disappointment to the American intelligentsia—if not to ordinary Nicaraguans 
who exultantly exercised their franchise. For many American observers, Central 
America was Vietnam redivivus. The alleged Vietnam analogy to events down 
south was invoked constantly in Congress; in this period, even Richard Nixon 
authored a book entitled No More Vietnams (1985).
But the Vietnam analogy is a two-edged sword: on the one hand, for neo-
isolationists it means that the United States should never intervene because 
Vietnam proved that our meddling inevitably leads to tragedy; on the other 
hand, to Richard Nixon it meant that we should intervene decisively when doing 
so is in our national interest—a policy that later became known as the “Powell 
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Doctrine.” Shortly after our hundred-day victory in Operation Desert Storm, 
President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) visited the White House Press Room 
to announce that, as of 1 March 1991, “the Vietnam Syndrome is over.”
Hollywood has not been passive in the Vietnam analogy debate: Oliver 
Stone’s historical drama Platoon reached theaters the same month that his Sal-
vador went into distribution. Other films such as The Mission (1986) and Walker 
(1988) further drove home the Vietnam message, although Walker so overstated 
the lesson as to draw critical guffaws. In the penultimate scene, as William 
Walker’s pre–civil war Nicaraguan empire crumbles, an American helicopter 
lands near his palace. Out springs a U.S. State Department official who explains 
that he is authorized to remove all U.S. citizens. This tendentious anachronism, 
a heavy-handed parallel to the 1975 evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, 
has actually been praised by some reviewers. More sensible critics have described 
the scene as silly at best.
After the initial success of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and in the 
wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the analogy lost its flavor. Public 
response to Hollywood criticism of the 2003 war was swift and took an entirely 
new direction. After her pronouncements about the war, Susan Sarandon was 
canceled as a speaker for a celebrity event in Florida. Not long thereafter, her 
Bull Durham costar and longtime partner Tim Robbins was informed by the 
Baseball Hall of Fame that the controversy over the war had made both of 
them undesirable speakers at an institution devoted to the national pastime. 
In March 2003, at a concert in England, Dixie Chicks singer Natalie Maines 
apologized to the audience for being from Texas, the home state of America’s 
president. Within days, country western stations pulled Dixie Chicks records, 
and an angry constituency of country western fans made their displeasure known 
through protest calls and chain letters on the Internet. One wag even proposed 
to give a “Dixie Chicks Award” to Hollywood ideologue Janeane Garofalo, an-
other celebrity activist. These reactions were 180 degrees from the Vietnam-era 
responses; an active public—assisted by the Internet, talk radio, and cable televi-
sion news—refused to accept the posturing of the Hollywood elite. Indeed, it 
launched an aggressive counterattack, which was then condemned in the press 
as a new form of McCarthyism.
Some two years later, moribund Vietnam models and critiques regained 
viability as American troops encountered delayed resistance; for example, Mi-
chael Moore’s major commercial success Fahrenheit 9/11  borrowed heavily from 
the Vietnam epic by Peter Davis. On the political front, in May 2007 Congress 
haggled with President George W. Bush over the war budget. For some, it ap-
peared to be an attempt to relive the glory days of the 1970s, when support for 
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South Vietnam had been undermined by the War Powers Resolution (1973) 
and subsequent congressional moves such as the Case-Church amendment. Led 
in the House of Representatives by Vietnam veteran John Murtha (D-Pa.), the 
2007 ploy to encumber the supply of men and materiel was nearly successful. 
This mercurial change of national mood was reflected by a debate over the 
release of previews for Sylvester Stallone’s new Rambo IV. Internet reactions 
varied from a fan who urged that “Chuck Norris needs to make another MIA 
film now” to a war-weary blogger who opined that “Stallone looks ridiculous. 
Please let Rambo rest in the 80s” (www.flynetonline.com).
Formal Factors
The Premise of a Lost War
James Banerian drew on a Vietnamese proverb to title his book Losers Are 
Pirates. In thinking about popular culture in relation to Vietnam, the proverb 
provides valuable insight. People naturally want to jump on the bandwagon. 
In relation to the WGBH-TV history of the war, Banerian saw two related 
trends: the Boston-based producers—none of whom had substantial training in 
history—wanted to produce empathy for the then current (i.e., 1980s) regime 
in Vietnam so that wartime enmities could be transcended; as a dramatic by-
product, the “losers” in the war—the South Vietnamese and their American 
ally—had to occupy unsympathetic roles in the thirteen-chapter story.
The same perspective can easily be applied to other renderings of the 
Vietnam experience. Suppose you were involved in writing a novel or a screen-
play or assembling an anthology; how would you conduct yourself if your basic 
premise was that we were the losers—and moral reprobates to boot? First, you 
would have to explain how the most technologically advanced and mobile 
armed force in world history was defeated by an agrarian, Third World nation. 
Second, your task with respect to individual motivation would be to explain 
how good American boys could be involved in such a dirty and disgusting foray. 
If possible, you would try to link these two themes.
Consider some eligible (and ineligible) themes. Prohibited would be the 
following: any intelligent defense of the concept of containment by sympathetic 
characters (only “lifers” would swallow such claptrap), good relations between 
American fighting men and local civilians (strictly for rebels against a callous 
establishment), concern for innocent human life or the destruction of civil-
ian property (all Vietnam as a free-fire zone), racial harmony and teamwork 
on the front lines (rampant racism), mutual trust between officers and men 
(frequent fraggings), religious faith by fighting men (spiritual alienation only), 
intelligent conversation by officers or troops (f-words ad nauseam).  At no time 
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would commanders above the squad level be concerned about troop morale 
and safety. Whenever possible, include President Lyndon Johnson’s picture in 
the same frame with the face of a high-ranking villain. Never show that leader-
ship experience can help a young person grow in confidence so that he will 
make a contribution to society upon his return to the United States. Vietnam 
narratives are stories of losers who return to our country as pathetic remnants, 
“walking wounded.” Years after they return, PBS can sponsor programs for 
them, such as the PBS special For Vietnam Veterans and Others Who Should Care 
(SONY Home Video). During such “happenings” we are urged to commiserate 
with the poor dupes. These are some of the spin-offs of the ubiquitous “lost 
war” premise, results demanded by the artistic form more than by the actual 
experience of veterans. (See note 1.) 
The American Adam Motif
Concomitant with the “losers” premise is the American Adam motif. The 
novels by Caputo and Ehrhart, as well as the personal narrative by Herr and 
Beesley’s collection of letters—but not Webb’s Fields of Fire —draw on this fa-
miliar American literary motif. Dark romantics such as Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
Herman Melville, and Edgar Allan Poe ridiculed the motif’s limitations when it 
became popular in the early nineteenth century, but the scheme is extremely 
useful in the Vietnam context, where the rhetorical strategy is to condemn 
the nation while forgiving the soldiers. (See Maland for a survey of this motif 
in American films.)
The American Adam leaves a placid, civilian environment to become im-
mersed in a war that leaves him devastated. Ron Kovic’s Born on the Fourth of 
July (1976) is a model text: films and television shape young Kovic’s attitudes 
toward war; after high school, the Marine Corps adds its perverting influence. 
When combat experiences further erode his spirit, Kovic reaches a dead low: 
he kills a friend by accident and participates in the accidental shooting of Viet-
namese children. His spinal wound comes as a blessing of sorts; through it, he 
learns to fight back against the official authorities—“Them.” Caputo’s A Rumor 
of War  follows a similar outline in its effort to exculpate young Philip from his 
war crimes. At the climax of Vietnam-Perkasie, another tale of disillusionment, 
Ehrhart participates in the battle for Hue with demented fury:
I fought back passionately, in blind rage and pain, without remorse, conscience 
or deliberation. I fought back . . . at the Pentagon Generals and the Congress 
of the United States, and the New York Times; at the draft card burners, and the 
Daughters of the American Revolution . . . at the teachers who taught me that 
America always had God on our side and always wore white hats and always won; 
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at the Memorial Day parades and the daily Pledge of Allegiance . . . at the movies 
of John Wayne and Audie Murphy, and the solemn statements of Dean Rusk and 
Robert MacNamara. (246–47)
In literary terms, the corrupted innocent is always pathetic, never heroic. From 
the opening scene of Stone’s Platoon to the closing scene of Kubrick’s Full 
Metal Jacket, the motif presents American boys who merit our pity—never our 
admiration. We feel compelled to honor their broken and faltering requests 
for forgiveness. Big-heartedly, they are welcomed home to whatever redemp-
tion a misdirected nation can offer.
The lost war premise and the American Adam motif work together. Even 
the Rambo fantasies tap them. John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone) is an alien-
ated vet; when society pushes him too far, he erupts into violence. In Rambo 
II he asks an oft-quoted question: “Do we get to win this time?” Thus Rambo 
is an angry American Adam, flailing against “Them” as well as the evil enemy, 
rather than being an alternative heroic figure. Most critics have missed this 
important likeness between the maligned Rambo figure and his much-praised 
Adamic cousins in literature and film. As indicated earlier, John Rambo came 
back in 2007, again reflecting the ambivalence toward American soldiers and 
their mission in Iraq.
Search for a New Genre: The Vietnam Film
John Wayne’s Green Berets (1968) was actually a World War II film that con-
formed to well-established genre conventions; it cannot really be counted as 
an attempt to break ground for a new Vietnam-based genre. In subsequent 
efforts such as The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now, filmmakers groped toward 
the right metaphors and the proper formula to cope with the complexities of 
a limited war that America could not win. Robert Baird argued that Platoon 
was such a box office success because it included good and evil characters in 
a way that allowed the protagonist (and the audience) to be exposed to the 
purported horrors of Vietnam without being fully corrupted. Chris Taylor 
(Charles Sheen) never suffers the full disillusionment of the American Adam. 
Audiences scratched their heads over The Deer Hunter and blew their minds over 
Apocalypse Now, but Platoon worked so well as a cathartic fiction that a now hip 
Time  magazine (which had long since abandoned the cold warrior stance of its 
original publisher, Henry Luce) joined legions of reviewers in a cover story that 
(incorrectly) honored Platoon for portraying “Viet Nam, the way it really was.” 
Baird’s thesis seems more convincing: Platoon was so powerful as a metaphor 
for Vietnam because it seemed real as a war film, conforming to key elements 
of the genre while cleverly modifying factors to suit a new setting and special 
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tensions. Casualties of War (1989) was an unsuccessful bid to repeat Platoon’s 
generic success. Not even Michael J. Fox could save Brian De Palma’s jejune, 
sadopornographic attempt to decry America’s “rape” of Vietnam; the story was 
revived, in an Iraq context, by De Palma’s Redacted, a film that received kudos 
from professional reviewers but failed miserably at the box office, drawing no 
more than three thousand viewers nationwide.
Visual Language: Learning to “Read” Television and Film
For years, journals such as the History Teacher and Film & History have been 
exhorting historians to learn the language of film and television. Without such 
preparation, they are at a disadvantage—one that media producers cherish for 
the license it gives them—when they approach productions about Vietnam. 
Here are a few obvious examples of distortion.
In Hearts and Minds, General Westmoreland says something along the lines 
that “the oriental doesn’t value human life the way we do.” Filmmaker Peter 
Davis then cuts away to a graveyard in Vietnam, where the wife of a Vietnamese 
soldier grieves for her husband; she becomes so overwrought with anguish that 
she jumps into the grave! It is a heart-rending, “documentary” contradiction 
of the American general’s apparently heartless observation. What really hap-
pened? General Westmoreland told Davis that in Korea, the Chinese routinely 
anticipated high casualties during attacks—casualty counts that would be 
inconceivable for American commanders who wanted to retain command. 
That experience, Westmoreland said, taught him that Asian commanders 
do not place the same value we do on individual human life. Davis extracted 
Westmoreland’s observation and recontextualized it with the graveyard mate-
rial to make the good general look callous, even racist. (Orcutt identifies other 
such editing legerdemain in Hearts and Minds.)
Westmoreland was bushwhacked again in the CBS documentary The Un- 
counted Enemy, where responses to very different questions were edited to 
appear as answers to the same question. This is a notorious trick of the trade, 
and it was expressly prohibited by CBS News guidelines at the time the show 
was broadcast, although that did not deter CBS’s producers in their zeal to 
prove the malicious and untrue thesis of the program—that General West-
moreland hid intelligence information from President Lyndon B. Johnson 
and the American people.
Vietnam: A Television History employed Nguyen Vinh Long as its translator, 
yet Mr. Long had been exposed in public court as a paid employee of Hanoi. 
Banerian’s Losers Are Pirates documents numerous critical translation errors in 
the series, all of which point to a consistent intent to hide communist rhetoric. 
386 / Peter C. Rollins
Film students know that narration can determine what audiences see on the 
screen.
Montage is a basic technique, but Good Morning, Vietnam has a particularly 
significant example as Louis Armstrong sings “What a Wonderful World.” Os-
tensibly, this is a laid-back segment, but a close reading of the shot sequence, 
as well as the interaction between pictures and words (“film irony”), reveals a 
very serious message. Simply stated, the message is that Americans like Lieuten-
ant Hauk (pronounced “Hawk”) are inflicting pain on a placid and peaceful 
nation; communist aggression is the natural response of a wronged people to 
the violence perpetrated by us and our ally. As the aggressors, we have taken 
a lovely and wonderful world and transformed it into a bloody battlefield.
Producers will be forever grateful to historians and teachers who ignore 
the place of visual language. They know that their messages are more readily 
absorbed by the visually illiterate and that they will remain society’s true teach-
ers with “mass-pop” as content.
If popular culture novels, personal narratives, anthologies, and visual media 
dealing with Vietnam pose so many perils, why should we study them? The 
answer seems clear: our students, like us, are significantly influenced by the 
popular culture around them. We can let them make up their own minds about 
Vietnam, but we need to give them the tools to identify opinion and point 
of view as they consider the meaning of our longest war. We can make them 
sensitive to the contexts from which novels and films are produced; we can 
prepare them with some notion of the formal and artistic elements that make 
“the medium the message.” As we do so, we will be giving them analytical skills 
that they can apply to other issues with high emotional stakes. In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, it seemed conceivable that the sea change in our national mood 
following Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom could help 
Americans gain perspective and understanding of both the Vietnam experience 
and the various artistic renderings of it. The domestic and war-front turbulence 
of the postoffensive Iraq experience has delayed any expected exorcism of the 
“Vietnam Syndrome”; the perils of using popular culture to study Vietnam 
have been revived and intensified as our fellow citizens are asked to apply the 
putative “lessons of Vietnam” to the War on Terror.
NOTE
1. The executive summary of the 1980 Harris poll contains some interesting find-
ings in response to questions put to veterans:
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“Looking back, I am glad I served my country.” Agree: 90 percent
“The United States took unfair advantage of me.” Disagree: 79 percent
“The country owes me a great deal more in return for my military service than 
I’ve gotten.” Disagree: 75 percent
“If I were asked to serve again, I would refuse.” Disagree: 67 percent
“I enjoyed my time in the service.” Agree: 54 percent
Students are shocked by these statistics for obvious reasons; almost everything they 
have seen in the media is contradicted by the figures. This Harris poll should be in 
most libraries and will definitely be in any library designated a “Federal Repository.” As 
a commissioned work for the Veterans Administration, it is a government publication 
and contains both statistics and analysis.
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FRAGMENTS OF WAR
Oliver Stone’s Platoon
18 / Lawrence W. Lichty and Raymond L. Carroll
The Hollywood image of war, and of Americans in battle, has been almost 
universally positive. Many Hollywood combat films begin with the training 
of a single unit and follow it into battle. American troops are depicted as he-
roic; the enemy fanatical. Our men are portrayed as reluctant soldiers more 
interested in the girl back home, their families, and baseball than they are in 
international politics. A number of early war films, and especially those about 
the war in Vietnam, fit that pattern.
After the United States entered World War II, and again during the war 
in Korea, there was a tremendous increase in the number of war films—most 
about combat—but there was no similar spurt of war film production from 
1963 on, as more and more American troops served, and died, in Southeast 
Asia. Since that time, there have been few major theatrical films that deal with 
the American fighting man in Vietnam. This void was partly responsible for 
the tremendous reception of Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986). No earlier Vietnam 
feature film was so narrowly focused on the plight of the “grunt.”
PLATOON’S PREDECESSORS
The lack of early films about the Vietnam War can best be explained by a 
brief review of three previous films that deal primarily with men fighting in 
Vietnam, each of which detours into propaganda, downright silliness, or dark 
personal confusion. 
The Green Berets andThe Boys in Company C
The first of these films to appear after the big buildup of American troops 
in Southeast Asia was John Wayne’s The Green Berets (1968), which resembles 
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a Western rather than a film about the war Americans were watching on the 
T V news each night.
Between 1965 and 1975—from the landing of American combat troops 
to the final withdrawal of Americans from Saigon—The Green Berets was the 
only major American film about combat in Vietnam. In August 1965, just 
after President Lyndon B. Johnson promised to provide General William C. 
Westmoreland with the troops he needed to fight the war, Art Buchwald of 
the Washington Post observed: “Every war deserves a war movie and the Viet-
Platoon: the agony of Vietnam.
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namese War is no exception. . . . We have a part for John Wayne, as the tough 
paratrooper colonel.” But as Buchwald also explained, under the guise of a 
fictitious studio head, there are other problems associated with making a film 
about the Vietnam War: “No one knows how to tell the South Vietnamese 
from the Viet Cong. They all look alike. . . . Our research indicates the Viet 
Cong are always smiling and looking friendly. . . . The Defense Department is 
against it. They say they don’t want to show American soldiers attacking a South 
Vietnamese village because the Americans are in South Vietnam to protect the 
villages and not to attack them. We had a great scene when the paratroopers 
couldn’t find any Viet Cong, so they burned every straw hut to the ground.” 
And so Buchwald has his fictitious studio head conclude that the “Defense 
[Department] said if they have to fight a different kind of war we should be 
willing to make a different kind of war picture.”
But almost as Buchwald had predicted, John Wayne wrote to President 
Johnson in late 1965 suggesting a movie based on Robin Moore’s book The 
Green Berets, published earlier that year. Although the book relates stories of the 
Special Forces, screenwriter James Lee Barrett admitted that “the film makes 
wide departures from the book—but stops short of going on a propaganda 
foray” (“Studios Reject” 5). Most viewers would probably not agree. A subplot 
centering on a reporter is introduced into the film to make the political points 
Wayne wanted. At the beginning of the film the reporter (David Janssen) asks, 
“Why is the United States waging this ruthless war?” Sergeant Muldoon (Aldo 
Ray) makes the case in favor of the war and shows captured Communist Chi-
nese weapons, explaining that the press seldom gives any of the arguments 
for the war. By the end of the film the reporter, who went to see for himself, is 
fighting side by side with the troops. But the reporter observes that if he had to 
write about his views of the war now, he would be out of a job. Michael Wayne, 
the film’s producer and John Wayne’s son, observed in the May 1968 issue of 
Esquire: “I’m not making a picture about Vietnam, I’m making a picture about 
good against bad. I happened to think that that’s not true about Vietnam but 
even it isn’t as clear as all that. That’s what you have to do to make a picture. 
It’s all right, because we’re in the business of selling tickets.”
In March 1968 a majority of Americans thought it had been a mistake to 
send troops to Vietnam, and 56 percent agreed with the statement that the best 
thing would be to “stop the bombing and the fighting and gradually withdraw 
from Vietnam.” As more Americans had been killed, and there seemed to be 
no progress in spite of optimistic statements from officials, support for the 
war had declined steadily since Wayne’s letter to Johnson in December 1965 
(Mueller 52–65).
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The world premiere of The Green Berets was 19 June 1968—after the Tet 
Offensive, Johnson’s announcement that he would not seek the Democratic 
nomination again, and the beginning of peace talks in Paris. The critics were 
harsh, calling The Green Berets “cliché ridden,” “dull,” “stupid,” “rotten and 
false in every detail,” “foolish,” “vile and insane,” “absurd and blundering,” 
and so on. But it sold tickets. British journalist John Pilger called it “so unwit-
tingly silly that it was funny,” which was surely true if one expected a truthful 
representation of the way war is fought or the issues involved. Yet Pilger also 
noted that when he saw the movie in the summer of 1968 at a theater in the 
American South, many in the audience cheered (353).
The film cost $6 million to make, according to Warner Bros. ($7.7 million, 
according to Michael Wayne); when distribution and other costs were added, 
it totaled more than $10 million. But by the end of 1968 The Green Berets had 
earned nearly $11 million and was one of the most successful Warner Bros. 
releases in the previous five years; Bonnie and Clyde, released a year earlier, had 
earned $26 million (Kessler; “Berets”). However, a decade later Variety listed 
the film’s total rentals at only $9.75 million, compared with more than $22 
million for Bonnie and Clyde by that time (“All-Time”). 
Not until five years after the last American combat troops and POWs came 
home did other films address the combat experience. One of these, The Boys in 
Company C  (1978), based on a script by Rick Natkin, a nineteen-year-old student 
at Yale, was advertised as “Vietnam as it really was.” But the film is a mediocre 
copy of M*A*S*H (1970), even down to a final soccer game substituted for 
football. One critic concluded: “The best thing to be said for this blithering, 
disjointed chronicle of a group of Marine recruits from boot camp to combat 
duty (of a sort) in Vietnam is that it scrapes the bottom. It will require truly 
subterranean ineptitude to sink lower. . . . [This film] gets the heralded cycle 
of Vietnam movies off to such a flying catastrophe that, everything that follows 
is bound to look relatively respectable” (Arnold, “Boys” B13). But attention 
was already being directed at Francis Ford Coppola’s promised Apocalypse Now 
(1979), which industry analysts thought would be a “critical test of whether 
the wounds of war have healed enough for American audiences to pay money 
to relive the painful experience” (“Viet War Films” 7).
Coppola’s Vietnam Epic
Francis Ford Coppola frequently boasted that he was “the only one making a 
picture about Vietnam” (McArthur 37). But because of numerous delays in 
filming, which generated nearly as much print as the final film, it was the last 
combat film produced in the 1977–1978 cycle. (Coppola had even asked the 
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Pentagon for support, but the Department of the Army was not interested.) 
Yet Apocalypse Now was really the first combat film since The Green Berets more 
than ten years earlier. Production began in March 1976, was stopped and then 
resumed in August of that year—taking 167 and then 230 shooting days. The 
budget was announced at nearly $31 million. 
After much anticipation, the film was first publicly shown as a “work in 
progress” and, as such, received a great deal of publicity. Variety and Newsweek 
both said that it was “worth the wait,” while other reviewers called it alterna-
tively “brilliant and bizarre” and “extraordinarily powerful” (“Film Reviews” 
21; Michener 100). It was also previewed in Los Angeles with a questionnaire 
from Coppola inviting viewers to “help me finish the film” by describing their 
favorite or disliked scenes and providing suggestions for the ending (Denby 
101). Indeed, compared with the 70mm limited theater version, the 35mm print 
does include, under the credits, an additional ending as the jungle hideout of 
the mad Colonel Kurtz (Marlon Brando) is bombed to bits.
When Apocalypse Now was finally released in August 1979, correspondent 
Morley Safer, on the CBS Sunday Morning  show, observed that the film re-
minded him of “Vietnam only in the sense that they tried to win it with money.” 
Most critics were not kind. However, Vincent Canby argued that in many scenes 
it did live up to its title, “disclosing not only the various faces of war but also 
the contradictions between excitement and boredom, terror and pity, brutal-
ity and beauty. . . . When [the film] is thus evoking the look and feelings of 
the Vietnam War, dealing in sense impressions for which no explanations are 
adequate or necessary, [it] is a stunning work” (“The Screen”). 
Yet Coppola’s film is really two movies—one about the many absurdities of 
the Vietnam War, the other based on Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, James 
Frazer’s The Golden Bough, and even T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (Tessitore; Chiu). 
Many of the incidents on the trip up the river show the “real” Vietnam, with 
reasonable allowances for exaggeration and contraction. Patrols were startled 
by tigers and other animals in the jungle, and although there is no record of 
surfing in Vietnam, one navy commander did arrange for his men to water-ski 
behind patrol boats. And Americans did broadcast music and propaganda to the 
enemy over loudspeakers aboard helicopters. When, in the midst of carnage on 
the beach, Lieutenant Colonel Kilgore (Robert Duvall) says, “I love the smell 
of napalm in the morning . . . the smell of gasoline smells like—victory,” it is 
only an echo of General George S. Patton Jr. describing his men as “bloody 
good killers.” At one point on the trip upriver, Captain Willard (Martin Sheen) 
and his men stop a sampan. When a Vietnamese woman moves too quickly to 
protect something, all the Vietnamese in the boat are killed. The lone survivor 
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is the small puppy she had tried to shield. This scene is frighteningly real to 
anyone who witnessed men on river patrol boats conduct just such searches.
Most of the rest of the film is a “profoundly anticlimactic intellectual 
muddle” and “a ruinously pretentious and costly allegorical epic.” Coppola 
admitted as much himself, saying, “The movie is a mess—a mess of continuity, 
of style—and most important, the ending neither works on an audience or 
philosophical level” (Arnold, “Mangled” B12). But Time critic Frank Rich said 
more: “In its cold, haphazard way, Apocalypse Now does remind us that war is 
hell, but that is not the same thing as confronting the conflicts, agonies and 
moral chaos of this particular war. . . . The Vietnam War was a tragedy. Apoca-
lypse Now is but this decade’s most extraordinary Hollywood folly” (57). As a 
study of filmmaking, celebrity, or egotism, Apocalypse Now may be worthy of 
note, but for someone who wishes to understand Vietnam, it has very limited 
value (Coppola).
OLIVER STONE: VIETNAM VETERAN
In September 1967 Oliver Stone reported for duty in Vietnam as a member of 
the 2d Platoon, Bravo Company, 3d Battalion, 25th Infantry. During his tour 
Chris Taylor (Charlie Sheen) on patrol.
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he served in two other units and was wounded twice. In 1976, the year he ar-
rived in Hollywood, Stone wrote a screenplay about his comrades and their 
war: “Platoon in many ways is a chapter in [Oliver Stone’s] autobiography. The 
character of Chris Taylor has the psyche of Oliver Stone, and when the director 
is asked a question, he will sometimes refer the interviewer to his screenplay 
for the answer” (Norman 17). At age nineteen Stone quit Yale, taught in a 
Vietnamese school, served in the Merchant Marine, and worked on a novel in 
Mexico—all before his stint in the army and Vietnam. In 1969, after Vietnam 
and a scrape with the law over marijuana possession, Stone enrolled in the 
New York University film program, where he studied with Martin Scorsese. 
After moving to Hollywood in 1976 Stone served as coauthor on a number of 
scripts and eventually wrote the screenplays for Conan the Barbarian (1982) and 
Midnight Express (1978), winning an Academy Award for the latter. Even with 
that success, Stone struggled for years to get the script based on his Vietnam 
experiences produced. It was the dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
in Washington, D.C., that marked a turning point. That event led to increased 
sales of books about the war, two TV documentary series, and a new willingness 
to talk about the war by those who knew and those who wanted to know. Yet it 
would take financing from Britain (two-thirds of the production costs) for the 
film to finally be made. Platoon was initially released in December 1986 for a 
very short run to qualify for the Oscars. It opened generally in January 1987, 
heralded by a very good publicity campaign, much press attention, and word 
of mouth. By mid-February it had become the top-grossing film and remained 
so for several weeks.
PLATOON AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Like Stone, Chris Taylor (Charlie Sheen) arrives in Vietnam in September 
1967. As he disembarks a troop carrier plane, he passes body bags and sea-
soned soldiers so dirty and tired that they look dead. As a greenhorn, Chris 
has to learn on his own—the more experienced grunts rarely help and do not 
trust newcomers. On patrol, Staff Sergeant Barnes (Tom Berenger) argues 
with Lieutenant Wolfe (Mark Moses), who is portrayed as a wimp. While out 
on ambush, a GI falls asleep on guard duty; there is a firefight, and Taylor is 
wounded.
During one scene in the jungle—it is 1 January 1968—Sergeant Elias 
(Willem Dafoe) enters a tunnel to find an enemy hospital and emerges in a 
hooch. The unit then moves up the river toward a village, where they find a GI 
who had been missing from their outfit tied to a tree, tortured, and killed. As 
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they advance into the village they see a civilian running away, and he is shot. 
A GI trips over a cooking pot, and a pig is shot. Civilians come out of one of 
the holes, and an explosive charge is thrown in. Bunny (Kevin Dillon) uses 
his rifle butt to smash an old retarded man’s skull. Prisoners are rounded up, 
and the enraged Sergeant Barnes shoots a woman amid the sound of children 
crying.
To this point, many moviegoers who had served in Vietnam were noting 
how realistically the frustrations were portrayed. It was clearly the milestone 
movie for the evocation of jungle combat. Yet everything in the film happens 
so fast, the images are so rich, the action so compacted, that even in several 
viewings it cannot all be absorbed. The fast pace of the film’s action seems to 
trivialize what is happening. There may be a perception that the men’s actions 
are not justified, and some in the audience may withdraw in disgust.
Back in the village, Sergeant Barnes interrogates an old woman and an 
older man. Growing impatient, he grabs a young girl and holds a pistol to her 
head. Sergeant Elias approaches and, seemingly in a single motion, asks what 
is going on and smashes Barnes in the face. They then engage in a fistfight. 
The lieutenant orders the village burned and blown up. Taylor then comes 
upon some of his team members forcibly raping a young girl. When he tries 
to stop them, he is called a homosexual and spat on.
Later the same day, after an artillery barrage that drives the enemy back, 
Staff Sergeant Barnes (Tom Berenger) resorts to brutality.
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Elias pursues the enemy. This pursuit results in the climactic battle of the 
film, which is based on a real battle that took place on New Year’s Day 1968. 
But rather than pursue the enemy, Barnes stalks and then shoots Elias. The 
wounded Elias flees, running in the open in front of enemy soldiers. The ac-
tion is observed from a helicopter hovering over the battlefield. Unfortunately, 
this scene looks as though it is staged, rather than a natural part of the film’s 
action, and it tends to reduce the credibility of the rest of the film.
Later, after others learn that Barnes has shot Elias, he taunts and disdain-
fully urges his own men to kill him. Meanwhile, the firefight with the enemy 
continues throughout the next day and becomes even more ferocious: the 
captain faces annihilation of his company in an air strike on his position, 
Junior is bayoneted in the throat several times, and Bunny is killed when his 
foxhole is overrun. Barnes is wounded and tries to kill Taylor just as an air 
strike comes in. At dawn, Taylor finds Barnes still alive and shoots him. At the 
end of the battle, all the enemy dead are bulldozed into a bomb crater, and 
the wounded Americans are evacuated.
Occasionally Taylor narrates his story in voice-overs from letters to his 
grandmother. Without this continuity, the film might be hopelessly muddled. 
Much of the swirling confusion seems to be a deliberate attempt to capture the 
reality of a surreal experience. Platoon provides little or no information to help 
viewers understand why the men in the infantry unit are so abusive toward one 
another—especially the new members of the group. This is not the traditional 
“group-at-war” genre combat film. War here is depicted from the perspective 
of the individual, not from the group or from a national perspective. The film 
effectively reveals Taylor’s confusion and disorientation from beginning to end. 
As Taylor is evacuated from his last battle, his narration concludes:
I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves. And 
the enemy was in us.
The war is over for me now, but it will always be there, for the rest of my days, 
as I’m sure Elias will be, fighting with Barnes for . . . “possession of my soul.” 
There are times since then I’ve felt like a child born of those two fathers.
But be that as it may, those of us who did make it have an obligation to build 
again, to teach to others what we know, and to try with what’s left of our lives to 
find a goodness and a meaning to this life.
This same dichotomy is required for an understanding of the two parts of this 
one film. One part is an incredibly contracted but realistic visualization of what 
it was “really” like for some men in Vietnam. For those who were there, and 
even for those who watched at home, the images are incredibly vivid and evoca-
tive, sometimes appearing unreal or dreamlike. The other part is a question 
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of finding purpose and meaning in the war experience, and the film presents 
confusing images of multiple enemies, both without and within.
MOVIES AND COMBAT
A GI pulls another dead soldier on top of himself in an attempt to hide; on 
night ambush a GI falls asleep as the enemy sneaks up; smoking drugs through 
the barrel of a shotgun; hooches set on fire with a lighter and a flamethrower; 
GIs wounding themselves to get out of battle; a GI cuts off the ear of a dead 
enemy; enemy bodies are stacked and buried. As Canby put it: “The movie is 
a succession of found moments. It’s less like a work that’s been written than 
one that has been discovered, though, as we all probably know, screenplays 
aren’t delivered by storks” (“Film” 12).
Here for the first time in a theatrical film about Vietnam is the “small war” 
fought by the ordinary grunt. Literally the only settlement shown during the 
film is the village that is burned and many of its civilian inhabitants killed. 
There are no dramatic shots of choppers in flight. Except for one complaint 
about the bureaucrats in Washington who make them fight the war with one 
hand tied behind their backs, the only “politics” discussed is the preferential 
treatment given to other soldiers. After the village is burned and the civilians 
killed, Sergeant Elias can only say that he believed in the war in 1965, “but now 
it just bugs me.” The platoon’s war is being fought not for ideology but for 
survival. They are draftees, living in fear, counting the days they are “short.”
Chris Taylor and the platoon leave a My Lai–like situation.
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These are finely drawn characterizations developed by the writer-director 
and the actors—especially with the aid of technical adviser Dale Dye, a retired 
Marine Corps captain who worked his way up through the ranks and has a few 
moments on-screen as the battalion commander. Dye put the actors and extras 
through “twelve unique days of hard, no-slack field training” (Sharbutt 32).
Anne Taylor Fleming, on PBS’s MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, noted that the 
My Lai–like destruction of the village and its people is the “shining moment of 
truth” in the film. But when the bad soldier kills the good soldier, and young 
Taylor must avenge the act, how are we to think about heroes or murderers? 
Thus, she argues, the film is no less sentimental about the Vietnam War than 
its predecessors: “[The film is] full of the old notion, [that] war is the ultimate 
male romance. War is the place where men go to learn about themselves and 
each other. That is the enduring myth Oliver Stone is not ready to let go of, 
nor judging from the huge success of this film, are many of the rest of us.”
All artists manipulate history, and Platoon, as art, can be freely interpreted, 
but the main questions we ask here are these: What is the film’s value in help-
ing us understand some of what actually happened in 1967–1968? What did 
the war mean at the time to Oliver Stone and his fellow grunts? And how, if 
at all, had their thoughts changed by 1985, when the film was made? Finally, 
what does all this mean to viewers of the film in 1987 and beyond?
Those who have lived through combat like that in Vietnam understand how 
accurately parts of this film catch the fevered pitch of battle. Platoon can help 
others who were in Vietnam but only heard of such experiences or who saw 
only occasional glimpses of frenetic battles in news reports and documentaries 
to understand the frustrations and madness of men under such conditions. 
Platoon allows its audience to imagine what that kind of combat was like and 
perhaps, with that insight, to read other documents and sources in a more 
illuminating light.
But without the context provided by personal experience, will others (it is 
too easy to say younger people who did not experience that time) turn away? 
Many have seen Platoon, but as writer Charles Krauthammer has asked, how 
many can understand it? He states:
A filmmaker is not obliged to give context. It is perfectly legitimate to choose a 
narrow focus. But he should not then pretend to a cosmic message, such as the 
narrator’s conclusion that in Vietnam the enemy was us.
War is hell, and Platoon does hell well. That is a considerable achievement. 
What Platoon does not do, despite its pretensions, is tell us anything more than 
that. (A19)
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The men of the platoon are frightened draftees, counting the number of days 
they have left in Vietnam. They carry with them the character flaws that so 
typify ordinariness, existing unfettered by the conventions in force “back in 
the world.” The believability of these characters is the film’s strength, which 
magnifies its greatest weakness. Staff Sergeant Barnes is the manifestation of 
man’s most ignoble instincts unchecked. The brooding and brutal Barnes 
seems to have wrenched his destiny from fate, whereas the others—the ordi-
nary ones—seem propelled by a milieu that catches them up and overwhelms 
their inhibitions. Courage and restraint took on much different meanings in 
’Nam.
Control—or its abandonment—permeates the film. Some of the characters 
seem predisposed to unconscionable behavior. Others are pushed to hysteria 
by horrific circumstances. For Bunny, the loud, not very bright, working-class 
kid who drinks beer and listens to country music, war is hell—except the 
good parts. He summarizes: “I like being here. You get to do what you want, 
nobody fucks with you. The only worry you got is dying. If that happens you 
won’t know about it anyway.” But the central figure in Platoon is Chris Taylor, 
the college dropout who seems to be characterized by both perceptiveness 
and indecisiveness. He is neither good nor bad. He is neither held up for 
admiration nor reviled for his conduct. His role is to “be there,” to act as a 
surrogate for you and me.
In the end, Platoon is not a film in which the classic notion of “justice” is 
carried out when protagonist and antagonist have a final showdown. Instead, 
Platoon offers a nasty ending. In the ambiguity of war (or are we to believe 
it was only the Vietnam War?), Taylor’s cool execution of Barnes is depicted 
as justice. Viewers may dismiss that act as inevitable, assuming that Sergeant 
Barnes would not hesitate to kill Taylor. Thus, the ending of the film plays out 
its greatest flaw. In the character of Barnes, Stone’s film has succumbed to the 
temptation of a Coppola-like treatment of a universal madness personified in 
an individual. Neither Colonel Kurtz nor Sergeant Barnes have human frail-
ties that are truly comprehensible; they are more akin to Herman Melville’s 
Captain Ahab—who is referenced in the film—than to any actual Vietnam 
veteran. That flaw in the direction of literary allusion and symbolism is all 
the more regrettable because the totality of the war’s madness, and what it 
does to the human beings who populate the platoon, is so finely drawn and 
credibly conveyed.
We are not asking that one film tell the whole story of the Vietnam War. 
No film, novel, or history book can do that. But more than any other feature 
film to date, Platoon demands that the viewer experience what is portrayed on 
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the screen. Nor do we find fault with the film because it is not the final word 
on Vietnam. This is a Vietnam War story from the perspective of Oliver Stone, 
which carries more credence in its telling by virtue of his having served there. 
The writer-director makes no pretense of dealing with the gamut of events 
and places that was Vietnam; instead, he limits his account to that of a single 
platoon serving in War Zone C, in a place the Americans called the HoBo 
Woods, in 1967–1968. It is, Stone says, “one reality” (Phillips).
Yet on 26 January 1987, Time’s cover story went overboard by announc-
ing, “Viet Nam as It Really Was,” causing former marine and Washington Post 
writer Henry Allen to retort: “[It] is silly and decadent, this willful confusion 
of life and art. And it’s dangerous. War is too wildly stupid, glorious, hideous, 
huge and human for us to think that art can tell us what it really is. War is a 
little like God—when we start thinking we understand it, we’re heading for 
trouble” (“Why” 25). In the past two decades Oliver Stone has continued to 
make controversial films, and the American public has had many opportuni-
ties to watch wars on the big and little screens. Still, Platoon, as David Edelstein 
recently summarized, remains an important portrait of war “as moral hell.” 
The many facets of Stone’s powerful epic are still worthy of examination and 
interpretation.
As is so often the case, the interpretations say as much about the “readers” 
of the film as they do about the work of a great American filmmaker working 
in the tradition of the Hollywood war film.
Sergeant Elias (Willem Dafoe) crucified by Vietnam.
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THE QUIET AMERICAN
Graham Greene’s Vietnam Novel through the 
Lenses of Two Eras
19 / William S. Bushnell
Graham Greene’s The Quiet American, published in 1955, has twice caught the 
interest of respected filmmakers. Joseph Mankiewicz directed his adaptation of 
the novel in 1958, and Phillip Noyce returned to the text nearly a half century 
later. These radically different presentations reflect the different historical 
contexts in which they were filmed and show how America’s involvement in 
Vietnam from the early 1950s through the fall of Saigon in 1975 continues to 
be revisited and revisioned. The American director, Mankiewicz, transposed 
what he called a “cheap melodrama in which the American was the most idiotic 
kind of villain” into a dramatization of America’s fledgling foreign policy in 
Indochina (quoted in Geist 269). By returning to The Quiet American with four 
decades of hindsight, Noyce, an Australian director, was able to treat his film 
with full awareness of America’s pending escalation and ultimate defeat in Viet-
nam. Mankiewicz ennobles the political idealism of the quiet American, Pyle, 
while simultaneously emptying the protagonist, Fowler, of diplomatic wisdom. 
Noyce’s departure from the novel also centers on the characterization of the 
American; this time, however, Pyle is more menacing. Mankiewicz privileges 
the murder investigation and Fowler’s jealousy of Pyle as a motive, while Noyce 
favors the self-reflective intimacy of Greene’s work. The 1958 screenplay, writ-
ten by Mankiewicz, and the 2002 script, written by Christopher Hampton and 
Robert Schenkkan, both adhere closely to the novel. What separates the two 
films is the reimagining of the character of Pyle, the quiet American.
THE QUIET AMERICAN AS LITERATURE
Greene’s controversial and popular novel provided attractive adaptation pos-
sibilities: it is part political thriller, part romance, and part detective story set in 
The Quiet American through the Lenses of Two Eras / 405
exotic French Indochina in 1952. Thomas Fowler, a washed-up reporter for the 
London Times, pits his fatalistic experience against the newly arrived American’s 
youthful innocence in an effort to keep Phuong, his Vietnamese mistress—a 
contest that symbolizes Old and New World designs on Southeast Asia. The novel 
begins at the end of the story, with the investigation into the murder of Alden 
Pyle. Fowler, the lead suspect, tells Vigot, inspector for the French Sureté, how 
he became friends with the American. Pyle had come to the region to spread 
the ideals of a “third force,” a third alternative to French or communist rule 
in Vietnam. Carrying books by fictional political scientist York Harding, Pyle 
embodies the democratic idealism that Louis Hartz describes in The Liberal 
Tradition in America: “the current struggle against Communism is in significant 
part an ideological competition for human loyalties; it has brought into the 
plainest view America’s psychological pattern. One of the issues it involves is 
the issue of social ‘message’ to compete with the appeal of Communism in 
various parts of the world” (305). After befriending Fowler, Pyle meets and 
pursues the lovely Phuong. He unaccountably travels north through the war 
zone to Phat Diem, where Fowler has gone to report on an alleged massacre. 
Once there, the gentlemanly Pyle declares to Fowler his intention to tempt 
Phuong away from the elder man with the promise of marriage (an offer the 
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married Fowler cannot make). The young suitor succeeds, and Fowler begins 
to struggle with the loss of his mistress and the increasingly suspicious behavior 
of this quiet American.
Pyle’s chivalry is lambasted by the cynical expatriate. The young American’s 
approach to women and politics is viewed as woefully naïve, and in the novel, 
Fowler underscores the danger of Pyle’s innocence: “He was too innocent to 
live. He was young and ignorant and silly and he got involved. He had no more 
of a notion than any of you what the whole affair’s about, and you gave him 
money and York Harding’s books on the East and said, ‘Go ahead. Win the 
East for Democracy’” (Greene, Quiet 31–32). The love triangle among Fowler, 
Pyle, and Phuong drives the plot of the novel as well as both screenplays. Fowler 
is threatened by the younger suitor and goes to extreme lengths—including 
deceit and murder—to keep Phuong. He is also moved to action against what 
he considers to be Pyle’s lethal innocence. The shading between personal 
motives and political cover underscores the differences between the novel 
and the two films.
Greene’s novel is highly autobiographical. He served as a correspondent 
in Saigon in the early 1950s, and most of the historical events were re-created 
from his dispatches and journal entries. Like Fowler, he smoked opium, fre-
quented brothels, and intended to divorce his wife, Vivian, during his long 
affair with Catherine Walston (who was not Vietnamese). As the dedication to 
the novel suggests, Greene borrowed from his friend René Berval details about 
his apartment, the name of his girlfriend, and even his dog.
Fictional characters are often composites of real individuals melded by the 
author’s imagination. Such is the case with The Quiet American, and even Greene 
would have trouble denying the similarities between author and protagonist. 
Fending off criticism, Greene offered a feeble disclaimer that he did not share 
Fowler’s anti-Americanism because, unlike Fowler, he did not lose his girlfriend 
to an American. A few of the characters are more fact than fiction—Trinh 
Minh Thé, for example, is portrayed with historical accuracy. Thé led the Lien 
Minh platform, which supported an independent Vietnam and was both anti-
Vietminh and anti-French, a veritable third force. To his biographer, Norman 
Sherry, Greene admitted that the bullying American correspondent Granger 
was based on Larry Allen, the Pulitzer Prize–winning World War II reporter 
who had, by 1951, “sadly lost his heroic qualities, had been drinking too much, 
and was rather obese and sloppy in manner, in his personal demeanor and 
in his work as well” (400). Likewise, Phuong and Miss Hei were based on the 
Mathieu sisters, whom Greene had met through his friend Berval.
The Quiet American through the Lenses of Two Eras / 407
PHUONG RISES FROM THE ASHES:  
THE FEMINIZING OF VIETNAM
The character of Phuong is central to the story. To Fowler, she is “the hiss of 
steam, the clink of a cup, she [is] a certain hour of the night and the prom-
ise of rest” (Greene, Quiet 12). She is a meal ticket for her sister, Miss Hei, 
who, having lost her Mandarin father to the communist Vietminh, aggres-
sively calculates the dollar value of Pyle’s marriageability. And to Pyle, she is a 
mission—a citizen, like the nation, in need of saving by the West. He sees 
himself rescuing her from a life in the House of the Five Hundred Girls: “ You 
know, I think it was seeing all those girls in that house. They were so pretty. 
Why she might have been one of them. I wanted to protect her” (58). Pyle’s 
desire to protect Phuong and her country echoes the paternalistic attitudes of 
many American policy makers in the early 1950s. Consider an excerpt from a 
speech by Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in 1956:
Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. 
The American (Audie Murphy) and Phuong (Giorgia Moll) in the 1958 version.
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If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We 
presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. 
As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined 
in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring—we 
cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the 
perils that threaten its existence—communism, political anarchy, poverty and the 
rest—then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; 
and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low. (quoted in Herz 17)
In many ways Phuong symbolizes Vietnam. She is beautifully exotic and much 
stronger than she appears. Fowler describes her this way: “She’s no child. She’s 
tougher than you’ll ever be. Do you know the kind of polish that doesn’t take 
scratches? That’s Phuong. She can survive a dozen of us” (Greene, Quiet 133). 
Fowler notes that her name, Phuong, means “phoenix” but adds ruefully, “noth-
ing nowadays is fabulous and nothing rises from its ashes” (11).
The feminization of Vietnam through Phuong is not unique to Greene. 
This form of reductive symbolism is common in films and literature about the 
conflict. Early films such as Saigon (1948), starring Alan Ladd and Veronica 
Lake, capitalize on Vietnam’s exotic allure. Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket 
(1987) depicts the pitfalls of succumbing to the seductive beauty while under-
estimating the strength of the Vietnamese. His “in-country” half of the film 
begins in Saigon with a Vietnamese prostitute strutting to Nancy Sinatra’s pop 
tune “These Boots Were Made for Walking”; it ends in Hue with a squad of 
marines being picked off by a female sniper. The eventual execution of the 
sniper—looking much like a gang rape—eerily mixes sex and violence in what 
one of the participants describes as “hard-core” and worthy of  “the Congres-
sional Medal of Ugly.” Kubrick’s female sniper subverts the image of a powerless 
Vietnam. Her plea to “kill me” is as much a challenge to the impotent soldiers 
with their guns in hand as it is a cry for mercy.
Vietnam has often identified itself through its resilient heroines; for 
example, the story of the Trung sisters continues to inspire generations of 
Vietnamese. In A.D. 40, Trung Trac and her sister Trung Nhi rallied thirty 
thousand troops to fight the occupying Chinese. They regained control of 
sixty-five citadels and ruled as queens for two years before their enemy amassed 
an overwhelming force and reoccupied the territory. Rather than surrender to 
their conquerors, the queens committed suicide by drowning in the Hat River. 
Theirs is an inspiring story of courage, resilience, and independence.
Female suffering and perseverance are also associated with The Tale of 
Kieu, the national poem of Vietnam. In the introduction to Nguyen Du’s epic, 
translator Huynh Sanh Thong writes, “[The Tale of Kieu] has stood unchallenged 
since its publication and dissemination in the second decade of the nineteenth 
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century as the supreme masterwork of Vietnamese literature” (xx); “Kieu stands 
for Vietnam itself, a land well-endowed with natural and human resources, but 
too often doomed to see such riches gone to waste or destroyed” (xl). Graham 
Greene’s tale of Phuong is much like The Tale of Kieu: both women are forced 
into a life of submission, but time and again they prove their resilience. Kieu’s 
successes and failures are much more numerous and tragic than Phuong’s, but 
in the end she serves as a model of hope and perseverance:
Heaven appoints each human to a place.
If doomed to roll in dust, we’ll roll in dust;
We’ll sit on high when destined for high seats.
Does Heaven ever favor anyone,
Bestowing both rare talent and good luck?
In talent take no overweening pride,
For talent and disaster form a pair. (lines 3242–48) 
Like the phoenix, Phuong rises from the ashes. Fowler frees her from a 
life as a taxi dancer, but when his efforts to obtain a divorce from his wife in 
England fail, she leaves him for a more secure life with his American rival. 
Upon Pyle’s death she bounces back to Fowler. According to Cynthia Fuchs, 
“Phuong has will and determination, . . . she fully understands her situation, 
and . . . she doesn’t much care what either of her would-be saviors wants of 
Colonel Edward Lansdale (second from left) and President Ngo Dinh Diem (center) 
with colleagues, circa 1957.
N
at
io
n
al
 A
rc
h
iv
es
410 / William S. Bushnell
her. She is autonomous and resolute, long before they are willing or able to 
see it” (1). Thus, although Phuong is a metaphor for Vietnam, she is not a 
representation of subordination—a possession to be used or protected—but 
a symbol of survivability and independence.
EDWARD LANSDALE: A VERY QUIET AMERICAN IN VIETNAM 
Controversy surrounding the character of Pyle contributed to the allure and 
longevity of The Quiet American. Speculation over who was the model for the 
quiet American narrowed to one man—Colonel Edward Lansdale. Sporting 
a background in advertising, he was sent to Vietnam from the Philippines im-
mediately after the French loss at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 to “win the hearts and 
minds” of another country in turmoil. He had become a bit of a celebrity in the 
Philippines, where his propaganda operations helped subdue the Huk rebels; 
he was hoping to duplicate his success in Vietnam. Through his numerous 
State Department and Vietnamese contacts, he knew more than any American 
about a “third force.” Sherry addresses the almost mythic connection between 
Graham Greene and Lansdale by stating, “It’s rare to find a book on Vietnam 
which doesn’t automatically accept that Greene used Lansdale as his source 
[for Pyle]” (416). Even Lansdale’s biographer, Cecil Currey, perpetuates this 
tantalizing but inaccurate belief: “One of the book’s two focal characters was 
Alden Pyle, patterned after Lansdale and other Americans Greene observed 
in Vietnam, and thus Greene became the first author to caricature Lansdale’s 
real-life exploits” (196). Lansdale recounted to Currey that he had overheard 
Greene say that he had definitely not had Lansdale in mind when he created 
the character Alden Pyle: “I sure hope not. . . . On the other hand, Pyle was 
close to Trinh Minh Thé, the guerilla leader, and also had a dog who went 
with him everywhere—and I was the only American close to Trinh Minh Thé 
and my poodle Pierre went everywhere with me” (198).
Pyle’s dog is prominent in the novel. The detail about Lansdale’s dog ac-
companying him everywhere was something that could have made its way to 
Greene; it was certainly the type of authentic detail of espionage he cherished. 
When Lansdale arrived in 1954, he offered assistance to Captain Pham Xuan 
Giai, head of G-5, the psychological warfare division of the Vietnamese army. 
Lansdale taught the spy trade to his protégés at G-5, including Giai’s cousin 
Pham Xuan An, who learned about using dogs for intelligence work. An said, 
“I trained my dog so that he could alert me when the police were searching 
people’s houses, even a kilometer away. He was a good spy” (Bass 58).
Greene and Lansdale were like two alpha dogs fighting over the same back-
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yard, and Saigon was not big enough for both of their larger-than-life personas. 
Lansdale recalled meeting Greene at the Continental Hotel and walking away, 
thinking, “I’m going to get written up someplace as a dirty dog” (Currey 198). 
He was convinced that he was being mocked by Greene, and none of Greene’s 
denials stuck. The two Cold War celebrities fought over the Pyle connection 
until their deaths, but it was exactly through this association that their celebrity 
was reinforced. Jonathan Nashel, in his recent history Edward Lansdale’s Cold 
War, writes: “Yet like so much about the nature of celebrity, Greene’s denials 
concerning Pyle as Lansdale were drowned out by the far more intriguing tale 
of a British novelist and a CIA agent fighting their own personal Cold War. 
In ways neither could have appreciated at the time, Greene’s novel created 
Lansdale’s celebrity more than any single thing Lansdale actually did. One need 
only to consider that after 1955 it is rare to encounter a story about Lansdale 
that does not refer to him as the ‘quiet American’” (150).
Despite popular belief, Pyle is not based on Lansdale. In his autobiography 
Ways of Escape, Greene writes of a trip in 1951 to visit Colonel Leroy, who was 
the French officer in charge of the Bentre province at the time. On the drive 
back to Saigon, Greene met the inspiration for The Quiet American:
I shared a room that night with an American attached to an economic aid  
mission—the members were assumed by the French, probably correctly, to belong 
to the CIA. My companion bore no resemblance at all to Pyle, the quiet American 
of my story—he was a man of greater intelligence and of less innocence, but he 
lectured me all the long drive back to Saigon on the necessity of finding a “third 
force” in Vietnam. I had never before come so close to the great American dream 
which was to bedevil affairs in the East as it was to do in Algeria. (127)
Sherry identifies Leo Hochstetter, public affairs director for the economic aid 
mission in Saigon, as Greene’s traveling companion. Other than sharing his 
political views, Hochstetter was nothing like the quiet Pyle; he was known to be 
talkative and gregarious (Sherry 419). Greene gave Hochstetter a photograph 
of their visit with Colonel Leroy, and on the back, Greene wrote everyone’s 
name; behind Hochstetter he wrote “Q.A.” (Quiet American) (417).
The meeting with Hochstetter preceded Lansdale’s arrival in Vietnam. By 
the time Greene and Lansdale met, Green was almost finished with The Quiet 
American. Lansdale arrived in May 1954, and Greene had begun writing the 
novel as early as March 1952 and had a working draft finished long before 
completing it in June 1955 (Sherry 417). Greene hinted that Pyle’s naïveté, 
particularly regarding women, was actually a caricature of how Greene viewed 
himself in his youth. Still, in much the same manner that Phuong was written 
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as a metaphor for Vietnam, Pyle became a metaphor for American foreign 
policy.
Greene’s “anti-American” novel touched off a firestorm of criticism when it 
was published in the United States in early 1956, but it grew in popularity with 
the rise of the antiwar movement a decade later. Both supporters and critics 
of America’s involvement in Southeast Asia took the novel as fact. Nashel sug-
gested that “this quality of ‘real’ fiction, verging on the reportage method, lies 
at the heart of the book’s success in depicting the country, but it also leaves 
open the question of whether we should read it as a journalistic account of 
the period or primarily as a fictional meditation on American power. Greene 
essentially wanted to have it both ways: a piece of nonfiction masquerading 
as a novel” (151). Many of the scenes described in The Quiet American—Phat 
Diem, bombing runs along the Red River with the Gascogne Squadron, and 
the Place Garnier explosion—have their counterparts in newspaper stories 
bylined by Greene.
Martin Herz, a career diplomat, ambassador, and historian, addressed 
the influential role of the media (including, in this case, a work of fiction) 
in a series of lectures given just before his death in 1983. He suggested, “The 
thing to retain here is that the press had become a major factor in the drama 
unfolding in Vietnam; that it tended to have its own point of view, sometimes 
single-mindedly committed to a particular purpose; and that already under 
Kennedy our government often believed the vivid reporting of the media 
more than it believed its own representatives on the spot” (36). He added 
that once images such as Nick Ut’s famous “napalm girl” photograph (1972) 
“entered people’s consciousness one cannot rectify the impression—people are 
no longer interested in hearing that the Buddhist monks of Hue were totally 
unrepresentative or that the little girl was the victim of a military accident. 
Visual paradigms have been suggested, and once created in people’s minds 
they persist” (46–47). Like the iconic photographs, The Quiet American took 
on the status of a paradigm for the conflict.
People will believe what they want to believe, and people wanted to believe 
The Quiet American. Nashel recorded Congressman William Lehman (D-Fla.) 
using fiction to describe reality when questioning CIA Director William Colby 
in a 1975 congressional hearing on the accuracy of the CIA’s intelligence about 
the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong:
MR. LEHMAN: Just thinking back to some of the things I have read. I wonder how 
many of you gentlemen ever read any of Graham Greene’s books? Have you read 
The Quiet American?
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MR. COLBY: I have.
MR. LEHMAN: Graham Greene . . . seems to have a conceptual understanding 
of the impossibility of understanding the motivations and what you called the 
capabilities of the armed services of that particular kind of culture. . . . I am 
just concerned about how can we possibly prevent the kinds of miscalculations, 
the misconceptualizing or lack of understanding of what is going on—the basic 
limitations of someone like this fellow Pyle, and Graham Greene, who was deal-
ing from one culture into another culture without knowing what the hell he was 
doing. (quoted in Nashel 162)
As Congressman Lehman’s muddled inquiry evidences in substance and style, 
the real danger is not only that Greene’s fiction verges on reportage but also 
that because of this style and the readership’s overwhelming desire to make 
fiction fact, we have fiction serving as history.
THE MANK IEWICZ VERSION
Joseph Mankiewicz bought the movie rights to The Quiet American just a few 
months after it was published in the United States. Although the director- 
producer claimed he was not pressured by United Artists to put a pro-American 
spin on the story, Robert Lantz, executive vice president of Figaro Productions 
(the film’s production company), claimed that the filmmaker boasted about 
the change: “I will tell the whole story anti-Communist and pro-American” 
(quoted in Geist 268). According to Mankiewicz’s biographer, Kenneth Geist, 
the director later denied making this boast; however, interviews promoting 
the film displayed both Mankiewicz’s seething anger toward Greene’s anti-
Americanism and his goal of reversing America’s Cold War image. In the 
25 January 1958 Saturday Review, Mankiewicz said he “often wanted to do a 
picture about one of those ice-blooded intellectuals whose intellectualism is 
really just a mask for completely irrational passion” (Knight 27). And while 
speaking with James O’Neill Jr. of the Washington Daily News, Mankiewicz 
made it clear that he saw Fowler, like Greene, as the real villain: “Here is a 
man whose lack of any real moral fiber made him far more dangerous than 
the stupid, idealistic American” (24).
While scouting for locations in Vietnam, Mankiewicz met Colonel Lansdale, 
and the two became allies. “Mankiewicz found in Lansdale the perfect source 
for the host of questions he had about Vietnam, its people, and the nature 
of the war. In turn, Lansdale found in Mankiewicz an American who could 
counter Greene in a way no one else had done” (Nashel 164). The partner-
ship with Lansdale made clear the direction Mankiewicz intended for his film 
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and provided Lansdale with a soapbox to promote America’s involvement. 
Mankiewicz set out to shift the blame for the terrorist bombing of the Place 
Garnier in Saigon on 9 January 1952 from Colonel Thé (Pyle’s third-force 
leader—Greene promoted him to general) to the communists. In a letter dated 
17 March 1956, Lansdale identified Trinh Minh Thé as the mastermind behind 
the bombing and included details about how and where he had acquired the 
melenite (plastic explosive) and how the bombs had been detonated; amaz-
ingly, Lansdale continued to support the spin Mankiewicz wanted to place on 
the event: “in keeping with your treatment of this [incident] actually having 
been a Communist action, I’d suggest that you just go right ahead and let it be 
finally revealed that the Communists did it after all, even to faking the radio 
broadcast (which would have been easy to do)” (quoted in Nashel 165).
Government support for Mankiewicz’s script extended above Lansdale’s pay 
grade. Lantz met with Allen Dulles, director of the CIA. Dulles liked the idea 
of the film and how its message countered the novel’s depiction of Americans 
abroad and offered Lantz U.S. government assistance (Nashel 166). On 28 
October 1957 Lansdale wrote to Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem:
Just a little note to tell you that I have seen the motion picture, “The Quiet Ameri-
can,” and that I feel it will help win more friends for you and Vietnam in many 
places in the world where it is shown. When I first mentioned this motion picture 
to you last year, I had read Mr. Mankiewicz’ “treatment” of the story and had 
thought it an excellent change from Mr. Greene’s novel of despair. Mr. Mankiewicz 
had done much more with the picture itself, and I now feel that you will be very 
pleased with the reactions of those who see it. (quoted in Pratt 307)
Diem should have been pleased; in the film Pyle refers to meeting an impressive 
Vietnamese while taking classes at Princeton. Pyle believes that this man (Diem, 
though he is not directly named) will be the third force and that Thé� with his 
army will be one of his chief supporters. On the same day that Lansdale wrote 
to Diem he also wrote to his friend and supervisor General John W. O’Daniel: 
“Thanks to you, I attended the screening of ‘The Quiet American’ in Wash-
ington last Thursday. It was quite an experience to see and listen to a mature 
approach to such recent events in Vietnam, and one so understanding of the 
things free men believe in” (quoted in Pratt 308). Mankiewicz had endorsed 
the government’s position on Vietnam and, judging by Lansdale’s praise, cre-
ated a film that forwarded the government’s foreign policy agenda.
Audie Murphy: Cold War Symbol
Eight weeks of filming began on 28 January 1957, with Michael Redgrave as 
The Quiet American through the Lenses of Two Eras / 415
Fowler and Audie Murphy as Pyle. Mankiewicz originally wanted Montgomery 
Clift to play the part of Pyle opposite Lawrence Olivier. Clift, who was recover-
ing from an auto accident, canceled. Angered by the recasting of his costar, 
Olivier pulled out, and Michael Redgrave signed on for the role of the British 
reporter. Audie Murphy was a bold but logical choice for the role of Pyle, given 
Mankiewicz’s revision of the novel. By 1958 Murphy, the most decorated soldier 
of World War II, had established himself as a motion picture action star. He had 
initially become a national celebrity with a Life magazine cover story on 16 July 
1945, and his boyish good looks and battlefield credentials opened the doors 
to Hollywood. Murphy played himself in To Hell and Back (1955), but his brief 
rise to stardom was short-lived, and he soon found himself knocking on closed 
doors in Hollywood. The Quiet American would be his only dramatic departure 
from more formulaic Westerns and combat films. Still, the war hero was just 
the image Mankiewicz needed to sell his version of The Quiet American. In an 
interview with the New York Times, Mankiewicz bragged that Murphy was “the 
perfect symbol of what I want to say” (Pryor 35). The American hero-turned-
actor in a supporting role received top billing over Michael Redgrave, his far 
more accomplished costar and the lead in the film. Audie Murphy, with his 
supportive fan base and remarkable military record, was ideal to represent an 
aggressive American presence.
Murphy was not a versatile actor; he largely played himself, which worked 
well for Mankiewicz’s concept of the film. Possibly to increase the sincerity of 
the character or to make Murphy more convincing in the role, Pyle’s home was 
switched from Boston to Murphy’s native Texas. Mankiewicz did little to down-
play the actor’s heroic status. In an early scene in the film, when Pyle rescues 
Fowler from a burning watchtower, Fowler sarcastically remarks, “We’re not 
a couple of movie Marines. You won’t even get the girl in the end.” Oblivious 
to the snide remark, Pyle responds, “This is the fireman’s lift. I learned it in 
the Boy Scouts—my good deed for the day.” Murphy fashioned Pyle into the 
consummate do-gooder without a hint of irony.
With the two principal actors cast, Mankiewicz needed to find an actress. 
The Quiet American was the first Hollywood feature filmed in Vietnam. Given 
the fact that he had invested a great deal both financially and emotionally 
(Mankiewicz was suffering from bouts of depression made worse by the loca-
tion shooting) for an authentic setting, his choice of Italian actress Giorgia 
Moll came as a bit of a surprise—even though most of the interior shots were 
filmed at Figaro’s soundstage in Rome. Mankiewicz had more convincing Asian 
actresses to choose from: France Nuyen tested for the role but was passed over. 
Nuyen became Joshua Logan’s discovery in the stage version of The World of 
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Suzie Wong and his film version of South Pacific (Geist 273). Moll’s character 
was an unconvincing Asian mistress, but Mankiewicz gave her Phuong more 
influence than she had in the novel. Her most empowering moment occurs 
in the final sequence, when she publicly rejects Fowler.
Greene was enraged by the American filmmaker’s reworking of his novel 
and openly criticized the project. His harshest attack, appearing first in the 
International Film Annual (1958), left no question about his feelings: “The most 
extreme changes I have seen in any book of mine were in The Quiet American; 
one could almost believe that the film was made deliberately to attack the 
book and the author, but the book was based on a closer knowledge of the 
Indo-China war than the American director possessed, and I am vain enough 
to believe that the book will survive a few years longer than Mr. Mankiewicz’ 
incoherent picture” (quoted in Geist 278). Greene’s prediction that his novel’s 
popularity would outlast Mankiewicz’s film proved to be accurate.
THE NOYCE VERSION
Whereas Mankiewicz’s film premiered just a little over a year after Greene’s 
novel was published in the United States, the second film version had a fifteen- 
year production history. Sydney Pollack initially acquired the rights in 1988 
and “promised a more faithful remake” of the novel (“Quiet American Remake” 
10), but following the commercial and critical success of Platoon (1986), 
Vietnam combat films saturated the market for the remainder of the 1980s. 
Pollack held on to the rights for seven more years without getting so much as 
a script drafted.
Phillip Noyce stumbled onto the idea for a remake of The Quiet American by 
accident while vacationing in Vietnam in 1995. He had just toured the Ho Chi 
Minh Museum in Hanoi and left with what he thought was a volume of Chairman 
Ho’s poetry (in translation). On the train ride from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City 
(formerly Saigon), Noyce discovered that he had bought a copy of Greene’s novel 
by mistake. In an interview with Rob Blackwelder, Noyce recalled, “I thought at 
the time, it’s weird how his [Greene’s] portrait of the American political evange-
list of the early ’50s contained the same zeal that has guided American foreign 
policy through to the present—a zeal born out of the best intentions.” And in a 
similar interview with Martin Grove for the Hollywood Reporter, Noyce recounted 
how Greene’s novel particularly attracted him, “having lived in a country, Aus-
tralia, that went through an almost identical journey (as America did with the 
war in Vietnam) and nationally believing in the necessity to take a stand against 
communism and believing in the domino theory, particularly as Australia was 
the final domino.”
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Calling serendipitously from the Graham Greene suite in the Hotel 
Continental, Noyce tracked the film rights to Sydney Pollack at Paramount. 
Another six years transpired before the estimated $30 million could be raised 
to fund the picture. Completed in 2001, only to be shelved by Miramax for a 
year after the  9/11 attacks, the Noyce version finally premiered at the Toronto 
International Film Festival in September 2002. Four weeks later, Congress 
would authorize military force to disarm Iraq. America’s foreign diplomacy 
would once again be examined through the lens of The Quiet American, this 
time through a historical perspective.
Although not as transparent as Mankiewicz about his desire to mold The 
Quiet American, Noyce’s direction reflects his post-Vietnam, post-Watergate 
sensibility in the same way Mankiewicz’s film was a product of the early Cold 
War. In particular, Noyce’s film perpetuates a distrust of government, mostly 
in what is perceived as the government’s abuse of power, as well as the popular 
myth that the press saved us from ourselves in Vietnam. Noyce vilifies American 
intervention by thrashing Pyle and valorizes the media through the rebirth of 
Fowler as a prescient reporter.
The Vietnam conflict has often been characterized as America’s first tele-
vised war. Peter C. Rollins, summarizing the media’s influence on the conduct of 
Thomas Fowler (Michael Caine) and Alden Pyle (Brendan Fraser) discuss their 
beloved Phuong (Do Thi Hai Yen) in the 2002 version.
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the war in The Columbia Companion to American History on Film, observes: “Night 
after night, American viewers saw their boys hurt or dying on the nation’s televi-
sion screens in a conflict insufficiently justified by their government. Especially 
during the Tet offensive of 1968, the stories from Vietnam stressed ineptitude 
and defeat, disaffecting the public permanently” (94). Most significantly, in 
the final newsreel montage, Noyce’s valorization of the media presents as fact 
stories that many historians now contend were misleading interpretations of 
events. Despite an abundance of historical reassessments of the media’s role 
during the Vietnam conflict, Noyce’s film simply reinforces attitudes about the 
media that other historians and filmmakers explore more objectively.
Finding Phuong in the Era of the New Woman
Robert Schenkkan, writer of the first draft of Noyce’s script, spoke with Rich-
ard Stayton about the difficulty of creating the female lead. Schenkkan said 
of Phuong:
She’s pretty much just treated as an object without a point of view. I don’t think 
that Greene is particularly interested in her point of view, and that was one of the 
major character issues. We needed to understand Phuong as a human being, as 
The lovely Phuong (Do Thi Hai Yen in the 2002 version) is a symbol for Vietnam in 
both films. 
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a woman living, admittedly, in a time period and culture that presented her with 
a very limited range of choices. But that she was an independent woman within 
that culture, that she had her own mind, her own point of view, that she made 
choices. And often she didn’t have a wide range of choices, but she knew what 
was going on. She could see these two men’s advantages and their disadvantages. 
(quoted in Stayton)
Noyce had difficulty finding an actress who could personify traditional Viet-
namese womanhood to a globalized culture: “Every other girl we tested,” said 
Noyce, “seemed polluted by the body language that you inherit from TV com-
mercials, magazines, movies” (quoted in Corliss). Noyce finally cast newcomer 
Do Thi Hai Yen. Yen’s performance offers the ethnic authenticity that Giorgia 
Moll’s 1958 performance lacks, but as the credibility of Phuong’s character 
increases, her influence in the film decreases.
Pyle for a New Generation
Brendan Fraser, who lacks Audie Murphy’s status as a highly decorated war 
hero, is best known as an action and comedy star. The critical praise he earned 
as Clayton Boone in Gods and Monsters (1998) has been overshadowed by pop-
corn hits such as The Mummy (1999), George of the Jungle (1997), and Dudley Do-
Right (1999). Casting an underestimated actor against the more experienced 
Michael Caine resembled Mankiewicz’s strategy of putting Audie Murphy 
opposite Michael Redgrave. Just as audiences believed in Murphy’s sincerity, 
they were equally willing to accept Fraser’s do-gooder oafishness in the role 
of Pyle. Noyce voiced his enthusiasm for Fraser in an interview: “Fraser brings 
to his performance a sense of innocence and even a kind of goofiness that 
turns out to be a marvelous cover for a character who we learn soon enough is 
really an American spy. . . . All of the light-weight roles that he’s been playing 
hopefully contribute to catching the audience off-guard” (Grove 6). Fraser also 
possesses an athletic physical presence that works remarkably well in the film. 
When Pyle first arrives in Saigon, his size and enthusiasm remind the viewer 
of a clumsy youth, but by the time of the terrorist bombing, Pyle intimidates 
like a seasoned soldier.
Pham Xuan An: History Reveals Itself
One of the most compelling aspects of Noyce’s film is the last-minute compres-
sion of the communist characters (Dominguez, Mr. Heng, Mr. Moi, and Mr. 
Chou) into one individual. Noyce not only consolidates the characters but also 
expands the role and makes Hinh, Fowler’s assistant and confidant, the one 
who actually assassinates Pyle. The change adds some credibility to a weakness 
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in Greene’s plot. The novel never explains why Fowler needs to be involved in 
the assassination in the first place. Ostensibly his role is to get Pyle to a specified 
place at a specified time, but the tension comes from Fowler’s moral struggle 
over whether or not to participate in the plot. By making the assassin Fowler’s 
aide, Noyce puts the knife much closer to Fowler’s own hand. Just as the audi-
ence is duped by Pyle’s cover, it is also misled by the “loyal” Hinh.
What makes Hinh so believable is that Noyce bases the character on an 
actual double agent, Pham Xuan An. Noyce recalled the following meeting:
We just combined the two [Dominguez and Mr. Heng] after I met a guy named 
General An. He wasn’t a general until the day after Saigon fell, when he could 
come out of the closet and reveal that he had been a double agent, he had worked 
as a censor for the French at the Saigon post office, where foreign correspondents 
would come in and present their copy that they were asking to be telegraphed (to 
their newspapers) overseas. They warned him to be very careful of this Graham 
Greene character and read his communiqués very carefully. (Blackwelder)
An’s own story is so remarkable that it makes Hinh’s actions seem plausible.
In 1952 An began his work as a spy by practicing his English as a press cen-
sor at the central post office in Saigon. He was told to black out the dispatches 
written for British and French newspapers by Graham Greene, a “troublemaker” 
Hinh (Tzi Ma) closely resembles Vietcong colonel Pham Xuan An, who “helped” 
American correspondents in Vietnam.
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whom the French assumed was working for British intelligence (Bass 60). The 
French were convinced that Greene was an “honourable correspondent”—in 
the vocabulary of espionage, a “spy with cover”—according to a report sent 
to General de Lattre de Tassigny, commander of French forces in Indochina 
(Sherry 481). General de Lattre responded to the report: “All these English, 
they’re too much! It isn’t sufficient to have a consul who’s in the Secret Service, 
they even send me their novelists as agents” (482). Beginning with his censor-
ing of Greene’s dispatches in 1952, Pham Xuan An would infiltrate The Quiet 
American in one way or another for the next fifty years.
An’s communist case officer next instructed him to take a position in the 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Through family connections, he 
found an assignment at G -5, the army’s psychological warfare department. As 
noted earlier, An’s cousin Captain Pham Xuan Giai was the commander of 
G -5 when Lansdale was sent by the CIA to run covert operations in Vietnam. 
“Finding a promising student in the young Pham Xuan An, Lansdale and his 
colleagues began teaching him the tradecraft that he would employ in his next 
twenty years as a Communist spy” (Bass 60). Next, the neophyte was sent to the 
United States to be trained as a journalist. In 1957, after much difficulty and 
several delays, the thirty-one-year-old communist spy, retired customs officer, 
and psywar specialist enrolled at Orange Coast College in California. Called 
“Confucius” by his classmates, An spent much of his time practicing his craft 
on the Barnacle, the school newspaper. Ironically, one of his articles was a re-
view of Mankiewicz’s The Quiet American (1958), in which he called the movie 
confusing and wrote that it should “not be shown in Vietnam” (Bass 61).
Returning to Vietnam, An was hired by the Office of Political, Cultural, 
and Social Research, a CIA-sponsored network of spies (Bass 62). He then 
went to the Vietnam News Agency, Reuters, and finally Time magazine, where 
he worked as a double agent until 1975 and the fall of Saigon. An wrote his 
dispatches, some as long as a hundred pages; photographed them; and hid the 
undeveloped film in baskets of fish. According to members of the Vietnamese 
Politburo, “the writing was so lively and detailed that General Giap and Ho 
Chi Minh were reported to have rubbed their hands with glee on getting these 
dispatches from Tran Van Trung—An’s code name” (Bass 56). An served as 
Time’s sole correspondent in postwar Vietnam until it closed its Saigon bureau 
in 1976. Ordered to a reeducation camp in 1978 and then promoted to general 
in 1990, An was not allowed to retire until 2002, at the age of seventy-four.
Noyce met General An just before he started filming in 2001. In addition 
to making Hinh reflect An’s real-life exploits, Noyce got a firsthand account 
of the 1952 terrorist bombing that is central to the plot of the story. An was 
running an errand that day and arrived at the Place Garnier by bicycle just as 
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the bomb detonated. Noyce filmed the scene exactly from An’s recollection. 
The bicycle figures in the film again as Hinh rides across the Dakow bridge 
after Pyle’s assassination and looks back into the knowing stare of Fowler.
A STYLISTIC COMPARISON 
The two films vary stylistically and emphasize different themes. Mankiewicz 
stresses the detective story and political intrigue of the novel, while Noyce 
devotes more interest to the character relationships and the introspective qual-
ity of Greene’s text. Robert Krasker, director of photography, shot The Quiet 
American (1958) in a style reminiscent of his film noir classic The Third Man 
(1949). In contrast, Christopher Doyle, Noyce’s cinematographer for The Quiet 
American (2002) and Rabbit-Proof Fence (2002), captured a richly textured mood 
warmed by the glow of an opium pipe and cooled by the damp rottenness of 
Phat Diem. He frequently shot in close-ups, hanging on the actor’s eyes. The 
final newsreel montage zooms in on the wounded eye of an American soldier, 
carrying out the leitmotif of bearing witness that orders the film.
These two opposing approaches to Greene’s novel suggest gross differ-
ences between the films. Their effects are vastly different, but ultimately, 
not until the end. Mankiewicz takes his shots at Greene’s anti-Americanism, 
mostly by capitalizing on what Greene offers in the text. The most damning 
line of Fowler’s is lifted verbatim from the novel: “Suddenly I couldn’t bear 
his boyishness any more. I said, ‘I don’t care for her interests. You can have 
her interests. I only want her body. I want her in bed with me. I’d rather ruin 
her and sleep with her than, than . . . look after her damned interests’” (59). 
Noyce depicts Fowler’s love for Phuong more favorably than Mankiewicz does 
and omits the misogynistic line. He also takes liberties in building a friendship 
between Pyle and Fowler and evokes a more disingenuous American than 
Greene intended.
THE LAST REEL
The novel and the two films diverge most clearly in what Pauline Kael, reviewing 
the earlier film, refers to as “the offending compromises of the last reel” (336). 
The terrorist bombing at the Place Garnier resolves both films with contrary 
actions by Pyle. The scene in the novel begins with Fowler sitting in the Pavil-
lon (a café he would normally shun because of its crass American clientele) to 
avoid an awkward encounter with Phuong. While at the bar he finds himself 
for a moment “envying them [two American women] their sterilized world, so 
different from this world that I inhabited—which suddenly inexplicably broke 
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in pieces” (160). After the explosion, Fowler runs to save Phuong, whom he 
believes is at a milk bar at the epicenter. He meets Pyle in the chaos, and both 
witness the carnage. Here is the precise moment of departure for Mankiewicz 
and Noyce. In the novel Greene writes:
Pyle said, “It’s awful.” He looked at the wet on his shoes and said in a sick 
voice, “What’s that?”
“Blood,” I said. “Haven’t you ever seen it before?”
He said, “I must get them cleaned before I see the Minister.”
I don’t think he knew what he was saying. He was seeing a real war for the 
first time. . . . He looked white and beaten and ready to faint, and I thought, 
“What’s the good? He’ll always be innocent, you can’t blame the innocent, they 
are always guiltless. All you can do is control them or eliminate them. Innocence 
is a kind of insanity.” (162–63)
It is not surprising that Mankiewicz alters Pyle’s action in this scene, but the 
extent of the change galled Greene and led many critics to call it a “travesty.” 
As in the novel, Mankiewicz’s scene begins in the Pavillon. Fowler rushes to 
find Phuong but is held back by Vigot and the Vietnamese police, who treat 
the desperate Fowler as a nuisance. In contrast to the helpless Fowler, Pyle, 
looking like George Washington crossing the Delaware, rides into the square 
on the running board of a vehicle marked “United States Operations Mission.” 
Fowler manages to slip into the trunk of Pyle’s car as it slowly passes through 
the crowd. Pyle, more astute than the flagging reporter, has arranged to have 
Phuong skip her afternoon break because he has “heard rumors that there 
might be a demonstration.” When Fowler connects Pyle to General Thé and 
the bombing, Pyle incredulously reproves him: “What are you talking about? 
You must be out of your mind.” Angered by Fowler’s insinuation and inaction 
during the melee, Pyle condemns Fowler: “Why don’t you just shut up and help 
somebody!” The blood on the shoes is gone: Pyle’s innocence is not naïveté; 
it is guiltlessness.
This moment is also the point at which one would expect Noyce to hold 
to his promise to be faithful to the novel. Brendan Fraser is no Audie Mur-
phy in this scene, but neither is he, as described in the novel, “impregnably 
armoured by his good intentions and his ignorance” (163). As Mankiewicz is 
faithful to the Cold War ideology of his day, Noyce is faithful to his era and 
overcompensates for a painful history by making Pyle sinister. Noyce flinches 
in the face of Greene’s moral and political challenge: that America’s foreign 
policy in Indochina is dangerously naïve—so dangerous as to necessitate mur-
der. Assassinating a deceitful spy for his zealotry is more palatable than killing 
an indefatigable naïf. According to Greene, Pyle must be stopped because he 
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“comes blundering in and people have to die for his mistakes” (174). The Pyle 
in Noyce’s 2002 film does not blunder; he is neither ignorant nor innocent. 
Rather, he is driven by his myopic political idealism.
In the 2002 film, the revelation that Pyle is not what he appears to be 
occurs slowly as Fowler, back in his office, reflects on the massacre. Washing 
blood off his hands, Fowler says, “Did you see Pyle? He spoke Vietnamese like 
it was his native language.” At the scene, Pyle barks orders at an American 
photographer to get shots of the wounded and bullies a Vietnamese police 
officer to stay out of the way. While doing so, he wipes blood off his pant leg 
with casual indifference. Pyle’s actions at the bombing could not have been 
more different between the novel and the two films, nor could they be any 
more telling of each creator’s general theme.
From the explosion until the respective endings, each work continues on 
its own trajectory. In the novel, Fowler meets with Pyle at his apartment and 
recalls the words of Captain Trouin and Mr. Heng that “one has to take sides. 
If one is to stay human” (174). Fowler becomes engagé. He takes a volume of 
poetry to the window, the prearranged signal to the communist assassins that 
Fowler will have Pyle on the bridge to Dakow at nine o’clock, and reads from 
Arthur Hugh Clough’s Dipsychus, a nineteenth-century poetic dialogue between 
a tempting spirit and an idealistic youth:
I drive through the streets and I care not a damn,
The people they stare, and they ask who I am;
And if I should chance to run over a cad,
I can pay for the damage if ever so bad.
So pleasant it is to have money, heigh ho!
So pleasant it is to have money. (177)
Pyle responds disapprovingly, “That’s a funny kind of poem,” missing the gibe. 
Up to his last meeting with Fowler, Greene’s Pyle projects an ignorance that 
cannot be controlled or cured, only eliminated (163).
Mankiewicz not only changes the delivery of the lines but also replaces 
Clough’s poem altogether. Four lines from Othello reinforce Fowler’s jealousy 
about losing Phuong:
Though I perchance am vicious in my guess,
As I confess it is my nature’s plague
To spy into abuses, and oft my jealousy
Shapes faults that are not. (3.3.146 –49)
Mankiewicz then delivers his most strident attack on Greene himself in a 
dialogue directed at Fowler. Pyle accuses the burnt-out Englishman of being 
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“an adolescent boy who keeps on using dirty words all the time because he 
doesn’t want anyone to think he doesn’t know what it’s all about. You’re going 
to hate this; I think you’re one of the most truly innocent men I’ll ever know.” 
Mankiewicz redirects the innocence that was once projected onto Pyle, betray-
ing Fowler as the political naïf. In the 1958 film Pyle wrongfully dies because 
Fowler, driven by jealousy, is duped by the communists’ manipulations.
In the 2002 version, Brendan Fraser’s Pyle knowingly finishes the poem 
for Fowler, making him Fowler’s intellectual equal as well as signifying his 
identification with Clough’s indifferent driver. Pyle’s youthful power and his 
pugilist’s stance dominate the frame as he commands more than questions 
Fowler: “We can disagree and remain friends, can’t we, Thomas?” The assumed 
naïveté is gone. Fowler confronts his friend’s deceit: “It’s you, isn’t it? Joe Tun-
ney, the staff at the Legation, General Thé, they all take their fucking orders 
from you, Pyle.” Pyle ends the scene by lecturing on the amount of financial 
aid the United States has provided to France, the domino theory, and the claim 
that today’s bombing will save lives in the long run.
Fowler’s fortunes in the last scene provide the final departure. All three 
works—the novel and the two films—end with his stating, “I wished there 
existed someone to whom I could say that I was sorry” (Greene, Quiet 189). In 
the novel, the jaded reporter ostensibly gets everything he wants—a divorce, 
an extension from the Times, and the lovely Phuong—but he is existentially 
alone.
In 1958 Mankiewicz punishes the guilty for the murder of Pyle. Fowler 
delivers the sorry line to Vigot, the French investigator, as a confession. Mankie-
wicz continues the sentence by having Phuong publicly reject Fowler when 
he pleads for her return. Wilkins, a fellow correspondent at the club, predicts 
tomorrow’s news story, suggesting that Fowler is washed up: “Let me put it to you 
as a reporter. The celebration of the Chinese New Year was briefly interrupted 
at the Cholon Restaurant by a shabbily dressed, middle-aged Caucasian who 
appeared suddenly on the dance floor, unshaven, unwashed, and unwanted 
and made a nuisance of himself by haranguing a young Vietnamese girl.” The 
film ends with the defeated Fowler retreating into the crowd.
Noyce ends his adaptation with the hindsight of almost fifty years of his-
tory. Again, Fowler wishes he could apologize, but this time, Phuong is there 
to reply, “Not to me,” while affectionately hugging him. Fowler continues 
busily at his typewriter, getting out the day’s dispatch. An extreme close-up of 
the keys striking the paper dissolves into a montage of headlines detailing the 
escalation of America’s involvement in Vietnam, each one bylined “Thomas 
Fowler.” Thus, as circumstances worsen for the United States in Vietnam, 
Fowler actually benefits personally and professionally.
426 / William S. Bushnell
The headline montage begins with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu 
and the Geneva accords ending the war with France, dividing Vietnam at the 
seventeenth parallel. A series of headlines follows, indicating the escalation 
of U.S. involvement: “August 24, 1965. Ground Operations Begin. 184,300 
troops in Vietnam.” The final image settles on a wounded soldier with a heavily 
bandaged eye. The date of the article is 23 December 1966, and the headline 
reads: “495,000 U.S. Forces Now in Vietnam. President Johnson Reinforces 
Commitment to Fight Communists.” The actual troop strength at the end 
of 1966 was 383,500, 100,000 less than the 495,000 listed in the news article. 
More than just a quibble over numbers, Noyce puts the troop strength near 
the maximum of 540,000, which was not reached until 1968. An escalation of 
this magnitude did not occur until after the Tet Offensive in 1968 and was 
designed to reconstitute the army’s strength worldwide and not, as Noyce’s 
misleading article suggests, to send more troops to Vietnam.
The negotiations behind General Westmoreland’s infamous troop request 
were explained as far back as 1977, when Herbert Schandler published The 
Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Relying on the govern-
ment study United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, better known as the 
Pentagon Papers, Schandler mentioned a 23 February 1968 meeting between 
General Wheeler and General Westmoreland in Saigon, where they discussed 
the current military situation and projected materiel and troop requirements: 
“The troop list developed in Vietnam by the two military leaders [Wheeler 
and Westmoreland] had been designed to serve many purposes. Under the 
best possible circumstances, it would provide some additional troops to the 
Vietnam commander, but most importantly, it would allow reconstitution of 
the strategic reserve” (115). Noyce’s finale montage recycles the myth that the 
press somehow saved the United States from itself and fabricates a false visual 
paradigm to support it.
Much of the power of Greene’s novel, when read in the new millennium, 
is due to its prophetic qualities. In the dedication, Greene insists, “This is a 
story and not a piece of history.” Unfortunately, The Quiet American has become 
a chillingly accurate foreshadower of events. Mankiewicz’s 1958 film remains 
an artifact of Cold War ideology, frozen in history. Likewise, Noyce’s 2002 film 
is wedded to a post-Vietnam subjectivity and is no less a product of an era. 
And yet, the prescience of The Quiet American continues to strike new chords. 
When asked whether he intended his 2002 film to be a cautionary tale, Noyce 
replied, “I don’t believe that one makes films to be cautionary tales, but they 
become them” (Blackwelder). Noyce’s film may caution, but most of all, like 
Fowler, it wishes to say “sorry.”
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OPERATION RESTORE HONOR IN 
BLACK HAWK DOWN
20 / John Shelton Lawrence and John G. McGarrahan
On 3 October 1993 a group of U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force operators, 
acting in support of a United Nations relief mission in Somalia, mounted a 
surprise raid into the urban center of Mogadishu. Task Force (TF) Ranger, as it 
was called, hoped to capture leaders of the Habr Gidr clan, which was leading 
the resistance to the UN presence in the country. The commando attack met 
fierce resistance from clan fighters; eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed, many 
more were wounded, and two Black Hawk helicopters were destroyed. Despite 
the adversity, TF Ranger seized several clan leaders and managed to extricate 
itself after a seventeen-hour battle. The mission exemplified remarkable hero-
ism and discipline, yet to many within the military, it also represented a failure 
of command at high levels. For Jerry Bruckheimer, producer of the film Black 
Hawk Down (2001), it presented an opportunity to celebrate American hero-
ism. He approached the Pentagon for equipment and personnel to heighten 
the feel of cinematic realism—without being quite so blunt about it. General 
John M. Keane, the army’s vice chief of staff, remembers his first meeting with 
Bruckheimer: “He came into my office and said ‘General, I’m going to make 
a movie that you and your Army will be proud of.’ He did, so we thank him 
for it” (Kozaryn).
The book by Mark Bowden on which the film is based, along with the 
video game and the television documentaries on Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia (1992–1993), have all cultivated among the public a sense that they 
have been historically informed through exposure to the dramatic narratives of 
the Battle of Mogadishu. The deluxe DVD edition of the Ridley Scott–directed 
film, which offers a running commentary by key veterans of the mission, is 
an unusually rich resource for the study of history presented in film, as are 
two major documentaries included in the three-disc set—PBS/Frontline’s 
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Ambush in Mogadishu (1998) and the History Channel’s The True Story of Black 
Hawk Down (2003). Although the film Black Hawk Down is a case of “mutual 
exploitation,” Lawrence Suid’s phrase for productions that employ Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) resources (Seelye A1), it has earned a reputation as 
a truthful telling that justified the Pentagon’s faith in the production. The 
military’s commitment was significant. Bruckheimer persuaded the Pentagon 
to lend one hundred troops and eight helicopters, all shipped to Morocco for 
location shooting, at a cost of only $2.2 million (USAPA 2). Two retired army 
officers, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Matthews and Colonel Lee Van Arsdale, 
veterans of the battle, served as technical advisers for location shooting. To 
develop the proper military stances and maneuvers, actors trained at Fort Ben-
ning, Georgia (Rangers), Fort Bragg, North Carolina (Delta Force), and Fort 
Campbell, Kentucky (helicopters). During this training, even the self-described 
“arty-farty” among the actors bonded with the soldiers and became outspoken 
advocates of their courage and patriotism.1 The startling documentary-like 
scenes of expert aerial maneuvers, Rangers “fast roping” into rotor-washed 
streets, and furious firefights offer a visceral sense of skill, risk, and danger 
seldom experienced on film.
The result so pleased the George W. Bush administration that on 15 
January 2001 top civilian and uniformed leaders attended the Washington 
premiere. In addition to General Keane, who at one time commanded the 
XVIII Airborne Corps, the audience included Army Chief of Staff General 
Eric Shinseki and General Peter Pace of the Marine Corps, vice chair of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The civilian contingent included Vice President Richard 
Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary 
Paul Wolfowitz (Kozaryn). Black Hawk Down was praised by most mainstream 
critics and was well received by the public. When producers, actors, military 
professionals, civilian and political leaders, film critics, and the general public 
all agree on both the artistic merits and the accuracy of a popular film about 
a controversial episode, a historically minded person cannot resist asking a 
few questions: What kind of film could produce such a remarkable consensus? 
How could Bruckheimer and Scott transcend the Hollywood reluctance that 
kept big-budget, “mutual exploitation” Vietnam films—with the exception of 
John Wayne’s Green Berets (1968)—away from the screen for a full decade? Was 
this American film culture’s The Charge of the Light Brigade, praising the cour-
age of soldiers in combat while rebuking the folly of their commanders?2 This 
chapter examines such questions by exploring the background of the Somalian 
campaigns and the book that became the film. The focus then turns to the 
Bruckheimer-Scott collaboration that dramatized the book so effectively for 
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popular audiences. The chapter concludes with some troublesome questions 
of historical truth that remain after the film and its numerous documentary 
and video game spin-offs have been played.
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
The topic of Black Hawk Down is plucked from a complex, UN-requested engage-
ment that began as a humanitarian mission in 1992, became a nation-building 
exercise in 1993, and finally evolved into U.S.-dominated warfare directed at 
capturing the leader of the Habr Gidr clan, Mohamed Farah Aideed.3 Aideed 
had led the Somalian army under President Mohamed Siad Barre during a 
late 1970s war with Ethiopia, but he launched a successful rebellion against 
the president in 1989, pushing him into exile by 1991. The expulsion of Barre 
brought no stability, since Somalia had never had a functioning national gov-
ernment. In the absence of civil authority, warring clans and subclans fought 
with one another for dominance, while banditry flourished and relief agencies 
suffered from extortion.4 The civil war was fought with leftover weapons from 
Somalia’s past as a Soviet and then an American client state under the Carter 
administration. During the miseries of 1991–1992, television news, led by CNN, 
conveyed a picture of such desperate suffering and hunger that the U.S. Con-
gress and President George H. W. Bush felt they could not ignore the situation, 
even though Bush had just lost the presidential election to Bill Clinton. The 
emotional appeal was this: having triumphed in the Cold War, how could the 
surviving superpower, so often animated by its humanitarian impulses, let the 
wretched of the earth die in the streets of their hopeless cities?
On 4 December 1992 President Bush sent twenty thousand marines to 
Somalia in a mission called Operation Restore Hope. The marines restored 
some stability, and under their protection, the United Nations and several non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) set up an effective distribution system for 
humanitarian aid. Months later, in June 1993, U.S combat troops were drawn 
down to twelve hundred after a multinational peacekeeping force under UN 
command (UNOSOM) had been put in place.
Operation Restore Hope and its UN-commanded successors intermittently 
found Aideed and his clan antagonistic if not outright deadly. Aideed believed 
that the equitable distribution of aid and entreaties for reconciliation would 
permit rival clans a share of national power that they had not earned. Aideed 
also believed that the UN peacekeeping force was a personally motivated 
subterfuge by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to undermine 
and ultimately depose him. On 5 June 1993 twenty-four Pakistani soldiers 
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were killed in ambushes and their bodies dragged through the streets. U.S. 
and UN leaders believed that Aideed had ordered the murders in response to 
aggressive searches of his clan’s compounds by UN forces. Although Aideed’s 
involvement could not be proved, the inference was reasonable. Anger and 
frustration among U.S. and UN forces were compounded by deadly attacks on 
U.S. servicemen. After four military policemen were killed on 8 August, U.S. 
commanders decided to assign top priority to the capture of Aideed. A special 
operations task force—TF Ranger (consisting of 440 men and code-named 
Operation Gothic Serpent)—was sent to Mogadishu on 24 August to take 
more aggressive action against armed disorder and resistance; it became, in 
effect, the counterinsurgency component to nation building (Karcher 27–29). 
TF Ranger’s rules of engagement did not respect the limits of humanitarian 
peacekeeping: within the new campaign of raids to decapitate Habr Gidr’s 
leadership, a significant escalation from the UN-U.S. side occurred on 12 July 
1993 during the so-called Abdi house raid (Operation Michigan) in Mogadishu 
(Bowden, Black Hawk 72–74). Intelligence reports suggested that several leaders 
directing attacks on UN activities would be gathered at the house. According 
to U.S. military historians Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates, U.S. air 
and ground forces attacked the building with antitank missiles and 20mm can-
non fire. “Somalis who did not evacuate the building were ‘fair game.’” Dozens 
of Somalis died or suffered injuries, “including Sheik Aden Mohammed, the 
movement’s spiritual leader.” There was collateral damage as well; the French 
embassy was struck by a missile and 20mm shells (Baumann et al. 118).5
Every kind of observer in Mogadishu as well as subsequent historians have 
called this tactical application of the Powell doctrine (overwhelming force) 
in an urban setting a grim turning point that elevated hatred for Americans 
and guaranteed the strategic failure of their nation-building mission. Four 
journalists were immediately murdered at the Abdi house site by angry mobs, 
their corpses displayed for television. Some of the journalists had been work-
ing for American publications (Hirsch and Oakley 121). Mark Bowden, who 
interviewed one surviving American-educated Somali who had been present 
at the Abdi house meeting, reported that clan leaders, fatigued by the chaos 
of Aideed’s anarchism, had gathered on that day to discuss a moderation of 
their militancy and whether to accept peace proposals sent from Admiral 
Jonathan Howe, the U.S. special representative to the United Nations. After 
seeing ninety-year-old Sheik Aden and poet Moallim Soyan, as well as judges 
and lawyers, shredded by the missiles, the surviving Habr Gidr leaders felt 
threatened and naturally found support from other clans, who saw American 
bellicosity as intolerably destructive to the interests of all Somalis (Bowden, 
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Black Hawk 72–74). As John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, key U.S. diplomats 
present during 1992–1993, put it, “The change in atmosphere was evident; the 
effect of the raid irrevocable” (121).6
OPERATION IRENE
Thereafter, events spiraled toward 3 October 1993 and another exercise of 
overwhelming force. That mission, code-named Operation Irene, was a day-
light Ranger–Delta Force urban assault aimed at neutralizing the leadership of 
the Habr Gidr clan. Aideed and other clan leaders were to be snatched from 
a site in south Mogadishu by Delta Force and conveyed to imprisonment by 
ground vehicles with a Ranger escort. The mission succeeded in snatching a 
pair of Habr Gidr leaders and a few other clan members at a cost of eighteen 
U.S. servicemen and perhaps as many as a thousand Somalis, but the mission 
as a whole failed. Aideed and other clan leaders remained at large, causing 
the Americans to convert Mogadishu into a battle zone. Operation Irene was 
retrospectively described as an attempt merely to arrest two Habr Gidr leaders, 
but most observers reject that description. Hirsch and Oakley, who worked 
intimately with the U.S. military principals, flatly say, “U.S. Rangers launched 
another attempt to find the elusive general [Aideed]” (127).
The title of Frontline’s documentary, Ambush in Mogadishu (1998), may 
exaggerate the notion of a planned entrapment, but among a militia with plenty 
of Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), it seems obvious that angry, 
drug-assisted (khat) shooters operating in full daylight would go for the tails 
of the low-altitude Black Hawks and the Little Bird choppers that provided 
battle command and control. Aideed and his lieutenants understood that if 
they shot down a helicopter or two, the resulting rescue missions through 
the narrow streets would be vulnerable. The thin-skinned Humvees would 
be easy targets for the thousands of lightly armed and hostile militia in the 
neighborhoods the vehicles would have to drive through. Having Aideed as a 
target for this mission helps explain the high level of risk accepted (Drew 312; 
Drysdale 210; Rosegrant 15; Loeb W06).7 Two MH-60L Black Hawks were in 
fact shot down by RPGs, while three others were crippled and forced to land; 
recovery and escape efforts resulted in the eighteen soldiers killed, and one 
pilot, Michael Durant, was taken prisoner. The warriors exhibited high levels 
of courage, loyalty to one another, and ingenuity. At the same time, they were 
not prepared for the fierce, well-armed resistance. Drivers made wrong turns, 
circling back to be fired on in the neighborhoods they were trying to escape. 
Expecting a quick thirty-minute extraction, the Rangers and Delta men found 
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themselves engaged in a battle lasting seventeen hours that produced seventy-
six casualties in addition to the eighteen deaths.
THE POLITICAL FIRESTORM
An angry Congress and a very disappointed Bill Clinton quickly decided that 
the militarized nation-building mission was over. Talks resumed with Aideed, 
who even received a marine escort on one occasion for his own security. Those 
arrested on 3 October were released. By 25 March 1994, all U.S. troops had 
been withdrawn (U.S. GAO 1).
Called the Battle of the Black Sea, the Battle of Mogadishu, and the Day of 
the Rangers (the name of a Habr Gidr clan holiday), superlatives of U.S. and 
worldwide historical significance have been attributed to it.8 It was the largest 
loss of life in a firefight since the Vietnam conflict and an unsurpassed humili-
ation as the world watched on CNN while American soldiers were mutilated 
and dragged through the streets. Many saw it as the death of the “superpower 
fantasy” of a U.S.-controlled new world order. Major Timothy Karcher of the 
U.S. Army sees Mogadishu in the light of the “victory disease,” whose symptoms 
are “arrogance, complacency, and the habit of using established patterns to 
solve military problems” (v). Regarding the United States and the United Na-
tions, some concluded that multilateral actions were irrelevant to U.S. national 
interests. As for military power’s role in foreign policy, some despaired about 
the ineptness of Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and National 
Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Widespread suspicions of timid incompetence 
were compounded by preoccupations with “force protection” that led to an 
exaggerated display (but not use) of force in Haiti (1994), ignoring of the 
Rwandan genocide (1994), and the stand-away war in Serbia over Kosovo 
(1999). Operation Allied Force in the airspace above Serbia was fought without 
a single American death but at the cost of target errors that claimed civilians in 
a dozen embarrassing incidents, include the bombing of the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade, a misdirection that killed four staffers and sent twenty-six to the 
hospital (Lambeth 136–47). The late 1990s and eventually post-9/11 hindsight 
brought the severest interpretation of all: that the hasty accommodation of 
Aideed in Somalia and withdrawal in the face of his ragged militia advertised 
American weakness and lack of resolve.
The Battle of Mogadishu’s aftermath was retrospectively seen by both hos-
tile and friendly critics as nothing less than an invitation to al Qaeda. Osama 
bin Laden himself commented sarcastically on how quickly the Americans 
departed: “The American troops left after achieving nothing. They left after 
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claiming that they were the largest power on earth. . . . The Americans ran 
away from those fighters who fought and killed them, while the latter were still 
there” (Arnett). Al Qaeda followed with attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania; on the USS Cole; and ultimately with 9/11. Consistent with 
this portrait of humiliation, Newsweek reporters at the Battle of Fallujah in April 
2004 encountered street vendors selling a $1 video calling for “brave men to 
slaughter the occupiers.” The invocation to a showdown “was accompanied 
by grainy footage pirated from a copy of ‘Black Hawk Down’ with words from 
a singer telling that ‘They [the Americans] were left on the ground. No one 
came to help them’” (Nordland 28).
The Battle of Mogadishu became the subject of dozens of anxious DOD 
examinations focused on training, weapons, tactics, foreign policy, and inter-
agency coordination. It is obvious that Black Hawk Down’s topic was deeply 
political. Given the sense of failure clouding the mission as a whole and the 
perpetual search in American politics to identity someone else as the goat, the 
principals who had been responsible for authorizing, planning, and executing 
the mission had motives to be less than candid. Among them were figures still 
esteemed by the Pentagon who had to grant approval to the script and final 
cut. Major General William F. Garrison, who had commanded TF Ranger on 
that day, had been promoted to commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center 
at Fort Bragg (1995–1996) after Gothic Serpent (Bowden, Black Hawk 337). 
Thus the Pentagon’s film liaison was an auteur with a stake in protecting the 
reputations of the commanders as well as building goodwill toward the mili-
tary and an aura that would invite recruits to join. But how could such a film 
revisit a topic that was a source of dishonor for so many people? If the military 
itself was responsible for the heavy weight of failure placed on the events of 
those seventeen hours, how could its reputation be reclaimed? The DOD’s 
own guidelines for assistance to filmmakers demand that a “production must 
be authentic in its portrayal of actual persons, military operations, and histori-
cal events” (Department of Defense Instruction 3.1.1). But was this possible? 
What compromises with historical accuracy might be necessary for the movie 
to complete its mission successfully?
BLACK HAWK DOWN: THE LITERARY BASE
Mark Bowden’s articles and book offer an eye-of-God narrative that incor-
porates the views of soldiers, officers, diplomats, policy makers, observers, 
and noncombatants in Mogadishu. He made a wise choice in publishing his 
material first as a series of Philadelphia Inquirer articles, posting them on the 
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Internet, and inviting comments from anyone who could help him improve 
the accuracy of his treatment and lead him to new interviews. Veterans and 
military buffs were generous in responding (Bowden, “Narrative Journalism” 
25). To achieve comprehensiveness, Bowden traveled to Somalia at some 
personal risk. His book carefully identifies its sources, both oral and written, 
sometimes noting discrepancies among the informants. Bowden shuns jingo- 
ism by sometimes complementing Americans’ perceptions with those of 
Somalis. Although the battle scenes in the book are short melodramas, the 
whole story is conceived as a dramatic tragedy in which failures of planning, 
understanding, and communications spread harm in every direction. While 
Bowden presents the mission of 3 October as heroic, he believes that everyone 
ended up losing. In a concluding, cautionary comment he says, “The Battle 
of the Black Sea is another lesson in the limits of what force can accomplish” 
(Black Hawk Down 337).
In Bowden’s larger ironic view, the bored young Rangers who quest for 
battle are naïve and arrogant about their prospects for success. His narrative 
voice frequently echoes their language of conquest and subordination, record-
ing the fact that they see themselves in “Indian Country” fighting “Skinnies” and 
“Sammies,” their terms of derision for Somalis. He seems condescending when 
he writes, “Most of the Rangers were practically kids. They had grown up in 
the most powerful nation on earth, and saw these techno-laden, state-of-the-art 
choppers as symbols of America’s vast military might, all but invulnerable over a 
third world dump like Mog” (Black Hawk Down  88). But he is also the soldiers’ 
affectionate champion, someone who sees their idealism and vulnerability and 
reports the remarkable things they do with little prospect of reward. He is quite 
sensitive to their deprivations, far from home and female companionship. To 
a lesser extent, Bowden is also moved to sympathy for the fate of the Somalis, 
who squandered their loyalty on leaders who offered nothing more than a life 
of continued anarchy and poverty or death in a city relentlessly perforated by 
shells long before outside powers ever arrived.
BLACK HAWK DOWN: THE DEMANDS OF CINEMA
Books are generally richer in sheer information than the films derived from 
them. Bowden’s complex portrayals of politics, policy, and points of view hardly 
lent themselves to the combat film genre. The fuller, policy-laced story would 
be told on the screen by PBS and History Channel documentaries. Although 
Bowden contributed an initial screenplay, he had a subordinate role in shap-
ing a predominantly visual and auditory battle film.9 Director Ridley Scott’s 
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postrelease interviews emphasized his quest for factual truth, an attempt to 
“bring it as close to documentary accuracy and credibility as possible.” Putting 
it in military terms, he said, “It was about the insertion and the exit and how 
it felt afterwards” (“Battlefield” 8:40–9:12).10 Yet “documentary accuracy” does 
not hint at the most apparent techniques of transforming prose into the film’s 
aesthetics of bloodstained fatigue: filmic condensation, mythic condensation, 
truthful fiction, and purposeful omission. The cinematic rhetoric occasion-
ally veers subjectively toward slow-motion, balletic nightmare during scenes 
of extreme danger. The actors reported being so frightened by the explosive 
sounds on the set that their own real fear rather than acting technique drove 
their performances in the battle scenes. Jerry Bruckheimer wryly remarked, 
“Ridley doesn’t interrupt weapons fire for dialogue” (“Battlefield” 17:49–18:45). 
Slawomir Idziak’s daring camera technique records events using multiple 
viewpoints and relies on brilliant editing to create narrative drive. It was no 
surprise when the film received Oscars for best editing (Pietro Scalia) and best 
sound (Minkler, Munro, and Nettzak) and Oscar nominations for best cinema-
tography (Slawomir Idziak) and best director (Ridley Scott). Such awards and 
nominations, also conferred by the American Film Institute, the Art Directors 
Guild, and other organizations, testify to the high production values achieved 
despite the recording of dangerous aerial maneuvers in a gritty shooting envi-
ronment while using a crew and cast who spoke several languages.
Filmic Condensation
The film’s story line simplifies TF Ranger’s life in the hangar, and its projection 
into the city for a single battle creates an unusually tight thread. The frame of 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is foreshortened to Operation Irene on 2 
and 3 October 1993, without any backward references to explanatory contexts 
rooted in prior hostilities; the “irrevocable turning point” of the Abdi house 
raid on 12 July is missing, as is a Black Hawk downing in Mogadishu on 25 
September. With its hell in a small time period, the film becomes exhausting as 
Operation Irene offers terrifying moments that repeatedly flay the arrogance, 
idealism, and flesh of the Rangers.
An important example of this filmic condensation is the character of Todd 
Blackburn (Orlando Bloom), a cocky, chatty kid who arrives on base with the 
announcement that he is “excited in a good way” and “ready to kick some ass.”11 
Then, as his Ranger “chalk” (a squad assigned to a helicopter) fast-ropes down 
to provide covering fire for the convoy of captured clan leaders, Blackburn 
misses and drops seventy feet to the street; his near fatality becomes Operation 
Irene’s first liability. The resulting confusion hinders the squad’s momentum, 
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making the point regarding Blackburn’s youthful naïveté. Blackburn’s fellow 
Rangers, faithful to their code of “Leave No Man Behind,” will not abandon 
him even when withering militia fire falls on their positions. “Leave No Man 
Behind” is the movie’s tagline, suggesting that the operational difficulties 
reflect this commitment to save lives and bodies. It is one of several displace-
ment strategies that divert attention from the serious tactical miscalculations 
and command failures.
Another piece of condensation relates to the theme of neglected duties of 
command. As the men pack their gear for the 3 October mission, Grimes (Ewan 
McGregor) fills his canteen but is stopped by Nelson (Ewen Bremner), who 
says, “You’re not going to need that, dude.” Then, as Yurek (Thomas Guiry) 
gets his night observation gear ready, Twombley (Tom Hardy) says, “You’re not 
going to need that either.” Yurek drops the gear. As Casey Joyce (Chris Beetem) 
pulls the back panel out of his protective vest, he complains about “another 
12 pounds” he does not need. “I’m not planning on getting shot in the back 
running away” (Nolan and Zaillian 26–27). Sergeant Eversmann watches all this 
and smiles serenely. Captain Mike Steele ( Jason Isaacs) fails to make a premis-
sion inspection. The battle—and the film—ends with the dramatic scene of 
the “Mogadishu Mile.” When the relief column makes a dash back to safety at 
Sergeant Matt Eversmann ( Josh Hartnett) smiles indulgently as his men decide to 
leave behind water, flak jackets, and night-vision goggles. The real Sergeant Evers-
mann claims that, as chalk leader, he, not his men, chose the equipment for the 
mission.
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the base, a dozen Rangers and Delta Force men are left behind by the rolling 
rescue column, forcing them to run to safety through intense fire.
Behind these three scenes that condense so much of the movie’s version 
of Operation Irene is a story of blatant failure at all levels. Not since Vietnam 
has the army sent soldiers into battle before they have been integrated as a 
trained fighting team with their units, their officers and noncommissioned 
officers (NCOs), and their fellow troopers. Yet in the film, Blackburn, a rookie 
just assigned to the unit, is ordered to fast-rope seventy feet into a free-fire 
zone. The soldiers in Eversmann’s chalk are seen deciding for themselves 
what gear to bring into battle and what to leave behind, while their sergeant 
passively watches. This casual take-whatever-you-want demeanor falls below 
the standard for a Boy Scout campout. It demonstrates a cavalier disregard at 
all levels of command for military regulations and basic principles of military 
organization and discipline. It is not the individual soldier’s job to decide what 
equipment and supplies (including sufficient water) to bring on a mission. 
This responsibility of mission commanders extends all the way up the chain 
(Department of Army Headquarters Field Manual [FM] 7–8; FM 7–10, ch. 8 
§III). The virtual abandonment of the squad of Delta Force men and Rang-
ers is portrayed as the product of confusion and the fog of war, or perhaps 
the indifference of the Malaysian drivers for the armored column, but the 
survival of all twelve men is attributable only to luck or a miracle, not to the 
competence of command.
How do these details of neglect square with the film’s DVD commentary 
by the soldiers themselves, including technical advisers Matthews and Van 
Arsdale? According to Matt Eversmann, Blackburn was not a callow recruit 
but a trained Ranger.12 Eversmann says that his unit had trained as an organic 
rifle team and that even those who, like Blackburn, were sent to Mogadishu 
as replacements were fully trained and known to the other members of the 
team (“Task Force Ranger Veterans Commentary” [TFRVC] 11:45–12:30). (Was 
the film at this point attempting to evoke the Chris Taylor character in Oliver 
Stone’s Platoon [1986], a young soldier who arrives fresh from basic training?) 
Eversmann also comments that it was he, not the individual soldiers under his 
command, who decided what to carry. Based on the unit’s experience in six 
prior raids, he expected to return to base in less than an hour. He decided 
to leave extra water and night-vision gear behind to enable the men to carry 
more ammunition and, it can be inferred from his and Colonel McKnight’s 
comments, to lighten the loads they would have to carry on the rope (TFRVC 
30:00–31:00, 32:00–32:20).
Speaking to the issue of the ragged “Mogadishu Mile” run, Colonel Van 
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Arsdale says that the depiction is fictitious. He reports that, as the field com-
mander, he followed the “time-honored combined arms technique,” which 
requires that armor moving in urban territory be accompanied by infantry on 
foot (FM 71–2, App. A §4). He says that the plan was to carry the wounded out 
of the battle zone in the armored vehicles while the rest of the troops, includ-
ing Van Arsdale himself, walked with the column. He reports that the column 
proceeded at a walking pace, with the foot soldiers between the armored 
vehicles. He adds that the column had air cover the whole way and that once 
outside the area controlled by Aideed’s fighters, the foot soldiers mounted the 
vehicles and rode the rest of the way to the base (TFRVC 2:04:30–2:06:16).
But why, given the DOD’s insistence on truth in historical fact and in the 
depiction of army procedure, and with veterans of the battle as technical ad-
visers, does the film itself contradict its own tagline premise of “no man left 
behind” and falsely denigrate TF Ranger’s leadership? None of these scenes is 
essential to the point the movie seeks to make about the valor of the soldiers 
on the ground. Blackburn could have served equally well—or perhaps even 
better—as an example of a cocky, experienced trooper rather than a rookie. 
The soldiers’ ability to persevere in battle, even without their high-tech gear 
and enough water, might have been seen as even more heroic if the movie 
had accurately presented their ill-preparedness as the product of misjudgment 
on the part of their leaders. The scene of the abandoned soldiers running 
through smoke and fire to safety allows for high drama, great cinematogra-
phy, and swelling music. But one can conceive of an equally dramatic climax 
showing the unit as it actually was: disciplined and cohesive to the end, truly 
leaving no man behind.
How, then, in a movie meant to make the U.S. Army proud, one that was 
subject to Pentagon approval, did these false implications of command failure 
make their way onto the screen? Colonel Tom Matthews, air commander of TF 
Ranger, says that he tried to ensure complete technical accuracy, but his rec-
ommendations were frequently rejected by the filmmakers as “not Hollywood 
entertainment.” Dramatic entertainment values trumped the requirements of 
factual accuracy and plausible renditions of military procedure. Nevertheless, 
Matthews and other military commentators agree that the movie portrays the 
reality of urban combat (TFRVC 2:11:30–2:12:50). Perhaps the answer to these 
questions lies in the film’s effect of shifting the responsibility for miscalcula-
tions in Operation Irene downward to the battlefield soldiers—and away from 
policy makers and military commanders.
There were certainly many instances of command failure during the Task 
Force Ranger mission. The army itself included a highly critical evaluation of 
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the operation in its Field Manual 3–06 on urban operations (App. C). One 
particular instance highlights the movie’s compromises with reality. In the 
movie, during his premission briefing, General Garrison (Sam Shepard) warns 
the assembled officers and NCOs that the mission will be a dangerous one. 
But according to the DVD commentaries, the NCOs were never given such a 
warning. When Eversmann comments that he based his decision not to carry 
night-vision gear or extra water on his experience with six previous missions, 
Matthews tells him that there was “significant concern” at higher levels that the 
extraordinary danger of the mission had not been passed down to Eversmann’s 
level of command (TFRVC 32:30–33.30). So Eversmann apparently learned 
something in a film studio that would have had much greater survival value if 
he had been told a decade sooner.
Mythic Condensation
Most characters in the film are based on real soldiers who participated in 
the Battle of Mogadishu: despite fumbles, panics, and traumatic wounds, the 
fighting men are individually and collectively heroic, and their cohesiveness 
enables their survival. Within their collective bravery, two figures become the 
symbolic anchors that convey the film’s ambivalent message about success in 
war. A mythic polarity is established between the real Staff Sergeant Matt Evers-
mann ( Josh Hartnett) and the fictional, superheroic Sergeant First Class Hoot 
Gibson (Eric Bana), the “Delta boy” who is presented as realistic, apolitical, 
and superbly calm in facing every test of his military skill and courage. Hoot’s 
“Well this is my safety, sir,” Hoot Gibson (Eric Bana) responds defiantly when Cap-
tain Mike Steele ( Jason Isaacs) rebukes him for carrying a “hot” M16 in the chow 
line. Gibson personifies the lone warrior’s scorn for army discipline.
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character was invented for the film; he does not appear in Bowden’s book.13 
A symbolic bonus of the film characters’ names is that Eversmann suggests 
“Everyman,” while Hoot Gibson points toward a cowboy film star of several 
decades’ duration. The heroism of the group is thus distilled into these two 
characters, with Hoot’s battle-earned wisdom emerging as dominant.
The Somalis themselves undergo a mythic diminishment that renders 
them as embodiments of tribal primitivism, warlordism, and cynicism about the 
death of their own people and as suicidal in battle. Rather than complaining 
about the Americans’ indifference toward the value of their lives (as they do 
in Bowden’s book), the film Somalis simply urge the United States to butt out, 
because war is their way of life. For example, when captured Chief Warrant 
Officer Michael Durant (Ron Eldard) explains that he cannot negotiate for 
his own release, Firimbi (Treva Etienne) replies, “Course not, you have the 
power to kill, but not negotiate. In Somalia, killing is negotiation. . . . There 
will always be killing, you see. This is how things are in our world” (Nolan and 
Zaillian 102).
Eversmann is portrayed as the trained but not battle-tested NCO who un-
expectedly receives the call to lead his chalk. He articulates the humanitarian 
aspect of the U.S. commitment, conveyed in a piece of dialogue about whether 
he really likes the “Skinnies.” Kurth (the only black in the movie’s elite unit) 
has observed that “the Sergeant here is a bit of an idealist. He believes in the 
mission down to his very bones.”
EVERSMANN: Look, these people, they have no jobs. No food, no education, no 
future. I just figure that . . . we have two things we can do, we can either help, or 
we can sit back and watch a country destroy itself on CNN. Right?
KURTH: I don’t know about you guys, but I was trained to fight. Were you trained 
to fight Sergeant?
EVERSMANN: Well, I think I was trained to make a difference Kurth. (Nolan and 
Zaillian 18)
Eversmann is presented as wanting to help the Somalis, not simply “kick some 
ass,” as Kurth and Blackburn seem inclined to do.14 But such optimism is in-
sufficient, as shown when a Somali woman holding a baby aims her pistol at 
Kurth: “Don’t damn do it,” he yells before he shoots her.15 During the raid, 
hordes of American-hating Somalis come out with their automatic rifles, RPGs, 
machine guns, and rockets mounted on pickup trucks (called “technicals”). 
How can you help people who are raging to kill you?
The philosophical solution comes from the laconic Hoot Gibson, a Delta 
Force operative who emerges early in the film as a traditional American su-
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perhero type. He takes spying assignments in the city; he wears no insignia or 
uniform and has the grizzled, wild look of a drifter in exotic lands. He shuns 
the Ranger spit and polish. During a helicopter ride, he becomes the hunter 
and brings back a wild boar for a welcome barbecue in the hangar. He breaks 
into the mess line, offending the callow Blackburn, who expects him to follow 
the rules. He carries his weapon in the mess hall with the safety off, defiantly 
telling Captain Steele of the Rangers, “Well this is my safety, sir,” as he lifts 
his index finger to eye level (Nolan and Zaillian 14). In a conversation with 
Eversmann about the mission in Somalia, we hear this dialogue16: 
HOOT: Know what I think? Don’t really matter what I think. Once that first bullet 
goes past your head—politics and all that shit—just goes right out the window.
EVERSMANN: I just wanna do it right today.
HOOT: Just watch your corner . . . get all your men back here alive. (Nolan and 
Zaillian 31)
Hoot is shown saving the green tactician Eversmann in battle by advising him 
to stand away from a wall. And once Operation Irene is over, Hoot—like a 
much older brother—explains to Eversmann why he is going back into the 
city: “There are still men out there. When I go home and people ask me, ‘Hey 
Hoot? Why do you do it man? Why? You some kind of war junkie?’ I won’t say 
a god damned word. Why? They won’t understand why we do it. They won’t 
understand, it’s about the men next to you and that’s it. That’s all it is. Hey. 
Don’t even think about it, all right? I’m better on my own” (Nolan and Zail-
lian 126). 
Hoot resides in that mythic zone where warriors bond, love, and save one 
another, dying honorably together—evoking (if not borrowing from) scenes 
of The Deer Hunter (1978), where comrades transcend the national purpose of 
fighting in Vietnam by ignoring it. Hoot’s character counters any interpretation 
of the film as mere American jingoism. Hoot takes its ideology beyond war’s 
instrumentality into the region where war is transcendent. His character offers 
war as romance: to be at war with comrades is a fulfillment that lies beyond any 
rational justification or need. Hoot is as archaic as Homer’s Achilles, who rages 
against the dishonoring of his comrade Patroclus’s body, and as up-to-date as 
the night-vision goggles he remembers to take on Operation Irene.
Truthful Fiction
The film’s opening scene on 2 October 1993 shows BH Super Six Four, an MH-
60 Black Hawk, hovering over a food distribution site in Mogadishu. Men 
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in technicals machine-gun the hungry who have come to be fed as Mo’Alim 
(Razaaq Adoti), wearing a do-rag and aviator sunglasses, megaphones to the 
crowd: “This food is the property of Mohamed Farah Aideed. Go back to 
your homes.” Eversmann requests permission from his commander to engage 
and hears on the radio, “UN’s jurisdiction, 6–4. Cannot intervene. Return to 
base. Over” (Nolan and Zaillian 4). This is cinematic mood and context setting. 
There is no mention of such an incident in the voluminous record of events 
in Mogadishu during TF Ranger’s tour there. Colonel Van Arsdale reports 
that he never saw “a crew-served weapon” (i.e., a heavy machine gun, recoil-
less rifle, or other heavy weapon) during his entire tour of duty in Somalia, 
including the days of 3–4 October (TFRVC 4:20–5:56, 1:50:46–1:50:57). He 
also says that the rules of engagement authorized TF Ranger to fire on such 
weapons without warning (TFRVC 4:42–4:48). As for jurisdiction, it is true that 
the United Nations and TF Ranger had separate chains of command. However, 
the UN mission was headed by Admiral Jonathan Howe of the United States, 
who, prompted by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, sought an aggressive 
military response to Aideed. Although the implication of this scene is that too 
little military power has been applied in support of the humanitarian effort, 
most interpretations suggest an excessive use of force along with collateral 
damage—as in the infamous Abdi house raid. Yet there is truth here. Aideed’s 
militia harassed aid workers. And there was confusion about jurisdiction and 
command responsibility in Mogadishu.
Purposeful Omission
Other aberrations from history of the academic kind are major omissions that 
seem designed to please the Pentagon and make the film more acceptable 
to American audiences. General Garrison tells the troops leaving on Opera-
tion Irene that “the rules of engagement are that you do not fire unless fired 
upon.” In the film, there is not a single scene in which a U.S. soldier fires at an 
unarmed civilian. But at several points in the book’s narrative, Bowden reports 
that the rules of engagement broke down as soldiers fired into groups that 
contained both civilians and militia (76, 78, 187). Somali casualties ranged as 
high as one thousand to two thousand in Oakley’s estimate, and hundreds of 
these would have been civilians, since high-caliber weapons were fired into 
residential structures. In the History Channel’s The True Story of Black Hawk 
Down, several American soldiers show defensive sensitivity about the killing of 
civilians and say, “You can’t look at this man and say he was a bad man.”17 They 
and Bowden both report that armed militia (including women and children) 
mixed in with bystanders as a tactic to restrain the fire of Americans.
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Another kind of serious omission relates to the command responsibilities 
within Operation Irene. The film shows General Garrison making the deci-
sion to carry out the raid designed to snatch “tier one” clan leaders from a 
building in Mogadishu. In the film, he clearly has the command authority to 
make such a decision in the battle theater. But as noted later in this discussion, 
there were many other minds and hands involved. That they have successfully 
eluded official disclosure is another “story of modern war”—to borrow the 
subtitle from Bowden’s book—that throws light on how military adventures 
of the Mogadishu sort get cooked up in high councils whose subalterns draw 
the curtains when things go wrong.
The Mythic Premise
“No Man Left Behind” is presented not merely as the movie’s tagline theme 
but also as an immutable principle of the Rangers’ code. The climactic mo-
ment of the film is the relief column’s arrival at the “Alamo,” the place chosen 
to make their stand. The wounded are loaded into armored vehicles, but all 
must wait for the body of pilot Cliff Wolcott ( Jeremy Piven) to be recovered. 
Hours drag by and daylight comes, while the Rangers fight off furious attacks. 
A smoldering General Garrison radios Colonel McKnight (Tom Sizemore), 
commander of the relief column (in the movie), demanding an explanation 
for the delay. McKnight replies that they are trying to recover the pilot’s body 
from the wreckage. A grim, determined Garrison tells McKnight, “Danny, no 
one gets left behind. Do what you have to do.” It is a powerful scene meant 
to show both the force of the Rangers’ code and the loneliness of command, 
but it is perhaps the movie’s most extreme compromise with the truth. Van 
Arsdale, the actual commander of the relief column on 3 October, says in his 
commentary that he alone made the decision to delay the departure of the 
relief column until the pilot’s body was recovered. “It was my call as the rank-
ing man . . . and I determined that we were not going to leave him behind. 
We weren’t taking any casualties. It wasn’t a question of sacrificing live people 
for one dead guy. Had that been going on, I would have had to make a differ-
ent decision.” Although he pays “tribute to General Garrison and the guys in 
the C2 bird, that was my decision to make” (TFRVC 2:02:50–2:03:20).18 Van 
Arsdale says earlier in his commentary that Garrison did not give instructions 
to his field commanders; “he only interjected by exception.” The commanders 
on the scene made all the decisions and gave all the orders. The movie’s Gar-
rison shows “much more hands-on action” (TFRVC 9:36–10:00). Van Arsdale’s 
explanation of his reason for waiting to recover Wolcott’s body shows the think-
ing of a field commander who is careful with his men’s lives, but these words 
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could not be shaped into a ringing slogan that would bring the Pentagon’s top 
brass to a premiere. It speaks well of General Garrison that he permitted his 
field commanders to exercise discretion, and to their credit, they exercised it 
prudently. But what they actually did was not the premise of the “no man left 
behind” tagline. Just as the blame for fatal choices in terms of combat gear 
is shifted downward to the young Rangers, the upward shift of credit for the 
retrieval of Wolcott’s body gives the top command a more heroic aura. This 
dance of reassignment reflects a standard bureaucratic practice: push blame 
downward; pull credit upward.
RECEPTION OF THE FILM
Not since Richard Nixon repeatedly watched Patton (1970) at the White House 
has a Hollywood film become so historically intertwined with a sitting admin-
istration. In addition to its gala, Pentagon-blessed Washington premiere, Black 
Hawk Down had its own White House screening for George W. Bush. Bravo’s 
documentary on presidential film-watching reported his comment that “his 
military would always get everything it needed” (Pedersen 2). Vice President 
Cheney cited Black Hawk Down on the campaign trail when he argued that 
insufficiently resolute military power in Mogadishu had led to later attacks 
on the United States: “If you saw the movie ‘Black Hawk Down’ it portrays the 
events where we lost nineteen soldiers in the battle in Mogadishu, and within 
weeks, we’d pulled all of our forces out of Somalia. So two lessons, one, they 
could strike us with impunity; and, two, if they did hit us hard enough, they 
could change U.S. policy” (“Vice President and Mrs. Cheney’s Remarks”).19 In 
the context of the Iraq war launched in 2003, U.S. military leaders informed 
Time that Saddam Hussein was recommending Black Hawk Down as training 
for urban counterinsurgency against U.S. invaders (Ratnesar).
A film so firmly embedded in the policy struggles of its era guaranteed 
controversy. But perhaps because of the post-9/11 sense of urgency about the 
need for prolonged military sacrifice, it achieved success with critics and popu-
lar audiences. Like the award-granting film organizations, most reviewers for 
mainstream periodicals accepted it in the spirit Bowden expressed about the 
participants: “They returned to a country that didn’t care or didn’t remember. 
Their fight was neither triumph or defeat; it just didn’t matter. . . . I wrote this 
book for them” (Black Hawk 346). Reflecting this memorial attitude, Roger 
Ebert lamented the “gung-ho capers” of films such as Behind Enemy Lines (2001) 
while praising Black Hawk Down because it helped “audiences understand and 
sympathize with the actual experiences of combat troops, instead of trivializing 
them into entertainments.” However, the “gung-ho” Behind Enemy Lines, which 
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was also made with Pentagon support and script review, shares Black Hawk 
Down’s tendency to shift blame down and credit up. The film’s hero, navy 
flier Chris Burnett (Owen Wilson), is shot down over Bosnia and miraculously 
escapes a heavily armed force of Serb troops in hot pursuit as he seeks to ren-
dezvous with rescuing helicopters. Scripted as a bored young whiner, Burnett 
is shot down after defiantly steering into a no-fly zone. But, inspired by brief 
pep talks given over his radio by the gruff but kindly Admiral Reigart (Gene 
Hackman), he perseveres and is rescued at last in a mission led—Captain Kirk 
style—by the grizzled old admiral himself. As in Black Hawk Down, the junior 
man in the field is saved from his folly by a senior officer’s wisdom. This attri-
bution of success to the brass is not an accurate or fair portrayal of the actual 
event that inspired Behind Enemy Lines, which is based on the experience of 
air force captain Scott O’Grady, who was shot down over Bosnia in 1995. He 
evaded Serb pursuers for six days, quietly hiding and eating “clean leaves” 
from a tree (O’Grady 114).
In Behind Enemy Lines, Burnett’s violation of orders leads to his being shot 
down, just as the troopers in Black Hawk Down are made responsible for going 
into battle without the proper equipment. The real O’Grady followed orders, 
but like the troopers of Operation Irene, he failed to receive some vital infor-
mation. NATO’s threat warning network had detected a surface-to-air missile 
battery in O’Grady’s vicinity, but the information was not relayed in time for 
him to take defensive action (O’Grady 196). As Deputy Secretary of Defense 
John White put it, “We failed O’Grady. We had the information that the pilot 
needed and we didn’t get it to his cockpit” (“O’Grady, Con’t”). The Pentagon 
also belatedly recognized its inadequate preparation for O’Grady’s mission, 
making a “long overdue” change in procedure: in the future, “Wild Weasel” 
antimissile aircraft would accompany F-16 missions over Bosnia (O’Grady 198). 
Why, then, would the Pentagon approve the release of a movie that portrayed 
O’Grady’s doppelganger Burnett as an insubordinate cowboy who brings 
about his own misfortune? And why would the Pentagon portray Burnett’s 
commander—an admiral, no less—as rewarding this misconduct? O’Grady 
himself became so incensed by the film’s portrayal that he initiated litigation 
against Fox for misuse of his name and image (Nason).
As for the reception of the prolonged gruesomeness in Black Hawk Down, 
some upscale liberal publications, which might have been expected to sneer, 
did not. The New Yorker’s David Denby saw it as “exceptionally violent but also 
truthful to the pain and disorder of battle” while it “achieves the right tone 
of matter-of-factness, resolution, and defiance” (124). Other elite reviewers, 
such as Elvis Mitchell at the New York Times, scorned the film as “an eye catch-
ing misfire” filled with “slathering picture elements” rendered through “video 
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game detachment.” Negative criticism of this sort did not prevent the film from 
earning back its production costs or moving to other venues, where its life was 
extended through video games and documentaries. In the box office take alone, 
Internet Movie Data Base (IMDB.com) reports U.S. receipts of $109 million, 
against estimated costs of $90 million.
BLACK HAWK DOWN: THE VIDEO GAME
Critic Elvis Mitchell correctly viewed the film as a basis for video games, which 
offer many narrative formats that could have been employed to map the com-
plex world created by book and film. In the manner of the popular Sims series, 
which emphasizes conflict management through deals and compromises, a 
game about Somalia could have engaged the nation-building challenges to 
the United Nations and its national partners of India, Italy, the United States, 
Pakistan, and Malaysia. Or it could have been a strategy game such as Sid 
Myers’s Civilization, which calls for the construction of cities and institutions 
using the background knowledge related to a particular time and place. But 
just as the film removed the political context that explains the Somalis’ hatred 
of Americans—while retaining the confusion of command inherent in the 
multilateral peace-enforcing, nation-building mission—Novalogic’s Delta Force: 
Black Hawk Down game is just a shooting match. The graphic power of the as-
sorted X-Box, PlayStation, and personal computer platforms is dedicated to 
first-person-shooter simulations of the killing of Somalis. As Peter Hartlaub, 
game reviewer for the San Francisco Chronicle, put it, “You’re the good guy, the 
armed Somali clansmen are the bad guys, and you slaughter as many as you 
can without thinking about the consequences” (E1). Unlike popular fantasy 
games that permit players to change roles—going to the Dark Side with Darth 
or coming to the Light Side with Obi Wan—this real-world game compels the 
player to be a U.S. soldier hovering over the battle-scarred, corrugated roofs 
of Mogadishu’s shanties. The throbbing musical sound track creates a catchy 
backbeat for weapons fire at the smaller, relatively underarmed, and indistinct 
adversaries seen at a hazy distance. In this morally foreshortened world, the 
only good Somali is a cowering, captured, or killed Somali.
As much as anything, the video games bring to mind narratives about the 
conquest of Native Americans. Bowden’s book frequently uses the language 
of the soldiers in referring to Somalia as “pure Indian country” (6). In the 
American West, settlers, captives, and soldiers told stories of the savages they 
felt justified in destroying so that settlement could proceed. Without publishing 
houses, newspapers, stage plays, or comparable cultural instruments of their 
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own, Indians were spoken for only by the rare European who took pity on 
their losses of territory and life. In a similar fashion, the voices of the Somalis 
are excluded from this genre. They are just targets. Because the shooter genre 
has worldwide popularity, speakers of French, German, Italian, Russian, and 
Spanish—who lack the American revenge motive—can also play the game of 
killing Somalis.20 Is disseminating an American perspective through the trigger 
fingers of game players a more effective way of winning the hearts and minds 
of the world, whose governments expressed dismay at the military mayhem 
of 3 October 1993?
HISTORIC DOCUMENTARIES: THE ENLARGING  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Mark Bowden’s journalism and the publicity about the movie inspired two 
documentary films. PBS/Frontline’s Ambush in Mogadishu moves beyond 
the limited zone of Operation Irene to explore the policies that led to the 
violent confrontations and losses, telling a multiperspective story of U.S.-UN 
involvement that features interviews with policy makers, military leaders, U.S. 
Rangers, aid workers from NGOs, Somali citizens, and Somali militia. More 
than the film Black Hawk Down, Ambush elaborates on the conditions in So-
malia, creating a better sense of the squalor and misery that led outsiders to 
intervene on humanitarian grounds. The True Story of Black Hawk Down, shown 
on the History Channel, is essentially a video presentation of Bowden’s book, 
and like the book, it incorporates many voices and clashing perceptions of 
the truth.
The PBS program’s title reflects the premise that U.S. forces should have 
anticipated a shoot-down, since the Somalis had seen enough air operations 
to recognize an opportunity for RPG attacks. Interviews with Somali military 
tacticians confirm this supposition. Somewhat inexplicably, Ambush fails to 
mention the nighttime RPG shoot-down of a Black Hawk helicopter on 25 
September 1993; three U.S. servicemen died in that incident, and their bodies 
were reportedly flayed and paraded through Mogadishu. As Donatella Lorch 
reported for the New York Times the following day, “Jubilant crowds of Somalis 
holding pieces of metal and what appeared to be burned flesh danced around 
the wreckage. Later in the morning, Somalis paraded through the Bakhara 
market with an object in a white food-aid sack that they claimed to be the torso 
of an American soldier” (22). Would prudent commanders have contemplated 
a daring daytime raid that depended on many helicopters circling overhead at 
low altitude? According to the Levin-Warner Senate report, twelve RPGs had 
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been fired at Black Hawks during TF Ranger’s sixth mission in Mogadishu 
(Ecklund n22).
A recurring theme of Ambush in Mogadishu is the changing goals for U.S. 
involvement in Somalia, which abruptly shifted from protecting humanitarian 
relief operations to enforcing the peace to counterinsurgency. General Anthony 
Zinni, director of operations in Somalia in 1992–1993, and Ambassador Robert 
Oakley were surprised and considered it foolish when they learned that Aideed 
had been targeted for arrest. Like others close to the center of command, they 
seemed anxious to distance themselves from the disaster. They were even more 
surprised when they discovered that former president Jimmy Carter had been 
authorized by the White House to negotiate with Aideed. But neglected in 
the documentary is the policy turnabout announced on 28 September, when 
American military officials declared that they had given up the hunt for Aid-
eed. The Clinton administration announced through a front-page New York 
Times article that Secretary of State Warren Christopher was meeting with UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to stress “the need to move away from pursu-
ing General Aideed and to resuscitate the national reconciliation process.” At 
the same time, the Times reported that, according to an “administration offi-
cial,” “Boutros-Ghali remained committed to the capture of General Aideed” 
(Sciolino A1). This publicized confusion over the center of authority and the 
goal of policy was not touched on in the documentary.
In addition to this unexplored issue, a major question hanging over the 
mission is whether it succeeded. In the distant aftermath of the Battle of Moga-
dishu, it seems that the greatest honor is paid to those who died by calling their 
loss the price of a mission that achieved its goal. General Garrison was the first 
to make this assertion when he reported immediately after the battle, “The 
mission was a success. Targeted individuals were captured and extracted from 
the target” (Bowden, Black Hawk Down 338). In this rendition, since two lieu-
tenants of the Habr Gidr clan targeted by Operation Irene had been brought 
back along with other top-tier leaders, the raid was successful. But numerous 
cabinet-level officials and staffers confirmed to journalist Elizabeth Drew that 
the objective was “to capture Aideed and his top lieutenants” (316). In his 
interview for Ambush in Mogadishu, Specialist Jason Moore (a radio operator) 
stated, “The call came down that, you know, Elvis—‘Elvis has been spotted,’ 
you know, another Elvis sighting.” Admiral Howe, General Montgomery, Rob-
ert Oakley, and others who were present in Somalia confirmed that Aideed 
(code-named Elvis) was the objective in interviews with Susan Rosegrant and 
Michael D. Watkins. Vernon Loeb’s extended article in the Washington Post, 
based on interviews with CIA operatives, confirmed that Garrison had been 
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informed that “Aideed might be there” at the target location on 3 October. 
John Drysdale, a senior adviser to Admiral Howe, confirmed in writing that 
Aideed was a target (203, 210). Garrison’s statement does not exactly contradict 
these reports, because some of the targeted individuals, if not all of them, were 
seized. It simply fails to mention a goal that, if acknowledged, would make the 
mission a tactical failure.
Against the weight of such testimony, it is difficult to find an insider who 
does not believe that Aideed was the objective. Given the importance attached 
to Aideed as the obstacle to nation building, the great political risks attending 
the slaughter at the Abdi house and the operational risks of the 3 October 
raids become comprehensible only if he is the objective. The two-leaders-alone 
premise sustained by the film—and against the documentaries and the writ-
ten evidence—reduces the sting of loss felt by those concerned for the troops 
on the ground. At the same time, it reflects badly on the higher military and 
civilian leaders in Mogadishu, Tampa, and Washington who ordered such a 
dangerous mission to achieve such a small result.
LESSONS LEARNED
The Black Hawk Down film is a window into history, but like any other, it is an 
interpretation. As Peter Rollins reminds those who search for truth through 
cinema, “Filmmakers, in many cases, work very hard at interpreting the past. 
The cinematic end to the Battle of Mogadishu: Rangers and Delta Forces, left 
behind when the armored relief column dashes to safety, run a gauntlet of fire to 
escape. The film’s advisers—participants in the actual battle—call this “Mogadishu 
Mile” pure Hollywood. In reality, all the troops moved out with the armored column 
and received constant support from helicopter gunships.
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So, when we’re talking about history vs. film, it’s not fact vs. fiction so much 
as one interpretation vs. another interpretation.” The military commentators, 
from their boots-on-the-ground perspective, would agree. The film succeeds 
in carrying out its mission: it faithfully represents the ferocity of urban warfare 
and the courage, loyalty, and professionalism of the members of TF Ranger 
who are challenged to the extreme. This portrayal of a limited truth is achieved 
notwithstanding the many factual and technical inaccuracies in the film that 
were identified by the military commentators. These same technical inaccura-
cies and broader compromises with truth serve to mask the failures of policy 
and command that pitched these soldiers into their small, hot corner of hell 
in the first place. The documentaries do not overcome these limitations by 
soliciting talking heads who may have something to hide as well as to disclose. 
It will be a pity if the vector of public understanding takes the low road down 
the path of the video game rather than the more difficult road of examining 
the policy weaknesses and tactical errors of American operations in Somalia 
and seeking precise accountability for these failures. We owe it to our soldiers, 
and to the people of the nations we might seek to build, to construct a more 
honest interpretation—assisted, to be sure, by dramatic stories—that urges us 
to be wiser and more humane in the use of national power.
This hope might not be shared by the high civilian and military officials 
who greeted the film on opening night. The version they saw opened with a 
supertitle from T. S. Eliot’s Choruses from “The Rock”: “All our ignorance brings 
us nearer to death” (Nolan and Zaillian 1; Schickel 74).21 The version issued 
to the public replaced Eliot’s truth with a bogus quote from Plato: “Only the 
dead have seen the end of war.”
NOTES
We gratefully acknowledge editorial assistance from Major Frederick B. Harris, Peter 
Hartlaub, Jess C. Horsley, Robert Silvey, and Lawrence Suid; answers to queries were 
provided by Philip Strub, special assistant for entertainment–audio visual, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense. Archival assistance in the Department of Defense Film 
Collection at Georgetown was provided by Scott Taylor, manuscripts processor.
1. On the actors’ training, see “The Essence of Combat” on disc 2 of Black Hawk 
Down; for Ewan McGregor’s remarks, see “Question and Answer Forums: BAFTA” on 
disc 3.
2. See Woodham-Smith for an account of how the British aristocratic system pro-
duced incompetent officers, some of whom failed in battle during the Crimean War, 
but whose men served them honorably and with valor.
3. The exact dates of this mission were 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. Among 
overviews and chronologies, the most officially authoritative is Hirsch and Oakley. 
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Robert B. Oakley served as ambassador to Somalia and as special envoy and was closely 
involved with clan negotiations and coordination between the United Nations and the 
U.S. military.
 4. See Drysdale (vii–xxv) for an overview of internecine complexities in Somalia 
that existed before Operation Restore Hope.
 5. Baumann and coauthors assert that “a brief preparatory warning was given” 
(118), but Hirsch and Oakley report the UN independent commission’s finding that 
“no warning was given in advance ” (121n17). 
 6. In the “Interviews” of Ambush in Mogadishu, Mrs. Abshir expresses a more benign 
view of American mistakes and accuses Oakley of being fooled by the Aideed faction: 
“The American ambassador was duped by particular groups, who misinformed him 
and exaggerated the tales that they told him.”
 7. This point is important because several principals, including General Garrison, 
commander of TF Ranger, have denied the attempt to capture Aideed on 3 October or 
at any time after the first week of Operation Gothic Serpent (Karcher 36).
 8. Baumann et al. (1–9) contains an excellent summation of many interpreta-
tions and accusations.
 9. Bowden offers a precise description of his role as screenwriter in Nolan and 
Zaillian (vii–xv).
10. Throughout the chapter, commentary on the Black Hawk Down DVD set is 
cited by hours, minutes, and seconds.
11. Todd Blackburn, like many other named individuals in the film, is a real person 
who survived his fall.
12. According to Bowden’s book, Blackburn “has not even been to Ranger school” 
(4). We cannot resolve the discrepancy between the testimony of the officers on the 
DVD commentary track and Bowden.
13. There is a Norm Hooten in the book, and he is linked to the safety-off cafeteria 
incident described by Bowden (174); however, Bowden did not interview Hooten. The 
scaling up of his heroism in the film called for a name change.
14. When Eversmann spoke about his portrayal at St. Thomas University, he de-
nied being “introspective and liberal”: “I am probably a little more conservative than 
somewhere between Ronald Reagan and Attila the Hun” (Connel 2).
15. Kurth’s spoken warning is not in the shooting script (Nolan and Zaillian 123).
16. The veterans of the operation emphatically deny this sort of antagonism be-
tween Rangers and Deltas.
17. See soldiers’ comments on the killing of women and children in The True Story 
of Black Hawk Down (1:04:00).
18. A “C2 bird” is a command and control Black Hawk helicopter that hovers over 
a battle site. The Pentagon’s “Preliminary DoD Notes,” written on 8 November 2000, 
indicate an insistence, contrary to Van Arsdale’s understanding, to depict a headquarters 
controlling the field: “We need to add dialogue to several scenes to indicate that the 
special operations forces on the ground and in the air had a chain of command and 
didn’t operate independently.”
19. The decision to withdraw was actually made in mere days, but Clinton quickly 
sent reinforcements to cover the withdrawal, which was not complete until 25 March 
1994. U.S. General Accounting Office, 1.
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20. The game’s Web sites <http://www.blackhawkdownthegame.com> and <http://
www.novalogic.com> contain links for foreign-language editions. 
21. Illustrating the elusiveness of truth, Schickel recalled seeing “All our ignorance 
brings us closer to death,” a citation from George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. 
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DOCUMENTARY AND THE IRAQ WAR
A New Genre for New Realities
21 / Jeffrey Chown
The Vietnam conflict (1959–1975) has been described as America’s first tele-
vised war, or the first “living-room war.” In the ensuing years there was much 
discussion of the “Vietnam syndrome,” the view that a difficult, drawn-out 
military engagement would be impossible in the new media environment. The 
Vietnam experience allegedly demonstrated that the American public would 
not countenance body bags on the nightly news for an extended stretch of 
time. The current war in Iraq has apparently given the lie to that prophecy. 
Furthermore, with camcorders on the battlefield and both sides using the 
Internet, the Iraq war has become the first “digital war.” Despite attempts to 
suppress images of caskets and other representations of dead American sol-
diers, access to those images is now only a Google search away. The question 
about war and the public’s reaction to cinematic images of it now becomes, 
does anyone want to look? The answer depends on how compelling the war 
and the cinematic representations of it are. 
In the new digital environment, an interesting genre of cinematic 
work—with the Iraq war as a focus—is emerging. Indeed, there has been a 
veritable flood of digital documentaries—Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, 
HBO’s Baghdad E.R., the Sundance Channel’s Occupation: Dreamland, and 
A&E’s Combat Diary: The Marines of Lima Company—as well as independent films 
such as Gunner Palace, the Academy Award–nominated The War Tapes and My 
Country, My Country, and interesting low-budget “indies” such as Battleground: 
21 Days on the Empire’s Edge and Confronting Iraq. These efforts form a vanguard 
of work before the inevitable deluge of Hollywood fiction arrives on the scene. 
Monsters and Critics.com reported in March 2006 that six feature films were in 
development with major directors and stars (Goldberg). A year later, only the 
rather coolly received Home of the Brave (Irwin Winkler, 2006) had appeared, 
making documentary the most responsive form to date.
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Just as the American military struggles with lingering doubts about its ability 
to fight counterinsurgency efforts, media makers face an analogous dilemma. 
Vietnam-era documentaries and television images have established a template 
of how to represent modern warfare; that gestalt has influenced the styles and 
assumptions of the documentaries emerging from Iraq. This chapter exam-
ines the first wave of Iraq war digital documentaries (2004–2006) against the 
existing formula, with an eye toward assessing whether the exigencies of the 
“digital age” will alter in any substantial way the depiction and understanding 
of war and thus provide a new media paradigm.
PRELIMINARY CONTEXTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The American documentaries emerging from the Iraq war have operated within 
certain constraints. The war itself has mutated from the initial “shock and awe” 
storming of Baghdad and the search for Saddam Hussein to a violent and dan-
gerous occupation. Along the way, the obvious obstacles facing documentarians 
have been the dangers of gathering images in a combat zone, language and 
cultural differences, and the distance between front lines and editing suites. 
Early in the war there were also political constraints; the U.S. Department of 
Defense sought to influence portrayals of the war by “embedding” reporters, 
anticipating that the correspondents would bond with frontline soldiers and 
thus report empathetically on the conduct of the military. (It was hoped that 
these journalists would not go off on their own to report other war-related 
conditions, such as the impact of operations on civilians.)
Widespread use of digital video cameras in Iraq has resulted in photographic records 
of IED attacks such as this one from Occupation: Dreamland.
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The embedded reporter strategy worked famously in the early months 
of the war, when television news needed access to the front lines. As the war 
evolved into an occupation, however, correspondents and cameramen grew 
less dependent. (Some of the early documentaries reflect a certain freedom of 
access that reporters had before the insurgency became organized and danger-
ous.) Recent developments have made travel outside Baghdad’s Green Zone so 
dangerous that reporters seldom venture into the countryside without heavy 
escorts. John Higgins and Alison Romano estimate that deaths of journalists 
in Iraq have easily surpassed the total from World War II (20–21), and Sherry 
Ricchiardi estimates that the total of 700 “embeds” for the 2003 invasion had 
fallen to 50 or 60 by 2007 (30).
A dramatic example of the danger faced by journalists was presented to 
a large American television audience with the 27 February 2007 broadcast of 
ABC News Special: To Iraq and Back—Bob Woodruff Reports, which details the ex-
tensive trauma and rehabilitation endured by the popular reporter after being 
wounded by an improvised explosive device (IED). The death of Al-Jazeera 
reporter Tareq Ayoub, by an American missile, is given considerable screen 
time in Jehane Noujaim’s Control Room (2004). Trying to protect journalists 
is extremely expensive. According to Ricchiardi: “Foreign editors for good 
reason are reluctant to discuss the specifics of their security strategies or what 
they pay to protect their staffs. It is no secret that companies like AKE Group 
Ltd. or Blackwater USA charge around $1,500 a day for each member of a 
personal security detail” (29).
In the best examples, courage, creativity, and dedication are the operative 
descriptors for the efforts of the war documentarian. But despite these perils 
and constraints, a number of documentary films have emerged that explore 
new techniques and technologies—in effect, creating a new paradigm for how 
to document America at war.
FAHRENHEIT 9/11
The first major wide-release film with the Iraq war as a subject, Michael Moore’s 
Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), easily avoided the limitations of embedded reporting 
because the director never went to Iraq. He argued that his adversarial celeb-
rity would have made such an effort less than productive. Moore—a master 
of the compilation documentary—had no compunction about buying file 
footage from a variety of sources, and the film was delivered in time to fulfill 
Moore’s goal of being an influential factor in the run-up to the November 
2004 presidential election.
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The title of Moore’s film alludes to Ray Bradbury’s novel Fahrenheit 451 
(1953)— the temperature, according to the work of dystopian fiction, at which 
books burn in a futuristic totalitarian society. The thesis of Moore’s polemical 
documentary is that the Bush administration used the attack on the World 
Trade Center and the subsequent Iraq war as tools of social control. A strong 
subtheme of the film concerns how the U.S. military fought a counterinsur-
gency war. The documentary techniques Moore employs in the analysis of this 
subtheme emulate the documentary styles from the Vietnam era.
Michael Moore’s polemical Fahrenheit 9/11 is the only 
documentary with Iraq footage to break into a wide-release 
theatrical market.
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Moore has often proclaimed Peter Davis’s Hearts and Minds (1974) to be 
one of his favorite films, and it is easy to see its influence throughout Fahrenheit 
9/11 in a variety of narrative devices and arguments; however, there are also 
some crucial distinctions between the two films. Davis was a veteran CBS news 
producer with controversial films such as The Selling of the Pentagon (1971) and 
Hunger in America (1968) on his résumé. He began Hearts and Minds in 1972, 
a year after the marines were pulled out of Vietnam. It was released in 1974, a 
year after the last army troops left Vietnam and a year before the collapse of 
the Saigon government in April 1975. Davis’s stated intention for the film was 
to seek an understanding of the cultural mentality that led to Vietnam, what we 
did there, and how it changed us. As brilliant as the film was, many lamented 
that it had not appeared earlier, believing that it might have convinced policy 
makers to forestall the carnage of the last few years of the war. (More than half 
the American deaths occurred after 1968, when U.S. leaders began moving 
toward the strategy of turning the war over to the South Vietnamese. For more 
on depictions of Vietnam, see chapters 17–19). 
Fahrenheit 9/11’s appearance one year after military activities commenced 
in Iraq in some ways answers the question of whether an earlier-released 
Hearts and Minds might have been a significant factor in the Vietnam-era 
public debate. Moore’s film was seen by many people, and there has been 
much conjecture about its influence on voting in the November 2004 elec-
tions. Although it rapidly became dated as a presentation of the Iraq war, its 
overwhelming commercial success both theatrically and in ancillary markets 
makes the film’s vivid images the only ones encountered by many Americans 
at home early in the war. There have been reports that the DVD is widely cir-
culated by American troops in Iraq, and Muslim jihadists have referenced or 
even pirated it for footage. Attempts to discredit the film have been extensive, 
ranging from Web sites, counterfilms, books, and major magazine articles to 
screeds from television commentators (Toplin 52–70).
Hearts and Minds encountered its own backlash at the time, most famously 
Frank Sinatra’s attempt to discredit the production at the Academy Awards 
ceremony, just after Bert Schneider read a letter of congratulation from the 
North Vietnamese. The incident may have been in the back of Moore’s mind 
at the 2003 Academy Award ceremony when he denounced President George 
W. Bush to a worldwide audience. More important is the stylistic template 
that Hearts and Minds presented to Moore as he fashioned a response to the 
Iraq war.
One of the more compelling strategies in the Peter Davis rhetorical armory 
is his compendium of some of the most disturbing television images from the 
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conflict: the Vietnamese colonel’s point-blank shooting of a Vietcong captive, 
the napalmed Vietnamese girl running down the road naked, American sol-
diers lighting a peasant’s home on fire, George Patton Jr. describing his men 
to reporters as “a bloody good bunch of killers.” Davis also includes footage 
from World War II films such as This Is the Army to give a sense of America’s 
mind-set as it engaged Vietnam. On the “director’s cut” DVD voice-over, Davis 
estimates that the stock footage accounts for 10 percent of the film, an archival 
component essential to the historical-cultural argument.
Michael Moore edited Fahrenheit 9/11 before a similar compendium of 
images had emerged from Iraq. The film predates the now iconic images 
from the Iraq war: the hooded figure at Abu Ghraib prison, Pfc. Lyndy Eng-
land grinning in snapshots at the same prison, the four charred American 
bodies hanging at a Fallujah bridge, and the James Blake Miller “Marlboro 
Man” photo taken at Fallujah. Moore follows Davis’s lead in using Hollywood 
material, but he plays it for a derisive laugh, such as when key players of the 
Coalition of the Willing are parodied with black-and-white B-movie footage, 
or when George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld are introduced 
with music and imagery from the Bonanza television series (1959–1973). In a 
more serious vein is Moore’s selection of television news footage for the argu-
ment that the 2000 presidential election was a fraud, or his blank screen–live 
audio depiction of the events of 9/11. (For analyses of depictions of 9/11, see 
chapters 22 and 23). 
In some of the footage purchased by Moore, a grieving Iraqi mother 
screams at the camera that Americans are murderers, just after her home has 
been bombed. The scene is reminiscent of Davis’s juxtaposing a Vietnamese 
mother trying to jump into her son’s grave with General William Westmore-
land saying that the oriental does not put a high value on life. Hearts and 
Minds is exceptional in terms of how many South Vietnamese were interviewed 
about their disgust with the war, presumably at their peril. Moore confines his 
representation of Iraqis to the mother, some shots of boys flying a kite, and a 
wedding party. These few images produced a howl from the Right that Moore 
failed to represent how horrible life was under Saddam Hussein. (Had he gone 
to Iraq, more complexity might have emerged, but a reoccurring limitation of 
American documentaries on any war is their ethnocentricity.)
In the shooting plan for Hearts and Minds, Davis practiced cinema verité 
on location in Vietnam. He wanted to get behind the scenes to pick up insight 
that was unavailable on the nightly news, which gravitated more toward visual 
drama than nuanced analysis. Most famously, cameraman Richard Pearce was 
able to persuade two airmen to take him and a sound recordist into a Saigon 
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bordello. The way the airmen spoke to the prostitutes produced a shocking 
exposé of American racism; the antiwar movement certainly saw the scene 
as a metaphor for America in Vietnam. Equally flamboyantly, Davis filmed 
scenes from across America and, in editing the film, crosscut a Massillon, 
Ohio, football coach haranguing his young charges about their lack of killer 
instinct against American soldiers in Vietnam. The intention, of course, was to 
put the aggressive, masculine side of American culture on display and suggest 
that it was the underpinning of American imperialism.
Fahrenheit 9/11 has its own verité footage. Although edited shortly before 
revelations about the Abu Ghraib prison scandal of 2004, it shows soldiers 
humiliating captives. In a poignant scene, with nondiegetic Christmas music 
on the sound track, soldiers aggressively break into the homes of Iraqi sus-
pects. A tank crew is shown going on patrol listening to Bloodhound Gang’s 
“Fire Water Burn,” possibly the source of the film’s R rating. Moore carefully 
buttresses these images with a declaration on the sound track that they are 
examples of what happens when good kids are sent on a bad mission. Whereas 
Hearts and Minds contributed to the notion that Vietnam veterans were “baby 
killers,” Moore attempts to distance himself and his film from such blanket 
condemnations.
In deciding who to interview for his film, Davis was clearly biased toward 
veterans. The only celebrity of the antiwar movement who appears is Daniel 
Ellsberg, whose background included the Pentagon and the Rand Corpora-
tion. Excluded are the strident, nonmilitary voices of the movement such 
as Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, the Berrigan brothers, and various officers of 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Firsthand experience with the war 
is privileged. In the same fashion, Moore assiduously cultivates disaffected 
Iraq war veterans both in the film and in his activist work. He features their 
e-mails and letters on his Web site and published a collection titled Will They 
Ever Trust Us Again? In Fahrenheit 9/11, he introduces conscientious objector 
Raymond Henderson, who in full uniform accompanies Moore on a stunt in 
Washington, D.C., where they ask congressmen on their way into the Capitol 
to enlist their children in the armed forces.
In Hearts and Minds, some of the most effective antiwar critique comes 
from veterans such as infantryman Robert Mueller, who was paralyzed by his 
combat injuries, or pilot Randy Floyd, whose eyes well up with tears when he 
talks about the human cost of his precision-guided bombs. Davis also has a scene 
in Hearts and Minds in which he visits a factory in New York where returning 
veterans are fitted for their new prosthetic limbs. Such scenes effectively put 
the veterans’ physical bodies on-screen as a graphic statement of loss.
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Moore sought a similar impact by using file footage, which occasioned a law-
suit against Moore, Disney, and NBC. Attempting to illustrate the physical costs 
to seriously wounded veterans, Moore bought television footage of a double 
amputee, Sergeant Peter Damon, speaking from a gurney at Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center. The original NBC story was about new painkillers the army was 
using, and correspondent Brian Williams noted that the veterans depicted sup-
ported the war effort. Moore includes only Damon’s specific comments about 
pain. The crisply edited shot presents a disturbing image, coming right after 
Congressman Jim McDermott (D-Wash.), a Vietnam veteran, observes: “You 
know they say they’re not leaving any veterans behind, but they’re leaving all 
kinds of veterans behind.” Damon was outraged that, through editing, he had 
become an illustration of McDermott’s—and, by extension, Moore’s—point 
that the war had gone sour. The veteran and his wife filed lawsuits totaling 
$85 million against NBC, Miramax, Lion’s Gate, the Weinstein brothers, and 
Moore, claiming that Damon had been shown in a false light (Reuters). (Ear-
lier, Damon had expressed his displeasure by granting bitter sound bites in 
two anti-Moore documentaries: Michael Moore Hates America [Michael Wilson, 
2004] and Fahrenhype 9/11 [Alan Peterson, 2004].)
Massachusetts judge Stephen Woodlock dismissed the lawsuit in December 
2006 on the grounds that Moore’s intention was not to establish that Damon 
was against the war or the Bush administration—the basis of a “false light” suit. 
Moore’s lawyer noted that Damon appears on-screen for only sixteen seconds, 
but it is doubtful that anyone will convince Peter Damon that he was not ill 
served in having his image contribute to a film that caused a quarter of a bil-
lion dollars to change hands worldwide and became a factor in a presidential 
election. (As I have written elsewhere, Damon’s notoriety and availability for 
photo ops with figures such as Edward Kennedy, Mitt Romney, and the Boston 
Red Sox eventually led to his receiving a free handicap-accessible home from 
the Homes for Veterans organization [Chown, “Bodies and War”].) 
Fahrenheit 9/11 angered others besides Peter Damon, as the following 
three cases demonstrate. Representative Mark Kennedy (R-Minn.) created a 
controversy by complaining via the Congressional Record about Moore’s use of 
a clip showing his quizzical expression when he is asked whether he would 
have a child of his serve in Iraq. Moore edited out Kennedy’s response about 
where his nephew was serving. A blogger sent out an Internet call that Joanne 
Duetsch was looking for help in a possible lawsuit against Moore. Duetsch is 
the woman who walks into the frame and tells Lila Lipscomb that everything is 
staged; Duetsch claims that Moore edited out the part where she is sympathetic 
to Lipscomb. There is also the Oregon state police officer who is interviewed 
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about the lack of funding for coastal security. He complained after the premiere 
that he had no idea his interview was for a Michael Moore polemic.
The broader message of these cases is that war documentaries use human 
subjects, often American soldiers, as representations or signifiers of diverse 
points of view on a contested ideological battlefield. America has a set of legal 
and ethical guidelines that allow subjects in war documentaries a modicum of 
protection; whether these same protections apply to non-Americans is another 
question. It is doubtful that the Iraqi subjects in most of the documentaries 
about the war are being asked to sign release forms—certainly not the detain-
ees at Abu Ghraib, the suspects in house searches, the anguished street-bomb 
victims, or their grieving relatives. Too often, Iraqis tend to be the “Other” in 
these documentaries, playing a role analogous to the subjects of ethnographic 
films going back to Nanook of the North (Robert Flaherty, 1925).
Both Hearts and Minds and Fahrenheit 9/11 benefited from a well-funded 
research staff. Davis produced his film with Bert Schneider, who had Hollywood 
money behind him going back to The Monkees and Easy Rider (1967), which 
led to the creation of his legendary BBS production company. Moore had a 
$6 million budget from Disney, probably based on the lucrative precedent of 
Bowling for Columbine (2002). Once Disney realized the political ramifications 
of Moore’s documentary, its corporate executives shifted the film to one of 
its subsidiaries, Lion’s Gate Films. Despite the public row with Moore and the 
Weinstein brothers, Disney still made a handsome profit on Fahrenheit 9/11; 
most sources quote a figure of $220 million at the worldwide box office.
Fahrenheit 9/11, as the first major theatrical release of the Iraq war, can be 
characterized by both its haste of construction and the anger of its polemic. 
Given those constraints, it is remarkable that it was so right-on in its predic-
tions of both the quagmire the war would become and that George W. Bush 
and his cabinet would be reviled in the retrospective analysis of the war’s 
rationale. Moore’s epic may look back to Vietnam-era models in its documen-
tary style, but it marks a new milestone in the role of documentary in public 
policy discourse.
OCCUPATION: DREAMLAND 
The subjectivity of perspective in many American documentaries on the Iraq 
war surfaces in Occupation: Dreamland (2005). Two embedded filmmakers, 
Garrett Scott and Ian Olds, followed a squad of infantrymen of the 82nd 
Airborne during January 2004. The Vietnam War template here would be 
Pierre Schoendoerffer’s Academy Award–winning The Anderson Platoon (1967). 
Schoendoerffer used the then relatively new cinema verité approach as a way 
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of revealing the varying attitudes of a platoon of U.S. infantry composed mostly 
of African Americans and Hispanics and led by Lieutenant  Joseph Anderson, a 
black West Point graduate. If The Anderson Platoon seems dated now, it reflects 
the clumsiness of 16mm sound equipment in a war situation and the limitations 
on the amount of footage that could be collected in the predigital era. The 
subjects were probably not familiar with the type of film Schoendoerffer was 
making, although they would not have been disappointed with the sympathetic 
final product. (One wonders how they reacted to a French crew.)
Occupation: Dreamland is an early example of the post-MTV 
generation’s familiarity with cinema verité recording  
techniques.
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Occupation: Dreamland is much more fluid than its Vietnam predecessor. 
Clearly the soldiers have seen MTV’s Real World or similar examples of popular 
culture cinema verité or reality TV: they seem completely comfortable with 
a camera crew in their sleeping quarters or out on patrol. Several soldiers 
indulge the filmmakers by wearing wireless microphones. Seemingly average 
young American males, they appear cool, hip, ironic, sincere, and trusting— 
apparently not worried that someone will misuse their images in the editing room. 
One of them is a bodybuilder who does muscle-man poses. The soldiers discuss 
a magazine and debate whether Cher is “hot.” Their sleeping quarters are lined 
with pinups and pop culture paraphernalia: they have taken their cultural identity 
with them. They seem to know what they will look like in the eventual film in a 
way that the grunts of The Anderson Platoon could not have foreseen.
As various members of the squad are introduced individually—a technique 
used at the opening of The Anderson Platoon—their diverse perspectives toward 
the war are quickly apparent, ranging from one cynical soldier who sees it as a 
war for oil to another who extols Rush Limbaugh. At one point several soldiers 
begin debating their preferences for Democrats versus Republicans, but then 
their sergeant walks in and announces, “Hey everybody, we’re not going to talk 
about politics while we are on camera.” The filmmakers then cut to individual 
interviews, where the soldiers are only too glad to elaborate on their political 
views, which are at variance from official explanations. Significantly, none of 
the soldiers demonstrates familiarity with the Iraqi culture and the sectarian 
conflicts that will come to dominate the war. 
In the direct interviews, quite a bit of time is spent on the question of 
why each soldier joined the military. At one extreme, a cynical enlisted man 
observes, “If you want to join the army, know that you will get f—ed from day 
one.” At the other, a lieutenant comments, “I have faith the government did 
not send me over here to protect oil.” In the middle range are individuals who 
talk about how they were going nowhere in their civilian lives, and the army 
gave them direction and purpose. One believes that he would have ended up in 
prison if not for the army. Another mentions the World Trade Center attacks as 
he archly but incorrectly observes, “All the hijackers came from Saudi Arabia” 
(the actual count was fifteen of nineteen). One of them talks about playing in 
a heavy-metal band in high school and the editor, to illustrate and amuse, cuts 
to home video footage supplied by the soldier. (Later they are shown watching 
a video of “Slayer” before going out on a night patrol.)
As is often the case with cinema verité documentaries, by not supplying 
a controlling voice-over and by allowing participants to express a range of 
opinions, the filmmaker appears to avoid interpretation. The most pervasive 
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American ideology of the war has been to support and appreciate the frontline 
troops, and Occupation: Dreamland respectfully gives a voice to servicemen. An-
other agenda seems to be motivating the DVD liner notes supplied by author 
and Nation correspondent Christian Parenti, who opines:
Every war is different. Iraq is not Vietnam. But in some regards Occupation Dream-
land could be about the work of occupation anywhere at almost anytime because 
some of the basic tasks and basic humiliations never change. Witness the house 
searches, the ID checks, the arrests, the quick guerilla attacks, the frustrated 
response, the muted and confused intelligence, the basic linguistic and cultural 
alienation between occupiers and occupied. Note how the anxiety and grinding 
fear of the soldiers transforms into anger. Fallujah could be British-occupied 
Boston, German-occupied Paris, or French-occupied Algiers.
Perhaps the filmmakers had nothing to do with the packaging of the DVD, but 
it is doubtful that the soldiers signed their release forms knowing that their 
service would be compared to the German occupation of Paris (1940–1944).
One of the fascinating aspects of the documentary medium is that, above 
Documentary often depicts moments of cross-cultural connection, such as this 
American reservist and Iraqi child in Occupation: Dreamland.
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and beyond the rhetorical power of editing, the images themselves often fur-
nish opportunities for multiple interpretations. A case in point is a vignette 
surrounding First Lieutenant Matt Bacik, one of the main characters of Oc-
cupation: Dreamland. He is assigned the task of developing relations with local 
Iraqis as the platoon goes on a daily patrol. He attempts small talk with various 
people on the street. Several of the Iraqis are incensed that the Americans 
arrested a woman the day before, and they demand to speak to the camera; 
indeed, they look directly into the camera and shout and bluster in agitated 
fashion. They repeat themselves, and even with the subtitles, their argument is 
very basic. They have no sense of the cultural etiquette of American television 
and thus appear to that audience as belligerent hotheads. Their “Otherness” 
undermines any consideration of why the woman was arrested; no one will 
investigate it further. Some might see this sequence as a demonstration of how 
the American military is making an effort to win the hearts and minds of the 
Iraqis by sending out such an idealistic lieutenant; others might interpret it as 
a demonstration of the wide cultural chasm between Iraqis and Americans and 
the military’s pathetic attempts to bridge it. Either way, the film is unusual in 
the amount of time it allows on-the-street Iraqis to voice their complaints.
In the digital age, DVDs now have the capacity to further alter or extend 
the audience’s understanding of a film. Occupation: Dreamland’s contribution is 
to supply raw footage of the full-scale marine assault on Fallujah that occurred 
in the fall of 2004. This supplemental, barely edited material gives a tragic 
slant to the squad’s positive efforts to relate to the local population—now, it all 
seems for naught. The DVD extras explain that 47 marines and 1,000 civilians 
were killed in the fighting. Indeed, the streets once patrolled by the squad 
are now rubble, and the former city of 300,000 is in a state of catastrophe. 
The aforementioned essay by Parenti further develops the point that Fallujah 
may have been the turning point of the war. The film has an eerie moment of 
foreboding when a soldier talks about his desire to help the Iraqis when he first 
arrived, but after experiencing violent attacks by insurgents, he no longer cares. 
He just “wanted to light them up. They don’t give a sh–t about us here.” The 
DVD extras relate that this marine is now training army Rangers in the United 
States. The idealistic lieutenant was wounded in 2005; another participant is 
in Afghanistan; several others have returned to civilian life. Whereas in The 
Anderson Platoon attention is limited to the fairly uncharismatic soldiers and 
their business at hand, in the digital age, empathy for the lives documented is 
stretched beyond the text, often with explicit political intent.
With Patricia Foulkrod’s The Ground Truth (2006), several of the soldiers 
featured have since become celebrity speakers at activist gatherings. Likewise, 
some of Sergeant Peter Damon’s activities following Fahrenheit 9/11 have 
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been facilitated by his notoriety from that film. The most unusual example 
of documentary-generated celebrity is Josh Rushing, the American army 
public relations officer in Control Room. After his appearance in the film and 
his retirement from the army, he was hired by Al-Jazeera as a lead reporter 
for its English-language edition. A New York Observer  article trumpeted him as 
“Ex-Marine Matinee Idol on Al-Jazeera” (Sinderbrand C4–C5). At the other 
extreme, the ultra-right Front Page Magazine acidly commented: “Now this 
enemy-pandering nimrod, Josh Rushing, is the new face of America to bil-
lions of radical Muslims worldwide” (Schlussel). Perhaps it is a measure of our 
society’s need for celebrities that ordinary people snatched from documentaries 
Low-budget video-making has produced documentaries 
with countercultural political messages, such as Battleground: 
21 Days on the Empire’s Edge.
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suddenly become bearers of significance and meaning in the understanding 
of complex events.
BATTLEGROUND: 21 DAYS ON THE EMPIRE’S EDGE
Guerrilla News Network, as the name implies, is committed to making on-the-
fly material that is outside the mainstream. The antecedent in the Vietnam 
War was the Newsreel collective, which in turn traced its lineage back to activ-
ist filmmakers of the 1930s such as the Film and Photo League (Barnouw). 
Unlike its predecessors, Guerrilla News Network exists in the digital age, with 
distribution outlets that are much different from those in the days when 16mm 
film prints were hauled around to college film societies and labor halls; as a 
result of digital technologies, its documentaries are freer to respond with views 
from the fringe of political debate. Cheaply produced DVDs and Internet 
sites such as YouTube and Move.On.org have provided new outlets for activist 
documentaries. Thus, Guerrilla News Network’s production Battleground: 21 
Days on the Empire’s Edge (Stephen Marshall, 2004) foregrounds in its title the 
view that American involvement in Iraq is for an “empire.” With a $10,000 
grant, filmmakers Stephen Marshall and Anthony Lappe flew to Jordan and 
crossed the border into Iraq in October 2003 for three weeks of exploratory 
filmmaking, apparently with little involvement from the “empire’s” army. (As 
the filmmakers themselves note, their methodology is probably impossible in 
the Iraq that evolved after 2004.) The resulting three-week snapshot is now 
interesting mostly as a chronicle of what went wrong.
The film starts on the plane ride into Jordan. By chance, the filmmakers 
meet “Frank” Farhan, a former anti-Saddam guerrilla who has been living in 
the United States for thirteen years, out of contact with his family back home. 
He agrees to take the filmmakers along as he searches for relatives who had 
written him off as dead. As they cross the border into Iraq, Frank excitedly 
denounces Saddam to the guards and shows them scars from his torture. The 
scenes of Frank reuniting with cousins, a brother, and his mother are very mov-
ing and provide glimpses of Iraqi culture in an almost ethnographic fashion. 
For example, the demonstrations of affection between males would be outside 
the bounds of propriety in the West; the film constructs the Iraqi male as a 
contrast to American soldiers later in the film.
By traveling with Frank, the filmmakers are able to move deeper into Iraq, 
beyond the controlled access areas, where they discover an unsettling resent-
ment toward the American presence. Iraqis complain to the camera team 
about the lack of respect shown to them by American soldiers. The filmmak-
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ers meet May Welsh, an American former employee of Al-Jazeera who gives 
them a tour of Baghdad—including where American jets fired at the offices 
of the controversial Arab news organization (also detailed in Control Room). 
They meet Raed Jarrar, a popular Iraqi blogger who takes them on a tour of 
wrecked tanks with depleted uranium polluting the countryside (as shown by 
the Geiger counter he carries with him). The owner of a fig plantation shows 
the filmmakers his own site of destruction: after insurgent snipers fired at 
Americans from the trees, the Americans leveled his entire plantation. These 
reports suggest a perspective quite different from that of embedded network 
television journalists.
The Iraqi complaints are juxtaposed with a sequence in which Lieutenant 
Colonel Nate Sassaman misguidedly attempts to forge cooperation with a local 
city council near Forward Operating Base Eagle. In camera presence, American 
officers joke about their lack of training in dealing with the political structure 
of Arab communities. A scene of Sassaman, a former quarterback at West Point, 
upbraiding the Iraqi council members about their failure to cooperate with 
his men suggests just how valuable such training would be. 
In one crowded street scene, gunshots are heard just off camera, and 
people begin to move rapidly. Some American soldiers and Iraqi security 
forces appear, but it is never explained what is going on, who is shooting, or 
what the outcome is. Thus, although the title sounds a bit like an action movie, 
Battleground is valuable more for the interesting range of people it displays, 
not for the vicarious thrills of accompanying soldiers who kick down doors or 
duck IEDs—the stuff of many of the other “grunt’s-eye-view” documentaries. 
Ending on a philosophical note, the filmmakers give an African American 
sergeant, Robert Hollis, quite a bit of screen time as he articulates a theory 
of why Americans are in Iraq. He cynically supplies the word empire, and it is 
quite clear the filmmakers have found a spokesperson for their perspective. 
In a survey of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on film, Susan Carruthers 
notes, “Frequently, soldiers emerge not only as OIF’s most trenchant analysts 
but also its most persuasive critics—sardonic, self aware, scarred” (32). Their 
persuasiveness is always enhanced in the editing room—in this case, by giving 
Hollis the last word.
CAMCORDER REALITY: COMBAT DIARY:  
THE MARINES OF LIMA COMPANY
In the post-Vietnam compilation documentary entitled Dear America (Bill 
Couturie, 1987), filmmakers weave together old snapshots that soldiers took 
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with their Kodak Brownies and a sound track of celebrity readings of letters 
sent home. Although the HBO special won two Emmys, the retrospective is 
technically unimpressive because of the rather mundane quality of the photos 
of soldiers lounging around their bases. In contrast, there are thousands of 
photographically superior camcorders and digital still cameras on the front 
lines of the Iraq war. The new technology’s superior lenses, light sensitivity, 
capacity for images, and portability ensure that a high-quality visual record is 
no longer the exclusive province of the professional cameraman.
A&E’s Combat Diary: The Marines of Lima Company (Michael Epstein, 2006) 
takes participant video recording in a new direction. Lima Company was a 
marine reserve unit out of Columbus, Ohio, that in the summer of 2005 took 
some heavy casualties: 23 of the company’s 184 marines (12.5 percent) died 
during its tour. Filmmaker Epstein learned that many of the marines had their 
own video cameras and had compiled a significant amount of firsthand foot-
age of both combat missions and barracks life. The soldiers were convinced 
to share the footage, with the promise that any resulting film would be a com-
memoration, not an exposé. Epstein shot studio interviews with a number 
of the marines upon their return to Ohio to intercut with the actual combat 
footage. The resulting production has many moments of pathos; for example, 
one young marine, Andre Williams, composed a video greeting to his newborn 
son. This tender moment is juxtaposed with the revelation that Williams was 
killed three weeks later.
As a filmmaker, Epstein is certainly sympathetic with the desire to pay 
tribute to the unit’s bravery and sacrifice and to the loss experienced by the 
tight-knit group. Not surprisingly, the film aired frequently during the 2006 
Memorial Day weekend, a national commemorative moment. Significantly, 
whereas Dear America appeared thirteen years after American troops left Saigon, 
the commemoration in Combat Diary is taking place while the outcome of the 
war is still undecided. Inexpensive and easy-to-use video technology facilitates 
this commemorative activity, but it also means that such reports are part of an 
ongoing flow of history rather than a nostalgic encapsulation of its meaning.
THE WAR TAPES
Like Combat Diary, Deborah Scranton’s The War Tapes (2006) relies primarily 
on camcorder footage supplied by frontline American troops, this time from 
C Company of the New Hampshire Army Reserve. One important difference is 
that, in this case, soldiers were preselected to take the cameras along on their 
year-long tour and were given modest training in camera technique. Scranton 
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was originally approached about being an “embed,” but she declined, instead 
asking ten Guardsmen to send back footage. The film whittled this pool down 
to three soldiers who appear as identifiable personalities in the final cut: Ser-
geant Stephen Pink, Specialist Mike Moriarty, and Sergeant Zack Bazzi. They 
mailed back about eight hundred hours of footage that Steve James (Hoop 
Dreams) spent a year editing. With this project, a different set of philosophical 
questions emerges.
As the soldiers go out on missions, a critical viewer cannot help but 
wonder: Are they kicking down that door a little more dramatically because 
they know their buddy is taping? In an interrogation, are they being more 
authoritarian for the camera, or less? When a firefight starts, are they in a bit 
more danger because they are fiddling with a camcorder rather than ducking 
or lining up a target? Are they more likely to get in harm’s way in search of a 
dramatic sequence? Are they staging events for the camera? More philosophi-
cally, at what point does our need to know—even if only to satisfy a simple 
The War Tapes was constructed from 800 hours of camcorder footage shot by members 
of C Company of the New Hampshire Army Reserve. Specialist Michael Moriarty was 
one of three members featured.
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voyeurism—change the nature of the reality that is being documented for us? 
Surely a soldier carrying a camcorder into battle for whatever purpose has a 
different relationship to the experience than a journalistic observer.
These questions having been raised, The War Tapes achieves a level of obser-
vation of humans in war that is emotionally devastating. There is a harrowing 
scene in which a young Iraqi girl is run over by an American convoy. Then, the 
filmmakers follow the troops back home to intimately observe how the resulting 
post-traumatic stress disorder manifests and reverberates through the soldiers’ 
families. Boundaries of the traditional documentary change. Early in the film 
one of the videographers questions a sergeant about their mission. He responds, 
“I’m not supposed to talk to the media.” The interviewer responds, “What do 
you mean? I’m not the media.” But of course, he is. The blurred boundaries of 
participant and observer produce an intimacy that would be unimaginable for 
a network camera crew. The film was nominated for an Academy Award.
In perhaps the most shocking interview, one of the veterans of Fallujah 
tells the camera that after a firefight in which his unit killed several insurgents, 
he noticed a dog eating the flesh of one of the dead enemies, and he did 
nothing to stop it; in fact, he felt good about it. Scranton then cuts to one of 
the wives, Randy Moriarty, giving a GI Joe doll to her son. It is one of those 
ambiguous, open-ended moments that make documentaries so interesting. If 
the viewer is horrified by the dog-eating-flesh story, GI Joe is a symbol of how 
we indoctrinate our youth into a warrior culture. If the viewer sees the story 
as an example of the unpleasant realities of a job that needs to be done, then 
the GI Joe scene is only a demonstration of how military wives stand behind 
and support their spouses. Whereas the examination of militarism in the 
psyche of the American family seems to resonate with some of the concerns of 
Hearts and Minds, the editing of The War Tapes is more subtle and ambiguous, 
demanding an active viewer.
CAMCORDER REALITY: NEW VISUAL PARADIGMS?
The camcorder footage in Combat Diary and The War Tapes is still subject to the 
mediation of a professional video editor. The lighting and composition may 
have a rough edge, but the overall narrative structure and sequencing are far 
beyond the amateur. It is instructive to compare these works to the less polished, 
amateur footage that is easily available at YouTube and its growing number of 
competitors. The material ranges from a simple thirty-second clip of an IED 
explosion caught by a soldier out on patrol to more carefully edited polemical 
pieces designed to present pointed commentary. In this arena, documentary 
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representations of the Iraq war are furthest from the Vietnam template and, 
in effect, offer a new visual paradigm that is more subjective, spontaneous, 
and unfiltered than previous models.
As an illustration, consider a twenty-megabyte film called “Marines in Iraq 
and the Regular Mortar Attacks They Face” posted at Filecabi.net in July 2006. 
It contains a number of interviews with troops and displays evidence of recent 
mortar attacks on their living quarters. The interview footage is intercut with 
captured footage from Iraqi insurgents, suggesting that camcorders are plenti-
ful on their side as well. The insurgent video shows them firing mortars and, 
in one case, executing three prisoners. Reactions to this footage will vary, but 
the implication seems to be that some of the soldiers on the ground want to 
put their own spin on video images coming back from Iraq. The producers 
call themselves “Young Americans Media.”
Also on display at Filecabi.net is a piece from GrouchyMedia.com that 
is designed to strike terror in the hearts of the enemy. The song “Fire Water 
Burn” (ironically, the same music used in Fahrenheit 9/11) overlays a wide range 
of shots of tanks, jets, and other American technology unleashing “shock and 
awe” on the Iraqi countryside. It is something that a less artistically minded 
Leni Riefenstahl—the famous Nazi propagandist—might have done. Another 
compilation contains images from insurgent propaganda films with about 
fifteen examples of coalition armored vehicles being hit by IEDs. The impres-
sion is that the insurgents do not rig a booby trap without a camera on hand 
to catch the explosion. Another film at Filecabi.net features American soldiers 
performing BMX bike stunts in the desert, reminiscent of the water-skiing 
sequence in Apocalypse Now. Nothing comparable to the American worship of 
leisure time has been observed coming from the insurgent side.
The omnipresence of camcorders in Iraq has other ramifications besides 
giving American and insurgent soldiers an opportunity for self-representation. 
The Haditha controversy might not have surfaced without camcorder footage. 
Iraqi Taher Thabet, a would-be journalist and cofounder of a human rights 
watch group, heard explosions and shooting on 19 November 2005. The next 
morning he took a camcorder through several houses and the local morgue 
and discovered evidence that American soldiers had killed twenty-four Iraqis. 
Initially, the army reported that fifteen civilians had died as a result of a road-
side bomb. When Time  magazine’s Tim McGirk began investigating in January, 
he was given the camcorder images, which played a big part in the ensuing 
investigations by both the army and journalists (Duffy, McGirk, and Ghosh). 
Any conclusion that Haditha does not constitute a contemporary My Lai mas-
sacre (1968) must contextualize and explain the camcorder record.
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The earlier Abu Ghraib scandal broke in the spring of 2004 and was in-
flamed by the plethora of still photos taken by American reservists. The images 
of guards smiling for the camera while they were abusing detainees often had 
the look of a fraternity hazing, which occasioned a dismissive quip from Rush 
Limbaugh on his nationally syndicated radio program. Susan Sontag also 
aroused controversy when she observed in the New York Times Magazine that 
the photos depicted a level of cruelty and triumphalism deeply embedded in 
American culture. Part of their unsettling quality is the question of why they 
were taken and what the amateur photographers were attempting to document. 
Rory Kennedy tried to answer this question by paying some of the guards for 
interviews for her HBO-produced Ghosts of Abu Ghraib (2007); the results were 
less than definitive. Whatever their intentions, these digital images of prisoner 
abuse did incalculable damage to American prestige around the world—and 
in Washington—and they were widely disseminated by enemies through the 
Internet and propaganda DVDs.
Future historians will debate whether the decision by the Bush administra-
tion to demolish Fallujah had something to do with the images of the charred 
bodies of four American contractors hanging from a bridge. American main-
stream news media now seem to be willfully ignoring the frequent Internet 
release of atrocity footage—captives having their heads sawed off or being 
punctured by electric drills. Perhaps the emotion they inspire does not need 
the “oxygen of publicity,” to appropriate Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
rationale for censorship of the BBC’s reporting of Irish Republican Army 
spokespeople during the 1980s.
Regarding the presence of camcorders in Iraq, an officer in charge of 
training soldiers for deployment related the following story: A friend and for-
mer student of his called from a hospital in Iraq  just after surviving a highway 
IED explosion. Despite being wounded, the soldier was quite “jacked up.” He 
excitedly explained a camcorder on his vehicle had been rolling when they 
were hit, but more importantly, the vehicle behind them also had a camera 
running. This presented unexplored possibilities. He would now be able to 
edit the two angles together to show the explosion in all its glory. The same 
night, just after leaving the hospital, he proudly e-mailed the edited footage 
to his former trainer.
The officer interpreted the story with the following inflections. The modern 
army trusts its soldiers to use the Internet, camcorders, and mobile phones as 
a way to stay connected with loved ones back home. If they have the ability to 
convey the immediacy of their experience through this technology, it helps 
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the public understand and appreciate their commitment and professionalism. 
Morale is improved because of the digital connection to supportive loved ones. 
(This interpretation was offered prior to the May 2007 decision by the Depart-
ment of Defense to restrict access to YouTube and a list of other popular sites. 
Concerns about security and bandwidth usage were cited.)
However, as a media scholar, I would interpret the anecdote slightly different-
ly. In 1968 Andy Warhol observed, “In the future everybody will be world famous 
for 15 minutes.” The quip resonated because the modern media have become 
omnipresent in terms of how people psychologically define themselves and their 
need for personal recognition in a mass society. That soldiers have the ability to 
put their exploits on the Internet only hours after an event occurs provides an 
individual rationale for going to war that is far removed from weapons of mass 
destruction, the evil of Saddam Hussein, the need to protect oil resources, or the 
balance of power in the Middle East. It is the grunt’s potential fifteen minutes of 
fame that becomes the goal, and this seems to overwhelm or perhaps disguise any 
sensible response to the danger that alternates with tedium in a war zone.
French theorist Jean Baudrillard suggests that we live in a hyperreal his-
torical moment in which the signifier has eclipsed the signified, in which 
“simulations” have obscured our relation to the “real.” Put another way, our 
signs and symbols refer only to the process of discourse itself; they have become 
“unmoored” from physical or social reality. Apocalypse Now (Francis Ford Cop-
pola, 1979) sardonically hints at this stage when the surfer character Lance 
opines that he prefers ’Nam to Disney Land as he prepares for another drug 
trip, his own method of dealing with any “horror” that resides in Vietnam. It 
might seem that, as fiction, Apocalypse Now has more license to express the post-
modern, performative aspects of identity in a war zone than the reality-bound 
documentary form. Yet the all-volunteer force that is presently in Iraq grew 
up on video games, was regularly exposed to the thirty-second “The Few, the 
Proud, the Marines” ads, and finally saw images of two airplanes deliberately 
crashing into the World Trade Center replayed ad nauseam on network TV. 
Should we be surprised that documenting their activities in Iraq with personal 
camcorders is a way of inserting themselves into a video adventure of their own 
making? Perhaps this is not revolutionary: Ernest Hemingway participated in 
World War I because he wanted to have experiences that would be the grist 
of his modernist writing. It seems that in postmodern Iraq, the camera has 
eclipsed the pen. The discussion of the next film, Gunner Palace, shows how 
the use of the camera is often informed by the canonized images of war that 
filmmakers take with them to Iraq.
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GUNNER PALACE
Although the Vietnam War documentaries form an interesting stylistic tem-
plate for assessing films from the Iraq war, there is also an epistemological 
influence from Vietnam’s fiction films. Long before the current filmmakers 
got to Iraq, they experienced war via Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987), 
Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986), and other feature film critiques of America’s 
experience in Southeast Asia. As a case in point, the aforementioned Apoca-
lypse Now’s influence hangs all over Michael Tucker and Petra Epperlein’s 
Gunner Palace. This independent film, shot in September 2003 and released 
in 2004, is unimaginable without Coppola’s canonized classic guiding its im-
agery. Life imitates art, but so do documentary films. (For more on Platoon, 
see chapter 18.)
As documented in his diaristic blog, Tucker, who has a military back-
ground, went to Iraq looking to make a film but without a commitment from 
the military to attach him to any specific unit. Things were relatively quiet at 
that time, and he found what seemed to be the perfect location. A group of 
infantrymen was quartered in Uday Hussein’s pleasure palace in Adhamiya, 
an opulently decorated bachelor pad complete with a pool and a private golf 
range, which befitted his status as Saddam’s eldest son. Tucker immediately 
recognized the possibilities and initiated the proper procedures and clearances 
to make a cinema verité film about American troops ensconced in this former 
lap of hedonistic decadence.
In the earliest (1969) draft of Apocalypse Now, screenwriter John Milius 
seized on a metaphor for America’s lack of total commitment to modern war-
fare: Hugh Hefner’s playmates tantalizing soldiers in a sexually provocative 
USO show. In screenplay form, it seemed to be a send-up of the World War II 
era, when Bob Hope visited the troops with pretty girls and Betty Grable pin-
ups were part of the war’s iconography. In the final rendition Coppola takes it 
further. Helicoptered into the jungle, the girls gyrate provocatively with guns 
and wear skimpy costumes that mock America’s pioneer heritage. That the 
playmate performance ends with a riot perfectly embodies the debauched 
collision of Eros and Thanatos that was the counterculture of the 1960s. In 
Milius’s absurdist vision, soldiers want to drop napalm in the morning so they 
can surf in the afternoon. Apocalypse Now’s vision of American preoccupation 
with sexuality, drugs, and violence against the agrarian peasant nation of 
Vietnam—essentially the New Left critique—is in the unconscious of many 
contemporary directors (Chown, Hollywood Auteur 123–27).
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Soon after American soldiers entered Baghdad, news reports showed im-
ages of enlisted men lounging in Saddam Hussein’s various living quarters. It 
had an echo of GIs barging into Hitler’s Berchesgarden at the end of World 
War II, which is highlighted in Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers (2001). 
Both these tableaux provide a handy ideological juxtaposition: self-indulgent 
dictators supplanted by the Everyman agents of democracy. It should have 
further utility, in that Saddam’s material excesses remain anathema to the 
more fundamentalist representatives of the Islamic culture. The problem 
with the symbolic economy of a recaptured palace is that those who bivouac 
there run the risk of sending the message that one dictator has replaced 
another.
Another memorable aspect of Apocalypse Now is the 1960s rock music that 
seems to make more sense in the context of Vietnam. How can anyone listen 
to the Doors’ “This Is the End” without thinking of the psychedelic opening 
of the film? Gunner Palace goes looking for equivalent music for the Iraq war 
and comes up with marines doing rap when they are not out on a mission. A 
Newsweek feature on the rappers got them some airplay in the United States 
( Johnson and Conant). As in the case of Rushing and Damon, mentioned 
earlier, appearances in Iraq war documentaries seem to offer career advance-
ments for participants.
Tucker and Epperlein’s Gunner Palace demonstrates how media makers 
and the soldiers themselves do not approach the Iraq war with an “innocent 
eye.” Apocalypse Now, Full Metal Jacket, and Hearts and Minds form templates 
and frames of visual reference. In a Salon.com piece, Mark Follman writes, “In 
post-production, Tucker set one nighttime raid to Wagner’s ‘Ride of the Val-
kyries,’ an inescapable reference to the beach-assault scene in Apocalypse Now. 
Yet he says the soldiers themselves blared ‘Valkyries’ from their vehicles during 
psychological operations missions” (3–4). With regard to the first Gulf war, An-
thony Swofford’s autobiography and the film adaptation Jarhead (Sam Mendes, 
2005) depict marine trainees singing along to a showing of the helicopter attack 
scene in Apocalypse Now at the moment they get their call to action. Once in 
Saudi Arabia, Swofford hears a helicopter speaker playing a Doors song and 
remarks, “That’s Vietnam music. . . . Can’t we get our own music?”
Vietnam and Iraq present a complex interchange of images and cultural 
assumptions that are impossible for any analysis to exhaust. Just as policy makers 
and military leaders continually confront the “Vietnam syndrome” in consider-
ing our conduct and future in Iraq, so too are documentaries and other filmic 
representations beholden to the surreal imagery of the previous war.
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BAGHDAD E.R. 
The film from the Iraq war with the most graphic shock value is probably 
HBO’s Baghdad E.R. (2006). Filmmakers Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill were 
given free access to an emergency room in Baghdad for two months and came 
back with extraordinary footage of doctors attempting to save soldiers and 
Iraqi civilians choppered in after IED explosions. On view are amputations, a 
soldier given last rites, doctors moving with speed and professionalism in an 
attempt to salvage what they can from shattered body parts, and determined 
Prior to the broadcast of HBO’s Baghdad E.R., the army 
released a warning that any soldier or relative of a soldier 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder should not 
view the documentary because of its graphic nature.
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soldiers attempting to put on a brave face as they begin to see the existential 
changes ahead.
The military’s response to the presentation has been interesting. Alpert 
and O’Neill say that they got total cooperation, were transported and housed 
by the army, and experienced no censorship. With the broadcast imminent, 
the army released a statement that any soldier potentially suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder or any families connected with soldiers deployed in 
Iraq should not watch the program because of the anxiety and pain it might 
arouse. One can only guess at the dilemma the broadcast posed for the military: 
on the one hand, the depiction is of a professional, caring army doing all it can 
to ensure the best treatment of its troops; on the other hand, such a broadcast 
goes against the previous policy of not showing coffins, for fear of the effect 
on public morale. The problem was nothing new, as a review of World War II 
cases such as the George Strock Life magazine photographs or John Houston’s 
documentary The Battle of San Pietro would confirm. (In both cases, World War II 
commanders demanded suppression of the visual reports.) In defending such 
censorship, the government usually cites the need to protect soldiers’ families; 
opponents of the policy claim that censorship hides the sacrifice soldiers are 
making. Baghdad E.R. presents graphic footage of the on-the-ground conse-
quences of our military involvement, which has to make some viewers wonder 
whether the political objectives are worth this kind of suffering.
The filmmakers frame the presentation by placing the following in title 
cards at the beginning:
This film is a tribute to the heroism and sacrifice of the soldiers who are the 
patients and staff of the 86th Combat Support Hospital. The 86th Combat Sup-
port Hospital (CSH) is the Army’s premier medical facility in Iraq. It is located 
in Baghdad’s Green Zone at a hospital formerly reserved for Saddam Hussein’s 
supporters. Ninety percent of the American soldiers wounded in Iraq survive. 
This is the highest rate in U.S. History.
Certainly, most viewers will agree with these sentiments about “heroism and sac-
rifice”; still, framing it as a “tribute” at the outset limits the range of response. 
Other perspectives might cite this film as strong evidence of the extraordinary 
waste of life and human potential that is the Iraq war. As an HBO production, 
it has the potential for wide distribution and impact. If it is a “tribute,” then by 
implication, it turns its attention to something positive. Documentaries should 
be judged both by what they are about and by what they are not about. This is 
not a film about torture tactics at detention centers, civilians injured by errant 
bombings, the prospects of a civil war, soldiers who demonstrate racism toward 
Iraqis, or the exorbitant financial cost of this war. Instead, under the auspices 
484 / Jeffrey Chown
of the nation’s first and most popular cable channel, it is a documentary that 
attempts to find humanity amidst the horrors of war. Perhaps that is subversive; 
perhaps that is trying to have it both ways.
The first American injury featured in Baghdad E.R. highlights the open-
ended quality of the format. A New York National Guardsman is brought in 
with injuries sustained while distributing candy to Iraqi children. One way to 
read this scenario is that it demonstrates the evil of an enemy that would attack 
a soldier engaged in an act of benign public relations. Another interpretation 
is that it is commentary on the futility of our “hearts and minds” strategy and 
the ruthless means our enemy is prepared to employ in defeating that strategy. 
In the diegesis of the film, it is simply another example of how highly profes-
sional doctors patch up the soldiers and send them on their way.
The Vietnam antecedent would be M*A*S*H (Robert Altman, 1970), 
without the anarchistic sarcasm and the libertine behavior, but heavy on the 
competence of heroic doctors. The present-day staff is shown sitting out on 
the roof enjoying a “cigar night” or having a basketball game, but Trapper 
John and Hawkeye would find their lack of risqué humor tame. A few of them 
comment that they hate war, but generally their commentary is guarded. In 
both M*A*S*H and Baghdad E.R . the avocation of saving lives is ironically and 
implicitly contrasted with the larger environment of death and destruction 
that is war.
A bit of American machismo does emerge. Early in the film, rock music 
accompanies the introduction of individual members of a Black Hawk helicop-
ter rescue team. The pilot brags that he can fly like Lance Armstrong rides a 
bike. The statement is followed by quick cuts to each character in a variety of 
poses. Oddly, these introduced characters barely reappear. Instead, somber 
scenes in the emergency room predominate, and there is a modest amount of 
interview footage with another set of subjects. The camera team follows one 
rescue mission out into the Red Zone, but generally the coverage is restricted 
to the drama of the emergency room. 
HBO, with Real Time with Bill Maher and other programming, has clearly 
staked out a position in the mainstream media as purveyor of some biting criti-
cism of the Bush administration. As a premium cable service, it is relatively free 
of the Federal Communications Commission restrictions placed on broadcast 
networks regarding profanity and “fairness.” The appeal is to a young, hip, 
liberal market that constitutes about a 30 percent share of American television 
households. HBO has a mandate to do what the networks cannot, and it is 
unimaginable that Baghdad E.R. would turn up on CBS, for example, despite 
the fact that various newsmagazine shows have covered the medical side of 
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the war, such as pieces on the inadequacies of the Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center that aired in the spring of 2007.
Baghdad E.R.’s presentation, like so much cinema verité, is open-ended and 
therefore not preachy. Even as it suggests that we have a competent, admirable 
military, it graphically illustrates the horror of the injuries and the staggering 
human cost. As with much HBO programming, it seems shrewdly marketed. 
One looks at the title and cannot help but think that the programming execu-
tives at HBO knew that they had something that would hook fans of E.R. and 
the various CSI shows and the devotees of graphic hospital reality shows on 
cable. It seems to look forward to a time when, as with films and television 
shows about the Vietnam War, there will be a lively market for a historical look 
backward. In the meantime, it is interesting that none of the copyright holders 
have challenged Brasschecktv.com’s free streaming of Baghdad E.R. on a site 
replete with difficult-to-find antiwar activist pieces. Perhaps this has something 
to do with Jon Alpert’s long career as an advocate for community-based, por-
tapack journalism, outside the auspices of media giants such as HBO.
The films and Internet material surveyed by this chapter constitute a subset of 
a fairly sizable body of work that is emerging from the Iraq war. The particular 
works discussed were chosen to illustrate links back to the Vietnam template 
and forward to the new paradigm of digital representation. Other works ripe 
for analysis include the Academy Award–nominated Iraq in Fragments (James 
Longley, 2006) and My Country, My Country (Laura Poitras, 2006), as well as The 
Blood of My Brother (Andrew Berends, 2006), The Ground Truth (Patricia Foulk-
rod, 2006), The Prisoner Or: How I Planned to Kill Tony Blair (Michael Tucker 
and Petra Epperlein, 2007), Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers (Robert Greenwald, 
2006), and many others. Further analysis should explore whether these films 
collectively appeal only to film cognoscenti or whether they have made inroads 
to a broader audience.
In assessing the impact of what he calls “grunt documentaries,” Tony 
Grajeda has posed a challenging perspective: “By privileging personal experi-
ence over historical awareness, these accounts construct a version of the war 
in which it becomes impossible to apprehend such atrocities as Haditha, Ra-
madi, Abu Ghraib.” Documentary should have an explanatory power, but if 
documentary’s purview is circumscribed by an ideology of “support the troops” 
or American triumphalism, then all that has been documented is a patriotic 
zeitgeist. Grajeda ultimately asks the Iraq documentary genre to “begin the 
process of questioning why we fight,” an allusion to both Frank Capra’s World 
War II series and the 2005 film by Eugene Jarecki (17).
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The question of documentary’s explanatory power and ability to raise ques-
tions about, in this case, militarism brings us back to the two films considered 
at the outset of this chapter: Hearts and Minds and Fahrenheit 9/11. They are 
the most widely seen antiwar documentaries since World War II and also the 
most controversial—the former coming at the end of a war and the latter at 
the beginning. With its canonized status as a classic of many Vietnam history 
classes, it is easy to forget the withering criticism Hearts and Minds received 
at its premiere. Grajeda quotes the attacks that came from both sides of the 
political spectrum but notes that, in many ways, the film seems validated in 
hindsight—he cites the Massillon football scene as an example. Likewise, 
Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, though a box office hit, has been subjected to a bar-
rage of dismissive attacks from all manner of publications and commentators, 
often because of the director’s decision to foreground his own lightning-rod 
persona. Yet, with a shorter backward glance, was it not Moore who was ahead 
of the pack in saying that the war could become a quagmire, that the adminis-
tration was not ready to deal with the casualties coming into Walter Reed, that 
Halliburton and the contractors would become a scandal, that prisoner mal-
treatment would become an issue, and that atrocities committed by American 
troops were a possibility? Critics are fond of labeling the film as propaganda, 
but its predictions rarely missed the target, and it may have outlined its own 
template for future documentary investigations of controversial material.
In 1926, when John Grierson coined the term documentary, he famously 
defined it as “the creative treatment of actuality.” New technologies, ubiqui-
tous camcorders, and the option of Internet distribution have caused a flood 
of “actuality” to return to America over uplinks and downlinks. Rather than 
adding “creativity” to the actuality, perhaps documentarians need to provide 
a critical insight that helps contextualize and explicate the significance of raw 
images. If the severed arm that drops to the floor in Baghdad E.R. is just an 
image edited for shock value, then it is nothing more than pornography. If it 
is part of a larger mosaic of images that helps define the present moment of 
the American occupation of Iraq, then it is something that should be more 
widely seen. As with Vietnam, Iraq needs explanation in a visual aesthetic that 
speaks in the language of its own time.
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JESSICA LYNCH AND THE  
REGENERATION OF AMERICAN  
IDENTITY POST 9/11
22 / Stacy Takacs
On 1 April 2003 the broken body of Pfc. Jessica Lynch was recovered by the 
U.S. military from a hospital in Nasariyah, Iraq, where she lay suffering from 
injuries incurred in a combat-related Humvee crash. The rescue story quickly 
took on larger-than-life proportions as the vested interests of the military and 
the commercial media coalesced around the need for a good story to clarify 
the moral stakes of the war in Iraq.1 Within days, the tale of the 507th Main-
tenance Unit’s blunder into enemy lines had been framed as an “ambush,” 
and Lynch’s rescue had become a parable of American innocence lost and 
regained through the intervention of military might (Schmidt and Loeb A1). 
Thus sensationalized, the tale was embraced by the American public because it 
offered, through analogy, a reassuring resolution to the traumatic experience 
of 11 September 2001. 
This chapter examines the Lynch rescue in relation to the ongoing pro-
cesses of national regeneration necessitated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
As Julie Drew has argued, “prevailing narratives of who and what we are, as 
Americans, took a hit” on 9/11 (71). The process of reconstructing national 
identity began almost immediately in public discourse following the attacks. 
Media scholars have shown how breaking news coverage, newspaper editorials, 
and even advertisements strategically framed the events in ways that made the 
United States seem to be an innocent victim of a senseless act.2 Political elites, 
likewise, decontextualized terrorism, describing it as a “cowardly” act born of 
“hatred,” “jealousy,” and “evil,” rather than politics (Drew 73). Such rhetoric 
made “a unified military response” appear to be “the only real alternative 
to combat future devastation and terror” (Reynolds and Barnett 91). In the 
process, it also tied national identity and security to notions of masculinity. 
“Characteristics, actions, and reactions deemed feminine—such as diplomacy, 
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negotiation, and compromise” have been systematically devalued in public 
discourse since 9/11 in favor of “masculine characteristics of physical strength, 
punitive response, and violent aggression” (Drew 72). The Lynch rescue 
dramatically illustrates this process of social reprioritization and provides an 
occasion for thinking through the consequences of this gendering for U.S. 
foreign and domestic policy.
By examining documentary and docudramatic representations of the 
Lynch rescue, including Saving Private Lynch (A&E), Saving POW Lynch (Dis-
covery), Primetime’s interview special “Pfc. Jessica Lynch: An American Story” 
(ABC), and the made-for-TV movie Saving Jessica Lynch (NBC), this chapter 
seeks to illustrate how militarism, masculinity, and national security have be-
come conflated in post-9/11 public discourse and how this fusion has helped 
legitimate the Bush administration’s foreign policy. President George W. Bush 
has long conceived of the nation as a patriarchal family whose security depends 
on military strength, but it took 9/11 to convince him that national security 
could best be pursued through the militarized extension of U.S. hegemony. 
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate and, hopefully, disrupt the processes 
of consensus formation sustaining this counterintuitive security policy, for 
the use of war to achieve peace only spreads insecurity and guarantees the 
political marginalization of those who fail to embody the ideals of masculinity 
authorized by security discourse.
GENDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 
(NEO)CONSERVATIVE MIND
Historically, ideas about masculinity have encouraged political elites in the 
United States to associate security with military strength and to avoid thinking 
about the physical and emotional consequences of war (Enloe 126). This as-
sociation has not happened by accident; rather, it is a function of the gendered 
symbolic system used to interpret U.S. foreign relations. As feminist scholar 
Carol Cohn has shown, national security discourse depends on a gendered 
hierarchy of values that privileges “masculine” traits such as rationality, com-
petition, and aggression over “feminine” ones such as emotionality, coopera-
tion, and conciliation (“War, Wimps” 229). As with most binaries, the value 
of the first term is dependent on the devaluation of the second. The defense 
analysts Cohn studied, for example, used sexual imagery to police group 
identity, describing nuclear war as a “pissing contest” (“Sex and Death” 60) 
and labeling those who questioned the necessity or effects of war as “pussies,” 
“fags,” or “women” (“War, Wimps” 235–36). Such derogatory invocations of 
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femininity and homosexuality permit the disavowal of vulnerability, which is 
necessary to make the work of calculating human destruction psychologically 
bearable (Cohn, “Sex and Death” 57). However, it also associates militarism 
with omnipotence and makes war seem like a guarantee of security rather 
than a threat to it.
This specialized discourse of security has filtered out “to the military, 
politicians, and the public, and increasingly shapes how we talk and think 
about war” (Cohn, “War, Wimps” 228). Conservatives in particular (though 
not exclusively) have favored this view of militarism as the route to security 
because their value system already conceives of the nation as a patriarchal fam-
ily requiring masculine protection (Lakoff 65). When the end of the Cold War 
deprived the United States of a clear rationale for an activist foreign policy, 
conservatives did not abandon their priorities; rather, they searched for a new 
rationale. As early as 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, then undersecretary of defense for 
policy, drafted a defense planning guidance memo advocating the militarized 
extension of U.S. hegemony as a means of guaranteeing global security. The 
best defense, he argued, was a good offense (Bacevich 43–44). He and other 
prominent neoconservatives, including William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Elliott 
Abrams, Richard Perle, and Donald Rumsfeld, formed a think tank called the 
Project for the New American Century to press this agenda. They invoked 
the gendered language of national security to naturalize their positions. For 
example, they warned that President Clinton’s multilateral containment strat-
egy for Iraq left the United States “weak,” “helpless,” and “dependent” on the 
goodwill of European allies (Kagan 24; Project for the New American Century 
A21). They described the United States as a “cowering superpower” and an-
nounced that “only violence . . . may recoup the damage that the [British] 
Labour Party, Bill Clinton, and the Near East Bureau of the State Department 
have done to America’s standing” in the Middle East (Gerecht 29). Weakness, 
helplessness, dependence, and fear are characteristics associated in U.S. culture 
with femininity; hence militarized masculinity (violence) is viewed as the only 
possible antidote to the nation’s “feminization.” George W. Bush has not only 
incorporated a number of these individuals into his administration; he has 
also embraced a number of their ideas.
Even before 9/11, President Bush viewed national identity and security 
in terms of competing definitions of masculinity. In his first major foreign 
policy speech, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” he described the 
Clinton administration’s security strategy as promiscuous and, therefore, insuf-
ficiently masculine. By “multiplying missions” without regard to the nation’s 
“vital interests,” the Clinton administration “squander[ed] American will and 
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drain[ed] American energy.” Like sexual potency, Bush implied, military 
potency is undermined by overuse. Clinton’s preference for diplomacy, more-
over, made the United States appear “soft.” “There are limits to the smiles and 
scowls of diplomacy,” Bush warned, “armies and missiles are not stopped by 
stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose 
and the promise of swift punishment.” Bush offered voters a vision of renewed 
national vigor guaranteed through Victorian restraint. The United States 
would “[encourage] stability from a position of strength” but, like a good 
patriarch, would be “modest” and “humble” about its use of force to conserve 
that strength. Clearly, Bush had not fully embraced the hegemonic agenda of 
the neoconservatives prior to 9/11, but he did share their view of security as 
defined by militarized masculinity. This shared perspective made the transition 
to an offensive security strategy relatively easy to achieve once terrorist attacks 
exposed the alleged dangers of national “feminization.”
REMASCULINIZATION AS A PUBLIC NECESSITY POST 9/11
Within public discourse, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were depicted in gendered 
terms that reinforced and extended the Bush administration’s extant assump-
tions about national identity and security. Breaking news coverage of the events 
set the tone by describing the attacks as “acts of war” directed at an “innocent 
America” rather than a geopolitically entangled United States. Reporters 
proclaimed Americans “united” behind the idea that the only “just” response 
would be violent retribution (Reynolds and Barnett 91). Later news reports 
and eyewitness accounts described the attacks in terms of a “violation” and 
emphasized the generalized nature of feelings of fear, vulnerability, and help-
lessness. Images of men, even soldiers at the Pentagon, screaming, running, 
and crying were particularly evocative of this sense of violation, for they also 
violated cultural perceptions of stoic masculinity. This “discursive construction 
of the polis as far more pervasively feminine than was previously understood” 
(Drew 72) implicitly corroborated the neoconservative assumption that “weak-
ness is provocative” (Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld quoted in Bacevich 
84). Like the word violated, this statement links the terrorist attacks to rape 
and implies that the United States “got what it deserved” on 9/11 because it 
dressed improperly; its power was not sufficiently manifest.
The construction of the nation as overly feminized not only encouraged 
the Bush administration to embrace a military response in this instance; it 
also facilitated the administration’s adoption of the neoconservative strategy 
for U.S. hegemony. The 2002 “National Security Strategy Statement,” a virtual 
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replica of the 1992 Wolfowitz memo (Bacevich 45), left no doubt that the 
nation’s security would be vested in the military and that this remilitarization 
would also entail a remasculinization of national identity. The document is 
also exceedingly candid about what this strategy implies for others since the 
key to securing the homeland is to create military “forces strong enough to 
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” In other words, to 
ensure that U.S. potency cannot be challenged, every other nation must be 
effectively castrated.
ORIENTALISM AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
The war on terrorism has provided the ideological framework necessary to 
depict U.S. hegemonic aspirations as a form of altruistic self-sacrifice under-
taken in the name of high ideals: the spread of “freedom, democracy, and 
free enterprise” and the rescue of “civilization” (“National Security Strategy”). 
Orientalist assumptions about race and gender structure the opposition be-
tween civilization and barbarity in this discourse in ways that preclude the 
possibility of Arabs and Arab societies acting on their own behalf to secure 
these freedoms. Instead, action is reserved for the U.S. military, which must 
save Arab societies from themselves.
Edward Said defines Orientalism as a “style of thought” predicated on the 
distinction between the West (the Occident) and the East (the Orient). The 
Orient is both a material space and an imaginary construct whose purpose is 
to give coherence to the image of the West by serving as “its contrasting im-
age, idea, personality, experience” (Said 2). Specifically, Orientalism seeks to 
identify the West with civilization by coding the East as barbaric. Again, gender 
assumptions structure the dichotomy. Orientalism “collaps[es] non-Europeans 
and women into an undifferentiated field” and understands “the East . . . as 
the site of passivity and irrationality, awaiting the conquest by the masculine 
and rational West” (Volpp 154). Western colonization of the Orient has been 
justified historically through the invocation of “women in need of uplift.” 
Indeed, the project of European empire was virtually defined by “white men 
saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak 297).
Taking a page from this imperial playbook, the Bush administration has 
characterized the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as rescue missions. Barely 
a month after the 9/11 attacks, for example, First Lady Laura Bush delivered 
a presidential radio address elaborating the plight of Afghan women under 
the Taliban. She proclaimed “the fight against terrorism” to be “a fight for the 
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rights and dignity of women” and implied that the pending invasion was a moral 
duty that the United States should undertake in the name of “civilized people 
throughout the world” (L. Bush 250). A similar rhetorical strategy was adopted 
to legitimate Operation Iraqi Freedom. Even though Iraqi men were the main 
targets of state violence under Saddam Hussein, President Bush has insistently 
focused on the rape of women, implying it was common, indiscriminate, and 
somehow more tragic than the torture of men. In public speeches regarding 
the invasion, he often invokes torture as a specifically female experience: “ev-
ery woman in Iraq is better off because the rape rooms and torture chambers 
of Saddam Hussein are forever closed” (G. W. Bush, “Bush’s Opening State-
ment”; emphasis added). This emphasis on women facilitates the Orientalist 
confusion of the war in Iraq with the war on terrorism, casting Hussein as a 
terrorist merely for having oppressed and persecuted women.
The manly application of retributive violence will rescue not just Arab 
women but whole Arab societies, which have been feminized by their leaders. 
Military dictatorships and theocratic tyrants have left individuals in the Middle 
East “victims and subjects” rather than “citizens,” Bush claims. Therefore, it 
is the moral duty of the United States, as the leader of the civilized world, to 
rescue these victims. In the case of Iraq, the whole society was depicted as cowed 
into passivity and in need of salvation, which may be why U.S. military planners 
assumed the troops would be greeted as liberators. The gendered discourse of 
national security, abetted by Orientalist thinking, thus legitimated the invasion 
as a vital rescue mission undertaken in the name of civilization.
DOMESTICATING FOREIGN POLICY:  
THE LYNCH DOCUMENTARIES
The conflation of militarism, masculinity, and security reached its apotheosis 
in media depictions of the rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch. Documentaries about 
the rescue fetishize Lynch’s femininity and vulnerability in order to remascu-
linize a coed military and militarize the identities of civilian men and women 
in ways that will perpetuate the project of hegemony. Using melodramatic 
techniques reminiscent of captivity narratives from the colonial era, these 
documentaries personalize the political and make Lynch’s recovery seem to 
be a matter of family honor. As in most captivity narratives, gender, race, sex, 
and class assumptions are invoked to police the boundaries of communal 
identity, excluding those deemed “Other” and justifying the use of violence 
by coding it as defensive.3 The documentaries transform Lynch from a soldier 
at war to a symbol of the American family under attack in order to authorize 
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the U.S. mission in Iraq and elicit popular consent for the ongoing project 
of U.S. hegemony.
As a small, young, blond, white female from rural America whose visibly 
broken body renders her completely dependent on the kindness of strangers, 
Jessica Lynch fits the role of damsel in distress perfectly (Kumar 300). A&E’s 
documentary Saving Private Lynch acknowledges as much in its opening mono-
logue: “[her dramatic story] has all the ingredients of a Hollywood movie with 
its heroes, suspense, the rescue of a young woman in captivity and a bitter-
sweet ending.” Rushed to production just eighteen days after the rescue, this 
documentary follows the paths of the three female soldiers of the 507th Main-
tenance Unit as they encounter different “fates,” but it focuses most intently 
on Lynch, who is repeatedly referred to as “the blond nineteen-year-old from 
Palestine, West Virginia.” As this description makes clear, Lynch is selected for 
media stardom over the other candidates—Lori Piestewa, a Hopi Indian from 
Arizona, and Shoshana Johnson, an African American from Texas—because 
her race, age, and background identify her with the American heartland and 
connote the maximum vulnerability.
Both the Lynch biography and the television depictions of her story in-
voke her roots in West Virginia to create a particular image of the American 
homeland. Absent Lynch herself, her hometown becomes the center of media 
attention, evoking “traditional family values.” Such values equate national 
identity with notions of blood and soil and privilege filiation over affiliation in 
defining citizenship. For example, biographer Rick Bragg writes that Lynch’s 
“kin believe she is alive, in part, because she comes from this place [West Vir-
ginia], because she has the right blood in her. . . . Even though she is small and 
a little prissy, she carries the blood of the mountains—the blood of people who 
fought and worked and loved here” (15). If Lynch is a pioneering American 
spirit, this passage implies, her defining qualities are inherited, not learned. 
Symbolic imagery connotes the representatively “American” status of the community of Wirt 
County, West Virginia.
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A perception of Palestine as uniquely, timelessly, and exclusively American— 
despite, or perhaps because of, its foreign-sounding name4—also pervades 
the documentaries. For example, Primetime’s “Pfc. Jessica Lynch: An American 
Story” uses frequent aerial shots of the hillsides of Wirt County to connote the 
tight-knit quality of the community. It also obsessively focuses on the symbols 
of patriotism displayed in the county—American flags, yellow ribbons, prayer 
vigils, and support rallies that culminate in the playing of country singer Lee 
Greenwood’s “Proud to Be an American.” This exclusive yet reassuring image 
of national identity conforms to the Bush administration’s own conception of 
the homeland as a vulnerable community in need of militarized protection.
The documentary representations of the ambush and rescue also facilitate 
the conflation of militarism, masculinity, and security. First, the documentaries 
fetishize Lynch’s femininity and vulnerability so as to reassert traditional gender 
norms challenged by the presence of women in the military. As Bill Kurtis ac-
knowledges, “The reality of a volunteer army where women are equal partners 
hits Americans hard” (Saving Private Lynch). Lynch’s hyperfemininity allays 
popular anxieties about such gender insubordination. The television documen-
taries all refer to Lynch’s hair color, eye color, stature, and youth because these 
characteristics make her clearly and safely a “girl.” Lynch is also “‘rhetorically 
stripped’ of her military identity” (Howard and Prividera 96) by announcers who 
refer to her as “Jessica” and feature photos of her in civilian, rather than military, 
clothing: her senior class portrait, a picture of her posing by a tree outside the 
family home, and, most importantly, shots of her as a begowned Miss Congeniality 
at the Wirt County Fair. The narratives also take care to explain that Lynch joined 
the army only to help pay for college, not as a feminist statement. Her dreams 
for her life are modest and stereotypically feminine: she wants to settle in Wirt 
County and become a housewife and kindergarten teacher.
Rescue footage provided by the Department of Defense reinforces the image of Lynch as a 
passive subject in her own story.
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In addition to being “small” and “prissy” (Bragg 15), Lynch is utterly in-
capacitated by her injuries; she cannot help herself and so must be helped by 
others. This passivity activates cultural assumptions that portray women as weak 
and vulnerable while men are strong and protective. The rescue footage pro-
vided by the Department of Defense and incorporated into the documentaries 
reinforces these assumptions by literalizing the classic Hollywood mandate: 
men act; women appear (Mulvey 62–63). While the camera focuses obsessively 
on Lynch’s face during the evacuation, the shot obscures all but the moving 
arms and legs of her male rescuers. Her immobility is thus contrasted with their 
hypermobility. Like a Hollywood starlet, Lynch facilitates the movement of the 
masculine narrative of war through her passivity. Her need for rescue provides 
the U.S. military with the excuse to exercise its manly might.
Because Lynch embodies the homeland and its values, her personal vulner-
ability evokes the nation’s vulnerability and makes remilitarization appear the 
only viable means to achieve security. The documentaries implicitly link the 
ambush in Nasariyah to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, both of which are imagined 
as unmotivated crimes perpetrated against innocents. The noncombat status 
of Lynch’s unit is vital to this construction, as is her status as an all-American 
girl next door. Primetime makes the implicit explicit by opening the segment 
about her captivity with bucolic shots of her family home and the voice-over 
narration: “West Virginia, terror strikes the Lynch family at home!” (“Pfc. 
Jessica Lynch”). Recalling the discursive framing of 9/11, this invocation of a 
vulnerable domestic sphere incites spectators to identify with the need for a 
militarized security solution. Lynch’s status as all-American girl deepens this 
commitment, for if she is imagined as “everyone’s sister or daughter, . . . her 
enemies [become] ours. In the process of identifying with a soldier, the public 
[is] invited to consent to the US’s goals” in the Middle East and elsewhere 
(Kumar 304).
Finally, the documentaries aid in the process of consensus formation by 
exaggerating Lynch’s personal vulnerability. They do so in two ways: by specu-
lating about the nature of her experience in captivity and by casting her as a 
fish out of water in Iraq. The documentaries virtually obsess about the danger 
to women posed by combat duty. Referring to the videos of the five POWs 
from the 507th Maintenance Unit aired on Al-Jazeera, Bill Kurtis contends, 
“The sight of women being held is startling to Americans. What seems to 
worry people most are the accounts of the torture of POWs who were held by 
Iraqis during the first Persian Gulf War” (Saving Private Lynch). This statement 
is followed almost immediately by references to Colonel Rhonda Cornham, 
who was molested by an Iraqi soldier during the Gulf War after her helicopter 
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crashed in the desert. Each of the documentaries contains a similar sequence, 
and all of them mention Cornham’s story. None of them mentions the story of 
Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, who was also captured during that war but 
did not suffer sexual abuse (Howard and Prividera).
Such selective attention illustrates how assumptions about female vulner-
ability are constructed, rather than reflected, by the media. Lacking access 
to information about Lynch’s injuries, the documentaries simply assume that 
she was violated in captivity. For example, the Discovery Channel’s Saving 
POW Lynch claims, “It is unclear whether she sustained her injuries while she 
desperately fought for her life during the ambush or during her captivity.” 
We now know that her injuries were the result of a Humvee crash, but the 
suggestion that she was violated lingers nevertheless. Even Diane Sawyer’s 
Primetime interview with Lynch, which occurred seven months after the 
rescue, contains such speculation: “In addition to the wounds that we know 
about,” Sawyer says, “there may have been another wound, so brutal that there’s 
nothing that can reach into her memory and make it real.” Sawyer notes that 
Lynch’s army medical file shows she may have been sodomized. Although the 
language of the report is hesitant and contradicted by Lynch’s Iraqi doctors, 
Primetime sanctions the rape scenario by ending on Rick Bragg’s firm asser-
tion of support for the military version. Such innuendo constructs Lynch as 
vulnerable and transforms her from American soldier to ordinary woman. It 
relocates American identity in the private sphere and depicts that sphere as 
constitutively susceptible to attack, the better to legitimate the perceived need 
for militarized masculinity.
The documentaries also construct Lynch’s vulnerability by depicting her 
as alienated and alone in Iraq, a stranger in a strange land. As a narrative 
frame, this motif clarifies the difference between the foreign and the domestic, 
“them” and “us,” and effectively justifies “our” anxieties about “them.” The 
Iraqi landscape is always depicted, for example, as not merely unfamiliar but 
otherworldly. Primetime begins its discussion of the ambush by having Lynch 
read portions of the following passage from her biography: “It was flat, dull 
and yellow-brown, except where the water had turned the dust to reddish 
paste. She got excited when she saw a tree. Trees made sense. She had grown 
up in the woods, where the solid walls of hardwood had sunk roots deep in 
the hillsides and kept the ground pulled tight, as it should be, to the planet. 
All this empty space and loose, shifting sand unsettled her mind and made 
her feel lost, long before she found out it was true” (Bragg 8). The American 
homeland, the passage implies, is fixed, familiar, and solid, like a planet “should 
be,” while Iraq is empty, irregular, and inscrutable. Because the treeless, red 
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dust landscape seems more like Mars than Earth, the Iraqis are implicitly 
likened to aliens. The contrast is heightened by the strategy of intercutting 
that juxtaposes West Virginia and Iraq to emphasize Lynch’s representative 
Americanness. For instance, Saving POW Lynch (Discovery) and Saving Private 
Lynch (A&E) both juxtapose file footage of random, chaotic combat scenes in 
Iraq with placid pictures of Lynch in civilian clothes. Such intercutting not only 
distances Lynch from her military identity and heightens the illusion of her 
victimization but also implies that chaos is the norm in Iraq. The conspicuous 
absence of shots of Iraqi civilians performing the ordinary tasks of everyday 
life enhances the impression that violence is endemic to Iraq. In contrast, 
lavish attention is paid to Lynch’s private life and family, their routines, and 
especially their personal faith.
Melodramatic techniques used to heighten the identification with Lynch 
further distance the audience from the Iraqis. For example, Primetime repeat-
edly blurs the focus to invoke the “fog of war,” suturing the audience into 
the “ambush” scene and inviting its members to interpret the scene as a ter-
rorist attack. The depiction of the assault on the convoy mimics the chaotic 
experience of war: fragmented combat sounds and syncopated martial music 
punctuate a dizzying montage of trucks sticking in sand, Humvees whizzing 
by, and explosions ripping the air. The sentence fragments that constitute 
Diane Sawyer’s voice-over enhance the perception of urgency by suggesting a 
paucity of both words and time to describe the barbarism of the Iraqis: “her 
brutal injuries, the missing hours, what doctors say about a sexual assault.” The 
other documentaries adopt similar strategies, using random combat footage 
to convey the meaning of “ambush” and addressing the audience directly to 
facilitate an identification with the experience: “Imagine if your daughter or 
son were over in Iraq, and you got word that they were taken prisoner of war” 
(Saving POW Lynch). These melodramatic techniques accomplish an astound-
ing reversal of fortune, as the United States becomes the victim of a war it 
initiated. Moreover, the “ambush” is coded as an attack not just on the 507th 
Maintenance Unit but on the entire domestic U.S. population and specifically 
as an invasion of the family home. Thus, preemptive military action is made to 
seem like a form of self-defense, both necessary and inevitable to ensure the 
security of the nation and its families.
If Lynch’s vulnerability cries out for a heroic rescue, her status as a pas-
sive spectator at the event mirrors the status of the television viewer watching 
the war from the safety of home. The analogy positions audience members to 
embrace a military identity as a means of preempting their own anxieties about 
increased globalization and the terrorism it facilitates. All the documentaries 
Jessica Lynch and American Identity Post 9/11 / 499
foreground the first exchange between Lynch and her rescuers and read her 
willingness to claim a military identity as a sign of her courage. When the 
U.S. commandos first burst into Lynch’s hospital room, they reportedly said, 
“Jessica Lynch, we are United States soldiers come to take you home.” Lynch 
responded, “I’m an American soldier, too.” Saving Private Lynch consults several 
experts in military psychology who all agree that such affirmation “means that 
she viewed herself, even in her vulnerable state, still as a warrior.” In fact, Lynch 
perceives herself as a survivor, not a hero or a soldier (“Pfc. Jessica Lynch”). Yet 
her explicit rejection of the hero mantle has failed to register because, in the 
post-9/11 context, survival has become its own form of heroism (Freda 232). 
Ordinary Americans, particularly the spouses and children of the victims of 
9/11, have been lauded in popular culture merely for carrying on with their 
lives. President Bush has argued that the best way to defeat terrorism is to 
“live your lives and hug your children,” to go shopping and visit Disney World 
(G. W. Bush, “Address” 242). The real value of the Lynch rescue for U.S. foreign 
policy thus lies in its mingling of mundanity and heroism, domestic identity 
and military identity. Her rescue brings the war home and codes everyone as 
a potential hero in the fight against terrorism. These documentaries ensure 
that, like Lynch herself, no one will be left behind in the war on terrorism.
U.S. HEGEMONY AS CIVILIZING MISSION:  
NBC’S SAVING JESSICA LYNCH
The patriarchal assumptions structuring the Lynch rescue narrative also repro-
duce the Orientalist assumptions used to legitimate U.S. aggression as a defense 
A flashback highlights the difference between the familiar and familial landscape of West 
Virginia and the alien and alienating landscape of Iraq in NBC’s Saving Jessica Lynch.
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of civilization against a barbaric Arab Other. The NBC made-for-TV-movie 
version of Lynch’s rescue, Saving Jessica Lynch, provides the most elaborate 
example of this process of Othering, for the construction of Lynch’s identity 
is always relative to the projection of an Iraqi menace. Deepa Kumar argues 
that the film at least attempts to distinguish between “good” and “bad” Iraqis 
by incorporating images of Iraqi heroism (309). Unfortunately, “goodness” is 
still defined by an identification with things American. Thus, the presence of 
“good brown characters” does not seriously challenge the Orientalist dichotomy 
of the film or the mission it legitimates. Despite being based on the account of 
the rescue provided by Mohammed al-Rehaief, the Iraqi lawyer who reported 
Lynch’s whereabouts to the marines, the film is a study in the demonization 
of Arabs. Its agenda is to affirm a consensual American identity by offering 
the public a clear and undifferentiated image of the enemy. Both narratively 
and visually, the film manipulates extant race and gender codes to transform 
individual Iraqis into an alien mass recognizable as barbaric so that “we” may 
appear civilized.
Like the documentaries, the movie presents Lynch as an American in-
nocent abroad, lost and alone in a strange environment. The opening credit 
sequence establishes Lynch’s dislocation by fetishizing her race and size. The 
titles roll over images of a U.S. convoy in inexorable motion with a tiny Lynch 
(Laura Regan) driving an outsized truck into an infinite horizon. These shots 
convey a sense that Lynch is already out of place—her social place—before 
a sandstorm halts the convoy and literally disorients the unit. A conversation 
between Lynch and her comrades Lori Piestewa (Chrystle Lightening) and 
Shoshana Johnson (Denise Lee) during the brief rest reinforces this perception 
by contrasting the self-evidently American Lynch to Piestewa, a Hopi Indian 
from Tuba City, Arizona. Lynch looks around at the wasteland and sees noth-
ing familiar. Piestewa looks around and says, “You know I grew up on land 
like this. Joined the army just to get away from it.” Lynch insists, “ You can’t 
get any further from Arizona than this,” but Piestewa replies, “I don’t know.” 
Although this exchange might be viewed as a sly critique of U.S. race relations, 
which have made Indians like Piestewa feel alienated from their native land, 
the exchange also—and more importantly—affirms Lynch’s innocence about 
such relations as representatively American. Shortly after this exchange, Lynch 
stares curiously at a group of nomads and camels silhouetted against the desert 
sky. Intercutting is again used to emphasize the distance between the home 
Lynch knows and the desert she finds herself in, as the camels fade into shots 
of verdant West Virginia scenery. A brief montage depicts Lynch’s farewell to 
Palestine and concludes with her father’s voice telling her to “remember where 
you came from” and ordering her to “come home.” Home is presented as a 
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place with clear boundaries and stable content. Iraq, in contrast, is represented 
as inscrutable: its sand-covered roads and invisible berms entrap the military 
vehicles, and its combatants are indistinguishable from its civilians.
The depiction of Lynch as a naïve traveler is enhanced by the choice to 
present the ambush from Lynch’s perspective using a subjective angle. Lynch 
becomes the eyes of the audience, and her gaze organizes the sequence into 
a pseudonarrative whereby the Iraqis fuse into a single menacing entity. When 
the convoy enters Nasariyah, for example, a point-of-view shot shows Iraqi 
civilians staring menacingly at the convoy. They talk among themselves, but 
only in Arabic, which Lynch cannot understand. Since she does not know what 
they are saying, she assumes it is negative: “So much for the celebrating,” she 
remarks. The Iraqis are generally denied the benefit of a return shot, which 
means they are objects to be looked at, not subjects capable of returning the 
gaze. A shot of a mother and her child watching the convoy, for example, slides 
off the screen before the camera returns to Lynch.
One exception is the man who organizes the ambush. Lynch first sees him 
riding in the backseat of a passing car. At the point where the vehicles cross, 
the sequence goes into slow motion, and the two characters lock eyes. A shot-
reverse-shot sequence depicts him as powerful enough to return her gaze. 
Lynch’s imperial perspective is effectively undone by his look, and from that 
point on, Lynch and her compatriots become victims rather than conquerors. 
When the ambush begins, the man assumes narrative control, striding down 
the street with an AK-47 on his hip as if challenging the trucks to a duel. Lynch 
becomes utterly disoriented. She does not fire her weapon or even attempt to; 
instead, she looks around frantically, trying to find something to fix her gaze 
on. Her commander even enjoins her to “stay focused,” but her eyes register 
nothing but panic (indeed, Lynch’s sole function in this scene is to manifest 
terror). Her loss of subjectivity is confirmed by her lack of dialogue; during 
the last hour of the film she has only six brief lines. Thus, she literally becomes 
“an object about which stories [are] told” (Kumar 310).
The subjective camera portrays the Americans as victims of a brutal and 
unwarranted Iraqi assault. Swish pans and special effects incorporate the audi-
ence into the chaos by mimicking the exchange of gunfire. The Humvee crash 
is also depicted from the inside, heightening the identification with its military 
occupants. The Iraqi assailants, meanwhile, are depicted as inhumane zealots. 
For example, one gleeful Iraqi fires his rifle into the cab of an overturned 
truck, shouting “Allah, Allah” and waving his gun in the air in triumph. The 
celebration is captured in slow motion to emphasize its inhumanity. The un-
named fedayeen colonel (Navid Negahban) who takes charge of the prisoners 
after the ambush is the ultimate embodiment of Iraqi cruelty. His power over 
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the Americans is affirmed by the extreme camera angles used to depict the 
surrender of Sergeant James Riley (Dak Rashetta). A shaking Riley kneels in 
the dirt and begins to announce his name, rank, and serial number, according 
to the Geneva Conventions. As he does so, the camera looks over his shoulder 
and up at the fedayeen colonel, enhancing the colonel’s stature. Riley is then 
knocked down. The colonel is also depicted from a low angle as he crouches 
over Lynch’s broken body and says, somewhat sarcastically, “Welcome to my 
country.” Lynch immediately blacks out, and a disembodied scream provides 
the bridge to the next scene. The implication is that the colonel has done 
something to harm Lynch. Because the colonel and the leader of the ambush 
are the only Iraqis to achieve individuation at this point, they come to represent 
all Iraqis. The civilian dress of the ambush leader even implies that ordinary 
Iraqis are really fedayeen in disguise. Thus, the entire society is demonized for 
the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s specially trained military units. The attempt 
to convey Lynch’s sense of disorientation subjectively, for example, by blacking 
out when she does and filtering the screen to indicate a drugged state, makes 
even the doctors and nurses who care for her appear menacing and evil.
The depiction of Mohammed al-Rehaief (Nicholas Guilak) reaffirms, 
rather than challenges, the Orientalist portrayal of the Iraqi people as an 
undifferentiated, menacing mass. He is, after all, clearly distinguished from 
the other Iraqis through his association with American popular culture and 
family values. His identification with a paternal, militarized masculinity ef-
fectively deracializes him, enabling him and his family to be folded into the 
realm of “civilization.” From his first appearance, al-Rehaief is explicitly con-
trasted with the fedayeen and their barbaric values. When told by a nurse not 
“Bad” Arabs are portrayed as ruthless, brutal, and inhumane. U.S. soldiers are depicted as  
being subject to their mercy, which seems arbitrary.
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to go down a particular hallway because the fedayeen “are interrogating an 
American prisoner of war,” al-Rehaief replies, “Do you know what I just saw? 
I saw them drag my neighbor . . . through the streets. Do you know what her 
crime was? She waved, waved, at a U.S. Army helicopter, so I know who the 
fedayeen are.” When al-Rehaief does venture down the hallway, he allegedly 
witnesses Lynch being slapped by one of the interrogators (Lynch and her 
doctors both claim this incident never occurred). His reaction is paternal: 
“She’s just a girl, a child.” Such paternalism identifies him with the Americans, 
who view their incursion into Iraq as a benevolent mission of salvation, and, 
like the Americans, he vows to rescue the helpless Lynch. That this reaction 
is not “Iraqi” is illustrated by his wife’s disapproval: “There are millions of her 
[Lynch’s] countrymen marching on our country right now . . . the Americans 
have made this into a new crusade. They are ruining our country.” In response 
to her political perspective on the war, al-Rehaief invokes the value of kinship: 
“When I look at that girl, I see our daughter.”
Later, al-Rehaief ’s wife blames his mother for having “poisoned [his] mind 
with all of those John Wayne movies.” His association with American popular 
culture, and with the militarized masculinity of Wayne, in particular, makes 
al-Rehaief acceptable as the “star” of what becomes a rescue narrative. His 
alienation from his Iraqi identity is completed when he goes to find the ma-
rines and gets lost in his own land. This disorientation makes him structurally 
analogous to Lynch, which also makes him worthy of salvation. The film con-
cludes, appropriately enough, with the double rescues of Lynch from Saddam 
General Hospital and of al-Rehaief and his family from Iraq. The redemption 
of Lynch thus facilitates the redemption of al-Rehaief, which in turn redeems 
Mohammed al-Rehaief becomes a “good” Arab through his identification with American 
popular culture and American family values. His reward is to ride off into the sunset in classic 
John Wayne style.
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the U.S. mission. By filtering its narrative through an Orientalist prism, the 
film characterizes the invasion as a benevolent “civilizing mission” designed 
to save barbarous Others from themselves.
The invocation of patriarchal race and gender norms in the video re-creations 
of the rescue of Jessica Lynch enables both the remasculinization of the 
military and the remilitarization of foreign policy. By foregrounding Lynch’s 
femininity, passivity, and vulnerability, the videos invite Americans to embrace 
militarized masculinity as the only logical antidote to national insecurity. The 
videos illustrate how public discourse after 9/11 has reconstructed national 
identity in ways that naturalize and extend a conservative view of the nation 
and of national security. By popularizing the conception of the nation as a 
family in need of masculine providence and protection, such discourse has 
also made palatable the neoconservative philosophy of security.
It is important to understand how gender assumptions frame notions 
of security because discursive constructions have consequences. The Bush 
administration has used public enthusiasm for its conservative foreign policy 
to push through conservative domestic policies as well. As Drew notes, the 
administration’s “budget priorities and legislative initiatives . . . disproportion-
ately target women, children, the poor and citizens of color” (76). Tax cuts, for 
example, have been enacted at the expense of social welfare programs; federal 
aid for community assistance has been redirected to “faith-based initiatives,” 
and reproductive rights have been significantly curtailed during Bush’s years 
in office. The situation is even worse for those women “liberated” by the U.S. 
military in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to being virtually excluded from 
the reconstruction process, they have been targeted by fundamentalist groups 
struggling with one another and with weaker secular forces for power. In both 
cases, initial political and social gains have given way to chronic personal in-
security and political marginalization.5
In Iraq, for example, feminist politicians and political organizations have 
been excluded from the political process in favor of conservative women’s 
groups willing to subordinate women’s rights to national security or Islamic 
identity. Women have been subjected to kidnapping, rape, and assault and con-
fined to their homes or forced to assume the veil to escape being targeted. Basic 
necessities—food, water, electricity, and health care—are scarce, and education 
has been disrupted. The situation has become so bad that some Iraqi women 
now warn their children to behave by shouting, “Quiet, or I’ll call democracy” 
(Zangana). Here is the real danger of continuing to value masculinized tough-
ness and militarized hegemony as a means of regenerating national identity 
and achieving national security. Democracy will become a bogeyman to be 
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feared rather than a political ideal to be pursued, and “spreading freedom” 
will come to look a lot like spreading terror, especially to women.
POSTSCRIPT
On 24 April 2007, four years after her rescue, Jessica Lynch appeared before 
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to testify about 
the military’s use of her story for propaganda purposes. With grace and aplomb, 
Lynch once again denied her status as a hero and criticized the administration 
and the media for substituting “hype” for “truth.” “I am still confused as to 
why they chose to lie and try to make me a legend,” she said, “when the real 
heroics of my fellow soldiers that day were legendary.” She went on to celebrate 
the actions of the soldiers in her unit who stopped to pick up “fellow soldiers 
in harm’s way” and who “actually did fight until the very end.” “My hero,” she 
said, “is every American who says ‘my country needs me’ and answers that call 
to fight.” She concluded by upbraiding the military commanders and the media 
for underestimating the intelligence of the American public and demeaning 
the actions of the soldiers in the field by imagining they had to be embellished 
in order to register as heroic: “The bottom line is the American people are 
capable of determining their own . . . ideals for heroes, and they don’t need 
to be told elaborate lies. . . . The truth of war is not always easy, but the truth 
is always more heroic than the hype.”6
Lynch appears before the House Committee on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform, chaired by Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), 24 April 2007.
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Lynch’s testimony was forceful in its condemnation of the military’s 
manipulation of the media for propaganda purposes. Yet her version of the 
rescue narrative does not differ substantially from the original; it just shifts 
the locus of heroism from herself to her fellow soldiers. By failing to question 
the viability of the “hero frame” (she uses the word hero seven times during 
her seven minutes of testimony), Lynch ultimately reinforces the “hype” and 
makes it more effective because it is less apparently calculated. The center of 
the war story is still the U.S. soldier, the “noble grunt” who alone is capable of 
heroism and worthy of empathy (Aufderheide 81). Although no one can blame 
Lynch for celebrating the heroics of her compatriots, who did in fact show great 
courage under extreme duress, the use of the hero frame obscures more of the 
“truth” of war than it reveals. The romanticization of the war hero ultimately 
depoliticizes the conflict, reducing it to “an emotional drama of embattled 
individual survival” (Aufderheide 86). Locating the U.S. soldier at the center 
of the narrative not only marginalizes the other actors in the political drama 
(diplomatic agents and allies, enemy soldiers, civilian casualties of war, and 
so forth); it effaces the political context of war entirely. This is not history but 
melodrama. Such tales are not informative; they are therapeutic (Aufderheide 
89). Their purpose is to rehabilitate the U.S. mission in Iraq.
Given the United States’ ambiguous motives for invading Iraq, and the 
ambivalence about continuing the mission four years later, the obsessive focus 
on the soldier’s perspective in documentary and tabloid treatments of the war 
is not at all surprising. It offers a way of sidestepping moral questions about the 
necessity, legality, and effects of the war in Iraq. In that sense, it is the logical 
extension of the practice of media embedding, which, by aligning journalists lit-
erally behind the troops, encourages the public to get behind them figuratively. 
As Tony Grajeda explains, the focus on the “noble grunt” in such coverage, and 
in the many subsequent documentary treatments of the war in Iraq,7 creates 
an “uneven distribution of affect, in which the victimization of ‘our boys [and 
girls]’ over there” supplants consideration of the agency of the soldiers in the 
destruction around them. Indeed, as I have argued, it is the narcissistic focus 
on the soldier’s perspective that enables the U.S. military invasion of Iraq to 
assume the appearance of an innocent defense (or rescue) of civilization in 
the first place. This inversion of the real power dynamics (the transformation 
of an invasion into an ambush) encourages individuals to forget the motives 
for and effects of U.S. military violence. Thus, the choice to focus on the noble 
grunt is not politically innocent or lacking in repercussions.
Yet, as the recent hearings into battlefield misinformation illustrate, 
the political repercussions of the noble-grunt approach are unpredictable. 
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The reduction of major political events to human-interest stories obviously 
oversimplifies complex social and political phenomena and, by encouraging 
cultural amnesia, sets the stage for the future repetition of past mistakes. But 
focusing on the suffering of the individual soldier in war can backfire as well. 
When the public perceives that their beloved “heroes” have been mistreated by 
military and governmental institutions, they can turn against these institutions 
and their representatives. Political scientist Matthew Baum argues that “soft” 
coverage of foreign policy crises may even promote isolationism and politi-
cal apathy among a populace cued by the human-interest frame to interpret 
events in individualistic terms. The translation of social problems into personal 
tragedies, he argues, reinforces a belief in the powerlessness of individuals to 
effect social change (258). The best that can be hoped for in such stories is 
that the individual will rise above his or her circumstances—or “survive,” in 
the parlance of the noble-grunt tale. The circumstances themselves appear 
unchangeable, and the idea that institutions or governments can intervene 
successfully to alter the context of tragedy becomes unthinkable.
Baum’s studies document an “inverse relationship between exposure to 
soft news programming and support for a proactive or multilateral approach 
to US foreign policy,” especially among politically inattentive segments of the 
population (287). If his studies are correct, then the real danger of the ma-
nipulation of stories like Jessica Lynch’s is that it will undermine the political 
will necessary to counter terrorism on a global scale. Tales of heroism obviously 
tell certain truths about war, but those truths are partial and highly partisan, 
promoting an uncritical linkage among militarism, masculinity, and national 
security that nourishes cultural narcissism and leads to self-defeat. A fuller 
accounting of the effects of the militarization of counterterrorism—on both 
U.S. soldiers and the casualties of U.S. violence—is necessary if the United 
States hopes to sustain a global coalition willing to address this shared security 
problem. Hopefully, Representative Henry Waxman’s hearings on battlefield 
misinformation signal the beginning of this difficult but essential process of 
historical reckoning. The truth of war is not always easy, as Lynch says, but only 
an honest appraisal of the politics of war can sustain the cooperative relations 
needed to address the global social problems that inspire acts of terrorism.
NOTES
This essay originally appeared in Feminist Media Studies 5.3 (Nov. 2005): 297–310.
1. For an analysis of how this convergence of interests resulted in an exaggerated 
rescue story, see Kampfner; Ritea; and Sussman.
2. On breaking news coverage, see McDonald and Lawrence and Reynolds and 
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Barnett. On op-ed pieces, see Lule. On advertising, see Campbell. See also the essays 
collected in the volumes Framing Terrorism (Norris, Kern, and Just) and Communication 
and Terrorism (Greenberg).
3. Melani McAlister and Emily Rosenberg have likewise noted the similarity be-
tween the captivity narrative and the Bush administration’s rhetorical legitimation of 
the war in Afghanistan.
4. In a Middle Eastern context, Palestine refers to the land now occupied by the 
countries of Israel and Jordan. On the one hand, the name of the West Virginia town 
invokes the multicultural character of the nation. It is a reminder of the politics of affili-
ation that have defined citizenship for most of the nation’s history. On the other hand, 
it invokes the biblical reference to Palestine as the Jewish homeland, which has been 
used to legitimate Zionist claims to the lands now known as Israel (and to delegitimate 
the claims of the Arabs living in those territories). Palestine, in this sense, embodies 
the sense of national identity as a matter of destiny—of blood and soil—rather than 
political choice. Given the strong support Israel enjoys in the United States, especially 
among evangelical Christian communities of the type depicted as central to life in 
Palestine, West Virginia, the latter meaning seems to prevail over the former. Palestine 
functions, in other words, to naturalize national identity and community as a matter 
of blood and soil. On support for Israel among evangelical Christians in the United 
States, see McAlister.
5. For information on the status of both Afghan and Iraqi women’s rights post 
invasion, see the Web site for the international human rights organization MADRE 
<http://www.madre.org/>.
6. Lynch’s testimony can be viewed in its entirety on the CNN Web site <http://
www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/04/24/tillman.hearing/index.html> or on YouTube 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0OyihqYfF4>.
7. Grajeda analyzes the films Gunner Palace (2003) and Occupation: Dreamland 
(2005), but the argument holds for the more recent War Tapes (2006) as well. War Tapes 
provides the soldier’s view of war, as it was composed using footage shot by soldiers 
themselves. Reality TV series such as Profiles from the Front Lines (ABC) and Off to War 
(Discovery Channel) employ a similar approach, to similar effect. Each of these films 
or series details the life of a grunt in Afghanistan or Iraq. They “celebrate survival as a 
form of heroism” and present “cynicism as a form of self-preservation” (Aufderheide 
84). They also evacuate the politics of war, even as they permit the cast of soldiers to 
express a range of political views on the war. In the end, professionalism trumps politics, 
and war is reduced to a matter of individual perseverance, or “survival.”
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It is surely not a coincidence that French film theorist André Bazin wrote some 
of his most famous and lasting works about the nature of the cinema during 
the last calendar year of World War II. Bazin’s argument that “photography 
and the cinema . . . are discoveries that satisfy, once and for all and in its very 
essence, our obsession with realism” (12) came directly on the heels of a 
seemingly apocalyptic world war, the vast horrors of which were captured and 
preserved in various forms of moving and still photography. Bazin’s theories 
about the mechanical nature of the cinema suggest a direct link between the 
images captured and their objects—a connection that, in his words, “embalms 
time.” In this view, the images of actual catastrophic events, especially moving 
images, carry a special charge—a remnant of the event itself.
This charge is particularly true of the video images of the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, an event that ranks among 
the most documented national traumas in U.S. history. The phrase “It was 
just like a movie” has been used to describe not only the hyperreal images of 
the jetliners crashing into the buildings but also the scene on the ground in 
the aftermath, which some witnesses described as looking just like a movie 
set teeming with cameras and chaos. The world has seen these images over 
and over again, from virtually every angle imaginable, played and replayed ad 
infinitum and, perhaps, ad nauseam. Even the first plane hitting the North 
Tower, which many thought had gone unrecorded, has serendipitously shown 
up in three different videos.1
All this imagery with which we are so familiar resides in the realm of 
actuality—recorded footage of the actual event. But what would happen if that 
event were to be re-created for the camera? What happens to 9/11 imagery, 
so ubiquitous and so devastatingly familiar, when it is represented, rather than 
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simply presented ? In this sense, there is a simple, dichotomous difference be-
tween presentation and representation, with the former defined as unaltered 
documentary footage of an actual occurrence and the latter defined as the 
re-creation of an event using cinematic means such as special effects, actors, 
and scripted actions.
For some time, the thought of representing 9/11 imagery was anathema, 
much like Claude Lanzmann’s views about representing the Holocaust. As 
Lanzmann, the director of Shoah (1985), the landmark nine-hour documen-
tary about the Holocaust, put it, the Holocaust is “above all unique in that it 
erects a ring of fire around itself. . . . Fiction is a transgression. I deeply believe 
that there are some things that cannot and should not be represented” (Hart-
man 84). And, in the days immediately after 9/11, broad sentiment about the 
representability of the events of that day was similar. The idea of a Hollywood 
film re-creating those events was unthinkable, even to the point that any film 
that depicted terrorist violence was deemed suspect.2 Video footage of the 
events of 9/11 had, of course, been repeatedly viewed on televisions around 
An American nightmare—the trauma of 9/11.
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the world, but to represent them in a film with special effects and intentional 
artistry seemed beyond the pale—simply unthinkable. And for almost five 
years, that remained the case.
The year 2006 witnessed the release of the first two major Hollywood films 
about 9/11 within a few months of each other: Paul Greengrass’s United 93  and 
Oliver Stone’s World Trade Center. United 93, the first of the two films to arrive in 
U.S. theaters (it premiered on 28 April), tells the story of the United Airlines 
flight that was hijacked but never made it to its intended target (thought to be 
the White House). The passengers, having learned of the two American Air-
lines flights that were flown into the World Trade Center, revolted, causing the 
plane to crash into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing all aboard. 
Greengrass and cinematographer Barry Ackroyd boldly shot the film in the same 
immediate, handheld style as Blood Sunday (2002), Greengrass’s film about the 
1972 British massacre of Irish civil rights protesters. As filmmaker Greg Marcks 
notes, “Few filmmakers would have even attempted a cinéma vérité approach 
to such charged subject matter, let alone succeeded so well” (3). The film takes 
place in virtual real time, cutting between the events on board United Flight 93 
and the commotion on the ground. The film re-creates what might have hap-
pened on the flight, based on extensive research that included interviews with 
the families of all forty passengers killed. Based on these interviews, a dossier 
was created for each passenger, and these were given to the actors in lieu of a 
traditional script (Marcks). Roughly half the film takes place inside various air 
control facilities in New York and Ohio, as well as the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) command center in Herndon, Virginia, and the Northeast Air 
Defense Sector base in Rome, New York. In these scenes, nine of the people 
who were there that day play themselves, including Ben Sliney, an FAA national 
operations manager whose first day on the job was 9/11.
World Trade Center  tells the story of two Port Authority police officers, John 
McLoughlin (Nicolas Cage) and Will Jimeno (Michael Peña), who were two 
of only nineteen people to be pulled out of the rubble of the Twin Towers 
alive. The film depicts with frightening detail what it would have been like to 
be inside the towers as they came crashing down, although most of the story 
involves McLoughlin and Jimeno being trapped twenty feet beneath chunks of 
concrete and twisted metal beams while their families wait to find out whether 
they are dead or alive. World Trade Center also depicts the rescue attempts that 
began in the immediate aftermath, especially the tireless efforts of marine 
staff sergeant Dave Karnes (Michael Shannon), who went to Ground Zero 
independently and was responsible for discovering McLoughlin and Jimeno’s 
whereabouts.
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Much was made about the release of each film. There were anguished 
protests from New York viewers, who yelled “Too soon!” at the screen during 
a United 93 trailer. Also, there was Stone’s apparent volte-face in his ideological 
stance in making a 9/11 film about heroism, family, and loyalty rather than a 
radical, both-sides exploration of the event, as he infamously mused about at 
an HBO Films panel a little more than a month after 9/11.
This chapter considers the ramifications of representing 9/11 in Hollywood 
theatrical feature films versus television documentaries, scores of which have 
aired repeatedly with little or no controversy over the past five years. For Ameri-
cans, 9/11 was a historical trauma that has neither the chronological distance 
of years nor the physical distance of geography to ease the burden of memory. 
Films that tackle 9/11, whether documentaries or features, must deal first and 
foremost with that trauma and what it means. Television documentaries have 
approached 9/11 concretely, either as a harrowing ordeal that must be relived 
again and again so that it can be mastered or as a historical event the details of 
which must be deconstructed and therefore understood. Hollywood feature 
films, in contrast, have focused on reassuring emotional concepts such as hero-
ism and resilience in an attempt to transcend the horrors of that day.
P
h
o
to
fe
st
John McLoughlin (Nicholas Cage) and Will Jimeno (Michael Peña) enter the World 
Trade Center in Oliver Stone’s World Trade Center.
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TELEVISION DOCUMENTARIES: THE POWER OF PRESENTING
Because the attacks of 9/11 were broadcast live on all the major television 
networks and every cable news channel, the event itself and its televisual pre-
sentation quickly became inextricably intertwined. For millions of Americans 
and millions more around the world, as soon as the images of dark smoke 
billowing out of the impact zone on the ninety-second through ninety-eighth 
floors of Tower One were broadcast on television, the event and its presenta-
tion became one in the same. The fiery explosions as the planes hit the tow-
ers and the expanding gray clouds of dust as the mighty structures collapsed 
became metonyms for the event as a whole, and that connection has persisted 
ever since.
Television has relived the events of that morning in every conceivable for-
mat: documentaries focusing on the experiences of those who lived through 
the attacks, staged re-creations, detailed structural analyses of why the buildings 
“pancaked” in progressive collapse. In the years since 9/11, there is no angle 
that television has not covered. But regardless of the focus, every program 
returns almost compulsively to the imagery of the towers exploding and col-
lapsing. Normally, it is considered taboo to show actual death on-screen, but 
documentaries and news outlets have readily showed the towers crashing down, 
killing thousands of people in the process. The acceptable limits of what can 
be presented in terms of the violence of that day are rigidly proscribed, how-
ever. For instance, all the documentaries that aired on U.S. television shied 
away from showing those who chose to leap to their deaths actually hitting the 
ground. Several documentaries, notably the National Geographic Channel’s 
Inside 9/11 (2005), show detailed images captured with zoom lenses of people 
leaping—some so close that one can almost make out their facial expressions. 
But the closest any of them comes to depicting the inevitable end are the 
sounds of bodies landing in CBS’s 9/11.
The days surrounding the five-year anniversary of 9/11 illustrate the 
breadth and depth of television coverage. All the network morning news shows 
dedicated themselves to the five-year anniversary and attendant ceremonies. 
Cable news channels MSNBC, Fox News, and CNN committed much of their 
daily coverage to remembering 9/11, and CNN’s Web site even posted a con-
tinuous feed of its unedited news coverage of the day for those who wanted to 
relive the televisual experience. Many of the major cable networks, including 
the History Channel, the National Geographic Channel, and CourtTV, aired 
new documentaries about 9/11 and its aftermath; Alessandra Stanley of the 
New York Times listed eighteen programs, both new and reruns, as a “sample” 
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of what television would be offering in the days surrounding the five-year an-
niversary and called 9/11 “the tragedy you can’t avoid.” The Discovery Chan-
nel aired After 9/11: Rebuilding Lives, one of many programs focusing on the 
survivors and how they were affected by the event, as well as Inside the Twin 
Towers, which mixes interviews with those who escaped the burning buildings 
with staged re-creations of what they experienced. The only program to at-
tract any significant controversy was ABC’s two-night docudrama Path to 9/11 
(2006), which re-creates the events leading up to the terrorist attacks from 
the perspective of government officials, many of whom felt that they were 
unfairly portrayed.
It is significant that Path to 9/11 was the only program to sustain notable 
criticism because, with the exception of Inside the Twin Towers, it was the only 
one to rely entirely on “representing” rather than “presenting.” That is, it 
eschewed the documentary approach and re-created the events surrounding 
9/11 in a way familiar to Hollywood feature films based on real-life events: by 
compressing time, using composite characters, fabricating dialogue, and specu-
lating about why historical figures made the decisions they did. A disclaimer 
preceding the film admitted as much: “For dramatic and narrative purposes 
the movie contains fictionalized scenes, composite and representative char-
acters and dialogue, as well as time compression.” Following widely reported 
charges from Clinton administration officials that the miniseries was factually 
incorrect, some significant edits were made to the version circulated among 
television critics two weeks prior to its air date, but no amount of editing could 
change the fundamental fact that Path to 9/11 is a re-creation. Therein lies the 
difference between it and most other 9/11 programming, which relied almost 
entirely on documentary footage and talking-head interviews with survivors 
and various experts.
The most direct presentation of the events of 11 September is found in the 
CBS documentary 9/11, which originally aired six months after its eponymous 
date and was replayed one night before the fifth anniversary (it had also been 
available on DVD since September 2002). There was some attendant contro-
versy when the documentary was first announced. Families of 9/11 victims 
argued that it might exploit the tragedy for ratings and that, at the very least, 
it was being aired too soon. Most TV critics and pundits praised 9/11, and even 
those who questioned the appropriateness of the film before seeing it agreed 
that it was in no way exploitative, although many still maintained that it was 
“too soon” (Trigoboff).
In an editorial in Broadcasting & Cable, the editors opined that 9/11 was 
“one of the most affecting pieces of television in memory” (“How to Remem-
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ber 9/11” 30). Part of the documentary’s power is its “accidental” quality. The 
film exists only because two French filmmakers, brothers Gédéon and Jules 
Naudet, happened to be making a documentary about a rookie firefighter 
in Manhattan’s Engine 7/Ladder 1 Company. By pure chance, while shoot-
ing that documentary, Jules Naudet caught the first plane hitting the North 
Tower, one of only three video recordings of that event. Their cameras then 
recorded the firefighters rushing to the World Trade Center and provided the 
only known footage from inside the lobby of the North Tower from the time 
the firefighters arrived until the collapse of the South Tower. The film then 
continues, chronicling the mostly failed rescue efforts in the following weeks 
and the firefighters’ gradual return to some sense of normalcy. 
The imagery in 9/11 is the best example of pure presentation in the docu-
mentary sense. There is nothing aesthetically pleasing or organized about it; 
it has the kind of rough, shaky, immediate sense of presence that cuts right 
through any boundaries between spectator and screen. It is, for most people, 
the closest they will ever come to experiencing firsthand what it was like to be 
in close proximity to what would eventually be known as Ground Zero.
Jules Naudet’s video footage from inside the North Tower when the South 
Tower collapsed provides a frighteningly direct experience: the ominous rum-
ble of the faltering building, the overwhelming sense of panic that followed, 
and the sudden envelopment in the darkness of concrete dust and debris. Both 
Gédéon and Jules recorded the collapse of the North Tower from the streets 
outside, and the imagery suggests the experience of being inside a tornado. 
The footage of the collapsing towers is presented unedited and unadorned; 
there is no extradiegetic music to heighten the experience, and the film does 
not cut away from Gédéon and Jules wiping off their dust-streaked lenses or 
moments when the complete chaos and violence make it impossible to know 
what is happening. It presents the horrifying events in the most direct terms 
possible through the camera—something the filmmakers seem to be keenly 
aware of, at least in retrospect. In his voice-over narration, Jules discusses his 
thoughts as he walked through the ashen streets following the collapse of the 
South Tower: “I knew there was nothing I could really do. I mean, I was not a 
fireman, had absolutely no medical expertise at all. I was just a civilian. But, 
as a cameraman—yeah, there was something I could do, and it was to look at 
what was happening. So the cameraman took over, just filmed.”
Jules essentially collapses the distinction between his eye and the camera’s 
eye, suggesting that his instincts as a filmmaker brought him to a place of pure 
presentation—collecting on video direct memories that are unmediated by 
aesthetic decisions or even thought itself. Later in the film, Jules returns to this 
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mind-set during his footage at the firehouse as the firefighters return, noting, 
“The cameraman came back. Just filming.”
Yet, for all the immediacy of 9/11, it still bears the hallmarks of a con-
structed film. It is purposefully edited to create meaning through juxtaposi-
tion. It includes footage not shot by the Naudet brothers that allows the film 
to witness the details of the collapsing towers. There are several points in the 
film that include nondiegetic musical accompaniment, primarily haunting 
choral music, that is clearly intended to guide the viewer’s emotional experi-
ence. The imagery is also interpreted via voice-over narration, much of which 
comes from those who experienced the event firsthand—Gédéon and Jules 
and the firefighters. The majority of the voice-over, however, is provided by 
Jim Hanlon, a firefighter who was a member of Engine 7/Ladder 1 Company 
but was not working on 11 September.
Nevertheless, even with these markers of constructedness, 9/11 maintains 
an intensely immediate aura that haunts the film. The presence of the cameras 
at the moments of collapse is the very definition of presentation that no Hol-
lywood film could ever hope to duplicate, which is quite possibly why it took 
so long for a feature film to even try.
HOLLYWOOD FILMS: REPRESENTING HEROISM
Despite the prevalence of programs about 9/11 on television, the U.S. feature 
film industry waited nearly half a decade before it ventured into similar wa-
ters, and when it did, its approach to the material was significantly different. 
While the television documentaries tended to either relive or dissect the events 
of 9/11—what happened, how it happened, to whom it happened, why it 
happened—the first two Hollywood feature films, United 93 and World Trade 
Center, approached 9/11 as a metaphor for coping with national trauma and 
elided direct reference to the most iconic images of the attacks.
Prior to Vietnam, Hollywood’s depiction of America’s wars had begun 
virtually in tandem with the wars themselves, if not before. For example, as 
soon as President Woodrow Wilson began preparing the United States to enter 
World War I, Hollywood ceased production of films that reflected the nation’s 
previous antiwar sentiments and began producing films that “project[ed] he-
roic images of battle” and “incite[d] a fighting spirit” (Rollins 109). Similarly, 
Hollywood worked with the Office of War Information throughout World 
War II to produce a steady stream of war films that “played an important role 
in sustaining morale and optimism” (Fyne 126). Later, as Julian Smith shows 
in Looking Away: Hollywood and Vietnam, Hollywood shied away from dealing 
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directly with Vietnam during the war itself for a number of reasons, including 
a growing rift between the film industry and the military, a series of aborted 
projects by well-known directors in the 1960s, and, most important, “a general 
disinclination to get involved in a brouhaha unless a significant opportunity 
for profit is involved” (20).
More than any of these reasons, though, Smith argues that Vietnam as 
a subject was simply too difficult for Hollywood filmmakers to grapple with 
effectively, especially during the war itself: “Vietnam’s disorienting effect on 
our society, the indeterminate nature of that war we couldn’t seem to win or 
abandon, was reflected in our filmmakers’ inability to find an appropriate 
format for presenting the war to a mass audience” (22). It seemed that 9/11 
would be the opposite of Vietnam because, as a clear-cut, Pearl Harbor kind 
of crisis, it brought the country together in a unified desire to overcome the 
trauma. Yet 9/11 also posed many of the same problems as Vietnam in terms of 
cinematic representation, particularly its lack of a fitting conclusion. Any film 
about 9/11 that did not engage the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq (in 2001 and 2003, respectively) would have to end with the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, American symbols of capitalism and military power, 
in smoking ruins—hardly the stuff of box office gold. In this sense, then, 9/11 
was just as “indeterminate” as Vietnam, particularly as popular comparisons 
of that war and the war in Iraq began to intensify.
A few films prior to 2006 dealt with 9/11, but indirectly. It was like the 
specter of Vietnam in 1960s films, which Smith describes as going “under-
ground in the movies, tunneling into our subconscious, a true phantom of 
Hollywood, surfacing in strange places, taking off its mask only briefly” (25). 
Spike Lee’s 25th Hour (2002) was the first Hollywood production to reference 
the shadow of 9/11 in its story about an upscale drug dealer’s final twenty-four 
hours of freedom before surrendering himself to a seven-year jail sentence. 
Lee uses imagery of the gaping hole in the middle of Manhattan where the 
World Trade Center once stood as an all-encompassing metaphor for both 
the pain of life and hope for the future. The Guys (2003), a feature film based 
on Anne Nelson’s play about a New York City journalist helping a fire captain 
pay tribute to the men he lost on 9/11, is essentially a drama about 9/11’s 
emotional aftermath, not the event itself (the same can be said of Rescue Me, 
Denis Leary’s successful television series on FX about emotionally scarred post-
9/11 New York firefighters). The Guys had minimal impact on the film-going 
public, however, because its release was limited to seventeen theaters, where 
it played a mere three weeks. In War of the Worlds (2005), Steven Spielberg 
takes an even more indirect approach by appropriating 9/11 imagery to give 
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new resonance to his reinterpretation of H. G. Wells’s science fiction classic 
about alien invasion. The shattered, flaming remains of a downed airplane, 
with the bodies still strapped into the seats; victims reduced instantly to ash by 
alien lasers; and teary-eyed family members posting quickly made signs with 
the pictures of missing loved ones are just a few of the film’s most strikingly 
associative images.
Although United 93 and World Trade Center both deal directly with the events 
that took place on the morning of 11 September, they largely eschew depictions 
of the attacks. World Trade Center avoids it completely, depicting the attacks 
from the point of view of the men and women on the ground, which results in 
little more than a passing shadow before the sound of a crash. United 93 also 
takes a point-of-view approach, depicting the crash of American Airlines Flight 
11, which hit the North Tower, as a blip that simply disappears from an air traf-
fic controller’s computer monitor. This both avoids the need to re-create the 
explosion via special effects and creates a haunting, metaphoric image: as the 
indexical sign of the plane suddenly vanishes, so do ninety-two lives, suggesting 
with terrible power just how quickly life can end. United 93 does appropriate 
Ben Sliney (playing himself ) monitors the chaos as FA A national operations manager 
in Paul Greengrass’s United 93.
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actual news footage of United Airlines Flight 75 hitting the South Tower, but 
again, from the point of view of the air traffic controllers and military person-
nel who were coming to terms with what was happening.
The general eliding of direct visual references to the attacks themselves, 
and the complete refusal to re-create them using special effects, is crucial 
because it shifts the focus away from the violence inflicted on the United 
States by foreign enemies and turns instead to stories of heroism, unity, and 
resilience that can be used as models for how to endure the unthinkable. 
United 93 and World Trade Center are not about the attacks of 9/11 so much as 
how to overcome them.
On the surface, the two films are stridently different. United 93 is a verité-
style account of the doomed United Airlines flight that crashed in a Pennsyl-
vania field and the actions taken by both the aviation industry and the U.S. 
military on the morning of 9/11; it features a cast of unknown actors, most of 
whom were drawn from the New York theater scene, as well as several real-life 
people who were involved in 9/11 playing themselves. In many ways, United 93 
brings to mind the harrowing post–World War II films of Polish director Andrez 
Wajda, especially Kanal (1956), which recounts the failed Warsaw Uprising of 
1944 and famously opens with a narrator introducing us to the “heroes of the 
tragedy” and then telling us ominously, “Watch them closely, for these are the 
last hours of their lives.” The film’s power derives from many sources, but none 
so strong as the knowledge of how it will all turn out. Director Paul Greengrass 
appears to be less interested in developing suspense than in developing a feel-
ing of unmitigated dread. Yet it is this very sense of dread that is key to the 
film’s underlying message about American unity and resilience.
The film takes place in virtual real time, cutting between the events on 
board United Flight 93—the only one of the four hijacked planes not to strike 
its intended target—and the commotion on the ground. As much as 9/11 was 
a worldwide mediated event, with virtually every second of terror played and 
replayed on television, Greengrass manages to evoke new horrors by going 
inside the confusion, showing how the scenario was slowly and belatedly pieced 
together by those who were in a position to possibly do something about it. 
There are scenes inside various air control facilities, each of which is a portrait 
of chaos and frustrating bewilderment. The film is surprisingly blunt in show-
ing how unprepared the designated guardians of the United States—both the 
military and the aviation industry—were for such an event.
World Trade Center, in contrast, has been described by numerous critics as 
being more like a Ron Howard than an Oliver Stone film.3 Stone’s previous, of-
ten intensely adversarial films about recent U.S. history include Platoon (1986), 
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which uses a grunt’s-eye view of the Vietnam War to explore the generational 
divide of the 1960s; Wall Street (1987), which is intensely critical of Reagan-era 
capitalism; JFK (1991), which posits a complex web of governmental-military-
criminal conspiracies to explain the assassination of John F. Kennedy; and 
Natural Born Killers (1994), which explores the interrelationship between 
high-profile violent crime and the media. World Trade Center is stylistically and 
ideologically removed from these earlier films, with the death and destruction 
being carefully restricted to fall within the parameters of a PG-13 rating and 
the horrors of the day ameliorated through the transcendence of two survivors. 
The careful curbing of violence in the film is never more evident than in its 
treatment of the estimated one hundred or more people in the World Trade 
Center who made the agonizing decision to leap thousands of feet to their 
deaths rather than be consumed by smoke and flames. This terrible reality is 
reduced to one quick image of a lone figure falling from the top of one of the 
towers. The potential power of this image is circumscribed by both the poor 
special effects used to produce it and the obviousness of its function: much like 
the classical Hollywood tendency to use an artful trickle of blood to represent 
severe bodily damage, this lone plummeting figure is an insufficient symbolic 
stand-in for a grisly reality that resists representation.
World Trade Center is a much more traditional Hollywood production than 
United 93, particularly with its cast of well-known and respectable actors such 
as Nicolas Cage, Maggie Gyllenhaal, and Maria Bello. The focus of the story 
is on individuals, particularly John McLoughlin and Will Jimeno, two real-life 
Port Authority cops who, along with hundreds of other firefighters and rescue 
workers, went into the burning towers and were buried in them. McLoughlin 
and Jimeno were in the concourse between the two buildings when the South 
Tower collapsed, and they were buried twenty feet down in the rubble, badly 
injured but alive. The film moves back and forth between their physically ago-
nizing experiences immobilized beneath tons of concrete and twisted metal 
and the emotionally agonizing experiences of their families back home.
Despite their surface differences, United 93 and World Trade Center share 
a number of characteristics in common. Both films are built around themes 
of heroism and resilience, although they address these themes with distinctly 
different attitudes that barely mask an uneasy subtext about helplessness. Both 
films have simple, uncomplicated titles with a direct, denotative connection to 
their stories’ physical settings, which in turn are crucial signifiers of the entirety 
of  9/11. Each title is also a metaphor about the American condition post 9/11. 
United 93  is the more obvious, with the name of the corporation that owned the 
doomed airliner conveniently suggesting unity, the ultimate virtue in post-9/11 
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America. It should come as little surprise that the film’s producers opted to go 
with the title United 93 rather than the original working title, Flight 93.
The title of World Trade Center is even more direct in linking story with 
location, in this case an iconic American landmark that, in the wake of its 
destruction, is now understood first and foremost as the primary symbol of 
America’s loss on 9/11. The Twin Towers, their functional, modernist design 
once derided as a blight on the Manhattan skyline when they were first erected 
in the mid-1970s, were almost immediately replaced in the days following 9/11 
with giant beams of light stretching up into the night sky. Although the film 
focuses on two people trapped beneath the rubble, the title World Trade Center 
stands as both a monument to loss and a metaphor for the powerlessness and 
inaction the country felt in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
In one sense, World Trade Center derives from a long legacy of American 
filmmaking about ordinary people surviving against all odds; it is a classic un-
derdog story, fitting neatly into the cherished American ideal of the strength of 
the individual. John McLoughlin and Will Jimeno survive despite their crushed, 
broken bodies and their inability to move because they want to reclaim their 
lives; the terrorists can damage them physically, but not spiritually. Stone evokes 
these feelings by visualizing McLoughlin and Jimeno’s thoughts and memories 
of American ideals: home, family, religion. At one point McLoughlin imagines 
his wife literally urging him to survive, while the supportive power of Jimeno’s 
Catholicism finds visual representation in a hallucination of Christ bringing 
him a bottle of water. It is not incidental that Stone ends the film several years 
after 9/11, with McLoughlin and Jimeno, their bodies healed after dozens of 
surgeries, celebrating life with their families at a large picnic. The film fades to 
black on an image of Jimeno holding aloft the child his wife was pregnant with 
when he was buried in the rubble, giving the film an appropriately uplifting 
conclusion: despite the most devastating historical events, life goes on.
World Trade Center  also embraces individualism and determination through 
the character of Dave Karnes, a retired marine staff sergeant who went to 
Ground Zero independently and was responsible for discovering McLoughlin 
and Jimeno through his own tenacity and refusal to stop searching. The film 
aligns Karnes with the same ideals associated with the trapped firemen: religion 
(he is in a church when he decides to head to New York), family (he calls his 
sister with instructions on how to relay his whereabouts to the authorities), and 
patriotism (his commitment to his country transcends his official status as a 
marine). Karnes is the quintessential American fighting man—stoic, intense, 
and refusing to give up even when others do. He alleviates the film’s otherwise 
intense feeling of claustrophobia and helplessness, suggesting that Americans 
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will always come to the aid of other Americans during times of crisis. Karnes 
also provides World Trade Center  with its most blatant political message when he 
declares that some good men are needed to “avenge” what happened on 9/11. 
This line of dialogue, though falling neatly in line with Hollywood cinema’s 
long-standing use of righteous vengeance as a narrative device, also clearly 
suggests a linkage to the subsequent invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq 
and contradicts Stone’s assertions that World Trade Center is an apolitical film.
United 93’s depictions of heroism and resilience are significantly more 
ambivalent than World Trade Center ’s, especially as embodied by Karnes. This 
is surprising, given that United 93 depicts direct action—Americans fighting 
back against their enemies—while World Trade Center focuses on immobility 
and entrapment. Although the passenger revolt aboard United Flight 93 was 
the one instance of American retaliation during the attacks of 9/11, United 
93 does not turn it into a call to arms. In fact, many viewers found the film 
disheartening, especially in comparison to World Trade Center. Rabbi Mayer 
Schiller, a teacher at Yeshiva University High School for Boys, was interviewed 
after seeing World Trade Center and said, “It showed the good that people can 
The “group” as hero: United 93’s passengers prepare to roll.
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do. I feel that life has heroes. It’s unlike the one about the plane [United 93]—
that took you and left you devastated” (Lee 2). Like so many viewers, Schiller 
was looking for uplifting, uncomplicated representations of heroism, which 
United 93 does not provide. Instead, Greengrass takes the same approach that 
he did in Bloody Sunday (2002), which he describes in that film’s DVD audio 
commentary: “It’s not treated in this kind of great, heroic way. It just is what 
it is” (quoted in Marcks 3).
Widely reported in the press, the most memorable statement made by 
anyone on the morning of 9/11 was a passenger on United Flight 93: Todd 
Beamer, an Oracle Inc. executive from Hightstown, New Jersey, said to the other 
passengers right before they made their move against the hijackers, “Are you 
guys ready? Let’s roll.” “Let’s roll” became a patriotic call to arms in the days 
and weeks following 9/11, a metonym for collective national sentiments about 
American heroism and self-sacrifice in the face of unmitigated evil. President 
George W. Bush even incorporated it into his State of the Union address on 29 
January 2002: “For too long our culture has said, ‘If it feels good, do it.’ Now 
America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: ‘Let’s roll.’” Yet writer-
director Greengrass avoids centralizing such sentiments by downplaying the 
line to the point that it is easy to miss. Instead of showing the passengers as a 
clear-eyed, nationalistic fighting force, the film presents them as a group of 
terrified people facing certain death and making a hasty decision to determine 
their own fate. There is no overstated sense of idealized heroism or national 
duty but rather the true heroism of combat: the jittery, horrifying sense of 
one’s own death approaching, but being brave enough to tackle it head-on 
rather than accept it without resistance.
In this sense, United 93 is explicit in its focus on ordinary Americans. Its 
collective cast of businessmen, flight attendants, vacationing couples, and 
other everyday travelers who had no idea what was in store for them when 
they boarded the plane heightens the Hollywood war film’s tendency to focus 
on soldiers as ordinary men in extraordinary situations. Interestingly, the film 
focuses less on the individual characters than on the group character, again 
reifying the significance of the word united in the title. The centrality of the 
group character is contrary to classical Hollywood narrative, which almost 
uniformly places importance on the individual hero(ine) and how he or she 
stands out from everyone else. United 93 is closer in spirit to the group hero as 
embodied in Soviet silent films such as Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin 
(1925); in the chaotic, violent final moments of the film when the passengers 
revolt, it is all but impossible to pick out individual acts of heroism, thus em-
phasizing that the event should be understood as a group effort.
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World Trade Center  is much more traditional in its focus on individual char-
acters. John McLoughlin is clearly held up as a man worthy of emulation; strong, 
proud, and thoroughly professional, he embodies the leadership qualities that 
America so desperately sought in the days following 9/11 (and some discerned 
in New York mayor Rudy Giuliani). Even as his strength is compromised by his 
entrapment beneath the rubble, he is still lionized for his strength of charac-
ter in simply staying alive and helping his comrade Will Jimeno do the same. 
As McLoughlin teeters closer and closer to the brink of death, the power of 
the individual is redistributed, first to Jimeno, who encourages McLoughlin 
not to let his life slip away, and then to Karnes, who embodies the patriotism 
and nobility of the American military at its best. In this respect, Karnes is the 
linchpin character of World Trade Center, as he becomes a ready metaphor for 
the undaunted American spirit in the face of catastrophe. Unlike United 93, 
World Trade Center’s focus shifts away from ordinary Americans (McLoughlin 
and Jimeno, who, though heroic and self-sacrificing, become victims in need 
of rescue) and onto one extraordinary American.
Although there will surely be more films depicting the events of 11 September 
2001 and its aftermath in the years to come, Hollywood has so far been careful 
All America watched on television and then on the big screen, as depicted in World 
Trade Center.
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in its depiction of this tragedy, eliding the more graphic, disturbing aspects 
of that morning in favor of real-life stories that can serve as metaphors for 
how to cope with a national trauma. The television documentaries that have 
flourished since the event also carefully depict 9/11, albeit with a more direct 
approach to representation that involves reliving the trauma over and over 
and over again.
The difficulty of representing such a monumental event so close in time 
to its occurrence is evident in both United 93 ’s and World Trade Center’s elision 
of the most iconic imagery of 9/11, which at this point still seems to be unrep-
resentable outside of the documentary genre. And whereas United 93 is more 
complex in its depiction of heroism and resilience, World Trade Center fits neatly 
in a long line of Hollywood national fantasies about the triumph of the individual 
in the face of adversity and the refusal of the United States to back down in the 
face of aggression. It seems likely that, as the years pass and the distance grows 
between the here and now and the violence of 9/11, more filmmakers will fol-
low the model of United 93 and accept the challenge of representing aspects of 
that day that are less comforting and possibly more disturbing.
NOTES
1. Footage of American Airlines Flight 11 hitting the North Tower was inadvertently 
captured by three men: French filmmaker Jules Naudet, who was at the intersection 
of Church and Lispenard streets in Manhattan while filming a group of firefighters 
checking for a suspected gas leak; Pavel Hlava, a Czech immigrant, who shot his footage 
while riding in a car just before entering the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel; and German-
born artist Wolfgang Staehle, whose show at the Postmasters Gallery, which opened on 
6 September 2001, included a live online video stream (updated every four seconds) 
of Lower Manhattan shot from a Brooklyn window.
2. After 9/11, several major Hollywood studios delayed the release of action and 
terrorist-themed films such as Collateral Damage (2001), which stars Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger as a Los Angeles firefighter avenging the killing of his wife and child, along with 
nine others, in a terrorist car bombing outside the Colombian consulate in Los Angeles. 
Yet, at the same time, video stores reported a sharp increase in rentals of similar films 
such as Die Hard (1988) and The Siege (1995) (Kakutani). 
3. For example, in his review in Rolling Stone, Peter Travers laments, “There’s little 
joy in seeing [Oliver Stone] morph into Ron Howard to play it safe at the box office.” 
Similarly, Owen Gleiberman, writing in Entertainment Weekly, notes, “World Trade Center 
isn’t a great Stone film; it’s more like a decent Ron Howard film” (48).
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FILMOGRAPHY
John Shelton Lawrence
War filmographies are abundant. The most comprehensive among them induce 
humility in those who offer yet another. Suid and Haverstick’s Stars and Stripes 
on Screen (2005) lists 1,300 feature films and documentaries depicting U.S. 
military personnel. Shull and Wilt’s Hollywood War Films, 1937–1945 (1996), 
which used more expansive criteria of theme and reference, lists more than 
1,000 films. Then they added 260 war-themed animated cartoons in Doing Their 
Bit (2004). This book’s more modest filmography acknowledges these larger 
ones by providing bibliographical information about them. However, its own 
entries are limited to films meeting at least one of the following criteria:
• The film receives some analysis in one of this book’s chapters; most 
films appearing in “such as” references are not included.
• The film has received the best picture or best documentary fea-
ture Oscar from the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences  
(AMPAS).
• The film has been named one of the American Film Institute’s 
(AFI’s) 100 Greatest Movies.
• The film has been selected for the ever-growing National Film 
Registry (NFR) administered by the Library of Congress’s National 
Film Preservation Board.
Using these traits has generated a list of nearly 150 films.
Everyone knows that fans, critics, and scholars argue endlessly about the 
“best” and the “most historically significant,” and the subjectivity of such discus-
sions is surely reflected in official lists. No attempt is made here to offer better 
judgments or to explain why, for example, Twelve O’Clock High (1949) appears 
in the NFR and Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) does not. However, taken together, 
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these lists tell us much about the unstable elements—commerce, popular 
and critical success, patriotism, and scholarly interest—that give such restless 
energy to analysis of the war film. Consider that in every year of World War 
II, best documentary Oscars were given to films that reflected governmental 
purposes and collaboration. Since the 1960s, however, the most critically and 
commercially successful documentaries—The Anderson Platoon (1967), Hearts 
and Minds (1974), The Panama Deception (1992), The Fog of War (2003), Fahren-
heit 9/11 (2004)—have shown distanced skepticism or fiercely oppositional, 
sometimes mocking attitudes toward the U.S. government’s military aims. Such 
a list gives us one more filmographic way to objectively define the differences 
separating the “Good War” from those that followed.
Some explanation of the tabular information is needed. With regard to 
production information (the Studio/Distributor column), the film industry has 
perpetual disputes about credits, particularly when several small organizations 
collaborate. As distribution rights are sold, the names of small companies are 
sometimes masked by the much larger companies that merely package titles 
for resale. In reconciling conflicts about these matters for earlier periods, this 
filmography relies on AFI’s Catalog of Feature Films, 1893–1970 as its authority. 
This source is available in many libraries as six printed volumes that detail 
more than 45,000 films. AFI recently developed its contents for the Internet, 
available in university libraries and to the public from its Web site, http://www 
.afi.com. Because of space limitations, the tables usually list only one produc-
ing company; this implies no judgment about the relative contribution of 
other entities.
Subgenre characterizations are limited to two, although the films may be 
far more complex. The Plot/Theme column aims to concisely describe the 
topic and narrative structure. Cited reviews in the New York Times and Variety 
(the weekly edition) can provide a sense of the initial assessment in national 
venues. Since both publications issued retrospective volumes and indexes in the 
pre-electronic era, researchers can continue to access them in research librar-
ies. The New York Times Historical (ProQuest) textbase theoretically contains all 
reviews, but the indexing sometimes frustrates the search for them, leading the 
dogged researcher back to the bookshelves. Variety’s compilation volumes do 
not contain page numbers but are organized by date. Under Award/Designa-
tion, information is limited to the Academy Award (AA) for best picture or best 
documentary or an equivalent Emmy Award and appearance in the NFR or the 
AFI 100. Thus blank spaces in the fields for Black Hawk Down and Saving Private 
Ryan, for example, conceal the fact that each won dozens of awards from both 
AMPAS and other organizations. They did not, however, win the best picture 
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Oscar and are probably too young for the other lists. Information about the 
wide array of film awards has become increasingly accurate and voluminous 
at online resources such as the Internet Movie Data Base and Wikipedia. It 
should also be noted that AMPAS restricted its best documentary award after 
1942 to a single best documentary feature.
To conserve space in the tabular listings, the following abbreviations are 
employed for the film production and distribution companies:
Accuracy in Media AIM
Columbia Pictures Columbia
Horizon Pictures Horizon
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer MGM
Miramax Films Miramax
Paramount Pictures Paramount
RKO Radio Pictures RKO
Sony Pictures Sony
20th Century-Fox Films 20CFox
United Artists UA
Universal Pictures Universal
Warner Bros. Pictures WB
COMPREHENSIVE FILMOGRAPHIES
Davenport, Robert. The Encyclopedia of War Movies: The Authoritative Guide to Movies about 
Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Facts on File, 2004. Provides coverage of 800 
films, with uneven amounts of information. Includes basic citation and sometimes 
cast list, plot, and production information.
Eiserman, Frederick A. War on Film: Military History Education Video Tapes, Motion Pic-
tures, and Related Audiovisual Aids. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, 1987. Lists more than 4,500 commercial films, many of 
them short, classroom-oriented expositions of important events or developments 
in military history.
Evans, Alun. Brassey’s Guide to War Films. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2000. Considers 
world film production, including date, director, cinematographer, screenplay, 
and actors, with a brief description and assessment. Includes some images and 
covers 3,000 films.
Suid, Lawrence H., and Dolores A. Haverstick. Stars and Stripes on Screen: A Comprehen-
sive Guide to Portrayals of American Military on Film. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 
2005. Provides information for 1,000 films in which the U.S. military appears in 
uniform as well as 100 made-for-TV titles and 175 documentaries. Includes review 
citations for New York Times and Variety as well as provocative lists—“25 Best” and 
“25 Worst.”
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Wetta, Frank  Joseph, and Stephen  J. Curley. Celluloid Wars: A Guide to Film and the Ameri-
can Experience of War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. Explores the relationship 
between historical experience and cinematic representations.
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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1775–1783), THE 
WARS OF WESTWARD EXPANSION (1775–1890),  
THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR (1846–1848), AND THE 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)
Hatch, Thom. Custer and the Battle of the Little Bighorn: An Encyclopedia of the People, Places, 
Events, Indian Culture and Customs, Information Sources, Art and Films. Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 2001.
Österberg, Bertil O. Colonial America on Film and Television: A Filmography. Jefferson, 
N.C.: McFarland, 2001.
The Spanish-American War in Motion Pictures. Motion Picture, Broadcasting, and Recorded 
Sound Division, Library of Congress. <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/sawhtml/
sawhome.html>. Features essays and streaming videos of 68 films—actualities from 
the United States, Cuba, and the Philippines made by the Edison Manufacturing 
Co. and the American Mutoscope & Biograph Co.
The victorious Mexicans of The Alamo (2004) are led by Antonio López de Santa 
Anna (center, Emilio Echevarría), the “Napoleon of the West,” who is presented with 
epaulettes, gold braid, feather plumes, and caskets of crystal for his dining room.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1920 The Last of the 
Mohicans
Maurice  
Tourneur
Maurice Tour-
neur Produc-
tions
Black and 
white, 6 reels
1924 America (chap. 1) D. W. Griffith D. W. Griffith/
UA
Black and 
white, 141 
minutes
1935 Mutiny on the 
Bounty
Frank Lloyd MGM Black and 
white, 131 
minutes
1939 Drums Along the 
Mohawk (chap. 1)
John Ford 20CFox Color, 130 
minutes
1960 The Alamo  
(chap. 2)
John Wayne UA Color, 192 
minutes
1990 Dances with Wolves Kevin Costner Tig Produc-
tions/Orion 
Pictures
Color, 183 
minutes
1998 The U.S.-Mexican 
War (1846–1848) 
(chap. 3)
Ginny Martin KERA  
Dallas/PBS
Color, 240 
minutes
2000 The Patriot  
(chap. 1)
Roland  
Emmerich
Columbia Color, 130 
minutes
2004 The Alamo  
(chap. 2)
John Lee  
Hancock
Buena Vista Color, 137 
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y.  
Times
Variety Award/ 
Desig- 
nation
Plot/Theme
History/ 
romance
21 Jan. 
1920: 21
NFR Cooper’s tale of British captiv-
ity by nefarious French-Indian 
foes and rescue by sympathetic 
Indians.
History/ 
romance
22 Feb. 
1924: 20
28 Feb. 
1924: 22
Famous incidents with the 
Minutemen, Battle of Yorktown, 
and famous personages such 
as Washington, threaded by 
romance.
Adventure/
romance
19 Sept. 
1935: 19
13 Nov. 
1935
AA Cruel military discipline and its 
mutinous consequences aboard 
a British ship (HMS Bounty) in 
eighteenth century;  based on 
1787 incident.
Adventure 4 Nov. 
1939: 11
8 Nov. 
1939: 14
Settlers work hard at establish-
ing a frontier and a culture; they 
wage war with Indians who resist 
their presence.
History/ 
romance
27 Oct. 
1960: 45
26 Oct. 
1960
Defenders are presented as cou-
rageous freedom fighters against 
Mexicans’ tyranny; combines 
military maneuvers, romance, 
and patriotic speeches.
Adventure/ 
romance
19 Nov. 
1990: C1
12 Nov. 
1990: 61
AA, AFI Union soldier assigned to South 
Dakota is alone, then merges his 
fate with Sioux and fights Paw-
nee, deserting U.S. military.
Documentary Systematic exposition of the 
war that describes precursors, 
conduct of the war itself, and the 
aftermath.
History/ 
romance
28 June 
2000: E1
19 June 
2000: 23
The impetus for independence 
is underlined when the sadistic 
British drive a colonial farmer 
to rebel.
History 26 Mar. 
2004: 
A11
12 Apr. 
2004: 36
A more nuanced rendition of 
the politics, including messy 
personal lives and logistics, of 
the Alamo battle.
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THE U.S. CIVIL WAR (1861–1865)
Kinnard, Roy. Blue and Gray on Screen: 80 Years of Civil War Movies. Secaucus, N. J.: Carol 
Pub. Group, 1996. Includes stills, posters, quoted reviews, and filmography of 
silent films from 1903 to 1929.
Reinhart, Mark S. Abraham Lincoln on Screen: A Filmography of Dramas and Documentaries 
Including Television, 1903–1998. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1999.
Spehr, Paul C. The Civil War in Motion Pictures: A Bibliography of Films Produced in the United 
States since 1897. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1961.
(Right) Gone with the Wind’s (1939) Southern viewpoint is symbolized by the presenta-
tion of cruel, race-mixing carpetbaggers who ride comfortably in suits and silks while 
Confederate veterans painfully stumble home.
Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1915 The Birth of a 
Nation (chap. 4)
D. W. Griffith Epoch Black and white, 
12 reels
1927 The General Buster Keaton Buster Keaton 
Productions
Black and white, 
8 reels
1939 Gone with the 
Wind
Victor Fleming David O.  
Selznick/MGM
Color, 219  
minutes
1976 The Outlaw Josey 
Wales
Clint Eastwood WB Color, 135  
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Epic/ 
romance
4 Mar. 
1915: 9
12 Mar. 
1915: 23
AFI, 
NFR
Civil War and Reconstruction told 
as a tale of two families, their divi-
sion, and the dangers posed to all 
whites by the liberation of slaves.
Adventure/ 
romance
8 Feb. 
1927: 21
9 Feb. 
1927: 16
NFR Southern rail engineer rescues a 
kidnapped train and becomes a 
hero to the woman he loves.
Epic/ 
romance
20 Dec. 
1939: 13
20 Dec. 
1939: 14
AA, AFI, 
NFR
Civil War and Reconstruction told 
as an unhappy love quadrangle 
that presents a vivid picture of 
white sacrifice and suffering in the 
South.
Western/ 
revenge
5 Aug. 
1976: 26
30 June 
1976: 20
NFR Southern soldier who refuses to 
surrender eventually kills murder-
ous Union troops with Gatling gun 
and flees from them.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1989 Glory Edward Zwick TriStar Color, 122  
minutes
1990 The Civil War 
(chap. 4)
Ken Burns American 
Documenta-
ries/ PBS
Color, 680  
minutes
2003 Cold Mountain 
(chap. 5)
Anthony  
Minghella
Miramax Color, 154  
minutes
Filmography / 539
Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Epic 14 Dec. 
1989: C15; 
15 Dec. 
1989: C18
13 Dec. 
1989: 30
The story of Massachusetts’ black 
54th Regiment led by whites 
into battle at Fort Wagner, near 
Charleston, S.C.
Documen-
tary
25 Sept. 
1990: C17
1 Oct. 
1990: 89
Emmy Ironic re-creation of aspirations 
and failures in the war through 
pictures, music, talking heads.
Romance/ 
adventure
25 Dec. 
2003: E3
8 Dec. 
2003: 50
Story of frustrated love as wound-
ed Confederate soldier deserts 
and then makes Odyssean journey 
home to the woman he loves.
540 / John Shelton Lawrence
WORLD WAR I (1914 –1918)
Campbell, Craig W. Reel America and World War I: A Comprehensive Filmography and History of 
Motion Pictures in the United States, 1914–1920. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1985.
Herman, Gerald. 1997. “The Great War Revisioned: A World War I Filmography.” 
Hollywood’s World War I: Motion Picture Images. Ed. Peter C. Rollins and John E. 
O’Connor. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State UP. 
(Right) As German troops march in the streets outside his classroom in All Quiet on 
the Western Front (1930), Professor Kantorek (Arnold Lucy) inspires his students to 
enlist by promising “a quick war . . . with few losses.”
Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1921 The Four Horse-
men of the Apoca-
lypse (chap. 6)
Rex Ingram Metro Pictures Black and 
white, 11 reels
1925 The Big Parade 
(chap. 6)
King Vidor MGM Black and 
white, 12 reels
1926 What Price 
Glory? (chap. 6)
Raoul Walsh Fox Film Black and 
white, 12 reels
1927 Wings (chap. 6) William A.  
Wellman
Famous  
Players – Lasky
Black and 
white, 13 reels
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Family 
drama
7 Mar. 
1921: 8
18 Feb. 
1921: 40
NFR Wealthy Argentinian living 
in Paris leads dissolute life, is 
caught in adultery with wife of a 
senator, enlists for the Great War, 
and is killed on the battlefield by 
a German relative.
Romance 20 Nov. 
1925: 18
11 Nov. 
1925: 36
NFR American wastrel is summoned 
to war, finds love in France, is 
wounded, then returns to find 
the woman he loves.
Romance/
comedy
24 Nov. 
1926: 26
1 Dec. 
1926: 12
Two sergeants in the marines 
have adventures and a competi-
tive romance in France but are 
reconciled.
Romance/
combat
13 Aug. 
1927: 10
17 Aug. 
1927: 21
AA, NFR Aviators compete for love; one 
accidentally kills the other in the 
air.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1930 All Quiet on the 
Western Front 
(chaps. 6, 8)
Lewis Milestone Universal Black and 
white, 140 
minutes
1930 Westfront 1918/
Comrades of 
1918 (chap. 8)
G. W. Pabst Nero Films/ 
Vereinigte Star
Black and 
white, 75  
minutes (U.S.)
1933 Cavalcade  
(chap. 9)
Frank Lloyd Fox Black and 
white, 110 
minutes
1933 Duck Soup Leo McCarey Paramount Black and 
white, 70  
minutes
1935 The President 
Vanishes  
(chap. 9)
William A.  
Wellman
Walter Wanger 
Productions/
Paramount
Black and 
white, 80 
minutes
1940 The Fighting 
69th  
(chap. 9)
William Keighly WB Black and 
white, 89  
minutes
1941 Sergeant York 
(chap. 9)
Howard Hawks WB Black and 
white, 134 
minutes
1951 The African 
Queen
John Huston Horizon/Romu-
lus Films/UA
Color, 103 
minutes
1957 Paths of Glory Stanley Kubrick Brynna Produc-
tions
Black and 
white, 86  
minutes
1962 Lawrence of 
Arabia
David Lean Horizon/Colum-
bia
Color, 220 
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Combat/ 
antiwar
30 Apr. 
1930: 29
7 May 
1930: 21
AA, NFR Based on notable novel about 
WWI; German schoolboys 
develop patriotism, enlist, fight, 
lose illusions.
Combat/
drama
20 Feb. 
1931: 25
25 Feb. 
1931
Four Germans disrupt their lives 
for WWI, fight in trenches, expe-
rience domestic betrayal in a film 
the Nazis were eager to ban.
Family/ 
antiwar
16 Jan. 
1933: 23
10 Jan 
1933: 15
AA Multigenerational British saga 
of soldiers of imperialism in the 
early twentieth century and the 
Great War.
Comedy 23 Nov. 
1933: 24
28 Nov. 
1933: 20
NFR Marx brothers skewer European 
dictatorships with hardly dis-
guised stabs at “Chiccolini.”
Drama 8 Dec. 
1934: 18
11 Dec. 
1934: 19
Fearing a fascist coup and public 
pressure for war, a pacifist presi-
dent fakes his own kidnapping.
Combat 27 Jan. 
1940: 9
10 Jan. 
1940: 14
Arrogant recruit endangers his 
Irish unit, then redeems himself.
Biopic/ 
combat
3 July 
1941: 15
2 July 
1941: 12
Backwoods pacifist becomes 
deadly killer of Germans.
Adventure/
romance
21 Feb. 
1952: 24
26 Dec. 
1951: 6
AFI, 
NFR
Degenerate river captain in 
Africa and female missionary suc-
cessfuly attack German  
munitions.
Combat 26 Dec. 
1957: 23
20 Nov. 
1957: 6
NFR French generals waste and even 
kill their own soldiers.
Adventure/
biopic
17 Dec. 
1962: 5
19 Dec. 
1962: 6
AA, NFR Englishman works with desert 
tribes to fight Turks.
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THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936–1939) AND  
WORLD WAR II (1937–1945)
Kohrs, Deanna, and Sophia McClennen. Cinergía Filmography of the Spanish Civil War. 
<http://www.personal.psu.edu/users/s/a/sam50/cinergia/filmog%20civil%20war 
.htm>. Lists a dozen films produced in the United States.
Mitchell, Charles P. The Hitler Filmography: Worldwide Feature Film and Television Miniseries 
Portrayals, 1940 through 2000. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2002.
Royce, Brenda Scott. Hogan’s Heroes: A Comprehensive Reference to the 1965–1971 Television 
Comedy Series, with Cast Biographies and an Episode Guide. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 
1993.
Shull, Michael S., and David E. Wilt. Doing Their Bit: Wartime American Animated Short 
Films, 1939–1945. 2nd ed. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2004.
———. Hollywood War Films, 1937–1945: An Exhaustive Filmography of American Feature-
Length Motion Pictures Relating to World War II. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1996.
(Right) At sea on Christmas day, the submarine crew in Destination Tokyo (1943) fos-
ters a family atmosphere, with Cookie Wainright (Alan Hale Sr.) as Santa Claus.
Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1938 Blockade  
(chap. 9)
William Dieterle Walter Wanger 
Productions/
United Artists
Black and white, 
73 minutes
1938 Inside Nazi 
Germany  
(chap. 10)
Jack Glenn March of 
Time/RKO
Black and white, 
16 minutes
1939 Confessions of a 
Nazi Spy  
(chap. 10)
Anatole Litvak WB Black and white, 
110 minutes
1939 Hitler, Beast of 
Berlin/Beasts of 
Berlin (chap. 
10)
Sam Newfield Producers  
Distributing
Black and white, 
87 minutes
1940 The Great  
Dictator
Charles Chaplin UA Black and white, 
127 minutes
1942 The Battle of 
Midway
John Ford U.S. Navy/
20CFox
Color, 18  
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Resistance/
espionage
17 June 
1938: 25
8 June 
1938
Peasant is caught up in romance, 
resistance during Spanish 
struggle.
Newsreel 21 Jan 
1938: 14
NFR Anti-German actualities, with 
mixture of real and fake footage.
Espionage 29 April 
1939: 19
3 May 
1939
Group of Nazi sympathizers in 
the United States is exposed by 
the FBI.
Resistance 20 Nov. 
1939: 15
22 Nov. 
1939
A German veteran of WWI orga-
nizes resistance against Nazis and 
then escapes.
Comedy/ 
resistance
16 Oct. 
1940: 29
16 Oct. 
1940: 16
NFR Comic treatment of fascist dicta-
tors combined with plea for Jews.
Combat 
documentary
AA Footage taken at the Battle of 
Midway.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1942 Casablanca Michael Curtiz WB Black and white, 
102 minutes
1942 Kokoda Front 
Line
Ken G. Hall Australian News 
and Info
Black and white, 
9 minutes
1942 Moscow Strikes 
Back
Ilya Kopalin and 
Leonid Varmalov
Artkino Pic-
tures/Republic 
Pictures
Black and white, 
55 minutes
1942 Mrs. Miniver William Wyler MGM Black and white, 
132 minutes
1942 To Be or Not to Be Ernest Lubitsch Alexander 
Korda/UA
Black and white, 
100  minutes
1942 Tulips Shall Grow George Pal George Pal/
Paramount
Color, 7 minutes
1942 Yankee Doodle 
Dandy
Michael Curtiz WB Black and white, 
126 minutes
1942–
1945
Why We Fight 
(chap. 11)
Frank Capra U.S. Office of 
War Informa-
tion
Black and white, 
50–80 minutes 
each
1943 Desert Victory Roy Boulting 
and David  
McDonald
RAF, Army Film 
Unit/British 
Ministry of 
Information
Black and white, 
62 minutes
1943 Destination Tokyo Delmer Daves WB Black and white, 
135 minutes
1944 The Fighting 
Lady
Edward Steichen U.S. Navy/
20CFox
Color, 61  
minutes
1944 The Memphis 
Belle
William Wyler First MP Unit 
USAF/Para-
mount
Color, 45  
minutes
1944 Miracle of 
Morgan’s Creek
Preston Sturges Paramount Black and white, 
99 minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Drama 27 Nov. 
1942: 27
2 Dec. 
1942: 8
AA, AFI, 
NFR
Noir-style tale of resistance to 
Nazism in North Africa.
Combat 
documentary
AA Scenes of fighting in New 
Guinea.
Combat 
documentary
17 June 
1942
19 Aug. 
1942
AA Scenes of resistance and coun-
teroffensive against Operation 
Barbarossa.
Home 
front/Allies
5 June 
1942: 23
13 May 
1942
AA Middle-class family in English 
village makes sacrifices, faces 
German air attacks.
Comedy/ 
resistance
7 Mar. 
1942: 13
18 Feb. 
1942: 8
NFR Shakespeare company in Poland 
outwits Nazis.
Allies NFR Allegorical tale about children 
in the Netherlands oppressed by 
German occupation.
Biopic/ 
musical
30 May 
1942: 9
3 June 
1942: 8
NFR Tribute to George M. Cohan and 
“Over There.”
Informa-
tion/orien-
tation for 
troops
27 April 
1943: 13; 
15 Nov. 
1943: 23
AA, NFR Newsreels, combat footage, 
policy analysis combine for  
stirring troop orientation.
Combat 
documentary
7 Feb. 
1943: X3
31 Mar. 
1943
AA Footage of North African fight-
ing, scenes of tank battles at El 
Alamein.
Combat 1 Jan. 
1944: 9
22 Dec. 
1943: 12
Submarine mission gathers 
weather information in Tokyo 
Bay.
Combat
documentary
14 Jan. 
1945: X3
20 Dec. 
1944
AA Combat operations on the York-
town in the Pacific.
Combat 
documentary
26 Mar. 
1944: X3; 
14 Apr. 
1944: 1; 
16 Apr. 
1944: 1
22 Mar. 
1944
NFR Bombing mission of German 
submarine pens.
Comedy 20 Jan. 
1944: 15
5 Jan. 
1944: 16
NFR Home-front tale of pregnancy 
resulting from send-off for  
serviceman.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1944 Tunisian Victory Hugh Stewart 
and Frank Capra
British Service 
Units/U.S. 
Army Signal 
Corps
Black and white, 
75 minutes
1945 San Pietro/The 
Battle of San 
Pietro
John Huston U.S. Army Pic-
torial Services
Black and white, 
32 minutes
1945 The True Glory Garson Kanin 
and Carol Reed
British Ministry 
of Information/
U.S. Office of 
War Information
Black and white, 
87 minutes
1946 The Best Years of 
Our Lives  
(chap. 12)
William Wyler Goldwyn Pro-
ductions
Black and white, 
172 minutes
1947 Design for Death Theron Warth 
and Richard 
Fleischer
RKO Black and white, 
48 minutes
1949 Twelve O’Clock 
High
Henry King 20CFox Black and white, 
132 minutes
1952–
1953
Victory at Sea M. Clay Adams NBC and U.S. 
Navy
Color and black 
and white, 30 
minutes each
1953 From Here to  
Eternity  
(chap 13)
Fred Zinnemann Columbia Black and white, 
118 minutes
1957 Bridge on the 
River Kwai
David Lean Horizon/Co-
lumbia
Color, 161 min-
utes
1962 Black Fox: The 
Rise of Adolf 
Hitler
Louis C.  
Stoumen
Image Produc-
tions
Black and white, 
89 minutes
1962 The Longest Day 
(chap. 14)
Darryl Zanuck, 
Elmo Williams, 
Andrew Marton
Darryl Zanuck/
20CFox
Black and white, 
180 minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Documentary 25 Feb. 
1944: 22
Planning and combat footage 
of the North African Operation 
Torch landings of 1942; high-
lights U.K.-U.S. unity.
Combat 
documentary
12 July 
1945: 8
NFR Visceral journey of a rifle squad 
during Italian campaign.
Combat 
documentary
AA U.S.-British collaboration that 
compiles the footage of some 
1,400 combat cameramen.
Drama/ 
veterans
22 Nov. 
1946: 27
27 Nov. 
1946: 14
AA, NFR Poignant tale of veterans’ reinte-
gration into small-town civilian 
life.
Documentary 11 June 
1948: 27
28 Jan. 
1948
AA Cautionary story of Japanese 
militarism that uses captured 
footage.
Combat 25 Jan. 
1950: 10
21 Dec. 
1949: 8
NFR U.S. Army air force general 
rebuilds demoralized bombers 
through discipline.
Combat 27 Oct. 
1952: 35
19 May 
1954
Emmy Attempts to convey comprehen-
sive picture of naval operations 
with emphasis on the Pacific 
theater.
Drama 6 Aug. 
1953: 16
29 July 
1953: 6
AA, AFI, 
NFR
Exposition of the private lives of 
soldiers stationed at prewar Pearl 
Harbor.
POW 19 Dec. 
1957: 39
20 Nov. 
1957: 6
AFI, AA, 
NFR
The logic of military rules at a 
Burmese prison camp for U.S. 
and British soldiers.
Documenta-
ry/Parable
30 Apr. 
1963: 26
12 Sept. 
1962
AA Use of fables, Mozart, Marlene 
Dietrich’s voice to explain Hitler.
Combat 5 Oct. 
1962: 28
3 Oct. 
1962: 6
Detailed depiction of the Allies 
and Germans during the Nor-
mandy invasion of 1944.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1963 The Victors Carl Foreman Highroad 
Productions/
Columbia
Black and white, 
175 minutes
1965 The Sound of 
Music
Robert Wise Robert Wise/
20CFox
Color, 173  
minutes
1970 Patton Franklin  
Schaffner
20CFox Color, 170  
minutes
1980 The Life and 
Times of Rosie the 
Riveter
Connie Field Clarity Films Color and black 
and white, 65 
minutes
1981 Genocide Arnold  
Schwartzmann
Simon Wiesen-
thal Center
Color, 90  
minutes
1988 Hotel Terminus Marcel Ophuls Memory Pic-
tures/Samuel 
Goldwyn
Color, 267  
minutes
1993 Schindler’s List Steven Spielberg Amblin Enter-
tainment
Color and black 
and white, 195 
minutes
1995 Anne Frank 
Remembered
Jon Blair Anne Frank 
House/Sony
Color, 122  
minutes
1996 The English 
Patient
Anthony  
Minghella
Saul Zaentz/Mi-
ramax
Color, 162  
minutes
1997 The Long Way 
Home
Mark J. Harris Moriah Films/
Seventh Art
Color and black 
and white, 110 
minutes
1998 Saving Private 
Ryan  
(chap. 14)
Steven Spielberg Amblin Enter-
tainment
Color, 170  
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Combat 20 Dec. 
1963: 21
30 Oct. 
1963
Unheroic depiction of war as ter-
rain for cynicism, lust, homesick-
ness, and other frailties in a U.S. 
rifle squad.
Family bio-
pic/musical
31 Mar. 
1965: 34
3 Mar. 
1965
AA Austrian aristocratic family op-
posed to Nazism sings, escapes.
Combat 5 Feb. 
1970: 31
21 Jan. 
1970: 18
AA, AFI, 
NFR
Biopic focusing on the politics 
of Patton’s service in various 
military theaters.
Documentary 27 Sept. 
1980: 13
1 Oct. 
1980
NFR Interviews, newsreels, photo-
based exploration of women’s 
home-front roles and connection 
with feminism.
Documentary 14 Mar 
1982: 64
AA Exposition of the Holocaust, in-
cluding the liberation of a death 
camp.
Documentary 30 Aug. 
1987: Sun. 
Mag. 38; 6 
Oct. 1988: 
C25; 24 
Dec.1989: 
32
25 May 
1988: 19
AA Story of Klaus Barbie, Butcher 
of Lyon, and how the Allies pro-
tected, used him in post-WWII 
period.
Docudrama/
biopic
12 Dec. 
1993: H1
13 Dec. 
1993: 36
AA, AFI, 
NFR
A story within the Holocaust, de-
picting heroism, Nazism, hope.
Documentary 1 Nov. 
1996: B4
AA Exposition of how Anne Frank 
hid from Germans; interviews 
those who helped her hide.
Romance 15 Nov. 
1996: B1
11 Nov. 
1996: 57
AA Canadian nurse in North Africa 
encounters mysterious soldier 
who arouses her and causes 
jealousy.
Documentary 9 Sept. 
1997: 
E14
3 Feb. 
1997: 44
AA Exposition of the post-WWII situ-
ation of liberated Jews, roles and 
stances of U.S. military personnel.
Combat 
docudrama
24 July 
1998: E1
20 July 
1998: 
45-46
D-day invasion of Omaha Beach, 
with retrieval of a soldier as an 
objective.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1998 The Last Days James Moll Kenn Lipper/
June Beallor/
Alameda
Color and black 
and white, 87 
minutes
2000 Into the Arms of 
Strangers
Mark J. Harris Sabine Films/
WB
Color, 117  
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Documentary 5 Feb. 
1999: 
E16
AA Story of liquidation of Hungary’s 
Jews told through interviews with 
survivors, U.S. Army officers.
Documentary 15 Sept. 
2000: 10
11 Sept. 
2000: 24
AA Story of the Kindertransport, 
in which children were shipped 
from Germany and Austria prior 
to WWII to save their lives.
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THE KOREAN WAR (1950–1953),  
THE COLD WAR (1945–1989), NUCLEAR WAR,  
AND SCIENCE FICTION
Broderick, Mick. Nuclear Movies: A Critical Analysis and Filmography of International Feature 
Length Films Dealing with Experimentation, Aliens, Terrorism, Holocaust and Other Disaster 
Scenarios, 1914–1989. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1991. Provides annotated entries 
for 850 feature-length films produced in thirty-six countries.
Davis, Doug. Cold War Filmography. Cold War Science and Technology Studies Program, 
Carnegie Mellon University. <http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/film.htm>. Lists nar-
rative films, documentaries, and archival materials.
Lentz, Robert J. Korean War Filmography: 91 English Language Features through 2000. Jef-
ferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2003.
Pearson, Glenda. The Red Scare: A Filmography. The All Powers Project, University of 
Washington. <http://www.lib.washington.edu/exhibits/AllPowers/film.html>. In-
cludes lists of films on Cold War themes, including anticommunism, science fiction, 
anti–House Committee on Un-American Activities, and the “Hollywood Ten.”
(Right) In The Big Lift’s (1950) reenactment of the Berlin Airlift of 1948–1949, Master 
Sergeant Hank Kowalski (Paul Douglas) confronts, accuses, and then torments Gun-
ther (Franz Nicklisch), the guard who had punished him in a concentration camp.
Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1950 The Big Lift 
(chap. 15)
George Seaton 20CFox Black and 
white, 120 
minutes
1951 The Day the Earth 
Stood Still (chap. 
16)
Robert Wise 20CFox Black and 
white, 92  
minutes
1951 Duck and Cover Anthony Rizzo Archer Pro-
ductions/U.S. 
Federal Civil 
Defense Agency
Black and 
white, 9  
minutes
1954 Night People 
(chap. 15)
Nunnally  
Johnson
20CFox Color, 93  
minutes
1961 One, Two, Three 
(chap. 15)
Billy Wilder Mirisch/UA Black and 
white, 108 
minutes
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Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Drama/ 
romance
12 Apr. 
1950: 27
27 Apr. 
1950: 37
The challenge of implementing 
the Berlin Airlift, combined with 
local romance for U.S. fliers.
Science  
fiction
19 Sept. 
1951: 37
5 Sept. 
1951: 6
NFR Beings from outer space warn 
earthlings about self-destruction 
in an allegorical critique of the 
Cold War.
Public  
service
25 Jan. 
1952: 7
NFR Nuclear war training film for chil-
dren featuring Burt the Turtle, 
who teaches children how to hide 
from nuclear blasts.
Leadership/
espionage
13 Mar. 
1954: 11
17 Mar. 
1954
A colonel in Berlin copes with al-
lies, personalities, betrayals.
Comedy 22 Dec. 
1961: 17
29 Nov. 
1961
Coca-Cola imperialism in West 
Berlin is satirized when an 
executive’s daughter takes up with 
a hippie.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1962 The Manchurian 
Candidate
John  
Frankenheimer
UA Black and 
white, 126 
minutes
1964 Dr. Strangelove Stanley Kubrick Hawk Films/ 
Columbia
Black and 
white, 48  
minutes
1966 The War Game Peter Watkins BBC Black and 
white, 48  
minutes
1968 Czechoslovakia 
1968
Robert Fresco 
and Denis  
Sanders
U.S. Informa-
tion Agency
Black and 
white, 20  
minutes
1970 M*A*S*H Robert Altman Ingo 
Preminger/
20CFox
Color, 116 
minutes
1996 Independence Day
(chap. 16)
Roland  
Emmerich
20CFox Color, 145 
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
POW/ 
subversive
25 Oct. 
1962: 48
17 Oct. 
1962
AFI, 
NFR
Decorated Korean POW is 
manipulated by red agent mom 
for assassinations before turning 
against her.
Comedy 30 Jan. 
1964: 24
22 Jan. 
1964
AFI, 
NFR
Insane U.S. Air Force general trig-
gers nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union.
Docudrama 28 Mar. 
1966: 67
AA Simulated reporting of nuclear 
war in England resulting from all-
out exchange.
Documentary AA, NFR Sympathetic story of the Prague 
Spring, which was crushed by 
Soviet invasion in 1968.
Comedy/ 
antiwar
26 Jan. 
1970: 26
21 Jan. 
1970: 18
AFI, 
NFR
Pranksters in Korean combat 
medical unit undermine their 
clownish superiors.
Science 
fiction
2 July 
1996: C2
1 July 
1996: 34
Earth is threatened by aliens and 
saved by the U.S. military, led by 
the president.
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THE INDOCHINA WARS (1945–1975)
Devine, Jeremy. Vietnam at 24 Frames a Second: A Critical Analysis of Over 350 Films about 
the Vietnam War. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1995.
Films on the Vietnam War. Wellesley College. <http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/
vietfilms.html>. An online filmography with annotations and some streaming 
media.
Malo, Jean-Jacques, and Tony Williams, eds. Vietnam War Films: Over 600 Feature, Made-
for-TV, Pilot, and Short Movies, 1939–1992, from the United States, Vietnam, France, 
Belgium, Australia, Hong Kong, South Africa, Great Britain, and Other Countries. Jef-
ferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1994.
Walker, Mark. Vietnam Veteran Films. Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1991.
(Right) In The Quiet American (1958), Fowler (Michael Redgrave), a cynical and sexu-
ally jealous British journalist, accuses the American (Audie Murphy) of collaborating 
in terrorist bombings of Saigon.
Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1958 The Quiet Ameri-
can (chap. 19)
Joseph  
Mankiewicz
Figaro/UA Black and 
white, 120 
minutes
1967 The Anderson 
Platoon  
(chap. 21)
Pierre  
Schoendoerffer
French Broad-
casting Syndicate
Color, 65 
minutes
1968 The Green Berets 
(chap. 18)
John Wayne Batjac Produc-
tions
Color, 141 
minutes
1974 Hearts and 
Minds 
(chaps. 17, 21)
Peter Davis BBS Productions Color, 112 
minutes
1978 The Boys in Com-
pany C  
(chap. 18)
Sidney J. Furie Columbia Color, 127 
minutes
1978 The Deer Hunter 
(chaps. 17, 20)
Michael Cimino EMI Color, 182 
minutes
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Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Espionage/
romance
6 Feb. 
1958: 24
22 Jan. 
1958: 6
American idealist in Vietnam pro-
motes a path between colonialism 
and communism.
Documentary 20 Dec. 
1967: 14
AA French crew tracks a U.S platoon 
during six weeks of patrols.
Combat 20 June 
1968: 49
19 June 
1968
Unabashedly pro-U.S. story of 
fighting the wily foe and educating 
a liberal journalist.
Documen-
tary/antiwar
23 Mar. 
1975: II, 
1; 24 Mar. 
1975: 38
15 May 
1974: 28
AA Both critics and defenders speak 
in frames tilted against U.S policy.
Combat 2 Feb. 
1978: C15
Tracks the fate of five young 
marine recruits in Vietnam as they 
experience demoralization.
Combat/
POW
15 Dec. 
1978: 
III, 5
29 Nov. 
1978
AA, AFI, 
NFR
Story of working-class men and 
how deeply the war changes their 
lives.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1979 Apocalypse Now
(chaps. 17, 18)
Francis Ford 
Coppola
UA Color 152 
minutes
1983 Vietnam: A 
Television History 
(chap. 17)
Richard Ellison 
(executive pro-
ducer)
WGBH/PBS Color, 60  
minutes each
1985 Television’s Viet-
nam: The Real 
Story (chap. 17)
Peter Rollins AIM/Sony Color, 116 
minutes
1986 Platoon  
(chap. 18)
Oliver Stone Cinema 86/Ori-
on Pictures
Color, 120 
minutes
1986 Television’s Viet-
nam: The Impact 
of Media  
(chap. 17)
Peter Rollins AIM/Sony Color, 60 
minutes
1987 Hamburger Hill 
(chap. 17)
John Irvin Paramount Color, 112 
minutes
1987 Hanoi Hilton 
(chap. 17)
Lionel Chetwynd Globus-Golan Color, 125 
minutes
1989 Born on the 
Fourth of July 
(chap. 17)
Oliver Stone Ixtlan Color, 145 
minutes
1994 Forrest Gump Robert Zemeckis Tisch-Finerman/
Paramount
Black and 
white and 
color, 142 
minutes
2002 The Quiet Ameri-
can (chap. 19)
Phillip Noyce IMF/Miramax Color, 101 
minutes
2003 The Fog of War Errol Morris @radical.media/
Sony
Color, 107 
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Desig-
nation
Plot/Theme
Combat/ 
allegory
15 Aug. 
1979: III, 
15
16 May 
1979
AFI, 
NFR
Surreal journey suggests that war is 
madness.
Documentary 4 Oct. 
1983: A19; 
20 Dec. 
1983: C19
28 Sept. 
1983: 146
Panoramic, interview, and combat 
footage of causes, results.
Documentary Counters 1983 PBS series with al-
legations of leftist bias, dishonesty.
Combat 11 Nov. 
1987; H21
3 Dec. 
1987: 19
AA Terrifying battles and bitter feuds 
within the ranks create an unhe-
roic vision.
Documentary Focus on Tet Offensive and 
charges that media turned U.S.  
victory into defeat.
Combat 28 Aug. 
1987: C16
12 Aug. 
1987: 12
Ten days of fighting for Hill 937 
offer window to home front, me-
dia, and casualties.
Docudrama 27 Mar. 
1987: C13
25 Mar. 
1987: 18
Re-creation of POW courage 
in suffering, North Vietnamese 
cruelty.
Biopic 31 Dec. 
1989: H9
20 Dec. 
1989: 21
His body, paralyzed by shrapnel, 
Ron Kovic returns home to become 
an anti–Vietnam War activist.
Fable 6 July 
1994: C9
11 July 
1994
AA, AFI Mentally challenged Everyman 
serves, wins honor in Vietnam.
Espionage/
romance
22 Nov. 
2002: E14
9 Sept. 
2002
American agent helps align CIA 
with terror operations to create a 
“third force.”
Documentary 11 Oct. 
2003: B9
2 June 
2003: B9
AA Extended interviews with Robert 
McNamara regarding Vietnam 
policy.
562 / John Shelton Lawrence
POST 9/11, THE WARS IN IRAQ (1991 AND 2003–), AND 
THE U.S. WAR AGAINST TERRORISM (2001–)
International Terrorism. Media Resources Center, University of California at Berkeley. 
<http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/terrorism.html>. Contains feature films, 
documentaries, streaming media of panel discussions, and links to government 
policy statements.
(Right) One of Jarhead’s (2005) absurdist moments: a marine unit in Saudi Arabia 
during the Gulf War plays a staged-for-journalists football game wearing chemical 
protection suits in the deadly heat.
Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
1992 The Panama 
Deception 
Barbara Trent Empowerment 
Project/Tara 
Releasing
Color, 91  
minutes
1998 Ambush in Moga-
dishu (chap. 20)
William Cran WGBH- 
Frontline/PBS
Color, 60  
minutes
1999 One Day in Sep-
tember
Kevin McDonald Passion Pic-
tures/Buena 
Vista
Color and black 
and white, 94 
minutes
2001 Behind Enemy 
Lines (chap. 20)
John Moore 20CFox Color 106 
minutes
2001 Black Hawk 
Down (chap. 20)
Ridley Scott Revolution Stu-
dios/Sony
Color, 144 
minutes
2003 The True Story 
of Black Hawk 
Down (chap. 20)
David Keane A&E, History 
Channel
Color, 100  
minutes
2003 Saving Jessica 
Lynch (chap. 22)
Peter Markle NBC Color, 120 
minutes
2003 Saving POW 
Lynch (chap. 22)
Loren  
Michaelmen
Discovery  
Channel
Color, 60  
minutes
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Times
Variety Award/
Designa-
tion
Plot/Theme
Documentary 17 June 
1993: 
C18
10 Aug. 
1992: 55
AA Critical analysis of reasons behind 
U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 
and extent of death among its 
citizens.
TV docu-
mentary
29 Sept. 
1998: E6
Analysis of the Battle of Mogadi-
shu by participants, bystanders, 
policy makers.
Documentary 17 Nov. 
2000: E29
11 Sept. 
2000: 26
AA Exposition of 1972 massacre of 
Israeli athletes in Munich.
Rescue 30 Nov. 
2001: E19
26 Nov. 
2001: 25
Navy pilot violates mission limits 
and is shot down but rescued 
from Serbian pursuers.
Combat/ 
rescue
26 Dec. 
2001: E1
10 Dec. 
2001: 31
Special forces in Mogadishu 
snatch militia leaders and fight 
their way  back to base.
TV docu-
mentary
21 Jan. 
2002: B3
Analysis of Battle of Mogadishu 
guided by author Mark Bowden.
TV docu-
drama
10 Oct. 
2003: 38
Re-creation of Pfc. Lynch’s cap-
ture, hospitalization, and rescue, 
reflecting Iraqi citizens’ help and 
perspective.
TV docu-
drama
Docudrama treatment that links 
Lynch and Rhonda Cornum from 
earlier Iraq war.
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Year Title Director Studio/ 
Distributor
Format and 
Length
2003 Saving Private 
Lynch (chap. 22)
Susan Aasen  
and Caroline 
Sommers
A&E Color, 60  
minutes
2004 Battleground: 
21 Days on the 
Empire’s Edge 
(chap. 21)
Stephen  
Marshall
Guerrilla News 
Network
Color, 81  
minutes
2004 Fahrenheit 9/11 
(chap. 21)
Michael Moore Lions Gate Films Color, 110 
minutes 
2005 Confronting Iraq: 
Conflict and Hope
Roger Aronoff Autumn Produc-
tions/AIM
Color, 86 min-
utes
2005 Jarhead  
(chap. 22)
Sam Mendes Universal Color, 123 
minutes
2006 Baghdad E.R. 
(chap. 21)
Jon Alpert and 
Matthew O’Neill
HBO Color, 60  
minutes
2006 United 93  
(chap. 23)
Paul Greengrass Universal Color, 115 
minutes
2006 The War Tapes 
(chap. 21)
Deborah  
Scranton
SenArt Films Color, 97  
minutes
2006 World Trade Cen-
ter (chap. 23)
Oliver Stone Paramount Color, 129 
minutes
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Subgenre N. Y. 
Times
Variety Award/
Designa-
tion
Plot/Theme
TV docu-
drama
Docudramatic recounting with 
journalists, news footage, inter-
views with POW experts.
Documentary 8 Nov. 
2004: 44
A three-week tour of Iraq empha-
sizing the unofficial views of U.S. 
soldiers, local citizens, disinter-
ested outsiders.
Documentary 23 June 
2004
24 May 
2004: 33
Docucollage of complaints against 
George W. Bush focusing on mili-
tary cost and competence.
Documen-
tary video
Analysis of causes of Iraq war 
based on interviews and historical 
images assigns its beginning to 
Iran’s 1979 revolution and result-
ing theocracy.
Combat 4 Oct. 
2005
31 Oct. 
2005: 47
Memoir-based profile of a marine 
company’s personal experiences 
in the Gulf War.
Documentary 20 May 
2006: B7
15 May 
2006: 29
Cinema verité record of a field 
hospital during the counterinsur-
gency phase of the Iraq war.
Docudrama 28 Apr. 
2006: E1
19 Apr. 
2006
Reconstruction of struggle be-
tween hijackers and passengers 
that crashed the plane.
Documentary 1 Apr. 
2006: 33
The Iraq war filmed by soldiers 
using digital minicams.
Docudrama 14 Aug. 
2006: E2; 
21 Sept. 
2006: 43
17 Aug. 
2006: 18
Dramatization of 9/11 attack 
highlighting the role of police 
and fire personnel.
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